Activities of Petri SARVAMAA related to 2020/2126(INI)
Reports (1)
REPORT on MFF 2021-2027: fight against oligarch structures, protection of EU funds from fraud and conflict of interest
Amendments (27)
Amendment 16 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes the EU-wide definition of active farmers in the new CAP is the mandatory instrument, that should lead to greater transparency and does not increase bureaucracy for SMEs; emphasises, however, the lack of progress in the fight against oligarch structures;
Amendment 30 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. Emphasizes that the ARACHNE is a key instrument for transparency on the beneficiaries of CAP funds;
Amendment 33 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Calls for the mandatory use of the ARACHNE system by Member States in order to achieve more transparency on the beneficiaries of CAP funds and where such funds end up, as well as the mandatory use of the Early Detection and Exclusion System for CAP funds in an effort to enhance transparency on the use of taxpayers’ money; the Commission should create a new comprehensive real-time monitoring system, including existing instruments such as Arachne, which provides an accurate picture of the distribution and fair allocation of EU funds, and the ability to track and aggregate distributed funds; this system should include information on the links between companies and beneficial owners;
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Asks the Commission nevertheless to amend Article 167(1)(c) of the Financial Regulation to include a more explicit definition of ‘professional conflict ofing interests’, so as to ensure that EU institutions are able to take mitigating measures in the case of bidders with a financial interest in a policy-related service contract;
Amendment 45 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Urges the Commission to strengthen its fraud prevention and detection capabilities; calls on the Commission to collect information on all subsidies received from the first and second pillars of the CAP and to aggregate the total amount that a natural person receives either directly through direct payments or indirectly as the beneficial owner of legal persons that are beneficiaries of CAP payments (direct payments and rural development payments) for prevent oligarchs from abusing these subsidies;
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Points out that the study1a on the implementation of the CAP funds revealed that the disbursement of EU agriculture funds is a highly problematic issue in at least five Member States and that there is a clear inequality between fund allocations for big and small farmers, with systemic advantages for the big farms, whose managers sometimes have close ties to the ruling political parties in their countries; _________________ 1a Sabeb et al 2021: WHERE DOES THE EU MONEY GO? AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CAP FUNDS IN BULGARIA, THE CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY, SLOVAKIA AND ROMANIA
Amendment 66 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Takes note that in Hungary according to several exposes, surveys and investigative articles Viktor Orbán has been centralising and redistributing wealth to his inner circle trough agriculture subsidies. Underlines that during the period 2015-2019, Hungary had the highest number of OLAF investigations closed with a financial recommendation among Member States;
Amendment 67 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Regrets the skewed distribution particularly of CAP money where in 2020, 0.5% of all beneficiaries receive more than EUR 100 000, thereby obtaining 16.6% of the total direct payment envelope, while 75% of beneficiaries receive less than EUR 5 000, which accounts for 15% of the total direct payment envelope1a; _________________ 1a Commission Report on Direct payments to agricultural producers - graphs and figures - financial year 2020
Amendment 70 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)
Paragraph 15 b (new)
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 b (new)
Paragraph 15 b (new)
15b. Deeply regrets that the current situation where one person can receive unlimited amounts from funds under shared management incentivises the creation of oligarch structures, nepotism and corruption in some Member States; reiterates its opinion that capping the total amount that one person can receive from EU funds under shared management would limit the strengthening of oligarch structures;
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 c (new)
Paragraph 15 c (new)
15c. Calls on the Commission to include in its proposal for the revision of the Financial Regulation an amendment of Art 63 paragraph 8 adding that the Commission shall ensure that payments accruing from the Union budget to a single beneficiary or beneficial owner in a given financial year do not exceed the limits provided for in the applicable sector-specific rules and, in any event, do not exceed an aggregated annual total per natural person; asks the Commission to include specific proposals for this aggregated annual total amount per natural person; is of the opinion that for the CAP annual total amounts per natural person of EUR 500 000 for first pillar payments and EUR 1 000 000 for second pillar payments are adequate;
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 c (new)
Paragraph 15 c (new)
15c. Points out that according to EU’s anti-fraud office OLAF Romania recorded the highest number of fraud cases of anywhere in the EU in 2018 and 2019. Recognises that small and medium- sized farms in Romania face high levels of bureaucracy regarding access to even essential amounts of funding and subsidies;
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3 a (new)
Subheading 3 a (new)
Other areas of concern
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 d (new)
Paragraph 15 d (new)
15d. Notes with great concern that according to the Single Market Scoreboard the proportion of contracts awarded with merely a single bidder amounted to around 50% in Czechia and Poland in 2018 and 2019, 40% in Hungary and Greece in 2019, and 38% in Portugal; is equally concerned by the proportion of procurement procedures negotiated with a company without any call for bids, which was at 40% in Cyrus in 2016 with a slight improvement to 25% in 2018 and 2019, and 29% for Bulgaria in 2019; is concerned that the proportion of contracts awarded after a call for tender whose name and conditions were not clear was 65% in 2019 in UK, 59% in Lithuania, 44% in Romania and 41% in Portugal;
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 e (new)
Paragraph 15 e (new)
15e. Emphasises that these figures demonstrate that severe shortcomings in public procurement continue to exist in several Member States; is concerned that inadequate tenders can favour opaque structures and nepotistic awarding of contracts;
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 f (new)
Paragraph 15 f (new)
15f. Reiterates its concern that the Commission’s preventive system audits found serious weaknesses concerning the Hungarian authority responsible for controls on public procurement contracts, which resulted in a10% flat rate correction amounting to around EUR 1.2 bn - additionally to EUR 1.5bn of financial corrections imposed in the period 2007 - 2013; emphasises that this reflects severe systemic weaknesses in the functioning of public procurement in Hungary;
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 g (new)
Paragraph 15 g (new)
15g. Reiterates its concern about OLAF investigations and Commission audits exposing serious shortcomings in the Slovak land parcel registry (cadastre) following reports of land grabbing and fraud; highlights that the Slovak authorities only check whether an applicant has the land at their legal disposal in cases of double claims; is of the opinion that such checks should take place in a digital and automated form in all Member States and for all payment claims to deter land grabbing by criminal and oligarchic structures;
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 h (new)
Paragraph 15 h (new)
15h. Emphasises that Malta and Cyprus show significant concentration of funds in the hands of few recipients; is concerned that Commission audits have identified significant shortcomings in the management and control systems of both countries; underlines that weak management and control systems do not provide adequate protection of EU funds against conflicts of interests and abuse by oligarchic structures;
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Emphasises the importance and added value of the newly established EPPO; appreciates the EPPOʼs endeavours to become operational under very challenging circumstances; calls on the Commission to assist the EPPO in solving the problem of diverging implementation of the PIF Directive by different Member Stateemphasises that a proper transposition of the PIF Directive is necessary to enable the EPPO to conduct effective investigations and prosecutions; recalls that the Commission’s report on the transposition of the PIF Directive concludes that although all Member States have transposed the Directive, further action is needed to address outstanding compliance issues, which mostly concern definitions of criminal offences and the liability and sanctions for legal persons and natural persons; underlines that the outcome of the cooperation between the EPPO and the Member States is also crucial in order to assess the proper functioning of the management and control systems for the purpose of audit arrangementfor EPPO to reach its maximum effectiveness;
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Reiterates the urgent call on the Commission to establish an EU-wide and interoperable, digital reporting and monitoring system, encompassing but not limited to ARACHNE; emphasises that this system needs to include information on the ultimate beneficiaries and beneficial owners and must enable to aggregate all individual amounts concerning the same beneficiary or beneficial owner into a total amount of all subsidies received from funds under shared management;
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Is of the view that none of the abovementioned remedies exclude the use of the ‘'rule-of-law conditionality mechanism’,' as defined in the Conditionality RegulationRegulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget, in cases where the Commission considers that other instruments are not sufficiently effective to protect the EU budget; underlines, moreover, that contrary to the scope of the EPPO Regulation, which is not in force in five Member States, the Conditionality Regulation applies directly and equally to all Member States;
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Points out that under the RRF Regulation, which forms part of the MFF 2021-2027 package, the Member States have to ensure the effective prevention, detection and correction of conflicts of interest, corruption and fraud, and avoidance of double funding; calls on the Commission, that the budget authorities are informed about all situations when funds from off-budget instruments are not paid out due to allegations of misuse, corruption, fraud or breaches of rule of law and when member states do not have sufficient anti-fraud systems in place; stresses that they are also required to explain the relevant arrangements in their recovery and resilience plans and include a summary of the consultation process at national level as well as a presentation of the controls and audit system put in place to ensure that the financial interests of the EU are protected;
Amendment 126 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 a (new)
Paragraph 28 a (new)
28a. Reminds that the RRF scoreboard will serve as a basis for the recovery and resilience dialogue and that it should be updated by the Commission twice a year; calls in this sense on the Commission to ensure a thorough monitoring of the progress achieved in the implementation of the milestones and targets foreseen, strictly in line with the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) Regulation, on the basis of the established common indicators and reporting methodology; recalls that the RRF is bound to conditions that guarantee a transparent use of the money and should prevent corruption or fraud, double funding or conflict of interests and believes that controls should be extended also to costs actually incurred by the final beneficiaries; stresses the joint effort of the European Parliament and of the Commission which resulted in Member States being now obliged to provide information about final recipients;
Amendment 128 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28 b (new)
Paragraph 28 b (new)
28b. Notes that the RRF is an extraordinary instrument specifically designed to address the effects of the pandemic; is concerned that absorption is closely connected to outstanding commitments that have continued to grow; recalls the increasing gap between commitments and payments which poses a serious challenge for the discharge authority too; calls on the Commission to inform the budget authorities if funds are not used by Member States or if EU-funds seep into national budgets;
Amendment 134 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
31. Reiterates, following the interinstitutional agreement of 16 December 2020 and as expressed already in several resolutions, its call for the Member States to implement a single, integrated and interoperable reporting and monitoring system developed by the Commission and including but not limited to a single data- mining and risk-scoring tool to access, store, aggregate and analyse data on those ultimately benefiting directly or indirectly from EU funding;
Amendment 137 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Considers that for the sake of fullgreatest possible transparency about the spending of EU funds, it is essential that such a database is developed to the greatest extent possible, in line with applicable data protection rules and the relevant jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and that relevant and non-sensitive data is made accessible to the public in a concise, comprehensive and user-friendly way in order to enhance public scrutiny and trust in EU public spending;
Amendment 138 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32 a (new)
Paragraph 32 a (new)
32a. Reiterates that a sound financial management of EU-funds is of utmost importance; regrets that databases on beneficiaries of EU funds do not contain information on the ultimate beneficiaries and their beneficial owners; regrets that it is not possible for control authorities to identify the ultimate recipients of funding; deeply deplores that NGOs have been used to disguise financing of terrorist and extremist organisations; underlines that common rules on beneficiary transparency should also apply to umbrella organisations that receive EU funds and pass them on to NGOs in their network to ensure that the Commission and control authorities can audit the project’s aims and final beneficiaries; regrets that the Commission did not propose a harmonized definition of NGOs on the basis of which it could monitor those ultimately benefitting; notes that the Financial Regulation sets out rules for the selection and award of funds to these entities as well as the control mechanisms; calls on the Commission to revise the Financial Regulation also in the sense of defining the term, by introducing clear categories of NGOs and extend the controls also to costs actually incurred by the final beneficiaries;