18 Amendments of Bernard MONOT related to 2017/0333R(APP)
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)
Citation 2 a (new)
- having regard to the report of the Eurogroup to the Heads of State and Government of 4 December 2018 and the annex thereto on the arrangements for the reform of the European Stability Mechanism,
Amendment 12 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 b (new)
Citation 2 b (new)
- having regard to the statement adopted at the euro area summit on 14 December 2018,
Amendment 28 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the introduction of the euro ishas been one of the European project’s most significant political achievements and a cornerstone of EMU constructionmost political achievements, with the most serious implications, for the European project, most of the Member States now being locked into EMU with no way out;
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the twenty years of its existence and the financial and economic crisis hasve revealed the weaknesses of the euro architecture, highlighting the need for the swift completiona thorough overhaul of the EMU;
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas membership of a common currency area certainly requires common rules and obligations, as well abut also requires common tools to respond to symmetric and asymmetric shocks and for the promotion of solidarity and socioeconomic upward convergence; whereas risk reduction and risk sharing should go hand in hand in deepeningwith a thorough overhaul of the governance of the EMU;
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and its later transformation into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have represented, despite its intergovernmental nature, an important step towards the creation of a European crisis management mechanism, helping to partially respond to the weaknesses of the EMU and providing financial assistance to several European countries affected by the crisis;
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the intergovernmental nature of the ESM has implications on its decision-making process, which risks undermining the ESM’s capacity to respond swiftly to economic and financial shocksensuring a minimum of democratic control over its decision-making;
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the future incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework should continue to be understood as part of the EMU completion projectis a further step towards creating a new bureaucratic structure completely beyond any effective democratic control, as is already the case with the ECB;
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas the ongoing debate on the future of Europe and the EMU has highlighted differing political views among Member States on the long-term future of the ESM, but also provides a good basis and whereas this debate is therefore an important first step towards good reason to reconsider the need to support the strengthening of its role, and the developingment of its financial tools and improvingto question its efficiency and above all its democratic accountability as part of the ESM reform;
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas in the short term, the ESM reform should contribute in particular to making the banking union more sustainable and less dysfunctional, providing a proper common financial backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), without prejudice to the need tolosing sight of the fact that the impossibility of establishing a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) demonstrates the failure of the Banking Union and, in the face of more risks and negative consequences than positive consequences, the need to reverse this incomplete and harmful reform;
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. WelcomNotes the Commission’s proposal of 6 December 2017 for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund and considers it a useful, although inadequate, contribution to the ongoing debate on the future of Europe, the completionreform of the EMU and reconsideration of the role of the ESM reform;
Amendment 111 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Highlights that the proper functioning of an EMU depends on the existence of an institution serving as a ‘lender of last resort’; acknowledges, in this context, the positive contribution of the ESM, despite its intergovernmental naturethe inadequacy of its financial capacity, towards addressing the weaknesses of the institutional setting of the EMU, namely by providing financial assistance to several Member States affected by the financial crisis and the Great Recession;
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Recalls that this role of ‘lender of last resort’ is naturally one for the European Central Bank, or, failing that, for each national central bank, and that the reform of the EMU should underline this role and abandon the ideology that prevailed at the time of drafting of the Maastricht Treaty and which gave rise to the euro area debt crisis twenty years later;
Amendment 119 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls its previous positions in favour ofagainst the incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework, which would make it a fully-fledged EU body; insists that this incorporation, i.e. a bureaucratic entity disconnected from effective democratic control, as is currently the case with the ECB; stresses that the establishment of effective mechanisms for democratic scrutiny of the ECB’s action as well as that of the future ESF should continue to be understoodseen as part of the EMU completionreform project; believes that such an integration would allow for management in accordance with the Community method, ensure the full consistency of fiscal rules and obligations, facilitat reform would permit democratic management and ensure economic efficiency, unlike systems designed to impose austerity and a permanent, covert financial crisis; considers that economic and fiscal policy coordination is necessary, but must also address the reconomic and fiscal policy coordination, and enhance democratic legitimacy and accountability through the European Parliamentessionary impact on their neighbours of predatory policies in countries with excessive twofold surpluses, both external and budgetary; recalls that the enhancement of the democratic legitimacy of the governance of the euro area and of its institutions, such as the ECB or the ESM, should on no account be achieved by increasing the powers of the European Parliament, whose ‘supervision’ of the ECB is clearly a comedy that fools nobody as regards its total lack of reality;
Amendment 140 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that the Commission’s proposal has generated a lively discussion on its political, financial and legal implications, and that discussions continue on a number of important issues; stresses, however, that this debate on the long-term vision of the ESM’s institutional setting should not delay the steps urgently required to strengthenreform the EMU and its capacity to promote financial stability and respond to economic shocks; calls, therefore, for a meaningful ESM reform in the short term by means of a revision of the ESM Treaty, without prejudice to more ambitious developments in the future;
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Underlines that the primary mission of the new ESF should continue to be to provide transitional financial assistance to Member States in need, on the basis of the agreed adjustment programmes; stresses that the ESF must have adequate firepower for that purpose; opposes, therefore, any attempt to turn the reformed ESM into an instrument for banks only, or to reduce its financial capacity to support Member States; recalls that financial assistance provided to Member States under the new ESF has to be complemented by other fiscal capacity tools, including precautionary instruments, to promote economic and financial stabilisation, investment and upward socioeconomic convergence in the euro area;
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Believes that the reformed ESM should play a more prominent role in the management of financial assistance programmes, alongside the Commission and in close cooperation with the ECB, ensuring that the EU institutional framework has more autonomy whenever needed, under effective democratic control, without prejudice to appropriate partnerships with other institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund;
Amendment 215 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Underlines the risks arising from the delay in completing the Banking Union, which mean that the incomplete banking union is far more dangerous to financial stability than the absence of a banking union; welcomes, in this context, the European Council’s commitment to a common backstop for the SRF and recalls the need also to establish the EDIS; stresses that, in particular in the absence of EDIS, it is preferable to undo the entire Banking Union;