12 Amendments of Laura AGEA related to 2017/2052(INI)
Amendment 7 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Recalls Parliament’s view that the duration of the MFF should be reduced from seven to five years so that it is aligned with the political mandate periods of Parliament and the Commission1, whilst providing for a long-term programme strategy of five years plus five, with a mandatory mid-term review; points out that in 2020 there will be an opportunity to bring the long-term strategy cycle in line with the budgetary cycle, and strongly recommends that this opportunity be taken; considers that the Commission should also examine the possibility of introducing a rolling programme in which each MFF, while having the same duration as now, would partially cover the previous one, on the premise that overlapping could help mitigate naturally existing peaks and troughs; __________________ 1 See paragraph 73 of its resolution of 6 July 2016 on the preparation of the post electoral revision of the MFF 2014-2020: Parliament’s input ahead of the Commission’s proposal (Texts adopted, P8_TA(2016)0309) and paragraph 5 of its resolution of 27 April 2017 with observations forming an integral part of the decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2015, Section III – Commission and executive agencies (Texts adopted, P8_TA(2016)0309).
Amendment 19 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 – indent 2 a (new)
Paragraph 4 – indent 2 a (new)
- certain programmes have not proven to be at all effective or have any added value, so that provision can be made for abandoning them in order to promote programmes that have proven to have real added value;
Amendment 29 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls Parliament’s concern that the financial complexity resulting from the interactions of more than a thousand financial engineering instruments, and of numerous financial mechanisms supporting Union policies that are not recorded in the union balance sheet, constitutes a major reason why democratic accountability of the galaxies of budgets may be impossible; underlines that EFSI has hitherto proven to be ineffective in reducing the investment gap in the Union and that the results achieved have been insignificant, without delivering any additionality or added value in comparison with the existing EIB programmes; highlights the fact that the growing use of financial instruments reduces Parliament’s democratic power in the annual budget adoption procedure and raises a significant issue of democratic scrutiny over the use of EU funds;
Amendment 46 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Encourages the Commission to examine the possibility of changing the structure of the EU expenditure in the Cohesion Policy since a majority of the original Union objectives can be considered achieved, and since more efficient results could be gained with emphasis on natural competition on development and modernisation, instead of sustaining the current framework for, and practices of, mere redistributive financial support; is, however, of the opinion that the economic, social and territorial Cohesion Policies of the Union could still provide support for the less developed regions, and for better cross-border cooperation, but should focus even more on growth, innovation, mobility, climate change, making the land safe to protect it from man-made and natural disasters, energy and environmental transition, while applying the same criteria to the whole of the EU;
Amendment 52 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
Amendment 58 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Points out that a new balance is needed between, on the one hand, the CAP and Cohesion Policies, and, on the other hand, the other EU internal policies and a reinforced external capacity of the Union, including the elements of security and defence; encourages the Commission to emphasise cooperation in security and defence when preparing its proposal for MFF post-2020, and when reforming and implementingphasing out financial instruments of the EU such as the European Fund for Strategic Investments (ESIF); supports the idea of further European integration and concrete initiatives in the field of security and defence, which would allow savings to be made in the national military spending of the Member States;
Amendment 69 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
Amendment 76 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Considers that if any possible new budgetary capacity is proposed specifically for Member States in the euro area, it should be developed within the Union framework and subject to proper democratic scrutiny and accountability through the existing institutions, and any financial assistance from this capacity should be made conditional on the implementation of agreed structural reforms;
Amendment 88 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Considers that while the United Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the Union is an unfortunate event that will have a negative influence on the future of the lives of citizens in the UK and in the remaining Member States, it alsoevent that creates an opportunity to redefine and reform the EU- 27’s political ambitions and the needed budget tools and methods; considers that the EU-27 should be ambitious in its budget reform and aim to maintain an annual EU budget similar in size to that of the EU-28;
Amendment 96 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
Amendment 103 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Emphasises, in particular, the need to omit the unnecessary fixation omaintain the 1 % ceiling of EU GNI, put in practice for the current MFF 2014- 2020, since expenditure is often constrained by this ceiling and makes the budget significantly harder to balance in times of varying circumstances; enc; considers a radical reform of the own-resouragces the Member States to consider flexibility in their budget discussionsystem to be vital, though this should not have a financial impact on national budgets, citizens and SMEs;
Amendment 106 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
31. Considers that the possibility to collect a CO2 levy, which should affect multinationals through carbon pricing (using either taxation or market-based instruments) – as presented by the High Level Group on Own Resources in its report on the future financing of the EU – should be examined by the Commission in the first instance as a way to strengthen the EU-27 budget7; believes that such an instrument could also provide extra added value in Europe, as the levy could function as an incentive to change consumer and producer behaviour in favour of a less carbon-intensive future; considers, however, that any tax-based EU solution should be as neutral as possiblebsolutely neutral for the total tax ratio of a given Member State, and should instead rely on higher contributions from risk actors; stresses that the introduction of a comprehensive financial transaction tax could represent a means not only to finance the EU budget but also to combat financial speculation; __________________ 7 European Commission, ‘Future financing of the EU – Final report and recommendations of the High Level Group on Own Resources’, 4 January 2017, pp. 41-43.