[ParlTrack]

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18 a (new)

(18a) Since sovereign debt by definition is risk free, no contribution to EDIS can be based on the sovereign risk weighting principle, and any attempt to overturn this principle would undermine a fundamental pillar of the functioning and stability of the financial system;

2024/03/13
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1

(1) Over the past years, the Union has made progress in creating an internal market for banking services. A better integrated internal market for banking services is essential in order to foster economic growth in the Union, to safeguard the stability of the banking system and to protect depositors.deleted

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2

(2) On 18 October 2012, the European Council concluded that "In the light of the fundamental challenges facing it, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) needs to be strengthened to ensure economic and social welfare as well as stability and sustained prosperity" and "that the process towards deeper economic and monetary union should build on the Union institutional and legal framework and be characterised by openness and transparency towards Member States whose currency is not the euro and by respect for the integrity of the internal market". To that end, the Banking Union has been established, underpinned by a comprehensive and detailed single rulebook for financial services for the internal market as a whole. The process towards establishing the Banking Union has been characterised by openness and transparency towards non-participating Member States and by respect for the integrity of the internal market.deleted

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3

(3) The European Parliament, in its resolution of 20 November 2012 'Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union', also stated that breaking the negative feedback loops between sovereigns, banks and the real economy is crucial for a smooth functioning of the EMU, stressed the urgent need for additional and far-reaching measures for the realisation of a fully operational Banking Union, while ensuring the continued proper functioning of the internal market for financial services and the free movement of capital.deleted

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

(4) While key steps have been made towards ensuring the efficient functioning of the Banking Union, with the Single Supervisory Mechanism (the 'SSM') established by Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/201311 ensuring that the Union's policy relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions in the euro area Member States and those non euro area Member States who choose to participate in the SSM (the 'participating Member States') is implemented in a coherent and effective manner and with the Single Resolution Mechanism (the ‘SRM’) established by Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 ensuring a consistent framework for the resolution of banks that are failing or likely to fail in the participating Member States, further steps are still needed to complete the Banking Union. ___________________ 11Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 29.10.2013, p. 63).deleted

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5

(5) In June 2015, the Five Presidents Report on Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union pointed out that a single banking system can only be truly single if confidence in the safety of bank deposits is the same irrespective of the Member State in which a bank operates. This requires single bank supervision, single bank resolution and single deposit insurance. The Five Presidents report therefore proposed to complete the Banking Union by establishing a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking Union alongside bank supervision and resolution. Concrete steps in that direction should already be taken as a priority, with a re-insurance system at the European level for the national deposit guarantee schemes as a first step towards a fully mutualised approach. The scope of this reinsurance system should coincide with that of the SSM.deleted

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6

(6) The recent crisis has shown that ~~the functioning of the internal market~~financial stability may be under threat and that there is an increasing risk of financial fragmentation. The failure of a bank that is relatively large compared to the national banking sector or the concurrent failure of a part of the national banking sector may cause national DGSs to be vulnerable to large local shocks~~, even with the additional funding mechanisms provided by Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council12~~. This vulnerability of national DGSs to large local shocks can contribute to adverse feedback between banks and their national sovereign undermining the homogeneity of protection for deposits and contributing to a lack of confidence among depositors and resulting in market instability. For this reason, a European deposit system must be established as soon as possible, which provides a full guarantee and has a public backstop provided by the ECB. ___________________ 12 Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes (OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 149).

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7

(7) ~~The absence of a homogenous level of depositor protection can distort competition~~ For the protection of Europeand create an effective barrier for the freedoms of establishment and free provision of services by credit institutions within the internal market. A common deposit insurance scheme is therefore essential for the completion of the internal market in financial servicesonsumers a common deposit insurance scheme is therefore essential.

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8

(8) ~~Although~~Since Directive 2014/49/EU ~~significantly improves~~is not the cap~~acity of national schemes to compensate depositors, more efficient deposit guarantee arrangements are needed at~~propriate tool for protecting depositors and savers in the levelnt of ~~the Banking Union to ensure sufficient financial means to underpin the confidence of all depositors and thereby safeguard financial stability. EDIS~~crises, EDIS is considered necessary since it would increase the resilience of the ~~Banking Union~~financial system against future crises by sharing risk more widely and would offer equal protection for insured depositors~~, supporting the proper functioning of the internal market~~.

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9

(9) Funds used by deposit guarantee schemes to repay depositors for unavailable covered deposits in accordance with Article 8 of Directive 2014/49/EU on deposit guarantee schemes do not constitute State aid or Fund aid. However, where those funds are used in the restructuring of credit institutions and constitute State aid or Fund aid, they must comply with Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and, respectively, with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council13, which should be amended for that purpose. ___________________ 13 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1). (OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1).

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

(15) In order to ensure a level playing field within the internal market as a whole, this Regulation is consistent with Directive 2014/49/EU. It complements the rules and principles of that Directive to ensure the proper functioning of EDIS and that appropriate funding is available to the latter. The material law on deposit guarantee to be applied within the EDIS framework will therefore be consistent with the one applicable by the national DGSs or designated authorities of the non-participating Member States, harmonised through the Directive 2014/49/EU.deleted

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16

(16) In integrated financial markets, any financial support to reimburse depositors enhances the financial stability not only in the participating Member State concerned but also in other Member States, by preventing any spill-over of bank crises into non-participating Member States. The conferral of deposit insurance tasks to the Board should not in any way hamper the functioning of the internal market for financial services. The European Banking Authority (EBA) should therefore maintain its role and retain its existing powers and tasks: it should develop and contribute to the consistent application of the Union legislation applicable to all Member States and enhance convergence of deposit guarantee practices across the Union as a whole.

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17

(17) EDIS should progressively evolve from a reinsurance scheme into a fully mutualised co-insurance scheme over a number of years. In the context of efforts to deepen the EMU, together with the work on the establishment of bridge- financing arrangements for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and on developing a common fiscal backstop, this step is necessary to reduce the bank/sovereign links in individual Member States by means of steps towards risk sharing among all the Member States in the Banking Union, and thereby to reinforce the Banking Union in achieving its key objective. However, such risk sharing implied by steps to reinforce Banking Union must proceed in parallel with risk reducing measures designed to break the bank-sovereign link more directly.deleted

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18

(18) EDIS ~~should be established in three sequential stages, first a re~~, being a full insurance scheme that covers a ~~share of~~ll the liquidity ~~shortfall~~needs and ofall the ~~excess~~ losses of participating DGSs, followed by a co- insurance scheme that covers a gradually increasing share of the liquidity shortfall and losses of participating DGSs and eventually resulting in a full insurance scheme that covers all liquidity needs and losses of participating deposit guarantee schemesshould be established in a single stage, from the entry into force of this Regulation, and should provide for full coverage of the liquidity shortfall and losses of participating DGSs, including through support of liquidity guaranteed on an unlimited and unconditional basis by the ECB.

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19

(19) In the ~~reinsurance stage~~first three years following the entry into force of this Regulation, and in order to limit the liability for the European Deposit Insurance Fund (“the Deposit Insurance Fund”) and to reduce moral hazard risk at the national level, assistance from the Deposit Insurance Fund can only be requested if the national DGS has raised ex-ante contributions in accordance with a precise funding path, and if it first depletes these funds. However, to the extent that a national DGS has collected funds over and above that which is required by the funding path, it only needs to use up the funds it had to collect to comply with the funding path before being able to receive coverage by EDIS. Therefore, DGSs which have collected more funds than is needed to comply with the funding path should not be in a worse position than those which have collected funds not exceeding the levels set out in the funding path.

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20

(20) As the Deposit Insurance Fund, in the re-insurance stage, would only provide an additional source of funding and would only weaken the link between banks and their national sovereign, without however ensuring that all depositors in the Banking Union enjoy an equal level of protection, the reinsurance stage should, after three years, gradually progress into a co-insurance scheme and ultimately into a fully mutualised deposit insurance scheme.deleted

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21

(21) While the reinsurance and coinsurance stages would share many common features, ensuring a smooth gradual evolution, pay-outs under the co- insurance stage would be shared between national DGS and the Deposit Insurance Fund as of the first euro of loss. The relative contribution from the Deposit Insurance Fund would gradually increase to 100 percent, resulting in the full mutualisation of depositor risk across the Banking Union after four years.deleted

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23

(23) The Deposit Insurance Fund is an essential element without which the ~~progressive~~ establishment of EDIS could not be achieved. Different national systems of funding would not provide for homogenous deposit insurance across the Banking Union. Th~~roughout the three stages, th~~e Deposit Insurance Fund should help ensuring the stabilising role of DGSs, a uniform high level of protection to all depositors in a harmonised framework throughout the Union and avoiding the creation of obstacles for the exercise of fundamental freedoms or the distortion of competition in the internal market due to different levels of protection at national level.

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26

(26) Contributions would be directly levied on banks to finance the Deposit Insurance Fund. The Board would collect the contributions and administer the Deposit Insurance Fund, while national DGSs would continue to collect national contributions and administer national funds. In order to ensure fair and harmonised contributions for participating banks and provide incentives to operate under a model which presents less risk, both contributions to EDIS and to national DGS should be calculated on the basis of covered deposits and a risk-adjustment factor per bank. During the re-insurance period the risk-adjustment factor should consider the degree of risk incurred by a bank relative to all other banks affiliated to the same participating DGS. Once the stage of co-insurance is reached, the risk- adjustment factor should consider the degree of risk incurred by a bank relative to all other banks established in the participating Member States. This would ensure that, overall, EDIS is cost-neutral for banks and national DGSs and avoid any redistribution of contributions during the build-up phase of the Deposit Insurance Fund.

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29

(29) The initial and final target level of the Deposit Insurance Fund should be established as a percentage of the total minimum target levels of participating DGS. It should progressively reach 20% of four ninth of the total minimum target levels by th~~e end of the reinsurance per~~ree years from the entry into force of this Regulatiodn and the sum of all minimum target levels ~~by the end of the co-insurance per~~starting from the fourth year and by the seventh year from the entry into force of this Regulatiodn. The possibility to apply for approval to authorise a lower target level in accordance with Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU should not be considered when setting the initial or final target levels of the Deposit Insurance Fund. An appropriate time frame should be set to reach the target level for the Deposit Insurance Fund.

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

2. In addition, this Regulation establishes a European Deposit Insurance Scheme ('EDIS') ~~in three successive stages~~:

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 1

~~- a reinsurance scheme that, to a certain extent, provides funding and covers a share of the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41a;~~deleted

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 2

~~- a co-insurance scheme that, to a gradually increasing extent, provides funding and covers losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41c;~~deleted

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 3

- a full insurance scheme that provides the funding and covers the losses of participating deposit guarantee schemes in accordance with Article 41e.

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 3 a (new)

- a public backstop system guaranteed by the ECB, in line with the aim of maintaining the stability of the financial system.

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point a

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 19 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

(a) in paragraph 3, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following: To the extent that the resolution action as proposed by the Board involves the use of the Fund, the Board shall notify the Commission of the proposed use of the Fund. The Board's notification shall include all of the information necessary to enable the Commission to make its assessments pursuant to this paragraph. ’deleted

2016/12/20
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Part IIa – title I – title

TITLE I: ~~PHASES OF~~ EDIS

2016/12/21
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Part IIa – title I – chapter 1

~~[...]~~Chapter 1 deleted Reinsurance

2016/12/21
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Part IIa – title I – chapter 2

~~[...]~~Chapter 2 deleted Co-insurance

2016/12/21
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41h – paragraph 1

1. As from the en~~d of the co- insurance per~~try into force of this Regulatiodn, the participating DGS shall be fully insured by EDIS in accordance with this Chapter.

2016/12/21
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41h – paragraph 2

2. In case a participating DGS encounters a payout event or is used in resolution in accordance with Article 109 of Directive 2014/59/EU or Article 79 of this Regulation, it may claim funding from the DIF for its liquidity ~~need as defined by Article 41f of this Regulation~~within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Directive 2014/49/EU.

2016/12/21
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41h – paragraph 3

3. The DIF shall also cover the loss of the participating DGS ~~as defined by Article 41g. The participating DGS shall repay the amount of funding it obtained under paragraph 2, less the amount of loss cover, in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 41o~~up to the total amount it repaid to depositors in accordance with Article 8 of Directive 2014/49/EU.

2016/12/21
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41i – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. A participating DGS shall not be covered by EDIS ~~in the reinsurance, co- insurance or full insurance phase,~~ if the Commission, acting on its own initiative or upon a request of the Board or a participating Member State, decides and informs the Board accordingly that at least one of the following disqualifying conditions is met:

2016/12/21
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41j

Funding path to be followed by 1. reinsured, co-insured or fully insured by EDIS during the year following any of the dates set out below, if, by that date, its available financial means raised by contributions referred to in Article 10(1) of Directive 2014/49/EU amount to at least the following percentages of the total amount of covered deposits of all credit institutions affiliated to the participating DGS: - by 3 July 2017: 0.14%; - by 3 July 2018: 0.21%; - by 3 July 2019: 0.28%; - by 3 July 2020: 0.28%; - by 3 July 2021: 0.26%; - by 3 July 2022: 0.20%; - by 3 July 2023: 0.11%; - by 3 July 2024: 0%. 2. the Board, may approve a derogation from the requirements set out in paragraph 1 for duly justified reasons linked to the business cycle in the respective Member State, the impact pro- cyclicaArticle 41j deleted participating DGSs A participating DGS shall con~~tributions may have, or to a payout event which occurred at national level. Those derogations must be temporary and may be subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions.~~ly be The Commission, after consulting

2016/12/21
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41j – paragraph 1

1. A participating DGS shall only be ~~reinsured, co-insured or~~ fully insured by EDIS during the year following any of the dates set out below, if, by that date, its available financial means raised by contributions referred to in Article 10(1) of Directive 2014/49/EU amount to at least the following percentages of the total amount of covered deposits of all credit institutions affiliated to the participating DGS: – by 3 July 2017: 0.14%; – by 3 July 2018: 0.21%; – by 3 July 2019: 0.28%; – by 3 July 2020: 0.28%; – by 3 July 2021: 0.26%; – by 3 July 2022: 0.20%; – by 3 July 2023: 0.11%; – by 3 July 2024: 0%.

2016/12/21
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 a (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 42 a (new)

10a. The following Article 42a is inserted: ‘Article 42a Role of the ECB The ECB shall play a ‘public backstop’ role in the general interest of the financial stability of the European Union and shall in an unconditional and unrestricted manner provide the liquidity required for the DIF. The ECB shall act as a guarantor during the constitution of the DIF in accordance with the provisions of Article 74(d) of this Regulation.’

2016/12/21
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 b (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 42 b (new)

10b. The following Article 42b is inserted: ‘Article 42b The ECB must provide all the liquidity required by the national DGSs in order to maintain the stability of the economic and financial system.’

2016/12/21
Committee: ECON

Marco VALLI, Marco ZANNI

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 c (new)

Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 42 c (new)

10c. The following Article 42c is inserted: ‘Article 42c A dedicated EDIS unit shall be established within the ECB at the time this Regulation enters into force. That unit shall have a section for each of the national DGSs and shall be independent from monetary matters.’

2016/12/21
Committee: ECON

Marco ZANNI, Marco VALLI