[ParlTrack]

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Dariusz ROSATI, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4

(4) The unprecedented financial crisis and economic downturn that hit the world and the euro area has exposed economic weaknesses in Member States, lacking resilience due to the postponement of structural reforms and thus their limited fiscal capacity to react, and has shown that in the euro area available instruments such as the single monetary policy, automatic fiscal stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy measures at national level are insufficient to absorb large asymmetric shocks.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Dariusz ROSATI, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5

(5) In order to facilitate macroeconomic adjustment and cushion large asymmetric shocks in the current institutional set-up, Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) have to rely more heavily on remaining instruments of economic policy, such as automatic fiscal stabilisers and other discretionary fiscal measures, making the adjustment more difficult overall, which highlights the need for adherence to the Stability and Growth Pact in the framework of the EU’s fiscal rules in order to create fiscal space and thus be able to address economic shocks. The sequence of the crisis in euro area also suggests strong reliance on the single monetary policy to provide for macro- economic stabilisation in severe macro- economic circumstances.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Dariusz ROSATI, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7

(7) ~~Additional instruments are therefore necessary to avoid in the future~~Sound public finances could be complemented in the future by additional instruments to avoid that large asymmetric shocks result into deeper and broader situations of stress and weaken cohesion.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Markus FERBER, Siegfried MUREŞAN

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

(10) EISF should be a Union instrument which complements national fiscal policies in clearly defined emergency situations. It should be recalled that it is essential that Member States ~~should~~ pursue sound fiscal policies and build up sufficient fiscal buffers in favourable economic times. Member States shall only be able to access the EISF if they have pursued responsible fiscal policies in the years prior to activating the trigger.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Dariusz ROSATI, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12

~~(12) The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or its legal successor could provide further support in addition to support under EISF.~~deleted

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Dariusz ROSATI, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15

(15) Strict eligibility criteria based on compliance with ~~decisions and recommendations under~~the Stability and Growth Pact as part of the Union's fiscal and economic surveillance framework over a period of ~~two~~five years before the request for EISF support should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EISF support in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent budgetary policies. Compliance with any other eligibility criteria, such as a convergence code, shall only be additional to the EU’s fiscal rules and not in replacement of them.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Dariusz ROSATI, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19

(19) In addition to loans, interest rate subsidies should be granted to the Member States concerned to cover the interest costs incurred on such loans, as a specific type of financial assistance under Article 220 of the Financial Regulation. Such an interest rate subsidy would provide additional support in parallel to the loan for Member States undergoing an asymmetric shock and facing tight financing conditions on the financial markets. Payment of interest rate subsidies should be strictly conditional upon the availability of sufficient means in the Stabilisation Support Fund.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Dariusz ROSATI, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22

(22) To that effect, the Commission should examine whether the Member State concerned has respected those conditions. In case of non-compliance the Member State concerned should repay ~~part or~~ the entire loan given and should not be entitled to receiving an interest rate subsidy.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24

(24) The amount of EISF loan should also be automatically determined on the basis of a formula which firstly takes into account the maximum level of eligible public investment that can be supported under EISF and secondly the severity of the large asymmetric shock. The support determined on the basis of that formula should also be scaled in function of the severity of the shock by means of a factor (β). That factor is determined such that for a shock that increases unemployment by more than 2.5 percentage points, the maximum support is made available to the Member State concerned. An EISF loan could be increased up to the maximum level of eligible public investment in case the asymmetric shock is particularly severe as reflected by other indicators of the Member State's position in the economic cycle (e.g. confidence surveys) and a deeper analysis of the macroeconomic situation (as conducted in particular in the context of the macroeconomic forecast and the European Semester). With a view to ensure that as many Member States as possible could qualify for support under EISF, the loan to a Member State should not exceed 320 percent of the remaining available means under the ceiling set for calibrating the loans under EISF to the available means in the Union budget.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27

(27) Both the determination of the amount of the national contributions to the Stabilisation Support Fund and their transfer should be governed by an intergovernmental agreement to be concluded between Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II). That agreement should provide that the national annual contributions for ~~all~~ the Member States ~~are calculated based~~shall be equivalent to a share onf the ~~share of th~~amount of monetary income allocated to the respective national central banks of those Member States whose currency is the euro ~~in the monetary income of the Eurosystem~~. For Member States which participate in ERM II a specific key should be foreseen to determine the national contributions. The Commission should assist the Member States for the calculation of those contributions. To that end, the European Central Bank (ECB) should communicate to the Commission the amount of monetary income the national central banks of the Eurosystem are entitled to.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Dariusz ROSATI, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28

(28) After that intergovernmental agreement has entered into force, payment of the interest rate subsidy to the Member State concerned should be conditional upon the Member State transferring its yearly contribution to the Stabilisation Support Fund, without exceptions, as the risk of moral hazard and permanent transfers should remain limited. Payment of interest rate subsidies should be strictly conditional upon the availability of sufficient means in the Stabilisation Support Fund, as payments through other funds cannot be guaranteed and would increase the risk of moral hazard. Payment of interest rate subsidies from the Stabilisation Support Fund would be postponed in case the interest rate subsidy to a specific Member State would exceed 320 percent of the available means in the Stabilisation Support Fund at the moment when such payment is due.

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Dariusz ROSATI, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31

(31) In order to determine the rules for the involvement of the ESM or its legal successor in providing financial assistance in parallel to the Commission in support of public investment, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of the exchange of relevant information as regards the EISF loan, the impact of the ESM's involvement for calculating the amount of EISF support, and the granting of an interest rate subsidy by the Stabilisation Support Fund to the Member State for costs incurred on ESM financial assistance. The Commission should also be empowered to adopt delegated acts determining the percentage in the formula for calculating the interest rate subsidy, the detailed rules for the administration of the Stabilisation Support Fund and the general principles and criteria for its investment strategy. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level, and that those consultations be conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 201614 . In particular, to ensure equal participation in the preparation of delegated acts, the European Parliament and the Council receive all documents at the same time as Member States' experts, and their experts systematically have access to meetings of Commission expert groups dealing with the preparation of delegated acts. _________________ 14 OJ L 231, 12.5.2016, p. 1deleted

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Siegfried MUREŞAN, Dariusz ROSATI, Gunnar HÖKMARK

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33

(33) EISF should be considered as a first step in the development over time of a fully-fledged insurance mechanism to cater for macro-economic stabilisation. Currently, EISF would be based on loans and granting of interest rate subsidies. In parallel, it is not excluded that the ESM or its legal successor would be involved in the future by providing financial assistance to Member States whose currency is the euro facing adverse economic conditions in support of public investment. Moreover, a voluntary insurance mechanism with a borrowing capacity based on voluntary contributions by Member States could be set up in the future to provide for a powerful instrument for the purpose of macro- economic stabilisation against asymmetric shocks.deleted

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Markus FERBER, Siegfried MUREŞAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) aA decision of the Council ~~establishing that no effective action has been taken to correct its excessive deficit under Article 126(8) or Article 126(11) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union~~in accordance with Article 126 (6) of the TFEU establishing that an excessive deficits exists in the ~~two~~five years prior to requesting support from the EISF;

2018/11/09
Committee: BUDG ECON

Markus FERBER, Siegfried MUREŞAN

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) a decision of the Council in accordance with Article 6(2) or Article 10 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1466/9719 establishing that no effective action has been taken to address the observed significant deviation in the ~~two~~five years prior to requesting support from the EISF; _________________ 19 Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1