Activities of Ildikó GÁLL-PELCZ related to 2013/2076(INI)
Plenary speeches (1)
European Central Bank annual report for 2012 (debate)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on the European Central Bank Annual report for 2012 PDF (170 KB) DOC (83 KB)
Amendments (24)
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)
Citation 8 a (new)
- having regard to the 83rd Annual Report of the Bank of International Settlements published on 23 June 2013,
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 (new)
Paragraph -1 (new)
-1. Welcomes the bold measures taken by the ECB in 2012, which have contributed in a decisive manner to the stabilisation of the banking sector and helping to sever the link between the banks and the sovereign;
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. WelcomNotes the decisions of July 2012 to reduce the key ECB interest rates in the context of very low inflation expectations and weak economic activity;
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes with concern that the banking system's demand for liquidity from the Eurosystem increased in 2012, thus strengthening the dependence of the banking system on the Eurosystem's intervention, and warns of the risks of such dependence;
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Considers that the three-year LTRO settled on March 2012 contributed to stabilising the banking system, but that this should be a temporary measure; notes that, despite the liquidity injected into the banking system by the LTRO, the credit available to the real economy is still below pre-crisis levels; suggests that it would be appropriate for the ECB to reduceunderstands that the demand for credits by business its deposit facility rate to negative values in order to encourage banking lending to the real economypresently at a very low level, making it difficult for banks to lend;
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Underlines that insufficient growth in the European business sector is not mainly due to the insufficient availability of credit offered by the banking sector;
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Underlines the important role played by the SMP in addressing the malfunctioning of certain eurozone sovereign debt securities market segmentNotes the positive effects played by the SMP on the sovereign debt; warns that this should not be considered by the banking sector or governments to be a permanent fixture, as the role of a central bank is neither the recapitalisation of governments, nor the attempt to influence the interest rates of sovereign bonds;
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Welcomes the setting-up of the OMTs, with no ex ante quantitative limits, in order to safeguard monetary policy transmission, but deplorwelcomes the decision to link the activation of the OMT to strict conditionalities attached to an EFSF/ESM programme; calls on the ECB to activate OMTs independently from strict conditionality;
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Understands the Bank of International Settlements' (BIS) warnings about too long a period of quantitative easing ('whatever it takes'); follows with interest the discussions in most major central banks on the best timetable to wind down their loose monetary policies; notes that amongst others the Federal Reserve Board intends to exit from the present policies as soon as this is possible; understands that the ECB will maintain an accommodative policy stands as long as the banking sector is not fully stabilised, and spill-overs into the public sector remain a threat, a policy which is made possible by the low inflation rates which are expected over the medium term;
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)
Paragraph 8 b (new)
8b. Considers, in the light of the recent developments in the US, that economic recovery and higher growth in the economy represent a sound and solid basis for a progressive phase-out of the quantitative easing policy measures;
Amendment 107 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 c (new)
Paragraph 8 c (new)
8c. Recalls that the quantitative easing policy measures of the ECB were intended to be of transitory nature and should hence in no way be regarded by the banking sector as a permanent instrument;
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 d (new)
Paragraph 8 d (new)
8d. Encourages the ECB to send clear signals to the market with regard to the estimated period of activation of its quantitative easing policy measures and to start their phasing-out as soon as the tension in the banking sector is diminished and the link between the banks and the sovereign could be severed and the economic indicators related to growth and inflation justify this decision;
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Considers that the monetary policy tools that the ECB has used since the beginning of the crisis, while providing a welcome relief in distressed financial markets, have revealed their limits as regards stimulating growth and improving the situation on the labour market; considers, therefore, that the ECB could investigate the possibilities of implementing new unconventional measures aimed at participating in a large, EU-wide pro-growth programme, including the use of the Emergency Liquidity Assistance facility to undertake an ‘overt money financing’ of government debt in order to finance tax cuts targeted on low-income households and/or new spending programmes focused on the Europe 2020 objectivesfurther measures based on a responsible approach and respect for the principle of prudence;
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
Amendment 152 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Argues thatRecalls the independence of the ECB in the conduct of its monetary policy should be democratic and should result from deliberation between different viewpoints and approach, as enshrined in the Treaties;
Amendment 160 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Invites the ECB to pay more attention tocontinue monitoring and to analyse the contractionary effects on GDP, employment and social welfare created by austerity policies carried out by national governments in the framework of Economic Assistance Programmes involvingsulting from a number of factors, such as the over indebtedness of several Member States, the loss of competitiveness resulting from belated structural reforms, a strong mismatch between modest productivity increases and generous wage increases and the contractive effects on the economy resulting from the adjustment programs which became inevitable when a number of Member States almost went bankrupt, a feat from which they were only saved by the intervention of the Troika in conjunction with the solidarity from other Member States through ad hoc funds like the ECBSM;
Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Underlines that the ECB's independence shouldall not justify lack of democratic accountability; recalls the ongoing call for more transparency in the ECB which would result in increased credibility and predictability and appreciates the improvements in this area that have already been implemented; recognises, in this respect, the difficulties relating to the publication of the minutes of the ECB Governing Council’s meetings, as differences in individual positions could be interpreted as representing national interests, leading to pressure from Member State governments on Governing Council members; calls on the ECB to publish its summary minutes;
Amendment 180 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Considers that the exchange rate is a crucial economic policy variable which impacts on the competiveness of thmpacts on the competiveness of the Eurozone; recalls, nevertheless, that the exchange rate policy is not an attribute of the ECB but of the Council which in 1997 chose to let the Euro float freely in order to neither impede the Treaty's monetary policy goal of a stable ecurozonerency nor the independence of the ECB;
Amendment 189 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Underlines the importance of supporting the euro as an international currency, and stresses the need to pave the way for a new international monetary order taking into account the new multipolar world economReiterates its wish to see the euro becoming of increasing importance as a leading international currency beside the US dollar in the world economy; notes the ECB´s stands to refrain from actively promoting the Euro as an international currency;
Amendment 210 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Considers that transparency in the field of banking supervision is essential and that the ECB should take all possible measures to improve its transparency such as, inter alia, the publication of the minutes of the Supervisory Board;
Amendment 231 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Notes that in order to strengthen the stability of the banking system and avoishould be strengthened and the development of the ‘'too big to fail’' syndrome, consideration should be given to introducing a full separation between deposit and investment banks, on the lines of the ‘Volcker Rule’ in the US should be avoided. Calls on the Commission to conduct a thorough impact assessment on a potential separation of bank’s retail and investment activities;
Amendment 233 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Points out that the draft regulation on the Single Supervisory Mechanism provides for interinstitutional arrangements to be concluded between the European Parliament and the ECB on Parliament's scrutiny andthe democratic accountability emphasizing the role of the Parliament; urges the ECB to meet the new requirements, in particular in terms of democratic accountability and transparency in its supervisory activities;
Amendment 239 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Is deeply concerned at the contempt shown by the Council towards Parliament's resolution of 25 October 20123 on the appointment of a new Member of the executive board of the ECB, and notes that due consideration should be given to both the expertise and the gender balance of members in the appointment of ECB top management;