BETA

11 Amendments of Luigi MORGANO related to 2017/2072(INI)

Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)
- having regard to the Commission’s targeted consultation on statutory prudential backstops addressing insufficient provisioning for newly originated loans that turn non- performing,
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
B. whereas the stock of non- performing loweighted average NPL ratio for Europe’s main banks of significant institutions (SIs) stood at EUR 865 billion at the end of Marchstood at 4.47%, as of 30 June 2017, according to the EBA’s quarterly Risk Dashboard; whereas this ratio has been steadily decreasing for the last 30 months, and particularly since September 20176;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
C. whereas the 2017 banking cases have shown that the move from bail-out to bail-in has yet to be finalisthe Banking Union remains incomplete and that the common framework needs to be improved;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Notes the ECB’s determination in the context of the precautionary recapitalisation of Monte dei Paschi di Siena that the bank is solvent and meets the capital requirements; notes, in this regard, that the determination of solvency leaves room for an element of subjectivity as this determination greatly depends on how a bank’s assets are valued;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. Reiterates its concerns about the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans’4 ; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU institutions and bodies on this issue; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly implement the Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on the action plan to tackle non-performing loans in Europe; recognises that the SSM's powers to influence a bank's provisioning policy with regards to NPLs - within the limits of the applicable accounting framework and to apply specific adjustments where necessary for prudential purposes - can only be applied on a case-by-case basis, depending on the individual circumstances of the bank; underlines that the exercise of the minimum supervisory powers granted to competent authorities depends on the specific situation of each supervised bank and only allows for the adoption of measures addressed to the individual bank concerned; _________________ 4 Commission communication on completing the Banking Union, 11 October 2017, p. 15 (COM(2017)0592).
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 147 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Reiterates its concerns about the risks stemming from the holding of level 3 assets, including derivatives, within large euro area banks, and in particular from the difficulty of their valuation;notes that these risks should be reduced and that this calls for a progressive reduction of the holdings of these assets;calls on the SSM to make this issue one of its supervisory priorities, and to organise, jointly with the EBA, a quantitative stress test on it;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 162 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’; takes note, in this respect,Warns against taking unilateral actions to address what is known as ‘home bias’ towards sovereign debt, as these could lead to financial instability in the euro area and create an unlevel playing field with respect to other jurisdictions; takes note of the Commission’s ongoing work on the idea of so-called sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS);
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Welcomes the work done by the EBA and ESMA on promoting supervisory convergence in the context of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU with a view to limiting the development of regulatory and supervisory arbitrage risks; believes that, in order to preserve financial stability, a new supervisory cooperation model should be developed between the EU and the UK;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 286 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Calls on the Commission to undertake as soon as possible the review referred to in the last subparagraph of Article 32(4) of the BRRD, taking into account the interplay between the new resolution regime and the 2013 Banking Communication, in order to draw lessons from the 2017 banking caseUnderlines that precautionary recapitalisation is a legitimate instrument for bank crisis-management; notes that the conditions set for it by the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) are restrictive and have so far been effective to prevent its inappropriate use on insolvent banks;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 313 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for progress to be made on the legislative proposals implementing total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) in Union law; supports the inclusion of a pre- resolution moratorium tool in the BRRD;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 328 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Recalls that the substance of the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) is to be ultimately incorporated into the Union's legal framework; asks the Commission to reflect on ways of doing so; is of the opinion that the proposal on the integration of the ESM into the EU legal framework could provide a useful template;
2017/11/24
Committee: ECON