BETA

271 Amendments of Bernard MONOT

Amendment 1 #

2018/2002(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas Member States have exclusive competence in the area of direct taxation, any Union proposal on the tax treatment of personal pension products will encroach upon this exclusive competence of the Member States;
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 11 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas equivalence is a tool to promote international regulatory convergence, which may lead to more competition in the EU on a level playing field, while preventing regulatory arbitragewhich should, in theory, prevent regulatory arbitrage, while in practice it enables only the major international financial players to artificially concentrate their liquidity, collateral and, in general, their business in a very small number of financial centres;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 16 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas this concentration in a small number of global financial centres, facilitated by equivalence, mutual recognition and exemption regimes, is harmful to global financial stability and to the economic development of those states which have had their financial liquidity lured away by international financial centres;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 30 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas the forthcoming withdrawal of the UK from the EU will potentially have a significant impact on the regulation and supervision of financial services, given the close relationship that currently exists between the Member States in this area;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 33 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas it is important for the financial liquidity of the EU's continental states - which, because of passporting and, more generally, the harmonisation of European financial regulation, has been concentrated in London, to the great benefit of US financial and banking operators - to be able to be redistributed among the various Member States after Brexit;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 40 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Notes that since the financial crisis, the EU has developed its financial regulation through wide-ranging reforms; welcomes the increased regulatory and supervisory cooperation between the EU and third countries; recognises that this has helped to improved global consistency in financial regulation and has made, with the aim of making the EU more resilient to global financial shocks;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 45 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that the EU should promote global financial regulatory reforms aimed at reducing systemic risk and should work towards an open, integrated and resilient financial system thatwhich supports sustainable economic growth, job creation and investment;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Notes that the Member States may not always entirely support international cooperation owing to concerns about the protection of national interests and the inherent incentive to shift risks to other jurisdictions;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Deplores the poor global coordination of financial regulation, which means that the United States often imposes its views and interests on the international community while exempting itself from implementing the rules it has imposed on others;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 62 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3b. Regrets that post-crisis global financial coordination has been used as a pretext for the deconstruction of the banking model for financing European economies, to the benefit of market-based finance, which is more remote from economic operators, particularly small- scale ones; regrets that high-street banks are, allegedly for the purpose of financial stability, being replaced by international giants and market participants which are, more often than not, from the United States;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 76 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses that, in many cases, the granting of equivalence is a unilateral decision taken by the EU and is not applied in a reciprocal manner by third countries; considers that international cooperation could be better advanced by dint of international agreements negotiated between the EU and third countries; notes that, unlike equivalence, international agreements can provide mutual access between the EU and third countries for financial institutions and for the mutual recognition of rules; is nevertheless concerned about the pattern, systematically repeated, whereby international agreements are concluded by the US administration but never ratified by Congress, which results in a de facto unilateral disarmament by EU countries to the benefit of market penetration by the United States;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 79 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Recognises that the EU’s equivalence regime is an integral part of its regulatory framework for financial services and can offer several benefits, such as: the removal of unnecessary regulatory barriers, increased competition, increased capital flows into the EU, and more instruments and investment choices for EU firms and investor, but seriously doubts it can be useful to the economies of the Member States;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 85 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Reiterates that equivalence decisions do not grant financial institutions comparable rights to passport financial services throughout the EU, but recogni and stresses that they may only give third-country institutions limited access to the single market for certain products and that this access can clearly be revoked in accordance with the interests of the Member States;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 98 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Emphasises that one of the key avowed objectives for equivalence is to promote regulatory convergence on the basis of international standards, whereas in reality it is a question of concentrating liquidity, collateral and, in general, the business of international financial giants in a minimum number of financial centres; stresses, furthermore, that artificially maintaining financial activity in a very small number of global centres in such a way harms the financial stability and economic interest of the Member States which have seen their financial liquidity disappear to the benefit of those international financial centres;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 117 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Believes that equivalence decisions and international agreements should be objective, proportionate, risk-sensitive and be taken in the best interests of the Member States of the Union and itstheir citizens;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 143 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Notes that the Commission has the right to withdraw equivalence decisions, and believes that Parliament should be consulted in a timely manner before such a withdrawal decision is taken; calls for the introduction of clear procedures and timelines governing the adoption, withdrawal or suspension of equivalence decisions; calls for Parliament to retain the power of initiative, at any time, to request that an equivalence decision be withdrawn;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 165 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for equivalence decisions to be reviewed at least once every threea years by the relevant ESA and for such reviews to be made public;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 177 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Calls on the Commission to consider the possibility of introducingdevelop an application processdure for granting equivalence which could be open, to be submitted to third countries on a date specified in a given piece of legislationto the benefit of European operators;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 191 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Stresses that close consideration should be given to the equivalence regime between the EU and high-impact third countriesthe United States and United Kingdom, in order to develop stable and resilient regulatory relationships - not one-way relationships - with thoese countries which have close financial links with the Union;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 203 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Recalls the importance of National Competent Authorities (NCAs) in the authorisation process for financial institutions that wish to delegate part of their portfolio management or risk management to service providers in third countries where the regulatory regime is comparable to that of the EU; considers that NCAs have sufficient technical knowledge and expertise to properly assess delegation approval requests; encourages the ESAs to develop further cooperation between NCAs in order to share best practice concerning regulatory cooperation and activities with third countries; considers that NCAs should be able to challenge and halt any granting of equivalence if it affects the interests of their national operators, financial stability and economic development; notes that the United States does nothing but behave in such a way and that the US Congress and federal agencies do not hesitate to call into question the enforceability of the international agreements signed by the United States;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 210 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Underlines the importance of the EU’s roleactive role played by the EU in global standard-setting as a means of working towards international consistency in financial regulation, seeking to maximisinge financial stability, preventing regulatory loopholes between jurisdictions and developing an efficient international financial system that is as efficient as possible;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Calls for active involvement from the Commission, the Member States and ESAs in global standard-settingMember States that are also G20 members in global coordination bodies in financial services; stresses the need forat the consistent implementation of international standards is theoretically important in order to achieve better regulatory cooperation with other jurisdictions and to improve global financial stability; deplores, however, the unilateralism and uneven transposition of the standards arising from global coordination which, de facto, always end up facilitating the penetration of non- European players into the economies of the Member States;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 228 #

2017/2253(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Calls to that end, moreover, for the EU-US Financial Markets Regulatory Dialogue to be upgraded to include more regular meetings; stresses that the EU should push to have, at all costs, prevent a financial services chapter as part offrom being included in any potential future EU- US trade agreement;
2018/05/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 31 #

2017/2226(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) has provided important support for investment in the EUfailed to fill the large investment gap in Europe, to restore growth and tackle unemployment, in addition to the European Structural and Investment Funds, while at the same time the orientation of savings towards equity has decreased returns and provided fewer incentives for investment;
2018/01/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 74 #

2017/2226(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Takes note ofIs concerned about the publication of the 2018 Annual Growth Survey (AGS) package and the proposfailed policy mix of investment, structural reform and fiscal consolidation, presented as a way to further promote higherunderperforming growth levels and to strengthen European recovery and contra-productive upward convergence;
2018/01/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 266 #

2017/2226(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to adopt adequate measures to help refugees settle and integratwithin their region of origin instead of migrating to Europe and to anticipate at an early stage the requirements for facilitating their smooth transition to the labour market, as well as ensuring that public services are provided with sufficient resources; stresses that social partners should play a key role in facilitating the integration of migrants and preventing them from suffering from labour abusereturn to their country of origin;
2018/01/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 359 #

2017/2226(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Underlines that any further step towards a deepening of the EMU must go hand in hand with strongerlacks democratic controls; insists that, to this end, the role of the European Parliament and national parliaments must be strengthened; asks to include trade unions in the negotiation process at both national and European level; urges the launch of the long- awaited negotiation of an interinstitutional agreement (IIA) on the Semester;
2018/01/17
Committee: ECON
Amendment 11 #

2017/2191(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. WelcomNotes the Report on Competition Policy 2016 of 31 May 2017 (COM(2017)0285);
2017/11/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 14 #

2017/2191(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Strongly supports the actions of the Commission in its fight against tax avoidance by multinationals, especially in the digital sector, including tax avoidance that is directly facilitated and legalised by EU Member States; endorses in this connection the independence of the Commission in its mission of shaping and enforcing the EU competition rules for the benefit of EU consumers;
2017/11/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 29 #

2017/2191(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Calls on the Commission to monitor the implementation of directives linked to the completion of the single market, particularly in the energy and transport sector, and to enhance the enforcement of EU competition rules in order to avoid uneven application thereof in the Member States;
2017/11/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 79 #

2017/2191(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Believes that the Commission should verify that national competition authorities (NCAs) are sufficiently equipped in terms of financial and human resources to guarantee their independence, and that it should submit an annual report to Parliament regarding this key point;deleted
2017/11/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 97 #

2017/2191(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Reiterates that all market players should pay their fair share of tax; welcomes the Commission’s in-depth investigations into anti-competitive practices such as selective tax advantages and excess profit ruling systems; stresses that the reduction of tax fraud and tax avoidance is fundamental in order to consolidate sound public budgets and that Member States promoting tax avoidance by multilateral companies cannot continue to shelter with impunity behind Council unanimity rule on matters relating to taxation; calls on the Commission's Competition DG to step up its efforts in this direction, taking particular account of all the means afforded by the Treaties to combat distortions in the internal market, including those stemming from the tax rules of the Member States;
2017/11/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 126 #

2017/2191(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Welcomes the Commission decision taken against Luxembourg on the illegal tax benefits granted to Amazon (around EUR 250 million); calls for active steps to be taken to increase to a fair level Apple's effective tax rate in the EU, which is currently close to zero.
2017/11/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 213 #

2017/2191(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
26. Asks the Commission to apply State aid rules strictly and uniformly to European airlines such as Alitalia and Air Berlin; believes that restructuring aid is one of the most distortive forms and that the same rules should be applied to national and low-cost carriers;deleted
2017/11/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 249 #

2017/2191(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
29. Calls on the Commission to open up competition in the transport sector in order to complete the single market, in particular in those Member States where public port and airport networks are managed and monopolised by the central government or where such networks persistently generate public deficits;deleted
2017/11/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 259 #

2017/2191(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
31. Invites the Commission to look at the bilateral aviation agreement between Spain and Russia which obliges all flights going through Siberia to depart from or land at the Madrid hub airport, giving an unfair advantage to the Iberia national carrier;deleted
2017/11/28
Committee: ECON
Amendment 175 #

2017/2124(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Asks the ECB to consiCalls for an amendment to the TFEU, and in particular Article 127(1) thereof, in order to complementingte the ECB's mandate and its price stability objective with nominal GDP growth targeting, while recalling the importance of fairly sharing the fruits of growth;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 202 #

2017/2124(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Underlines the positive effect of the ECB monetary policy on growth, employment and the financing costs of Member States, non-financial companies and households;deleted
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 207 #

2017/2124(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Underlines theIs unable to find objective evidence of any positive effect of the ECB monetary policy on growth, employment and the financing costs of Member States, non-financial companies and households; recognises, however, that it has provided the eurozone States with cheap financing, which delays the effort that many of them need to make to rationalise public spending;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 285 #

2017/2124(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Stresses that excessive current account surpluses in some Member States, first and foremost Germany, must be corrected through appropriate fiscal policies;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 301 #

2017/2124(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Acknowledges that monetary policy has effectivelymay have helped reduced the cost of credit and helped to improve access to finance for large companies and household; is concerned, however, about the consequences of a rise in interest rates for the stability of the real estate market in some countries; considers, howeverlastly, that the effect of this policy is limited owing to the lack of sufficient credit demand in the euro area;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 375 #

2017/2124(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. WelcomNotes the improvementchanges made by the ECB in disclosing the list of securities held by the Eurosystem under the ECB’s CSPP;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 401 #

2017/2124(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
27. Agrees that a well-functioning, diversified and integrated capital market would support the transmission of the single monetary policy; calls for the full completion and implementation of the capital markets union and the banking union;deleted
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 410 #

2017/2124(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
28. Welcomes the positive opinion of the ECB on the quick establishment of the European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) as the third pillar of a fully- fledged banking union; stresses that the EDIS will further help to enhance and safeguard financial stability;deleted
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 448 #

2017/2124(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
31. Agrees with the ECB on the importance of physical money as the only legal tender, and reminds all Eurozone countries that euro coins and banknotes must not be rejected in transactions; deplores in this context the excessive lowering of thresholds for cash payments in certain countries;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 496 #

2017/2124(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
35. Believes that ECB profits from seigniorage revenue should be considered an EU budgetary resource, since they are directly linked to a fully developed, sui generis European policyto be due to the Member States, in proportion to their share in the capital;
2017/09/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 5 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6
— having regard to the ECB’s guidance to banks on non-performing loans of 20 March 2017, and to the public consultation on its draft addendum to this guidance of 4 October 2017,
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 7 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)
- having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament's Legal Service of 9 November 2017 on the addendum to the ECB guidance to banks on non- performing loans (SJ-0693/17),
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 8 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 b (new)
- having regard to the European Parliament resolution of 4 September 2007 on institutional and legal implications of the use of “soft law” instruments (P6_TA(2007)0366),
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 94 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Takes note of the ECB’s ‘failing or likely to fail’ assessments in respect of Banco Popular Español S.A., Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca;deleted
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 104 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Notes the ECB’s determination in the context of the precautionary recapitalisation of Monte dei Paschi di Siena that the bank is solvent and meets the capital requirements; notes, in this regard, that the determination of solvency leaves room for an element of subjectivity as this determination greatly depends on how a bank’s assets are valued;deleted
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 119 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Notes that the current supervisory system focuses on credit risk, completely ignoring exposure to risky trading activities and legal risks possibly affecting the sustainability of financial institutions;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 121 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Notes the obvious disparity between real and effective significance regarding ECB supervision of the German banking sector;direct supervision of the German system is relatively light when measured against its assets and compared to the significance that that the banking system of the largest economy of the monetary area should have;while German banking assets amount to 27.6% of the euro area total, supervised German assets amount to 20.6% of total directly supervised assets;while consolidated loans from the German banking system represent 26.4% of total euro area lending, higher than all other countries, the figure falls to 18.2% of the subtotal for loans subject to direct supervision;while German deposits amount to 27.9% of the total, again the highest value, the figure falls to 17.6% of the total for supervised banks;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 140 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Reiterates its concerns aboutNotes the high level of non- performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and bpoints out that the problem can only be tackled definitively by meanks themselvof a systemic solution; stresses thave a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans’4; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU institutions and bodies ont this is the result of the macroeconomic imbalances caused by the EMU and poor crisis management with mistaken economic policies; considers thise issue; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly implement the Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on to be crucial and calls on the Member States to adopt anti-cyclical policies to stimulate growthe action plan to tackle non- performing loans in Europe; _________________ 4Commission communication on completing the Banking Union, 11 October 2017, p. 15 (COM(2017)0592).nd support domestic demand in order to limit NPLs, given the need to resolve macroeconomic problems associated with chronic demand shortages and the collapsing purchasing power of households;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 160 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt which are artificially maintained by the constraints imposed on central banks by the Treaties; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly investedcould invest much more in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessivwhich would constitute an additional safety net and enable thome bias’; se Member States to escape the arbitrary dictaktes note, in this respect, of the Commission’s ongoing work on the idea of so-called sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS)of the market; opposes, in this respect, any attempt to limit the scope for banks to purchase sovereign bonds issued by their own government;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 181 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. WelcomNotes the work done by the ECB to assess the adequacy of internal models, including its new guide to the TRIM, with a view to addressing the variability in risk- weights applied to risk- weighted assets of the same class across credit institutions; calls for a rapid conclusion of negotiations on output floors within the BCBS;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 184 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Stresses that any further measures proposed by the ECB, a purely technocratic institution, should respect the principle of accountability and democratic transparency;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 193 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. WelcomNotes the banking reform package proposed by the Commission in November 2016; underlines the importance of the fast-track procedure for the phasing-in of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 9 in order to avoid cliff effects on the regulatory capital of credit institutions; supports the efforts made to reduce the reporting burden for smaller banks; is concerned, however,is concerned about the proposed amendments to the waivers in Articles 7 and 8 of the CRR, and more generally, about the proposed shift in the home-host balance;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 201 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. WelcomesStresses that the banking reform package proposed by the Commission inas of November 2016; underlines the importance is having a considerable impact ofn the fast-track procedure for the phasing-in of International Financial Repstability of the banking system; notes that a more restrictive approach to non-perfortming Standard (IFRS) 9 in order to avoid cliff effects on the regulatory capital of credit institutions; supports the efforts made to reduce the reporting burden for smaller banks; is concerned, however, about the proposed amendments to the waivers in Articles 7 and 8 of the CRR, and more generally, about the proposed shift in the home-host balanceloans (NPLs) and a tighter sovereign debt policy might in fact step up pressure on a number of banking systems and jeopardise the smooth functioning of the debt market; supports, however, efforts to reduce the reporting burden for smaller banks;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 212 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Calls for the repeal of the BRRD, which has already shown itself to be ineffective and dangerous for investors, bondholders and savers and for the stability of the financial system as a whole;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 218 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Recalls its resolution of 17 May 2017 on FinTech; welcomnotes, in this respect, the work of the Commission, the proposed inclusion of technological innovation in the mandates of the ESAs and the ongoing public consultation on the ECB’s draft guidance to assessments of FinTech bank licence applications;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 225 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. WelcomNotes the work done by the EBA and ESMA on promoting supervisory convergence in the context of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU with a view to limiting the development of regulatory and supervisory arbitrage risks; believes that, in order to preserve financial stability, a new supervisory cooperation model should be developed between the EU and the UK;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 233 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Looks forward toAwaits the Commission’s proposal on large investment firms;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 266 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Is concerned about the high number of legal applications lodged before the General Court of the EU in relation to the Banco Popular Español S.A. case; asks the Commission to assess whetherhow this could endanger the effectiveness ofconfirm the risks associated with the new resolution regime; calls on the SRB and the Commission to provide more transparency in future resolution decisions;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 273 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Notes that, while the concern about the mismatch between state aid rules and Union legislation as expressed in the previous report5 related to the ability of deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) to participate in resolution as provided for in the BRRD and DGSD, the 2017 banking cases brought to light other areas of mismatch, in particular thehighlighted the still extant possibility for the Member States to intervene in support of their banking sectors and their citizens by using the opportunity to avoid being subject to the discipline of the BRRD - literally - by paying ‘liquidation aid’; _________________ 5 European Parliament, Resolution of 15 February 2017 on ‘Banking Union – Annual Report 2016’, paragraph 38.
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 293 #

2017/2072(INI)

14. WelcomNotes the SRB’s stated prioritisation of enhancing resolvability of credit institutions, as well as the progress made but also the slow progress made, as well as the inadequacy of the results achieved, in developing minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) targets in the framework of institution- specific resolution strategies;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 306 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for progress to be made on the legislative proposals implemeOpposes the inclusion of a pre- resolution moratorium tool in the BRRD; strongly criticises the ECB proposal of 8 November 2017 containg total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) in Union law; supports the inclusion of a pre-resolution moratorium tool in the BRRDed in the 'Opinion of the ECB of 8 November 2017 on revisions to the Union crisis management framework(CON/2017/47), paragraph 5 point 1' ; Believes that freezing accounts below EUR 100 000 would have a devastating impact on confidence in the banking system and the protection of savers and their right, as enshrined in numerous national constitutions;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 311 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for progress to be made on the legislative proposals implementing total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) in Union law; supports the inclusion of a pre- resolution moratorium tool in the BRRD;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 363 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Recalls that deposit protection is a common concern for all EU citizens; is currently debating the proposal on an EDIS at committee level; notes, in this respect, the Commission’s more proportionate ‘new approach’ to an EDIS as put forward in its communication of 11 October 2017;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 373 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Notes the potential benefits andserious risk situation facing European depositors: governments are not permitted to support their banks and, as we wait for eligible liquidity to be put in place (which will take a number of years), it is the depositors who will see their likely risks related toquidity absorbed and lost with bank resolutions, in a situation in which the financial robustness of national debt guarantee provisions is weakened by constraints on monetary sovereignty and the introduction of anthe EDIS; considers, therefore, risk reduction measures to be essential building blocks laying the foundations for an EDIS remains blocked until further notice; considers, therefore, that a backward step has to be taken and the Banking Union dismantled in preference to remaining in this maximum-risk, minimum-protection situation;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 386 #

2017/2072(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22a. Underlines that, as in all advanced systems, a public backstop is needed to ensure effective deposit protection; points out that the ECB is the institution able to guarantee unlimited protection for all euro-denominated current accounts in the banking union;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 15 #

2017/0810(COD)

Proposal for a decision
Recital 4
Bank (4) Significant developments at both global and European level are expected to increase the risk that disturbances affecting clearing systems, in particular central counterparties (CCPs), threaten the smooth operation of payment systems and implementation ofhence the sfingle monetary policy, ultimately affectingancial stability of the Eeurosystem’s primary objective of maintaining price stability area Member States.
2018/06/12
Committee: ECONAFCO
Amendment 20 #

2017/0810(COD)

Proposal for a decision
Recital 7
Bank (7) In order to address these issues, on 13 June 2017 the Commission presented its legislative proposal seeking to ensure financial stability and the safety and soundness of CCPs that are of systemic relevance for financial markets across the Union. In order to ensure that the Eurospean System as cof Central bBank of issue for the euro can carry out the role envisaged by the legislative proposal, it is of utmost importance that it has the relevant powers under the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB. In particular, the Eurosystems can nevertheless carry out the role of lender of last resort to market infrastructures, it is of utmost importance that it has the relevant powers. In particular, the ESCB national central banks should each have regulatory powers to adopt binding assessments and require remedial action, in close cooperation with the other Union authoritiesnational central banks concerned. Moreover, where necessary to protect the stability of the euro, the ESCB national central banks should also have the regulatory powers to adopt additional requirements for CCPs involved in the clearing of significant amounts of euro- denominated transactions.
2018/06/12
Committee: ECONAFCO
Amendment 25 #

2017/0810(COD)

Proposal for a decision
Recital 8
Bank (8) Article 22 of the Statute of the ESCB is part of Chapter IV ‘Monetary functions and operations of the ESCB’. TheSince the new tasks conferred therein should accordingly onlywill not be used only for monetary policy purposes, Chapter IV should accordingly become 'Functions performed by the ESCB'.
2018/06/12
Committee: ECONAFCO
Amendment 32 #

2017/0810(COD)

Proposal for a decision
Recital 9
Bank (9) For these reasons, the ESCB national central banks should be granted regulatory competence over clearing systems, in particular CCPs, by means of an amendment to Article 22 of the Statute of the ESCB,
2018/06/12
Committee: ECONAFCO
Amendment 34 #

2017/0810(COD)

Proposal for a decision
Recital 9 a (new)
Bank (9a) The reconsideration of the ESCB Statute serves to demonstrate, moreover, that the ECB and the ESCB national central banks are intrinsically no different from the American Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of China, and others: in addition to the declared objective of monetary stability, the ECB and the ESCB national central banks pursue the equally important aim of bringing about convergence towards full employment and maintaining the expansion of economic activity at an optimum level.
2018/06/12
Committee: ECONAFCO
Amendment 35 #

2017/0810(COD)

Proposal for a decision
Recital 9 b (new)
Bank (9b) Action by national central banks to promote full employment and growth should naturally be taken in close coordination with democratically elected national authorities.
2018/06/12
Committee: ECONAFCO
Amendment 36 #

2017/0810(COD)

Proposal for a decision
Recital 9 c (new)
Bank (9c) In particular, national central banks should reach agreement with the democratically elected authorities in their Member States on the best way to continue the operations of buying back and sterilising national government debt in order to free euro area Member States from the debt trap, which, having been created artificially, has gradually tightened up over several decades.
2018/06/12
Committee: ECONAFCO
Amendment 43 #

2017/0810(COD)

Proposal for a decision
Article premier – paragraph 1
Statute of the European System of Central banks and of the European Central Bank
Article 22
Bank The ECB and national central banks may provide facilities, and the ECB and national central banks may make regulations, to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems, and clearing systems for financial instruments, within the Union and with other countries. In addition to monetary stability, national central banks shall have the task of contributing to convergence of the Member States' economies towards full employment and of helping to establish optimum economic growth. These national central bank tasks shall be closely coordinated with the democratically elected authorities of each Member State.
2018/06/12
Committee: ECONAFCO
Amendment 10 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)
- having regard to the report of the Eurogroup to the Heads of State and Government of 4 December 2018 and the annex thereto on the arrangements for the reform of the European Stability Mechanism,
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 12 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 b (new)
- having regard to the statement adopted at the euro area summit on 14 December 2018,
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 28 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas the introduction of the euro ishas been one of the European project’s most significant political achievements and a cornerstone of EMU constructionmost political achievements, with the most serious implications, for the European project, most of the Member States now being locked into EMU with no way out;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 36 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas the twenty years of its existence and the financial and economic crisis hasve revealed the weaknesses of the euro architecture, highlighting the need for the swift completiona thorough overhaul of the EMU;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 53 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas membership of a common currency area certainly requires common rules and obligations, as well abut also requires common tools to respond to symmetric and asymmetric shocks and for the promotion of solidarity and socioeconomic upward convergence; whereas risk reduction and risk sharing should go hand in hand in deepeningwith a thorough overhaul of the governance of the EMU;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 64 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and its later transformation into the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) have represented, despite its intergovernmental nature, an important step towards the creation of a European crisis management mechanism, helping to partially respond to the weaknesses of the EMU and providing financial assistance to several European countries affected by the crisis;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 71 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Recital E
E. whereas the intergovernmental nature of the ESM has implications on its decision-making process, which risks undermining the ESM’s capacity to respond swiftly to economic and financial shocksensuring a minimum of democratic control over its decision-making;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 74 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Recital F
F. whereas the future incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework should continue to be understood as part of the EMU completion projectis a further step towards creating a new bureaucratic structure completely beyond any effective democratic control, as is already the case with the ECB;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 79 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Recital G
G. whereas the ongoing debate on the future of Europe and the EMU has highlighted differing political views among Member States on the long-term future of the ESM, but also provides a good basis and whereas this debate is therefore an important first step towards good reason to reconsider the need to support the strengthening of its role, and the developingment of its financial tools and improvingto question its efficiency and above all its democratic accountability as part of the ESM reform;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 81 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Recital H
H. whereas in the short term, the ESM reform should contribute in particular to making the banking union more sustainable and less dysfunctional, providing a proper common financial backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), without prejudice to the need tolosing sight of the fact that the impossibility of establishing a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) demonstrates the failure of the Banking Union and, in the face of more risks and negative consequences than positive consequences, the need to reverse this incomplete and harmful reform;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 95 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. WelcomNotes the Commission’s proposal of 6 December 2017 for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund and considers it a useful, although inadequate, contribution to the ongoing debate on the future of Europe, the completionreform of the EMU and reconsideration of the role of the ESM reform;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 111 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Highlights that the proper functioning of an EMU depends on the existence of an institution serving as a ‘lender of last resort’; acknowledges, in this context, the positive contribution of the ESM, despite its intergovernmental naturethe inadequacy of its financial capacity, towards addressing the weaknesses of the institutional setting of the EMU, namely by providing financial assistance to several Member States affected by the financial crisis and the Great Recession;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 117 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Recalls that this role of ‘lender of last resort’ is naturally one for the European Central Bank, or, failing that, for each national central bank, and that the reform of the EMU should underline this role and abandon the ideology that prevailed at the time of drafting of the Maastricht Treaty and which gave rise to the euro area debt crisis twenty years later;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 119 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls its previous positions in favour ofagainst the incorporation of the ESM into the EU legal framework, which would make it a fully-fledged EU body; insists that this incorporation, i.e. a bureaucratic entity disconnected from effective democratic control, as is currently the case with the ECB; stresses that the establishment of effective mechanisms for democratic scrutiny of the ECB’s action as well as that of the future ESF should continue to be understoodseen as part of the EMU completionreform project; believes that such an integration would allow for management in accordance with the Community method, ensure the full consistency of fiscal rules and obligations, facilitat reform would permit democratic management and ensure economic efficiency, unlike systems designed to impose austerity and a permanent, covert financial crisis; considers that economic and fiscal policy coordination is necessary, but must also address the reconomic and fiscal policy coordination, and enhance democratic legitimacy and accountability through the European Parliamentessionary impact on their neighbours of predatory policies in countries with excessive twofold surpluses, both external and budgetary; recalls that the enhancement of the democratic legitimacy of the governance of the euro area and of its institutions, such as the ECB or the ESM, should on no account be achieved by increasing the powers of the European Parliament, whose ‘supervision’ of the ECB is clearly a comedy that fools nobody as regards its total lack of reality;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 140 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that the Commission’s proposal has generated a lively discussion on its political, financial and legal implications, and that discussions continue on a number of important issues; stresses, however, that this debate on the long-term vision of the ESM’s institutional setting should not delay the steps urgently required to strengthenreform the EMU and its capacity to promote financial stability and respond to economic shocks; calls, therefore, for a meaningful ESM reform in the short term by means of a revision of the ESM Treaty, without prejudice to more ambitious developments in the future;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 146 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Underlines that the primary mission of the new ESF should continue to be to provide transitional financial assistance to Member States in need, on the basis of the agreed adjustment programmes; stresses that the ESF must have adequate firepower for that purpose; opposes, therefore, any attempt to turn the reformed ESM into an instrument for banks only, or to reduce its financial capacity to support Member States; recalls that financial assistance provided to Member States under the new ESF has to be complemented by other fiscal capacity tools, including precautionary instruments, to promote economic and financial stabilisation, investment and upward socioeconomic convergence in the euro area;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 166 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Believes that the reformed ESM should play a more prominent role in the management of financial assistance programmes, alongside the Commission and in close cooperation with the ECB, ensuring that the EU institutional framework has more autonomy whenever needed, under effective democratic control, without prejudice to appropriate partnerships with other institutions, namely the International Monetary Fund;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 215 #

2017/0333R(APP)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Underlines the risks arising from the delay in completing the Banking Union, which mean that the incomplete banking union is far more dangerous to financial stability than the absence of a banking union; welcomes, in this context, the European Council’s commitment to a common backstop for the SRF and recalls the need also to establish the EDIS; stresses that, in particular in the absence of EDIS, it is preferable to undo the entire Banking Union;
2019/01/09
Committee: BUDGECON
Amendment 31 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
(1) Foreign direct investment contributes to the Union'sEU Member States' growth, by enhancing itstheir competitiveness, creating jobs and economies of scale, bringing in capital, technologies, innovation, expertise, and by opening new markets for the Union's exports. It supports the objectives of the Commission's Investment Plan for Europe and contributes to other Union projects and programmes.
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 37 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
(6) Foreign direct investments are essentially stakes in the capital of companies, and do not therefore falls within the scope of common commercial policy. In accordance witht must be borne in mind that under Article 3(1)(e) TFEU, the European Union has an exclusive competence with respect to the common commercial policy, which does not apply to foreign direct investments.
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 40 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
(7) It is important to provide legal certainty and to ensure EU wide coordination and cooperation by establishingThe establishment of a framework for the screening of foreign direct investment in the Union on grounds of security or public order. This isshould be without prejudice to the sole responsibility of the Member States for the maintenance of national security and public order.
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 45 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) The framework for the screening of foreign direct investment should provide the Member States and the Commission with the means to address risks to security or public order in a comprehensive manner, and to adapt to changing circumstances, whilst maintaining the necessary flexibility for Member States to screen foreign direct investments on grounds of security and public order taking into account their individual situations and national circumstances.
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 48 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
(10) Member States should be able to take the necessary measures, in compliance with Union law, to prevent circumvention of their screening mechanisms and decisions to protect security or public order. This should cover cross-border investments within the Union by means of artificial arrangements that do not reflect economic reality and circumvent the screening mechanisms and screening decisions, in particular - but not only - where the investor is ultimately owned or controlled by a natural person or an undertaking of a third country. This is without prejudice to the freedom of establishment and free movement of capital enshrined in the TFEU.
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 51 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) To guide Member States and the Commission in the application of the Regulation, it is appropriate to provide a list of factors that may be taken into consideration when screening foreign direct investment on the grounds of security or public order. This list will also improve transparency of the screening process for investors considering making or having made foreign direct investments in the Union. This list of factors that may affect security or public order should remain non-exhaustive.
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 53 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
(12) In determining whether a foreign direct investment may affect security or public order, Member States and the Commission should be able to consider all relevant factors, including the effects on critical infrastructure, technologies, including key enabling technologies, and inputs which are essential for security or the maintenance of public order, and the disruption, loss or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State or in the Union. In that regard, Member States and the Commission should also be able to take into account whether a foreign investor is controlled directly or indirectly (e.g. through significant funding, including subsidies) by the government of a third country or large multinational companies. Multinational companies known for their aggressive tax optimisation practices and for systematically relocating production activities should be prevented from depriving the Member States of their economic lifeblood and contributing to the gradual exclusion from society of ever larger numbers of people in the Member States.
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
(13) It is appropriate to lay down the essential elements of the procedural framework for the screening of foreign direct investment by Member States to allow investors, the Commission and other Member States to understand how such investments are likely to be screened and to ensure that these investments are screened in a transparent manner and that they are non-discriminatory between third countries. Those elements should at least include the establishment of timeframes for the screening and the possibility for foreign investors to seek judicial redress of screening decisions.deleted
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 69 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
(17) In order to facilitate the cooperation with other Member States and the screening of foreign direct investment by the Commission, Member States should notify their screening mechanisms and any amendment thereto to the Commission, and should report on the application of their screening mechanisms on a regular basis. For the same reason, Member States that do not have a screening mechanism should also report on the foreign direct investments that took place in their territory, on the basis of the information available to them.deleted
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 81 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article premier – paragraph 1
This Regulation helps to establishes a framework for the screening by the Member States and the Commission of foreign direct investments in the Union on the grounds of security or public order.
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 84 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2
2. 'foreign investor' means a natural person of a third country or an undertaking of a third countrycountry other than that Member State or an undertaking of a country other than that Member State intending to make or having made a foreign direct investment;
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 91 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1
1. Member States may maintain, amend or adopt mechanisms to screen foreign direct investments on the grounds of security or public order, under the conditions and in accordance withnotably on the basis of the terms set out in this Regulation.
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 92 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2
2. The Commission, in addition to the Member States, may screen foreign direct investments that are likely to affect projects or programmes of Union interest on the grounds of security or public order.
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 104 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
In screening a foreign direct investment on the grounds of security or public order, Member States and the Commission may consider the potential effects on, inter alia:
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 120 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2
In determining whether a foreign direct investment is likely to affect security or public order, Member States and the Commission may take into account whether the foreign investor is controlled by the government of a third country, including through significant funding, as well as the multinational nature of the foreign investor, in particular its practices concerning tax evasion and aggressive tax optimisation and the systematic relocation of production.
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 134 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7
1. Member States shall notify to the Commission their existing screening mechanisms by […] (30 days of the entry into force of this Regulation) at the latest. Member States shall notify to the Commission any amendment to an existing screening mechanism or any newly adopted screening mechanism within 30 days of entry into force of the screening mechanism at the latest. 2. Member States that maintain screening mechanisms shall provide the Commission with an annual report on the application of their screening mechanisms. For each reporting period, the report shall include in particular information on: (a) foreign direct investments screened and undergoing screening; (b) screening decisions prohibiting foreign direct investments; (c) screening decisions subjecting foreign direct investments to conditions or mitigating measures; (d) the sectors, origin, and value of foreign direct investment screened and undergoing screening. 3. Member States that do not maintain screening mechanisms shall provide the Commission with an annual report covering foreign directs investments that took place in their territory, on the basis of information available to them.Article 7 deleted Notification by Member States of screening mechanisms and annual reporting
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 144 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall inform the Commission and the other Member States of any foreign direct investments that are undergoing screening within the framework of their screening mechanisms, within 530 working days from the start of the screening. As part of the information, and when applicable, the screening Member States shall endeavour to indicate whether it considers that the foreign direct investment undergoing screening is likely to fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) No 139/2004.
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 175 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1
1. The Commission shall evaluate and present to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the application of this Regulation no later than 3five years after its entry into force. Member States shall be involved in this exercise and shall provide the Commission with necessary information for the preparation of that report.
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 176 #

2017/0224(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2
2. Where the report recommends modifying the provisions of the Regulation, the report may be accompanied by an appropriate legislative proposal.deleted
2018/02/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 184 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 a (new)
(1a) A substantial part of old age pensions is provided under public schemes, so that there is a direct connection between national pension systems and the sustainability of public finances. Given the exclusive national competence regarding the organisation of pension systems as determined by the Treaties, only the Member States are responsible for income adequacy and financial sustainability of national pension systems.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 189 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 b (new)
(1b) The Union is facing several challenges, including demographic challenges because of the fact that Europe is an ageing continent. In addition, career patterns, the labour market and the distribution of wealth are undergoing radical changes, not least as a result of the digital revolution. At the same time, it is increasingly clear that national security systems are not adjusted to a globalised knowledge economy with open borders, labour mobility and migration which should be cause for a halt to immigration and a stop to social dumping. Too many people are not, or are inadequately covered by the traditional national pension systems.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 194 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 c (new)
(1c) Priority should be given to further developing, strengthening and reforming the first (public) and second (occupational) pillars of the national pensions systems. However, it is expected that the share of first pillar pay-as-you-go public pensions as part of the placement rate will decline. This could be partly compensated by accrued pension entitlements from second pillar funded schemes. But a well-developed third pillar could and should contribute substantially to improving the adequacy and sustainability of the existing national pension systems. It should stay an exclusive national competence.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 210 #

2017/0143(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 a (new)
(3a) The European pension market is highly fragmented and diverse, so PEPP cannot be implemented without encroaching upon the competences of the Member States. In Member States where the first and second pillar are insufficiently developed, PEPP might override national solutions for people who do not currently have access to adequate provisions. In Member States with highly developed pension markets, the PEPP could cannibalise the national first and second pillar.
2018/04/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #

2017/0138(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 2
(2) Most Member States find it increasingly difficult to protect their national tax bases from erosion as taxlegal tax avoidance planning structures have evolved to be particularly sophisticated and often take advantage of the increasedoverall mobility of both capital and persons within the internal market. These structures commonly consist of arrangements which are developed across variousA small number of Member States are with impunity taking outrageous advantage of this opportunity offered to multinationals, especially American multinationals, to artificially channel their taxable profits earned in various EU Member States into jurisdictions andoffering movre taxable profits towards more beneficial tax regimes or have the effect of reducing the taxpayer´s overall tax billfavourable conditions, such as Ireland and Luxembourg, whose tax regimes are deliberately designed and tailored to ensure that the overall tax bill payable by these multinationals is kept to a minimum. As a result, Member States often experience considerable reductions in their tax revenues which hinder them from applying growth-friendly taxbudgetary policies. It is therefore critical that Member States' tax authorities obtain comprehensive and relevant information about potentially aggressive tax arrangements. This information would enable those authorities to be able to promptly react against harmful tax practices and to close loopholes through enacting legislation or by undertaking adequate risk assessments and carrying out tax audits.
2017/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 40 #

2017/0138(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 6
(6) The disclosure of potentially aggressive tax planning arrangements of a cross-border dimension can contribute effectively to the efforts for creating an environment of fair taxation in the internal market and strengthen the collective pressure on those Member States that abuse freedom of movement of capital and EU company law provisions in a bid to attract the tax base of other Member States. In this light, an obligation on intermediaries to inform tax authorities on certain cross-border arrangements that could potentially be used for tax avoidance purposes would constitute a step in the right direction. In order to develop a more comprehensive policy, it would also be significant that as a second step, following disclosure, the tax authorities share information with their peers in other Member States. Such arrangements should also enhance the effectiveness of the CRS. In addition, it would be crucial to grant the Commission access to a sufficient amount of information so that it can monitor the proper functioning of this Directive. Such access to information by the Commission does not discharge a Member State from its obligations to notify any state aid to the Commission.
2017/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 113 #

2017/0136(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2 a (new)
(2a) Due in particular to the obligation to provide central clearing as a result of cross-sectoral G20 cooperation from 2008 onwards, and against a backdrop in which cross-border interoperability has been enforced on market infrastructures, market risks are being concentrated amongst CCPs more than ever before, and the way they are interconnected is increasing the risk of a domino effect and of the global financial system collapsing as the result of just one CCP going bankrupt.
2018/04/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 21 #

2017/0134(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
(1) TAmong other reasons, the increasing share of the Union’s own resources based on the gross national income at market prices (‘GNI’) of the Member States makes it necessaryimplies that it might be advisable to further reinforce the comparability, reliability and exhaustiveness of this aggregate.
2017/11/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 24 #

2017/0134(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
(2) Statistical integrity through respect ofor the principles of the European Statistics Code of Practice, as reviewed and updated by the European Statistical System Committee on 28 September 2011, and ofor Regulation (EC) No 223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council17, is of particular importanceimportant, in particular where statistics are being used directly for administrative purposes. _________________ 17 Regulation (EC) No 223/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009 on European statistics and repealing Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1101/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the transmission of data subject to statistical confidentiality to the Statistical Office of the European Communities, Council Regulation (EC) No 322/97 on Community Statistics, and Council Decision 89/382/EEC, Euratom establishing a Committee on the Statistical Programmes of the European Communities (OJ L 87, 31.3.2009, p. 164).
2017/11/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 30 #

2017/0134(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
(8) In order to ensuremake for uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation by providing GNI data for own resources purposes, implementing poweradvisory powers in relation to national statistical offices should be conferred on the Commission tofor the purposes of takeing measures concerning the inventory of the sources and methods used to calculate GNI and its components according to ESA 2010 and measures aimed at improving the comparability, reliability and exhaustiveness of Member States’ GNI. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council20. _________________ 20 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by the Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13).
2017/11/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 31 #

2017/0134(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
(9) Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 608/201421 provides for inspections visits in Member States for the purpose of verifying own resources. In addition to those inspections, the Commission should be entitled to carry out GNI information visits to national statistical authorities in order to help ensure that GNI data isare comparable, reliable and exhaustive. The participation of representatives of national statistical authorities in GNI information visits to other Member States should contribute to the transparency ofmight provide an interesting adjunct to the process of GNI verificobservation. _________________ 21 Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 608/2014 of 26 May 2014 laying down implementing measures for the system of own resources of the European Union (OJ L 168, 7.6.2014, p. 29).
2017/11/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 33 #

2017/0134(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) The GNI Committee referred to in Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1287/200322 has issued opinions, provided advice to, and assisted the Commission in the exercise of its implementing powers. Under the strategy for a new European Statistical System structure to improve coordination and partnership in a clear pyramid structure within the System, the European Statistical System Committee, established by Regulation (EC) No 223/2009, should have an advisory role and assist the Commission in exercising its implementing powercarrying out its activity of advising national statistical offices. To that effect, the GNI Committee should be replaced by the ESSC for the purpose of assisting the Commission in the exercise of its implementing poweractivity of advising the statistical authorities of the Member States under the current Regulation. Nevertheless, for the purposes of other functions previously undertaken by the GNI Committee under Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1287/2003, and not relating to assistance to the Commission in the exercise of the implementing powers of the Commissionits powers, the Commission should establish a formal expert group to assist it for such other purposes. _________________ 22 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1287/2003 of 15 July 2003 on the harmonisation of gross national income at market prices (GNI Regulation) (OJ L 181, 19.7.2003, p. 1).
2017/11/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 34 #

2017/0134(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. In accordance with point 8.89 of Annex A to Regulation (EU) No 549/2013, GDP means the final result of the production activity of resident producer units. It can be defined primarily in three ways:
2017/11/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 39 #

2017/0134(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 2
2. Before the end of September of each year, Member States shall provide the Commission (Eurostat), in the context of national accounting procedures, with figures for aggregate GNI and its components, in accordance with the definitions referred to in Article 1. Totals for GDP and its components may be presented in accordance with the three approaches referred to in Article 1(2). The figures provided shall cover the preceding year and any changes made to the figures for previous years.
2017/11/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 40 #

2017/0134(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2
2. The Commission shall establish, by means of implementing acts,, in coordination with the statistical authorities of the Member States, shall propose the detailed structure and content of the inventory referred to in paragraph 1, as well as the timetable for its updating. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2).
2017/11/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 45 #

2017/0134(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2
2. The Commission shall establish, by means of implementing acts,propose measures to make GNI data more comparable, reliable and exhaustive. Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 7(2).
2017/11/22
Committee: ECON
Amendment 33 #

2016/2270(INI)

Draft opinion
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas wealth inequalities, in Europe and all over the world, have risen to a level that is both unprecedented and unacceptable, as can be seen from the fact that a handful of multibillionaires own more than the majority of the population;
2017/05/10
Committee: ECON
Amendment 34 #

2016/2270(INI)

Draft opinion
Recital C b (new)
Cb. whereas this situation is a direct result of globalisation and of the liberal market deregulation policies advocated by the EU, which are enabling multinationals to take advantage of the lowest production costs, a worldwide market, and the possibility of escaping tax with the aid of tax planning;
2017/05/10
Committee: ECON
Amendment 45 #

2016/2270(INI)

Draft opinion
Recital D a (new)
Da. whereas the share-out of wealth created within the economy needs to be substantially adjusted in favour of labour;
2017/05/10
Committee: ECON
Amendment 120 #

2016/2270(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Points out that no redistribution policy is possible unless the number of beneficiaries remains reasonably constant and that mass migration, combined with equal access to social entitlements, would spell the swift collapse of any welfare system, the only way out in such a situation being colossal borrowing, which would, however, eventually prove unsustainable;
2017/05/10
Committee: ECON
Amendment 124 #

2016/2270(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 b (new)
4b. Considers that the way to eradicate poverty is not to open borders in order to import poverty into Europe, but, rather, to help create the conditions for development in countries of origin, not least by halting the plundering of their natural resources by greedy multinationals and corrupt governments;
2017/05/10
Committee: ECON
Amendment 125 #

2016/2247(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes, however, that modifying its prudential treatment could have a significant effect on the financial sector, which and create a dangerous instrument by means of which the markets and the ECB could exert pressure on elected governments, and therefore calls for caution in reform efforts; awaits with interest the results of the international work on this issue; considers that, in the end, a better regulatory framework, be it European or international, will be needed;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 357 #

2016/2247(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Criticises even more strongly the fact that the EU institutions, including Parliament, have abandoned the plan to separate banking functions properly, even though the only way to guarantee deposits effectively is to isolate them from high- risk activities;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 359 #

2016/2247(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)
18b. Points out that the Banking Union poses the biggest threat to depositors because it provides for banks to be rescued by means of a bail-in;
2016/12/20
Committee: ECON
Amendment 10 #

2016/2224(INI)

Draft opinion
Recital B
B. whereas whistle-blowing is not restricted to economic and financial matters, and is especially important in the fields of health and the environment, and persons who report or disclose information in the public interest often suffer reprisals, as do family members and colleagues, resulting for example in the loss of their careers;
2017/07/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #

2016/2224(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
2. Points out the need to ensure that whistle-blowers are able to report not only illegal activities but also wrongdoing and any information in the public interest, particularly in regard to working conditions and the dignity of the individual, but also anything that is morally wrong;
2017/07/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 65 #

2016/2224(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
4. Stresses that whistle-blowers should not bear the burden of proof when it comes to demonstrating that they acted in good faith, as what matters is whether the information disclosed is in the public interest, or and exposes wrongdoing and other misconduct;
2017/07/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 24 #

2016/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas, in theory, competition prevents the over-concentration of economic and financial power in the hands of a few, but whereas in reality the global and European economies are characterised by exactly the opposite result;
2016/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 77 #

2016/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Reiterates that all market players should pay their fair share of tax; Wwelcomes the Commission’s in-depth investigations into anti-competitive practices such as selective tax advantages or excess profit ruling systems; calls on the Commission to consider amending state aid rules to allow the Member States where the profits from these operations were generated to benefit from the revenues obtained from the fines, in the event that penalties are applied;
2016/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 178 #

2016/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Welcomes the Commission’s investigations into certain anti-competitive practices by a number of companies, in particularly Google, Amazon, Qualcomm and other media companies, film studios and TV distributors; calls on the Commission to speed up all procedures against behaviour which infringes EU antitrust rules and to ensure that the fines imposed are actually paid in full;
2016/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 242 #

2016/2100(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Stresses that – as the Commission has stated for the sixth time in its annual competition report – the temporary state aid granted in the financial sector was necessary for the stabilisation of the global financial system, but must quickly be reduced, or totally removed and scrutinised, once and that it will in future be unavoidable, whether directly or through guarantee mechanisms, given the fragility of the Bbanking Union is complesector in some Member Stateds;
2016/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 283 #

2016/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
28. Asks the EIB to continue its action to tackle the refugee crisis by financing emergency projects in countries of destination and making long-term investments in the refugees’ countries of originvesting in the long term in countries of origin, as that may help their populations to find a future and contribute to lessening economic migrant flows into European countries;
2016/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 298 #

2016/2099(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
29. Asks the EIB to continue its social housing project lending in the Member States in order to cope with the large number of refugees in the EU Member Stateshomeless or insecurely housed citizens in the Union;
2016/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 98 #

2016/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3
Role of financial institutiontax advisers, banks, law and accountancy firms and other intermediaries in aggressive tax planning by multinational enterprises (MNEs)
2016/06/02
Committee: TAX2
Amendment 102 #

2016/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital L
L. whereas some financial institutiontax advisers, banks, law and accountancy firms and other intermediaries have played a role as intermediaries in setting up complex legal structures leading to aggressive tax planning schemes used by MNEs, as evidenced in ‘LuxLeaks’ and the ‘Panama Papers’; whereas legal loopholes and lack of coordination, cooperation and transparency between countries create an environment that facilitates tax evasion; whereas banks could have played a positive role in combating the erosion of national tax bases by, for instance, using the means of exchange of information at their disposal in a more cooperative spirit;
2016/06/02
Committee: TAX2
Amendment 160 #

2016/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital AE a (new)
AEa. Whereas many of these banks and multinationals merely stated, in their hearings, that they scrupulously complied with the tax rules in force, refusing to accept their share of the responsibility for the scandals or admit their clear intention to circumvent tax laws through artificial arrangements; whereas they thereby openly expressed defiance of the sovereignty of the States and the authority of the European Parliament;
2016/06/02
Committee: TAX2
Amendment 211 #

2016/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Welcomes the agreement in Council on 8 December 2015 on automatic exchange of information on tax rulings; stresses that the Commission should have full access to the new Union database of tax rulings; insists on the need for a comprehensive and efficient database of all rulings having potential cross-border effect;
2016/06/02
Committee: TAX2
Amendment 355 #

2016/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. Calls on all EU institutions to refrain from using the services of banks, law firms, accountancy firms and other intermediaries which have actively taken part in evasion, fraud or aggressive tax optimisation schemes over a significant period of time, and to end any existing arrangements linking them to such providers;
2016/06/02
Committee: TAX2
Amendment 381 #

2016/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
28. Reiterates the crucial role of whistleblowers in revealing misconduct and illegal and wrongful por unethical practices, particularly when carried out by corporations seeking only to maximise profits at the expense of the resources of public administracticons, solidarity mechanisms and public health schemes; considers that such revelations, whichen they shine a light on the magnitude of tax evasion and avoidance, are clearly in the public interest, as demonstrated in the recent ‘Panama papers’ leak;
2016/06/02
Committee: TAX2
Amendment 428 #

2016/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
35. Calls on the Commission, in case of an unsatisfactory response on the part of the Member States, to present a legislative proposal to incorporate the Code of Conduct Group into the Community method;deleted
2016/06/02
Committee: TAX2
Amendment 455 #

2016/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
38. Calls for the creation of a new Union Tax Policy Coherence and Coordination Centre to guarantee the proper and coherent functioning of the single market and the implementation of international standards; believes that this new body should be in charge of monitoring Member States’ tax policies at Union level, of ensuring that no new harmful tax measures are implemented by Member States, of monitoring compliance of Member States with the common Union list of uncooperative jurisdictions, of ensuring and fostering cooperation between national tax administrations (e.g. training and exchange of best practices), and of initiating academic programmes in the field; believes that by doing so this Centre could help prevent new tax loopholes emerging thanks to uncoordinated policy initiatives between Member States, and counteract tax practices and standards that would upset, obstruct or interfere in the proper functioning and rationale of the single market; considers that the Centre could benefit from the pooling of expertise at Union and national level, so as to reduce the burden on the taxpayer;deleted
2016/06/02
Committee: TAX2
Amendment 516 #

2016/2038(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 46 a (new)
46a. Calls on the Member States to recover the sums diverted from their tax resources through illegal or abusive arrangements or strategies, and to use all the resources available under their tax control legislation for this purpose; recommends, moreover, that they do not compromise by accepting excessively small amounts, which could act as an undue reward for avoidance strategies, particularly in respect of the most profitable multinationals that have made widespread use of such strategies;
2016/06/02
Committee: TAX2
Amendment 56 #

2016/2032(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Recalls that special efforts should be made as regards funding for transferring SMEs to European buyers, where they are in competition with buyers outside the EU;
2016/04/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 219 #

2016/2032(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
25. WelcomesRetains reservations about the Commission’s proposals for a framework for simple, transparent and standardised (STS) securitisation and the calibration of the prudential requirements for banks; notes the possible effects of SME securitisation for bank lending to SMEs;
2016/04/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 3 #

2016/2007(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 19 a (new)
– having regard to the statements made by political and business leaders about a ‘world without cash’ at the World Economic Forum at Davos in January 2016,
2016/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 11 #

2016/2007(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas virtual money is not a means of exchange and cannot replace national currencies,
2016/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 14 #

2016/2007(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C b (new)
Cb. whereas the progress made in the area of virtual currencies should not be a reason for creating a society without liquid money,
2016/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 17 #

2016/2007(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C c (new)
Cc. whereas the right to bear physical money is a fundamental civil liberty and the abolition of that right would leave whole peoples largely dependent on financial institutions,
2016/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 18 #

2016/2007(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C d (new)
Cd. whereas virtual money should be under the control of national authorities and national central banks,
2016/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 25 #

2016/2007(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – point a
(a) dramatsignificalntly lowering transaction costs for payments and transfer of funds, quite possibly well below 1 %, compared to 2 % - 4 % for traditional online payment systems, and to more than 7 % on average for the cross-border transfer of remittances, hence potentially reducing global total costs for remittances by up to EUR 20 billion; __________________ 21 https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/101 80/657547/EBA-Op-2014- 08+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf 22 https://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/site s/default/files/rpw_report_december_2015. pdf
2016/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 70 #

2016/2007(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Notes, however, that neither the ways in which distributed ledgers are used nor the technology behind them have reached maturity: it is not yet possible, for example, to shift all a listed company’s securities from a regulated market to a distributed ledger because the volume of data that needs to be processed is too high – no distributed ledger can, as yet, cope with the sheer volume of data that has to be processed when an issuer launches a complex securities operation;
2016/03/30
Committee: ECON
Amendment 128 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 18
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1 – point i
18. In Article 27(1), the following point (i) is added: ‘(i) Article 29a are complied with, suspend any payment or delivery obligation to which an institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) is a party.’.deleted where the conditions laid down in
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 134 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 29a
[...]deleted
2018/01/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 192 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the total risk exposure amountliabilities of the relevant entity referred to in paragraph 1 calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013,
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 385 #

2016/0362(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45e
[...]deleted
2018/01/31
Committee: ECON
Amendment 112 #

2016/0361(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 e – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) any additional requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities determined by the resolution authority specific to the entity in accordance with paragraph 2, which shall be met with liabilities that meet the conditions of Article 12c.deleted
2018/02/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 475 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 39 – point a
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 92 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) a leverage ratio of 3%.. 9% in 2025; The leverage ratio will be set at 3% in 2019 and rise in annual steps to reach 9% by 2025. Institutions shall set their leverage ratio as follows: 4% by 2020; 5% by 2021; 6% by 2022; 7% by 2023; 8% by 2024; 9% by 2025.
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 519 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 94 – paragraph 3 – point a – point i
(i) positions concerning foreign- exchange and commodities;
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 560 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 124 – paragraph 2
(52a) In Article 124, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: "(2) Based on the data collected under Article 101, and any other relevant indicators, the competent authorities shall periodically, and at least annually, assess whether the risk-weight of 310 % or 25 % for exposures secured by mortgages on residential property referred to in Article 125 and the risk weight of 540 % for exposures secured on commercial immovable property referred to in Article 126 located in their territory are appropriately based on: (a) the loss experience of exposures secured by immovable property; (b) forward-looking immovable property markets developments; Competent authorities may set a higher risk weight or stricter criteria than those set out in Article 125(2) and Article 126(2), where appropriate, on the basis of financial stability considerations. For exposures secured by mortgages on residential property, the competent authority shall set the risk weight at a percentage from 3510 % to 150 %. For exposures secured on commercial immovable property, the competent authority shall set the risk weight at a percentage from 540 % through 150 %, Within these ranges, the higher risk weight shall be set based on loss experience and taking into account forward-looking markets developments and financial stability considerations. Where the assessment demonstrates that the risk weights set out in Article 125(2) and Article 126(2) do not reflect the actual risks related to one or more property segments of such exposures, fully secured by mortgages on residential property or on commercial immovable property located in one or more parts of its territory, the competent authorities shall set, for those property segments of exposures, a higher risk weight corresponding to the actual risks. The competent authorities shall consult EBA on the adjustments to the risk weights and criteria applied, which will be calculated in accordance with the criteria set out in this paragraph as specified by the regulatory technical standards referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article. EBA shall publish the risk weights and criteria that the competent authorities set for exposures referred to in Articles 125, 126 and 199(1)(a)." (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32013R0575&rid=1)Or. en
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 563 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 125 – paragraph 1 – point a
(52b) In paragraph 1 of Article 125, point (a) is replaced by the following: "(a) exposures or any part of an exposure fully and completely secured by mortgages on residential property which is or shall be occupied or let by the owner, or the beneficial owner in the case of personal investment companies, shall be assigned a risk weight of 35 %;" 10% or 25% in accordance with the conditions of paragraph 2;" Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32013R0575&from=EN)
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 570 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 125 – paragraph 2 – point d
(52a) In paragraph 2 of Article 125, point (d) is replaced by the following: "(d) unless otherwise determined under Article 124(2), the part of the loan to which the 3510 % risk weight is assigned does not exceed 80 % of the market value of the property in question or 80 % of the mortgage lending value of the property in question in those Member States that have laid down rigorous criteria for the assessment of the mortgage lending value in statutory or regulatory provisions. ; the part of the loan which exceeds 80% of the market value of the property in question or 80% of the mortgage lending value of the property in question receives a risk weighting of 25%." Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32013R0575&from=EN)
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 602 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) from [date of application of this Regulation], the internal model approach set out in Chapter 1b of this Title only for those positions assigned to trading desks for which the institution has been granted a permission by competent authorities to use that approach as set out in Article 325ba;deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 607 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) until [date of application of this Regulation], the simplified internal model approach set out in Chapter 5 of this Title for those risk categories for which the institution has been granted the permission in accordance with Article 363 to use that approach in. After [date of application of this Regulation], institutions shall no longer use the simplified internal model approach set out in Chapter 5 to determine the own funds requirements for market risks.deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 609 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 – paragraph 3
3. An institution may use in combination the approaches set out in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 on a permanent basis within a group provided that the own funds requirements for market risks calculated under the approach set out in point (a) does not exceed 90% of the total own funds requirements for market risks. Otherwise, the institution shall use the approach set out in point (a) of paragraph 1 for all the positions subject to the own funds requirements for market risks.deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 610 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 – paragraph 4
4. An institution may use in combination the approaches set out in points (c) and (d) of paragraph 1 on a permanent basis within a group in accordance with Article 363.deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 611 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 – paragraph 5
5. An institution shall not use either of the approaches set out in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 in combination with the approach set out in point (c).deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 612 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 – paragraph 6
6. Institutions shall not use the approach set out in point (b) of paragraph 1 for instruments in the trading book that are securitisation positions or positions included in the CTP as defined in paragraphs 7 to 9 of Article 104.deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 613 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 – paragraph 7
7. For the purpose of calculating the own funds requirements for CVA risks using the advanced method set out in Article 383, institutions may continue to use the simplified internal model approach set out in Chapter 5 of this Title after [date of application of this Regulation] at which date institutions shall cease to use that approach for the purposes of calculating the own funds requirements for market risks.deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 614 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 83
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 – paragraph 8
EBA shall develop regulatory technical standards to specify in more detail how institutions shall determine the own funds requirements for market risks for non- trading book positions subject to foreign exchange risk or commodity risk in accordance with the approaches set out in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1.
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 636 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Chapter 1 b
Chapter 1b The internal model approach […]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 637 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b a
Article 325ba Permission to use internal models […]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 641 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b b
Article 325bb Own funds requirements when using internal models […]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 642 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b c
Article 325bc Expected shortfall risk measure […]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 643 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b d
Article 325bd Partial expected shortfall calculations […]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 644 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b e
Article 325be Liquidity horizons […]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 646 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b f
Article 325bf Assessment of the modellability of risk factors […]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 662 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b g
Article 325bg Regulatory back-testing requirements and multiplication factors […]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 663 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b h
Article 325bh Profit and loss attribution requirement […]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 669 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b i
Article 325bi Requirements on risk measurement […]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 673 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b j
Article 325bj Qualitative requirements […]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 675 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b k
Article 325bk Internal Validation […]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 676 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b l
Article 325bl Calculation of stress scenario risk measure […]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 677 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b m
Article 325bm Scope of the internal default risk model […]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 678 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b n
Article 325bn Permission to use an internal default risk model […]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 680 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b o
Article 325bo Own funds requirements for default risk using an internal default risk model […]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 681 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b p
Article 325bp Recognition of hedges in an internal default risk model […]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 682 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 84
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 b q
Article 325bq Particular requirements for an internal default risk model […]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 686 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 88
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Chapter 5
(88) In Title IV of Part Three, the Title of Chapter 5 is replaced by the following:Chapter 5 is deleted.
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 765 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 l – title
Article 428l 530% available stable funding factor
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 778 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 r – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(aa) assets that have a residual maturity of less than six months resulting from secured lending transactions and capital market driven transactions as defined in Article 192(2) and (3) with financial customers, where those assets are collateralised by assets that qualify as Level 1 assets under Title II of Delegated Regulation (EU)2015/61, excluding extremely high quality covered bonds referred to in point (f) of Article 10(1) of that Delegated Regulation, and where the institution would be legally entitled and operationally able to reuse those assets for the life of the transaction, regardless of whether the collateral has already been reused. Institutions shall take those assets into account on a net basis where Article 428e(1) of this Regulation applies;
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 789 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 s – point b
(b) assets that have a residual maturity of less than six months resulting from secured lending transactions and capital market-driven transactions as defined in Article 192(2) and (3) with financial customers, where those assets are collateralised by assets that qualify as Level 1 assets under Title II of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61, excluding extremely high quality covered bonds referred to in point (f) of Article 10(1) of that Delegated Regulation , and where the institution would be legally entitled and operationally able to reuse those assets for the life of the transaction, regardless of whether the collateral has already been reused. Institutions shall take those assets into account on a net basis where Article 428e(1) of this Regulation applies;deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 797 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 s – point b a (new)
(ba) assets that have a residual maturity of less than six months resulting from secured lending transactions and capital market driven transactions as defined in Article192(2) and (3) with financial customers, other than those referred to in point (b) of Article 428s. Those assets shall be taken into account on a net basis where Article428e(1) applies;
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 798 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 s – point b b (new)
(bb) assets that have a residual maturity of less than six months resulting from transactions with financial customers other than those referred to in point (b) of Article428s and in point (a) of this Article;
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 809 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 u – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) assets that have a residual maturity of less than six months resulting from secured lending transactions and capital market-driven transactions as defined in Article 192(2) and (3) with financial customers, other than those referred to in point (b) of Article 428s. Those assets shall be taken into account on a net basis where Article 428e(1) applies;deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 813 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 114
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 428 u – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) assets that have a residual maturity of less than six months resulting from transactions with financial customers other than those referred to in point (b) of Article 428s and in point (a) of this Article;deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1020 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 127
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 501a
Article 501a [...]deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1071 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 128
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 507
(128) Article 507 is replaced by the following: ‘Article 507 Large exposures The EBA shall monitor the use of exemptions set out in Article 390 (6) and Article 400 (1) and Article 400(2) and by [one year after entry into force of the amending Regulation] submit a report to the Commission assessing the quantitative impact that the removal of those exemptions or the setting of a limit on their use would have. The report shall assess, in particular, for each exemption provided for in those Articles: (a) the number of large exposures exempted in each Member State; (b) the number of institutions that make use of the exemption in each Member State; (c) the aggregate amount of exposures exempted in each Member State.;’deleted
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1073 #

2016/0360A(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 128
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 507
"(128) Article 507 Large exposures By 31 December 2015, the Commission shall review and report on the application of Article 400(1)(j) and Article 400(2), including whether the exemptions set out in Article 400(2) is to be discretionary, and shall submit that report to the European Parliament and to the Council, together with a legislative proposal if appropriate. With respect to the potential elimination of the national discretion under Article 400(2)(c) and its potential application at the Union level, the review shall in particular take into account the efficiency of group risk management while ensuring that sufficient safeguards are in place to ensure financial stability in all Member States in which an entity belonging to a group is incorporated." is deleted. deleted Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32013R0575&from=EN)
2018/02/05
Committee: ECON
Amendment 36 #

2016/0336(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
(1) Companies which seek to do business across frontiers within the Union encounter serious obstacles and market distortions owing to the existence and interaction of 28 disparate corporate tax systems. Furthermore,have put in place tax planning structures which have become ever-more sophisticated over time, as they develop across various jurisdictions and effectively take advantage of the technicalities of a tax system or of mismatches between two or more tax systems for the purpose of reducing the tax liability of companies. Although those situations highlight shortcomings that are completely different in nature, they both create obstacles which impede the proper functioning of the internal market. Action to rectify these problems should therefore address both these types of market deficiencies.
2017/09/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 137 #

2016/0336(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 2
2. A company that applies the rules of this Directive shall cease to be subject to the national corporate tax law in respect of all matters regulated by this Directive, unless otherwise stadeleted.
2017/09/29
Committee: ECON
Amendment 123 #

2016/0011(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 2
2. Exceeding borrowing costs shall be deductible in the tax year in which they are incurred only up to 3015 percent of the taxpayer's earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) or up to an amount of EUR 1 000 000, whichever is higher. The EBITDA shall be calculated by adding back to taxable income the tax-adjusted amounts for net interest expenses and other costs equivalent to interest as well as the tax-adjusted amounts for depreciation and amortisation.
2016/04/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 29 #

2015/2285(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas global economic growth is slowing down, especially in China and in the emerging countries that have driven global growth in recent years, and new strategic challenges are arising;
2016/01/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 87 #

2015/2285(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Regrets, however, that the cost of hosting the one million migrants that arrived in Europe in 2015 has weighed heavily on the public finances of the more fragile countries;
2016/01/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 168 #

2015/2285(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Is aware of the ongoing deleveraging process in the private sector; points to the importance of completing the banking union and boosting equity investments in SMEs;
2016/01/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 326 #

2015/2285(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Supports all efforts towards improving the quality and growth-friendly character of public expenditure, with the emphasis placed on investment spending rather than operational expenditure;
2016/01/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 396 #

2015/2285(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
26. Agrees that while the euro area’s high current account surplus is a welcome sign of the euro area’s external competitiveness, it also implies a lack of internal investment and a risk of euro appreciation when monetary policy starts to become less accommodative, with adverse effects on growth and employment;(Does not affect the English version.)
2016/01/12
Committee: ECON
Amendment 9 #

2015/2210(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas the Commission’s spring 2015 economic forecast indicates growth rates of 2.1 % in the EU and of 1.9 % in the euro area for 2016, which figures result from a new method of GDP calculation imposed on European countries last year and that includes the underground and criminal economy, the effect of which is to artificially increase the wealth created, without an improvement in the economic situation;
2015/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 10 #

2015/2210(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas the Commission’s spring 2015 economic forecast indicates growth rates of 2.1 % in the EU and of 1.9 % in the euro area for 2016, which already seems overly optimistic;
2015/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 16 #

2015/2210(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas, according to the Commission, annual inflation in both the EU and the euro area is expected to rise from 0.1 % in 2015 to 1.5 % in 2016, while the fall in energy prices and the effects of the global growth slowdown on demand advocate a much more limited rise;
2015/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 17 #

2015/2210(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas annual consumer price inflation in both the EU and the euro area is expected to rise from 0.1 % in 2015 to 1.5 % in 2016, which does not reflect the risk of deflation anticipated by the European Central Bank;
2015/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #

2015/2210(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas unemployment in the EU remains at unacceptably high levels, but is on a declining path set to fall to 9.2 % in the EU and 10.5 % in the euro area in 2016;particularly reaching unacceptable levels in Greece and Spain, and increasing over the past year in France, Austria and Finland,
2015/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 30 #

2015/2210(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas the fiscal outlook in the EU and the euro area continues to improve wiremains bleak, given the a broadly neutral fiscal stance on aggregateccumulation of government deficits, stagnant growth and the risk of rates rising in the medium to long term;
2015/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 38 #

2015/2210(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the fact that economic recovery is slowly gaining ground, with GDP in the euro area expected to rise by 2.1 % in 2016; notes with concern, however, that its foundations are fragile, mainly owing to the EU’s underlying structural weaknesses Notes that some optimistic forecasts anticipate a clear economic recovery in 2016, while the global macroeconomic conditions, in particular the slowdown in growth in China, the recession hitting some emerging countries, and geopolitical uncertainties in the Middle East represent significandt resulting low international competitivenessisks to the European economy;
2015/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 63 #

2015/2210(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. WelcomesRemains indifferent to the Commission’s new approach to streamlining the European Semester process, i.e. through placing a stronger focus on a limited number of most important priorities and challenges and publishing its country-specific and euro area analysis three months earlier than in previous years;
2015/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 75 #

2015/2210(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Notes with concern the varying degrees of commitment demonstrated by Member States to implementing last year’s CSRs; stresses the importance ofat the implementation of the CSRs is desired by the Commission in order to ensure consistent and fair implementation of the economic governance framework across Member States; deplores in this context the non-binding nature of the recommendation, but that it undermines the freedom of elected governments to pursue national policies;
2015/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 114 #

2015/2210(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Welcomes the entry into force of the regulation on the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), aimed at boosting private investment in the EU, and calls on all relevant stakeholders to ensure its swift and effective implementation;deleted
2015/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 145 #

2015/2210(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Is concerned at the persisting macroeconomic imbalances in some Member States, in particular the high public debt levels and large current account gaps, as well as the excessive risks in the banking systems, which are moreover already widely insolvent;
2015/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 227 #

2015/2210(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Stresses the role of flexible labour markets in combatting unemployment, in particular the negative impact on job creation rates of rigid rules on dismissal, excessive minimum wage levels and lengthy labour disputes; calls for a shift away from labour taxes to other sources of taxation;
2015/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 283 #

2015/2210(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Reiterates its call for the strengthening of the positionIs concerned at the powers conferred ofn the Commission’s Chief Economic Analyst (CEA), whose mandate is to verify independently the implementation of the EU governance rules within the European Semester; calls, in particular, for the CEA’sir analysis to be made public and for the establishment of a regular dialogue betweenwith the competent committee of Parliament and the CEA; notes also in this context; considers it regrettable, in addition, that the Five Presidents’ Report on completing EMU proposes the setting-up of a European Fiscal Board (EFB)may pave the way for increased budgetary control by the European authorities over national budgets;
2015/09/11
Committee: ECON
Amendment 239 #

2015/2106(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Recognises the efforts made to establish a more transparentIs concerned about efforts made to relaunch the securitisation market; emphasises that very stringent requirements for underlying high-quality assets andassets in terms of their quality, transparency and standardisation, as well as calibrations according to the actual risk profile, are necessary,essential bearing in mind the riskiness of securitisationat securitisation can be very risky for the economy as a whole as shown during the crisis; calls on the Commission to conduct a thorough assessment of the benefits and drawbacks of securitisation for SMEs and the marketability of securitisation instrumentsthe stability of the financial system as a matter of priority, and to report to Parliament;
2015/09/25
Committee: ECON
Amendment 4 #

2015/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital A
A. whereas the having regard to the chronic instability of the global financial system, which is essential for the effectiveere short-term profit maximisation predominates at the expense of the fair allocation of resources for growth and jobs, is now a global public goodemployment;
2015/10/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 16 #

2015/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas global cooperation can lead to a dilution of responsibilities, at the expense of democracy; whereas the role of the national parliaments cand the European Pnot be reduced to mere rubberstamping and whereas those parliaments cannot be reduced to mere rubberstampingdeprived of their sovereignty;
2015/10/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 69 #

2015/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Regards as detrimental to the Union situations in which representatives of a Member State or national organisation assume positions in international bodies that are contrary to European legislative or regulatory decisions adopted by majority vote, but takes the view that this freedom must be maintained in order to uphold the principle of national government autonomy in matters relating to the economy;
2015/10/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 82 #

2015/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Considers that the priorities of organisations and related working groups should be clarified and formally set out; takes the view, that the principle of consensus risks not only slowing down deliberations but also diluting the substance of the recommendations and that the composition of the organisations must reflect their diversity in financial, economic and supervisory termsmust remain the norm in order to maintain full national sovereignty in matters relating to the economy; stresses the need to carry out ex ante impact assessments;
2015/10/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 140 #

2015/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 – indent 6
– Urges the Commission to use its right of initiative to propose, in accordance with Article 138(2) TFEU and the undertakings given by its President to the European Parliament in 2014, appropriate measures to ensure unified representation of the Union within international financial institutions and conferences; considers it imperative to progress towards single representation of the euro area within the IMF, the first step being to group member countries within specific constituencies and then within a single constituency, without prejudice to the creation of a single European Union constituency in the long term; points out that, under Protocol No 14 of the Treaty, closer coordination between Member States is the responsibility of the Euro Group;deleted
2015/10/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 169 #

2015/2060(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 – indent 8
– Calls on the EU institutions and Member States to reflect on the practicalities ofgive careful thought to the creatingon of a global financial organisation with wide-ranging powers of recommendation, arbitration and, where appropriate, penalisation through independent panels; genuinely dissuasive sanctions, on condition that all the organisations and structures with which its tasks overlap are abolished and that its governance is such that it is managed and supervised by public authorities or governments, and not by private interests or their lobbies; insists that states should remain free to adopt more restrictive measures and retain their power to impose sanctions, as well as the right to leave such an organisation;
2015/10/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 31 #

2015/2058(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
3. Calls for the establishment of a globally accepted definition of tax havens, including federal states where applicable, of penalties for operators making use of them and of a blacklist of countries that do not combat tax evasion or accept it, as has already been called for previously;
2015/04/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 73 #

2015/2058(INI)

Draft opinion
Paragraph 9
9. Stresses the urgent need for a study on the impact of international tax treaties in order to remove the opportunities for treaty shopping;
2015/04/15
Committee: ECON
Amendment 12 #

2015/2010(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas, as a result of those tax rulings, some companies have enjoyed effective tax rates of less than 1 % on the profits they have shifted into Luxembourg, with the complicity of the country’s authorities and its Prime Minister, Mr Jean-Claude Juncker;
2015/10/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #

2015/2010(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital J
J. whereas the loss arising from BEPS also demonstrates the lack of a level playing- field between those companies which operate only in one country and pay their taxes there, and certain multinational companies which are able to shift profits from high tax to low tax jurisdictions and engage in aggressive tax planning, thereby reducing their overall tax base and placing additional pressure on public finances, and therefore on the Member States’ taxpayers;
2015/10/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 62 #

2015/2010(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital O
O. whereas the power to legislate on corporate taxation is currently vested in the Member States and must continue to be;
2015/10/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 72 #

2015/2010(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital Q
Q. whereas the revelations of the LuxLeaks scandal and the work carried out by the TAXE Committee clearly show the need for Union legislative measures to improve transparency, coordination and convergence withinof policies on the corporate tax policiesbase in the Union;
2015/10/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 162 #

2015/2010(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital U – point viii
(viii) whereas the Commission should analyse the fiscal impact of reforms to tax administrations within the European Semester process, to enhance the capacity of national and European-level tax administrations in order to carry out their roles effectively;deleted
2015/10/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 177 #

2015/2010(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital V – point i
(i) whereas aggressive tax planning practices may sometimes arise from the cumulative benefits of double taxation treaties concluded by different Member States, perversely resulting in double non- taxation instead; whereas the proliferation of double tax treaties signed up to by individual Member States with third countries may lead to opportunities for new loopholes; whereas, in line with Action 15 of the OECD/G20 BEPS project, there is a need to develop a multilateral instrument for amending bilateral tax treaties;
2015/10/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 183 #

2015/2010(INL)

Motion for a resolution
Recital V – point ii
(ii) whereas the Union should have its own up to date list of 'tax havens', which would not preclude an examination of the situation in certain US federal states, such as Delaware;
2015/10/13
Committee: ECON
Amendment 43 #

2015/0263(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
(4) Reforms are by their very nature complex processes that require a complete chain of highly-specialised knowledge and skills. Addressing structural reforms in a variety of public policy areas is challenging since their benefits often take time to materialise. Therefore, early and efficient design and implementation is crucial, be it for crisis-struck or structurally-weak economies. In this contextHowever, the provision of support by the Union in the form of technical assistance has been crucial in supporting the economic adjustment ofhas not always achieved its intended aims, as shown by what has happened in Greece and Cyprus in the last years.
2016/09/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 64 #

2015/0263(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
(7) Against this background, it is necessary to establish a Structural Reform Support Programme ('the Programme') with the objective of strengthening the capacity of Member States to prepare and implement growth-enhancing administrative and structural reforms, including through assistance for the efficient and effective use of the Union funds. The Programme is intended to contribute to the achievement of common goals towards obtaining economic recovery, job creation, boosting Europe's competitiveness and stimulating investment in the real economy. This programme should not on any account be used by the Commission as a pretext to encroach upon the sovereignty of the Member States. The Commission’s actions must be overseen by the Member States, and it must intervene only at their specific request and in accordance with arrangements they have laid down.
2016/09/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 124 #

2015/0263(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1
The general objective of the Programme shall be to contribute to institutional, administrative and structural reforms in the Member States, albeit only if the Member States have explicitly requested contributions of that kind, by providing support to national authorities for measures aimed at reforming institutions, governance, administration, economic and social sectors in response to economic and social challenges with a view to enhancing competitiveness, growth, jobs, and investment, in particular in the context of economic governance processes, including through assistance for the efficient and effective use of the Union funds.The Member States may put an end to support provided under the programme at any time and shall not be issued with binding instructions by the Commission.
2016/09/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 173 #

2015/0263(COD)

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1
1. A Member State wishing to receive support under the Programme shall submit a request for support to the Commission, identifying the policy areas and the priorities for support within the scope of the Programme as set out in Article 5(2). This request shall be submitted at the latest by 31 October of each calendar year. It may be revoked at any time by the Member State concerned.
2016/09/01
Committee: ECON
Amendment 33 #

2015/0068(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
(1) The challenge posed by cross-border tax avoidance, aggressive tax planning and harmful tax competition has increased considerably and has become a major focus of concern within the Union and at global level. Tax base erosion is considerably reducing national tax revenues, which hinders Member States in applying growth- friendly taxbudgetary policies. In particular, rulings concerning tax-driven structures lead to a low level of taxation of artificially high amounts of income in the country giving the advance ruling and may leave artificially low amounts of income to be taxed in any other countries involved. An increase in transparency is therefore urgently required. The tools and mechanisms established by Council Directive 2011/16/EU13 need to be enhanced in order to achieve this. __________________ 13 Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC (OJ L 64 of 11.3.2011336, 27.12.1977, p. 15).
2015/09/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 115 #

2015/0068(CNS)

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive 2011/16/UE
Article 8a – paragraph 2
2. The competent authority of a Member State shall also communicate information to the competent authorities of all other Member States as well as to the European Commission on all advance cross-border rulings and advance pricing arrangements issued within a period beginning ten years before the entry into force but, stating which rulings and arrangements were still valid on the date of entry into force of this Directive;
2015/09/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 39 #

2014/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Notes, however, the implausibility of the ratio of 1:15 put forward by the Commission as the multiplier effect between contributions in kind and guarantees from the EU budget and the total amount of the investment programme of more than EUR 300 billion presented on 26 November 2014;
2014/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 165 #

2014/2156(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
27. Regrets the fact that in the context of the most recent scandal involving Glencore, the EIB is refusing to publish the findings of its internal inquiry; urges the EIB, wherever possible, not to grant loans for projects carried out with the direct involvement of multinationals whose profit levels would enable them to cover the expenditure in question without any external assistance; also regrets the fact that the 2013 aid transparency index11 shows that the EIB fares poorly on transparency and accountability; __________________ 11 http://newati.publishwhatyoufund.org/2013 /index-2013/results/
2014/12/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 172 #

2014/2145(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Believes that the current economic situation calls for urgent, comprehensive and decisive measures to face the threat of deflation or very low inflation, low growth, the pressure of migration and high unemployment;
2015/03/04
Committee: ECON
Amendment 713 #

2014/2145(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
35. Recalls that the banking union was the result of the political will to avoid a financial crisis and t, but also hatd the same will is needed as regards a fiscal union in order to avoid a political crisiaim of saving private banks at all costs, if necessary by robbing savers;
2015/03/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 747 #

2014/2145(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 – indent 1
– a ‘taxation union’,deleted
2015/03/03
Committee: ECON
Amendment 16 #

2014/2144(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Recital D
D. whereas many businesses, in particular multinationals, commonly structure their global tax position in a way that allows profit shifting towards lower tax jurisdictions or seek to secure preferential treatment to reduce their tax payments with the connivance of the authorities and governments of the states concerned;
2014/12/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #

2014/2144(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Stresses, however, that logic demands that the task of implementing reforms of this kind should not be conferred on a Commission whose President advocated and employed, in the recent past and on a large scale, practices entirely at odds with these objectives;
2014/12/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 270 #

2014/2144(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Requests that reforming tax expenditures should not result in an unjustified decrease in public expenditube accompanied by measures to rationalise public spending, as this is the only way to reduce budget imbalances in the MSs to a significant degrese;
2014/12/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 277 #

2014/2144(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
25. Calls on the Commission and the MSs to reflect on new and innovative tax forms; stresses that the debate on the FTT is crucial; , although they must be consistent with a general trend towards lower taxation and not add to the existing tax burden; stresses that the debate on the FTT is crucial and that it is vital that it should focus primarily on the financial products which are the most volatile and which therefore pose the greatest threat to the stability of the financial system;
2014/12/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 281 #

2014/2144(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)
25a. Reminds the MSs of the need to maintain compulsory taxation at a level which does not act as a brake on initiative and entrepreneurship and that tax flight is not linked solely to the existence of tax havens, but also to the excessive levels of taxation which taxpayers sometimes face in their countries of origin;
2014/12/19
Committee: ECON
Amendment 47 #

2014/2059(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Notes the fact that economic recovery in the EU is under way; reiterates, however, that this recovery is fragile and uneven, and must be sustained in order to deliver more growth and jobs in the medium termat the main euro zone countries are falling into structural economic recession;
2014/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 116 #

2014/2059(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Calls, in this connection, on the future Commission to put forward a proposal on the single external representation of the euro area based on Article 138 TFEU;deleted
2014/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 230 #

2014/2059(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Points out that the absence of a well functioning internal labour market and of a positive approach to immigration hampers growth in the EUlabour immigration constitutes an economic adjustment variable and a factor in depressing wages, which penalises the employment of the resident population; calls on the Commission and the Member States to establish a common labour market and a modern immigration policyfirm immigration policy which is in step with the needs of their economies, the latter being characterised by stagnating growth, mass unemployment and excessive public debt;
2014/09/09
Committee: ECON
Amendment 306 #

2014/2059(INI)

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
30. Is concerned about protectionist tendencies in certain Member States; points out that the Treaty does not provide for the restriction ofAcknowledges that it is legitimate for Member States to seek alternative solutions in view of the excesses of the globalised liberal model, in order to generate more employment and greater prosperity; stresses theat free movement of people, and services or capitalhas promoted the stagnation of wages, particularly for unskilled work, and crecalls that the Commission must safeguard and enforce these freedomsated situations in which there is unfair competition to the detriment of undertakings and workers in the countries of the Union which have the most protective social legislation;
2014/09/09
Committee: ECON