16 Amendments of Alain LAMASSOURE related to 2016/0365(COD)
Amendment 228 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16 a (new)
Recital 16 a (new)
(16a) The decision to be taken by a Union resolution authority should focus first and foremost on the preservation of Union financial stability.
Amendment 242 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 32
Recital 32
(32) In order to preserve financial stability, it is necessary that competent authorities are able to remedy the deterioration of a CCP's financial and economic situation before that CCP reaches a point at which authorities have no other alternative but to resolve it or to direct the CCP to change course where its actions could be detrimental for overall financial stability. Therefore, competent authorities should be granted early intervention powers to avoid or minimise adverse effects on financial stability that could result from the CCP’s implementation of certain measures. The early intervention powers should be conferred on competent authorities in addition to their powers provided for in the national law of Member States or under Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 for circumstances other than those considered to be early intervention. Early intervention rights should include the power to restrict or prohibit any remuneration of equity and instruments treated as equity to the fullest extent possible without triggering outright default, including dividend payments and buybacks by the CCP, and it should be able to restrict, prohibit or freeze any payments of variable remuneration under Directive 2013/36/EU and EBA Guidelines EBA/GL/2015/22, of discretionary pension benefits and of severance packages to management.
Amendment 243 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 34
Recital 34
(34) The resolution framework should provide for timely entry into resolution before a CCP is insolvent. The decision to enter into resolution should be duly justified, based on the information readily available. A CCP should be considered to be failing or likely to fail when it infringes or is likely in the near future to infringe the requirements for continuing authorisation, when its recovery has failed to restore its viability, when the assets of the CCP are or are likely in the near future to be less than its liabilities, when the CCP is or is likely in the near future to be unable to pay its debts as they fall due, or when the CCP requires extraordinary public financial support. However, the fact that a CCP does not comply with all the requirements for authorisation should not justify by itself the entry into resolution.
Amendment 245 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36
Recital 36
(36) Where a CCP meets the conditions for resolution, the resolution authority of the CCP should have at its disposal a harmonised set of resolution tools and powers. Their exercise should be subject to common conditions, objectives, and general principles. The use of additional tools and powers by resolution authorities should be consistent with the resolution principles and objectives. In particular, the use of such tools or powers should not impinge on the effective resolution of cross-border groups. The possibility to use public funds should be avoided as much as possible.
Amendment 278 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Each Member State shall designate one or more resolution authorities that are empowered to useapply the resolution tools and exercise the resolution powers as set out in this Regulation.
Amendment 284 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
The staff involved in carrying out the functions entrusted to the resolution authority pursuant to this Regulation shall be structurally separated from, and subject to separate reporting lines from, the staff involved in carrying out the other functions of that authoritytasks pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012.
Amendment 320 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – point j
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – point j
(j) that transparency is ensured wherever possible, in particular where a proposed decision or action is likely to have implications on the financial stability or fiscal resources of any relevant Member State;
Amendment 340 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 7
Article 9 – paragraph 7
7. Recovery plans shall be drafted in accordance with Section A of the Annex. Competent authorities may require CCPs to include additional information in their recovery plans.: (a) not assume any access to or receipt of public financial support; (b) consider the interests of all stakeholders that are likely to be affected by the plan; and (c) ensure that clearing members do not have unlimited exposures toward the CCP
Amendment 353 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 9 a (new)
Article 9 – paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Clearing members shall ensure that any provisions affecting their clients are adequately explained to them.
Amendment 357 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 3
Article 10 – paragraph 3
3. When assessing the recovery plan, the competent authority shall consult the ESRB and take into consideration the CCP's capital structure, its default waterfall, the level of complexity of the organisational structure and the risk profile of the CCP, the substitutability of its activities, and the impact that the implementation of the recovery plan would have on clearing members, their clients, financial markets served by the CCP and on the financial system as a whole. The competent authority shall take into due consideration whether the recovery plan ensures appropriate incentives for the CCP’s owners and clearing members and their clients to control the amount of risk that they bring to or incur in the system. The competent authority shall encourage monitoring of the CCP’s risk-taking and risk management activities, and encourage as full participation as possible in the CCP’s default management process.
Amendment 388 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 – point l – point v
Article 13 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 – point l – point v
(v) the portability of the assets and positions of clearing participantsmembers and the clients of clearing members as referred to in Article 39 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012;
Amendment 427 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 7 – point n a (new)
Article 17 – paragraph 7 – point n a (new)
(na) restrict or suspend interoperability links of the CCP where such restriction or suspension is necessary to avoid the adverse effects that the use of the resolution tools and the exercise of resolution powers could have on the interoperating CCPs.
Amendment 471 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) all contractual obligations and other arrangements in the CCP's recovery plan are enforced either partially or in full, to the extent that they have not been exhausted before entry into resolution, unless the resolution authority determines that the use of resolution tools or the exercise of resolution powers is more appropriate to achieve the resolution objectives in a timely manner and to ensure the stability of the financial sector;
Amendment 479 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point g a (new)
Article 24 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point g a (new)
(ga) the price of any termination of contracts by the resolution authority shall be based, insofar as possible, upon a fair market price determined on the basis of the CCP's rules and arrangements, or other appropriate price discovery method used by the resolution authority.
Amendment 488 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
Article 27 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
The resolution authority shall require the CCP, or its parent company, to issue instruments of ownership to be subscribed by all non-defaulting clearing members where those non- defaulting clearing members have been subject to loss and position allocation tools in deviation from the CCP's operating rules which have resulted in the non-defaulting clearing member suffering a financial loss. The number of instruments of ownership issued to each affected non-defaulting clearing member shall be proportionate to its loss and shall take account of any outstanding contractual obligations of the clearing members toward the CCP.
Amendment 515 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 1
Article 30 – paragraph 1
1. The resolution authority may reduce the value of the CCP's payment obligations to non-defaulting clearing members where those obligations arise from gains due in accordance with the CCP's processes for paying variation margin or an economically identical payment. The clearing members should communicate the use of such a tool to their clients as promptly as possible.