23 Amendments of Luděk NIEDERMAYER related to 2015/2344(INI)
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas keeping the Balance of Payments Facility for non-euroArticle 123 and 125 TFEU were put in place to avoid and prevent moral hazard and ensure fiscal sustainability and prudency of euro area Member States; while depriving euro area Member States of this instrument as a consequence of the no-bail-out clause reflects one of the original flaws of EMUereas the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) constitutes the crisis resolution mechanism for countries of the euro area and has the function of a shock absorbent; whereas non-euro area Member States are not covered by the ESM but by the Balance of Payment Facility which supports non- euro countries in difficulties or when seriously threatened with difficulties as regards its balance of payments, as laid down in Article 143 TFEU, as non-euro countries experience higher risks due to exchange rate fluctuations;
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas it became apparent during the sovereign debt crisis that the European Treaties do not provide the euro area with the instruments to deal effectively with shocks; countries which did not comply with the fiscal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which did not budget responsibly but triggered large budget deficits through high spending and had postponed relevant reforms of their labour markets and public administration, were more vulnerable and could not effectively handle economic shocks; whereas it became apparent that the lack of responsibility of one Member of the euro area is a risk for the euro area as a whole, meaning that one country not adhering to the rules can affect the economy of all Member States of the Union; whereas the currency union is only as strong as its Members, which requires all participating countries to respect economic and financial rules at national level and at the same time to strengthen their economies in their own interest and in that of the whole euro area, thus guaranteeing the well-being of all citizens in the long-term, as the consequences of irresponsible policies at national level have to be borne by the Union as a whole;
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas substantial progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws ofimproving and strengthening the governance of the EMU through legislation such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, as well as through the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such as the ESM, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) including the Fiscal Compact and the Euro-Plus Pact, thereby making the EMU more resilient against possible shocks in the future, however, these instruments cannot fulfil their function if they are not enforced;
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas Member States that failed to adhere to the SGP and enforce fiscal rules at national level have lost credibility of financial markets and herewith the possibility to finance themselves and a great deal of trust has been lost in the process, both between Member States and on the part of citizens and the markets in the EU institutions and the Union as a whole;
Amendment 151 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception undtronger enforcement of existing fiscal rules such as the SGP, the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack is necessary, and not the transfer of more financial means; whereas the SGP is a set of rules designed to ensure that EU Member States pursue sound public finances and coordinate their fiscal policies, however, the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policiesmain shortcoming is the non-implementation of existing rules as well as the underestimation of macroeconomic imbalances, which were not addressed in a sufficient and timely manner; whereas governments of euro countries are required by European economic governance rules to submit their draft budgetary plans for the following year to the European Commission by October 15 each year to ensure the coordination of fiscal and economic policies among euro countries and that EU economic governance rules are respected, but the implementation rate of the guidelines put forward by the European Commission subsequently has to be improved;
Amendment 167 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Stresses that the introduction of the euro as a common currency has eliminated tried and tested policy options for counterbalancing asymmetric shocks such as exchange rate fluctuafluctuation risks, exchange costs as well as risks and lack of transparency in cross- border transactions; reiteratstresses that the relinquishing of autonomy over monetary policy therefore requires alternative adjustment mechbenefits of the euro are interconnected, as economic stability creates trust and credibility, reduces uncertainty for businesses and encourages companismes to cope with asymmetric macroeconomic shocks in order to make the euro zone an optimal currency area able, inter alia, to implement a proper policy mixinvest, creates more employment and better-quality jobs for citizens and allows for long-term planning of governments; stresses that the need for convergence and competitiveness are conditions for the functionality of a common currency area, since a country cannot restore its competitiveness in a sustainable manner by simply devaluating its currency;
Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalancthe causes of the sovereign debt crisis were mainly unsustainable levels of public and private debt, lack of competitiveness and proper regulation in the banking and financial sectors; underlines, triggered by capital flows fhat high levels of debt limited the space of manoeuvre for eurom core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States, aggravated and led to a sovereuntries and led to an increase in financing costs, which impeded the repayment of debt at maturity; stresses that high costs of servicing debt due to high interest rates were too big of a burden given the overall debt level of some euro countries; whereas too hignh debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the merelevels entail high interest rates which have to be served instead of being able to invest in growth enhancing measures, social spending, healthcare and education; whereas the causes of the crises differed in existence of thet among euro area Member States;
Amendment 208 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustCommon monetary policy can only play a limited role in reaction to various shocks that the EU and the eurozone may face. It is therefore important to increase resilience of Member States’ economies via implementing structural reforms on one hand, and to conduct such a fiscal policy on national level that allows governments to react to such shocks on the other. The instruments avainlable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;t the European level including the ESM should only play a complementary role.
Amendment 292 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that while manoeuvring space of domestic fiscal policy must play prominent role, a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;. Member States with close to balanced budgets at the moment of adverse economic shock have significant space available for use of automatic stabilizers as well as for eventual discretional fiscal support of their economy within existing European rules.
Amendment 333 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Points outAcknowledges that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries may requires sufficient resources;. These resources can be made available via mix of domestic fiscal policy, existing instruments (including the ESM) and potentially newly considered tools such as a budgetary capacity for the eurozone.
Amendment 368 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Argues in consequence that three pillars of a fiscal capacity should be distinguished, wherein action should be undertaken in the framework of a common toolbox to address the different functions, i.e. incentivising convergence and sustainable structural reforms, absorbing asymmetric shocks, and absorbing symmetric shocks; takes note of the various proposals regarding designs put forward on this matter by politicians and academia; repeats that full compliance with existing fiscal rules grants significant space for fiscal reaction to adverse developments within national budgets.
Amendment 462 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Believes that compliance with a convergence code should be the condition for access to funding from the ESM/EMF; reiterates its call on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal to this end;Implementation of structural reforms, particularly those highlighted in country specific recommendations, should be the condition for access to funding from the ESM/EMF.
Amendment 480 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Stresses that significant progress in convergence and sustainable structural reforms is needed in order to reconcile fiscal consolidation, growth, jobs, productivity, competitiveness and the European social model so as to effectively prevent asymmetric shock; considers that financial support from the European level for the implementation of agreed structural reforms in the Member States, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, is therefore indispensable;could be considered taking into careful consideration costs and benefits of such approach.
Amendment 498 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Reiterates its call for the adoption of a ‘convergence code’, as a legal act resulting from the ordinary legislative procedure, toCalls on the Member States to respect the country specific recommendations and implement structural reforms based on these recommendations to better streamline the existing coordination of economic policies into a more effective convergence of economic policies within the European Semester;
Amendment 506 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
Amendment 587 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)
Paragraph 27 a (new)
27a. New paragraph after Pillar 2: Absorption of asymmetric shocks: Risk of asymmetric shock is declining with growing convergence of the Member States' economies. Economic policies of Member States should analyse risk of domestic asymmetric shock and adjust its fiscal policy to be ready to act appropriately in the case of such shocks. The ESM can serve as the last resort. In case of external asymmetric shock, it is more difficult to rely on domestic fiscal capacity. The possibility to introduce a support mechanism suitable for such a situation should be considered.
Amendment 591 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 5
Subheading 5
Pillar 2: Absorption of external and internal asymmetric shocks
Amendment 631 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Points out that the Rainy Day Fund must be aimed at restoring the stability of the EU and the eurozone. It should be funded by all the Member States on the basis of a cyclically sensitive economic indicator and used for payments to all Member States suffering from economic downturns;. The fund must play anti- cyclical role, and the position of member states vis-à-vis the fund must be neutral in medium term.
Amendment 650 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
31. Acknowledges that the model of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme would foster convergence of labour markets in the medium term; it must be consistent with the key role of Member States in social policy and must not provide base for permanent transfers between Member States.
Amendment 686 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one, the EMF can be considered as a tool in cases where monetary policy and fiscal room in a national budget are not sufficient to address the problem; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; recalls that the EMF should be used as an appropriate financial resource;
Amendment 743 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Points out that the fiscal capacity has to be of significant size in order to be able to addressTo cope with economic issues in the EU and in these euro-area-wide shocks and to finance its functions; insists that in order to provide sufficient financial resources, the euro area fiscal capacity, including the EMF, should be able to increase the issuance of equities via a rise in guarantees; considers that these common issuzone, balanced combination of available measure should be used. Monetary policy, domestic fiscal space, ESM fund and eventually newly considered tools should be used adequities should have the highest credit rate;ately to the risks faced by the EU and eurozone economies.
Amendment 787 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
Amendment 807 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Considers that those non-euro countries that do not have an opt-out will eventually become part of the EMU and therefore may join the governance framework on a voluntary basis with a special statuEmphasizes that the seven EU Member States that do not have an opt-out or opt-in from joining the common currency, but are bound to join the euro area by their Treaties of Accession to the European Union, should have full rights of participating in the governance structure of any fiscal capacity, be able to contribute and benefit financially, receive technical and financial assistance in transposing needed structural reforms in their countries, thereby making their economies more competitive especially vis-à-vis current euro area Member States, increasing resilience, thus ensuring the sound transition into the euro area and avoid economic and financial crises in the future by fostering a stronger euro area with stronger Member States;