Activities of Ildikó GÁLL-PELCZ related to 2011/2156(INI)
Plenary speeches (2)
ECB annual report for 2010 (debate)
ECB annual report for 2010 (debate)
Amendments (16)
Amendment 3 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas in 2010 the euro area recovered with GDP growth of 1.7% and is expected to stagnate at a similar levelremain consistently below 2% throughout 2011, after the slump in 2009 of -4.2% growth,
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Underlines that, while month-on-month HICP inflation has mostly been above 2% since the beginning of 2010, what matters for monetary policy are future expectations, the low level of which are a testimony of high ECB credibility and governments’ increasingly coherent budgetary policies;
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Recalls that the single objective of ECB is price stability; notes that de facto financial stability and proper liquidity of the financial markets is becoming a second objective; also notes the work of the ESRB under the auspices of the ECB on financial stability;
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Observes that, despite unitary monetary policy, monetary conditions diverge considerably in the euro area; in countries experiencing turbulence, banks are tightening the availability of credit, with the opposite happening in other countries with a current account surplus; this asymmetry is likely to become even more pronounced if the ECB keeps increasing rates in order to kick-start trade and thus promote economic recovery, given the prevalence of loans indexed to short-term interest rates in the former group of countries;
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Calls on the Commission to set up a European credit rating foundainstitution and to evaluate the pros and cons of temporarily suspending credit ratings for countries following an EU/IMF adjustment programme;
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 – indent 1 (new)
Paragraph 5 – indent 1 (new)
- Calls on the Commission to create the conditions for a European Monetary Fund to ensure that the IMF will not need to be involved in Europe’s future credit policy, thereby reducing the Member States’ dependence on other international institutions and markets
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Points out and welcomes the fact that the ECB balance sheet expansion has not led to inflation, due to its increasing role as a central counterparty between euro area banks, which effectively amounts to a monetisation of bank bailouts, and that the inflation target has consistently remained around the 2% level;
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Restates with concern the overreliance of many euro area banks on the liquidity provided by the ECB, in the absence of a fully functional interbank market; welcomes – though notes with concernout some misgivings – the collateral policies of the ECB as regards the amount and the quality of asset-backed securities provided to the Eurosystem as collateral, estimated at EUR 488 billion;
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Acknowledges the necessity of non- standard monetary policy measures, but calls for athe long-term phasing-out of those programmes as soon as possible;
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Calls on the ECB to put in place in the Security Markets Program a discount rate mechanism that can be adjusted, taking into account whether a certain security is further downgraded by most credit rating agencies and ensuring that the ECB does not end up with too many risky assets; in addition, believes that the ECB should use at least two number of credit rating qualifications before accepting a security as collateral;
Amendment 149 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for a more integrated macro- prudential policy framework within the monetary policy context, if necessary including differentiated macro-prudential tools in the Union to account for differences between the euro area and non- euro area countries; calls for ancontinuous analysis of the effectiveness of the new financial supervisory architecture with the aid of impact assessments and for an evaluation of the option establishing a single European financial supervisory authority, unifying under its umbrella the current European Supervisory Authorities and the European Systemic Risk Board;
Amendment 157 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
Amendment 173 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Stresses the need for a single European Treasury to relieve the ECB off its quasi-fiscal role; until that is the case, suggests confining more tasks to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); rRegrets that, as it stands, the ESM will not operate under Community rules and did not acquire the right to purchase government bonds on the secondary market as this would have meant a relief for the ECB in the current circumstances;
Amendment 194 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. BWelievcomes that the introduction of eurosecurities may constitute the necessary fiscal quantum-leap forwe rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXX with regard thato the Union needs at this juncture; welcomes the rapid implementation of the feasibility report promised by the Commission in its declaration XXXintroduction of eurosecurities, since it believes that this would, with the creation of the right conditions, ensure the necessary fiscal improvement that the Union needs at this juncture;
Amendment 212 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Reiterates its long-standing call for the minutes of the meetings of the Governing Council to be public; considers that their non- publication might be interpreted as a sign of weakness of the monetary union, as if the public and necessary individual accountability in the decision-taking within the Governing Council should be interpreted as a confrontation between Member States;