BETA

Activities of Bernd LUCKE related to 2014/2145(INI)

Plenary speeches (4)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2014/2145(INI)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2014/2145(INI)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2014/2145(INI)

2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2014/2145(INI)

Shadow reports (1)

2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2014/2145(INI)
Documents: PDF(242 KB) DOC(168 KB)

Amendments (92)

Motion for a resolution
Citation 9

– having regard to its resolution of 13 March 2014 on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika (the European Central Bank (ECB), the Commission and the International Monetary Fund) with regard to the euro area programme countries9 , __________________ 9deleted Texts adopted, P7_TA(2014)0239.

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Citation 10

~~– having regard to its resolution of 12 December 2013 on constitutional problems of a multitier governance in the European Union10 , __________________ 10~~deleted Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0598.

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Citation 12

– having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2011 on the financial, economic and social crisis: recommendations concerning the measures and initiatives to be taken12 , __________________ 12 OJ C 33 E, 5.2.2013, p. 140.deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Citation 15

~~– having regard to the conclusions of the European Council meetings of June and December 2014,~~deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Citation 16

~~– having regard to the conclusions of the Euro summit of October 2014,~~deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Citation 17

~~– having regard to the speech of 15 July 2014 by President of the Commission Jean-Claude Juncker at the European Parliament,~~deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Citation 18

~~– having regard to the Annual Growth Survey for 2015 (COM(2014)0902),~~deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Citation 19

~~– having regard to the speech of 22 August 2014 by President of the ECB Mario Draghi at the annual central bank symposium in Jackson Hole,~~deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Citation 20

– having regard to the opinion of 14 January 2015 of the European Court of Justice Advocate-General, Cruz Villalón, regarding the legality of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme of the ECB,deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Citation 21

~~– having regard to the announcement by the ECB of 22 January 2015 of an expanded asset purchase programme,~~deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Citation 23

~~– having regard to the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis policy brief of July 2014 entitled ‘Structural budget balance: a love at first sight turned sour’,~~deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Citation 24

~~– having regard to Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Working Paper No 977 of 6 July 2012 entitled ‘Implications of output gap uncertainty in times of crisis’,~~deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Citation 25

~~– having regard to OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper No 163 of 9 December 2014 entitled ‘Trends in income inequality and its impact on economic growth’,~~deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Citation 26

~~– having regard to the IMF staff discussion note of September 2013 entitled ‘Towards a fiscal union for the euro area’,~~deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Citation 28

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (A8-0000/2015),deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Recital A

A. whereas, according to the Commission’s autumn forecast, after two consecutive years of unanticipated negative growth, gross domestic product (GDP) in the euro area is expected to rise by 0.8 % in 2014 and by 1.1 % in 2015, meaning that the pre-crisis growth rate will not be regained this year;deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)

Aa. whereas the Eurozone has a common monetary policy but each of the Eurozone members is sovereign in its fiscal policy decisions;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)

Ab. whereas heterogeneity among member states and asymmetric shocks may require very different economic policy responses in member states, whereas this provides a permanent challenge for the monetary union unless heterogeneity among member states can be reduced, fiscal and economic policies can be coordinated and the likelihood of severe asymmetric shock can be reduced;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Recital A c (new)

Ac. whereas the Eurozone has always tried to achieve convergence among member states using a rules-based approach, whereas these rules of economic governance have undergone many changes moving from a set of a few, easy to comprehend rules to a highly complex framework today;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Recital A d (new)

Ad. whereas many rules of economic governance have been disrespected many times, most prominently the no-bailout clause of Article 125 TFEU, whereas European facilities which provide credits to Member States unable to finance themselves on private capital markets violate the spirit of Article 125 TFEU;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Recital B

B. whereas huge macroeconomic differences ~~will~~ continue to prevail between the Member States~~, also following the Troika’s interven~~ in terms of debt ratios, deficit ratios, unemployment levels, current account balances and levels of social protection, w~~ith fo~~herecas~~ted~~ GDP growth rates in 2014 ~~rangi~~are likely to range between - 2.8 % in Cyprus and +4.6 % in Ireland, reflecting ~~increasingly undermining~~ growing internal divergences and a potential to undermine the monetary union;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)

Ba. whereas economic governance will be successful only if, in line with Article 125 TFEU, no Member State will feel pressed to assume liabilities or commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Recital C

C. whereas, according to the Commission’s autumn forecast, investment in the euro area decreased by 3.4 % in 2012, by 2.4 % in 2013 and by 17 % since the pre-crisis period, with the expected rebound rate in 2014 (0.6 %) and that anticipated for 2015 (1.7 %) being very weak; whereas a lack of investment can be just as detrimental to future generations as excessive public debt;deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Recital D

~~D. whereas a European investment plan is being put in place to raise EUR 315 billion in new investments over the next three years;~~deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1

~~1. Believes that the current economic situation calls for urgent, comprehensive and decisive measures to face the threat of deflation or very low inflation, low growth and high unemployment;~~deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. Notes that economic governance in the Euro zone set out with two simple rules to enforce sustainability of public finances, namely in terms of GDP a maximum 3 % threshold on the annual government budget deficit and a maximum 60 % threshold on the stock of government debt (Art. 126 TFEU in conjunction with Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure and Art. 125 TFEU);

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)

1b. Notes further that the two rules were complemented by two enforcement mechanisms, namely the possibility to impose sanctions for breaches of the 3% deficit threshold and the possibility to refuse bailouts by other member states based on Art. 125 TFEU;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2

2. Highlights the fact that the current economic governance framework does not allow for a proper debate on the economic perspective of the euro area or on an aggregate fiscal stance and does not address the different economic and fiscal situations on an equal footing; 3% deficit threshold was violated more than a hundred times by Euro Area members since 1995, yet sanctions were never imposed although the Council had, in 1997, agreed to always impose sanctions when excessive deficits were not timely corrected; concludes that the current economic governance framework needs a proper debate on the economic perspective of the euro area under a common monetary policy and sovereign national fiscal policies;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Highlights the fact that excessive deficits contributed to government debt levels surpassing the 60% debt ceiling for all Euro area members except Finland, Slovakia and Luxemburg, with many countries being close to or even far beyond 100% of government debt and some countries having reached debt levels which they were unable to sustain without a bailout;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3

3. Notes that major policy initiatives which included policy recommendations were based on economic forecasts that had not anticipated the low growth and inflation experienced and have not fully taken into account the underestimation of the size of the fiscal multiplier, the importance of spillover effects across countries in a period of synchronised consolidation and the deflationary impact of cumulative structural reformspillover effects across countries due to excessive and nonsustainable debt are major causes of economic distress;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)

3a. Emphasizes that coordinated efforts by other member countries and by the ECB have prevented sovereign defaults at the cost of invalidating the no-bailout clause in Art. 125 TFEU as an enforcement mechanism;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4

4. Stresses that the current situation calls for ~~closer and inclusive economic coordination (to increase aggregate demand, improve fiscal sustainability and allow for fair and sustainable structural reforms and related investments) and for~~ swift reactions ~~so as~~ to correct the most obvious fault lines in the economic governance framework;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. Notes that the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact obliged all member states to achieve a balanced budget (or a surplus) in the medium run and that member states agreed that under a balanced budget here would be sufficient flexibility across the business cycle to keep the deficit below 3%;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)

4b. Notes that the balanced budget objective fell prey to German and French pressure in the 2005 SGP reform, allowing member states to define even the medium term objective (MTO) for the deficit as nonzero but not greater than 1% of GDP;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 c (new)

4c. Notes that the 2005 SGP shifted the focus of deficit surveillance to the concept of "structural" deficits and obliged member states to reduce the structural deficit by 0.5% of GDP per year if the MTO had not yet been reached, unless lesser efforts were justified by economic reforms or "bad times";

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 d (new)

4d. Highlights that member states off their MTOs failed on a large scale to reduce their structural deficits by 0.5% per year, notes that during the 10 years between 2005 and 2014 only Malta complied in at least half of the years considered while all other countries which had not yet reached their MTOs more often than not reduced their structural deficits by much less than 0.5% per year or even increased their structural deficits; emphasizes that despite of this no sanctions, let alone fines have been imposed;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5

5. Warns that the accumulation of procedures makes the economic governance framework complex and not transparent enough, which is detrimental to the ~~ownership and~~ acceptance by national parliaments, social partners and citizens of guidelines, recommendations and reforms ~~stemming from this framework~~;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)

5a. Points out that the Six-Pack and Two- Pack legislations of 2011 and 2013 widened the scope of economic governance to various types of macroeconomic imbalances providing detailed specifications for their prevention and correction as well as a great amount of flexibility in the form of escape clauses for structural reforms, temporary violations, infrastructure investments and adverse business cycle conditions;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)

5b. Notes that these legislations constitute a further increase in complexity and decrease in transparency of the economic governance framework;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 c (new)

5c. Notes that under the Two-Pack and Six-Pack legislations member states are still obliged to reduce their structural deficit by 0.5% per year as long as they have not reached their MTO while in the case of excessive debts the reduction must be "higher than" 0.5% per year;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 d (new)

5d. Emphasizes that in terms of deficits there is some evidence for compliance in 2012 and 2013 mostly in crisis countries, but that the fiscal efforts are again expected to be broadly insufficient in 2014 and 2015; also emphasizes that other Country Specific Recommendations have largely been ignored by Member States;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6

6. Acknowledges that progress has been made with a debate on the Medium-Term Objective (MTO) and a better ownership of the national debate in euro area Member States, also thanks to the contribution of the national fiscal councils;deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)

6a. Points out that concepts such as "structural deficits" are not directly observable such that their definition involves degrees of arbitrariness, their quantification involves judgemental issues, both opening up room for unwanted and unwarranted discretion;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)

6b. Points out that the interpretation of current account deficits as "imbalances" may not be warranted if these deficits are used to finance investments which give rise to current account surpluses at a later point in time;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 c (new)

6c. Insists that deficit financing is at the heart of most investment activities and that the Eurozone should encourage investment rather than discourage or control its external financing through questionable rules in the macroeconomic imbalance framework;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 d (new)

6d. Is worried that the multitude of social indicators in the scoreboard will lead to a lack of clarity and distract emphasis from fiscal sustainability;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 e (new)

6e. Concludes that economic governance has yet to show that the highly complex set of rules currently in use are more likely to induce fiscal discipline and debt sustainability than the simpler rules of previous years which did not work well because enforcement mechanisms like sanctions, fines and the no-bailout clause were discarded;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2

WCha~~t best use of the flexibility of existing rules?~~llenges and perspectives of economic governance in the view of built-in flexibility

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7

7. ~~Underlines all the exist~~Notes that the EU and the Euro area ing provisions under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which have been put in place to ensure an anti-cyclical policy; finds it regrettable that these provisions were not put to full use in previous years, in the context of low inflation, low growth and high unemploymentarticular is in a difficult economic situation where growth is unsatisfactory, job creation is low, unemployment in some Member States is high and inflation much lower than targeted such that a prolonged period of stagnation or recession coupled with deflation is possible;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8

8. Welcomes the fact that in its interpretative communication on flexibility, the Commission acknowledges that the way in which the current fiscal rules are interpreted is crucial in bridging the investment gap in the EU and implementing growth-enhancing structural reforms;deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)

8a. Reminds that expansionary fiscal policies are limited by the degree of flexibility built into the current economic governance framework; warns that flexibility should not be increased by changing the current set of rules since this would compromise debt sustainability as the ultimate goal of economic governance;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9

9. ~~Supports all the incentives~~Takes note of the investment clause to finance the new European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), mainly by making national contributions to the fund fiscally neutral as regards the SGP; warns that contributions should not be made at the expense of the 3 % deficit threshold, and therefore calls for further clarification regarding the concrete treatment of these contributions in accordance with the new paradigm set out in the communication;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)

9a. Warns that, given the current size of government debts, debt sustainability will become even more pressing an issue when interest rates in the Euro area come back to normal levels;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)

9b. Warns that high level of government debts which are not sustainable at "normal" interest levels may force the ECB to suppress interest rates for the indefinite future at the expense of wealth owners and entailing the risk of increased levels of inflation;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 c (new)

9c. Emphasizes that under the current set of rules, the economic governance framework provides ample space to provide fiscal stimuli;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 d (new)

9d. Warns that fiscal stimuli cannot replace structural reforms and that fiscal stimuli are not likely to be successful in an environment where structural reforms have not yet unfolded sizable effects, thus warns to press for even greater stimuli just because growth is not picking up;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 e (new)

9e. Is concerned that the desire to fully exploit the flexibility of the current set of economic governance rules may reinforce the perception that economic governance is unable to impose fiscal discipline on member states; asks the Commission and the Council to credibly commit to the enforcement mechanisms of sanctions, fines, asks national governments to insist on the no-bailout principle of Article 125 TFEU;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 f (new)

9f. Affirms that a credible commitment to the principle of no-bailout would enforce fiscal discipline on member countries without much need of further rules of economic governance, thus reinforcing the sovereignty and responsibility of member states in terms of economic and fiscal policies;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 g (new)

9g. Concludes that a return to the principle of no-bailout and free, decentralized fiscal decisions of member states should be the overarching objective of the European Union's policy of economic governance;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 h (new)

9h. Emphasizes that regulatory reforms like Basle III along with the asset quality review, the stress tests of the banking sector and the banking union can be viewed as increasing the credibility of the no-bailout principle, points out that further measures could be designed if there are concerns that these safeguards are still insufficient;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 i (new)

9i. Emphasizes that adherence to the no- bailout principle reinforces the ties between responsibility and liability which are at the heart of a market economy;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 j (new)

9j. Points out that this is in no contradiction to the principle of European solidarity since the European Union has well-established funds for regional development, cohesion and social policies which may aid countries in need of special support;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 k (new)

9k. Stresses that the level of debt alone does not warrant the solidarity of other European countries as high debt does not indicate an underdeveloped economy or insufficient incomes of parts of the population but rather the fiscal irresponsibility of elected governments;

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10

10. Believes that the communication rightly broadens the scope of the investment clause, allowing for flexibility in the preventive arm of the SGP to accommodate investment programmes by the Member States, in particular as regards expenditure on projects under structural and cohesion policy, including the Youth Employment Initiative, trans- European networks and the Connecting Europe Facility, and co-financing under the EFSI; believes that this approach must be urgently reassessed to be symmetrically applied to the corrective arm of the SGP;deleted

2015/03/04
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11

11. Believes that the structural reform clause under the preventive arm and the means of considering structural reform plans under the corrective arm constitute a step forward as regards ensuring the more efficient implementation of reforms by Member States; calls for further clarification as to the types of structural reforms eligible under this new scheme; believes that a direct link to the cost, timeframe impact and value of structural reforms should also be explicit in the corrective arm of the SGP;deleted

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12

~~12. Believes that structural reforms should have a positive socioeconomic return and contribute to increased administrative capacity;~~deleted

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13

13. Deplores, however, the fact that the communication does not touch upon the nature of ‘unusual events’ falling outside the control of a Member State which could allow it to temporarily depart from the adjustment path towards achieving its MTO;deleted

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3

~~Closer coordination and economic convergence: p~~Possible improvement of the SGP within the review of the 6 + 2 pack

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14

14. Believes that ~~mor~~the room for flexibility and soft laws ~~exists~~should be cut such that fiscal consolidation is achieved under the SGP and in the European Semester; invites the Commission to ~~build on this flexibility and to propose rule changes where needed~~limit the degree of flexibility in the current set of rules;

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15

15. Invites the Commission and the Council to better articulate the fiscal and macroeconomic frameworks, notably in the corrective arm of the SGP, to allow for earlier debate among stakeholders, taking into account the need to increase convergence between euro area Member States and the role of national parliaments and social partners regarding the design and implementation of structural reforms;deleted

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16

16. Insists that the Annual Growth Survey (AGS) and euro area recommendation must be better designed and put to better use to allow for a global economic debate, notably as regards convergence in the euro area; pProposes that the country- specific recommendations (CSRs) should be established on the basis of striking a better balance between the AGS and the macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP), and suggests that the euro area recommendation should be made compulsory following a proper debate with the European Parliament, with incentives being offered so as to encourage the implementation thereof; requests that the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) recommendation be joined together with the CSRs;nnual Growth Survey (AGS) and the macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP),

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17

17. Asks the Commission to verify whether the current 1/20 rule on debt reduction is su~~stainable and~~fficient or whether it needs to be reconsidered;

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18

18. Asks the Commission to make the three-pillar strategy (investment, fiscal rules and structural reforms), presented in the AGS 2015, more concrete under the euro area recommendation and in the CSRs and to strengthen its approach by building a fourth pillar on taxation;deleted

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19

19. Believes that national fiscal councils ~~could~~may play a useful role at EU level; requests the set-up of a European network allowing for an independent analysis of the economic perspective to be established as a basis for a proper political discussion among stakeholderin France, Greece, Italy and some other European Countries;

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20

20. Believes that the MIP must be used in a ~~more balanced manner between deficit and surplus countries, also to address countries with significant room for action~~n objective manner to assess the development of key macroeconomic variables in the EU member states;

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21

21. Calls on the Commission to explore ways in which to better align the preventive and corrective arms of the SGP~~, in particular regarding investment allowing temporary deviation from the MTO, or the adjustment path towards it, within the existence of a safety margin under the preventive arm~~;

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22

22. Asks the Commission to ~~take into account all relevant factors, including real growth and inflation, when evaluating~~strictly assess the economic ~~and fiscal~~ situations of Mmember Sstates under the EDP;

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23

23. I~~nsists on the need to clarify the way in which effective actions are taken into account~~s concerned that some member states are in risk of breach on rules of the EDP; emphasises that member states should reduce their budget deficit to three percent of GDP by the end of 2015 with structural reforms; insists on the a strict and thorough interpretation of actions taken under the EDP;

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24

24. Insists that the focus on structural deficits since the 2005 reform of the SGP, together with the introduction of an expenditure rule with the 2011 reform, creates margins for the discretionary implementation of the SGP, as the calculation of potential growth, underpinning the assessment of structural deficits, and that of the expenditure rule are subject to several questionable assumptions and substantial revisions between the Commission’s autumn and spring forecasts, thereby leading to various calculations and diverging assessments as regards the implementation of the SGP;deleted

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25

25. Calls on the Commission, when evaluating the fiscal position of Members States, to include a better balance between the impact of the agreed fiscal measures and the fiscal figures based on estimated potential growth for GDP, output gaps and structural deficits that may introduce unexpected radical change at a later stage;deleted

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26

26. Believes there is a strong need for less complexity, better ownership, more transparency and democracy in economic governance; believes that looking forward towards deeper integration cannot be achieved by adding a new layer of rules to the already existing onesmore national ownership and more transparency;

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Bernd LUCKE, Sander LOONES

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27

27. Acknowledges, based on the current situation, that the economic governance framework ~~must be corrected and complet~~should be reassessed in ~~both~~ the medium ~~and long t~~term, in orderm to a~~llow for the EU and the euro area to meet the challenges of convergence, long-lasting investment and relianc~~nalyse if the current framework has provided the desired results and set a timeline for returning to the principle of the no- bailout clause;

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28

28. Calls for the annual sustainable growth guidelines to be made subject to a codecision procedure that should be introduced in the next Treaty change; instructs its President to present the annual sustainable growth guidelines as amended by Parliament at the spring European Council;deleted

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29

29. Recalls that legislation implemented during the crisis ~~on the~~was basised ofn intergovernmental agreements ~~lacks democratic accountability at EU level~~;

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30

30. Recalls the European Parliament’s request that the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) outside of the structure of the institutions of the Union represents a setback to the political integration of the Union and, therefore, demands that the ESM be fully integrated into the community framework and made formally accountable to Parliament;deleted

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31

~~31. Calls for a new legal framework for future assistance programmes in order to ensure that all decisions are taken under the responsibility of the Commission with full involvement of Parliament;~~deleted

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33

33. Requests that a reassessment of the Eurogroup’s decision-making process be conducted so as to provide for appropriate democratic accountability; believes that in the long term the Commissioner for Economic Affairs should assume the role of President of the Eurogroup;deleted

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34

~~34. Recalls that a ‘genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ (EMU) cannot simply be limited to a system of rules but also requires an increased euro area fiscal capacity;~~deleted

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35

35. Recalls that the banking union was the result of the political will to avoid a financial ~~crisis and that the same will is needed as regards a fiscal union in order to avoid a political~~ crisis;

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37

37. Invites the stakeholders in this necessary next step of the EMU to avoid left-over and to explore all options which have been well discussed and documented over a long period of time as ways of achieving a deepening of the EMU, such as: – a ‘taxation union’, – a social dimension, including a minimum wage mechanism and a minimum unemployment benefit scheme for the euro area and in-depth reforms to favour mobility, – the inclusion of the ESM in Union law and a new approach towards Eurobonds, – a euro area fiscal capacity notably to finance counter cyclical actions, structural reforms or part of debt reduction;deleted

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38

38. ~~Requests that it be elaborated on the basis of a ‘4+1 Presidents’ approach, including the EP President~~Asks that the four Presidents report takes due note of this report and recommends measures compatible with the sound economic principles underlying it; expects the Four Presidents reports to be introduced to the European Parliament by the June European Council;

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON

Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39

39. Asks its President to ~~represent~~follow closely this work and inform the Parliament ion ~~this upcoming task~~important developments on the basis of the mandate given by this resolution;

2015/03/03
Committee: ECON