Activities of Bernd LUCKE related to 2017/2124(INI)
Plenary speeches (1)
European Central Bank Annual Report for 2016 (debate) DE
Amendments (40)
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 14 a (new)
Citation 14 a (new)
- – havingregard to Article 123(1) of the TFEU,
Amendment 16 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 16 a (new)
Citation 16 a (new)
- having regard to the Judgment C- 62/14 of the European Court of Justice(ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, June 16, 2015), in particular paragraphs 70, 97, 101, 102,104, 106 and 109.
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
C a. Whereas in its decision of 18 July 2017 the German Constitutional Court requested a preliminary ruling by the European Court of Justice on the compatibility of the ECB’s public sector purchase programme(PSPP) with EU primary law.
Amendment 77 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Recalls that, according to Eurostat, average inflation was just 0.2 % in 2016, while inflation excluding energy prices stood at 0.9 %; emphasizes that a rate of inflation close to but below 1% is even more price stability than an inflation rate close to but below 2%.
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. recalls that, according to a study published by the Bank for International Settlements, periods with very low or even negative inflation rates have only rarely entailed periods of low growth rates, the Great Depression being the most notable exception[1];[1] Borio, Claudio, Magdalena Erdem, Andrew Filardo and Boris Hofmann (2015):The costs of deflation:a historical perspective.BIS Quarterly Review, March 2015, pp.31-54.
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Is concernedNotes that the ECB will likely not reach its inflation target for at least six consecutive years and will remain below the medium-term target level of 2 % until at least 2020 despite pursuing a very accommodative monetary policy, which indicates that the economy is not operating at full capacity;
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Acknowledges that without the ECB’s policy package, inflation would be almost 0.5 % lower on average than the rate currently projected for the years 2016-2019;it is quite unclear how effective the ECB’s policy package has been in increasing inflation and what quantitative effect, if any, it will have in the future.
Amendment 136 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Agrees with the ECB that in order to reach the inflation target, supportive fiscal policies and socially balanced productivity-enhancing reforms are required;monetary measures alone are unlikely to reach the inflation target.
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. Notes that fiscal policies can only be supportive if productivity and competitiveness of the private sector are improved as a consequence of entrepreneurial investment decisions, increases in human capital and structural reforms aimed at better functioning product and factor markets.
Amendment 145 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
Amendment 157 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Points out that, while the effects of the ECB’s monetary policy on the real economy have been very limited, banks have been able to access funding at virtually no, or very low, cost, which has directly subsidised their balance sheets;deplores the fact that the size of this subsidy, despite representing a clear fiscal spillover effect of monetary policy, is not monitored and published,
Amendment 170 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Asks the ECB to consider complementing its price stability objective with nominal GDP growth targeting;Emphasizes that the ECB should not target nominal GDP since monetary policy measures cannot systematically improve the drivers of real growth.
Amendment 185 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls that, in accordance with Article 3 of its Statute, the ECB must support ‘the general economic policies of the Union’, including, as stated in Article 3 of the TEU, ‘the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth’;f this does not compromise the objective of price stability.
Amendment 196 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10 a. Notes that the current recovery in bank and market lending is geographically unevenly distributed among the Member States and has not so far wholly produced the expected effect on the existing investment gap in the euro area;
Amendment 209 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Underlines the positive effect of the ECB monetary policy on growth, employment and the financing costs of Member States, non-financial companies and households; is concerned about the low returns earned on savings and about the long-run sustainability of pensions and life insurance companies;
Amendment 216 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12 a. Believes that the ECB should carefully assess the benefits and side- effects of its policy and consider to end its expansionary measures as soon as it deems appropriate;
Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Notes that according to the ECB, economic recovery in the Eurozone has relied on the fall in oil prices and the ECB’s monetary policy, which will add a cumulative 1.7 % to growth in the period 2016-2019, with no sizable positive contribution from fiscal policy so far;
Amendment 229 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
Amendment 254 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Points out that while unemployment has decreased, aggregate demand in the euro area remains subdued, largely as a result of the rise in poor quality, temporary, low-paid jobs; calls on the ECB to evaluate how this pheno;points out that demand managemenont is slowing the recovery and explore ways to stimulate demand in spite of wage stagnationclearly not covered by the mandate of the ECB;
Amendment 276 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Stresses that excessive current account surpluses in some Member States must be corrected through appropriate fiscal policies;ay be due to insufficient competitiveness in other Member States, stresses that current account surpluses are capital exports in favour of countries with the corresponding current account deficits, many of which are clearly in need of foreign investment
Amendment 287 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16 a. Stresses that current account management is clearly not covered by the mandate of the ECB;
Amendment 308 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18 a. Points out that the ECB hasfew instruments left to fend off adverse macroeconomic shocks;
Amendment 320 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Agrees with the ECB that a bank’s profitability depends on its business model, low interest rates notwithstanding; stresses that an almost flat term structure of the interest rate greatly reduces the profitability of banks in one of its most important areas of business activity, the provision of credit for long-term investments;
Amendment 323 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20 a. Underlines the fact that a prolonged period of flat yield curve could lessen the profitability of banks, especially if they do not adjust their business models, and could create potential risks, in particular for private savings and pension and insurance funds;warns that a decline in the profitability of banks could dampen their willingness to develop lending activity;points particularly to the negative effect of such an interest rate policy on local and regional banks and savings banks with little funding from financial markets, and to risks in the insurance and pensions sector;calls therefore for specific and continued monitoring of the negative interest rate tool, its implementation and its effects;emphasises the need for proper, prudent, timely management of the winding-down of this ultra-low (negative) interest rate policy;
Amendment 339 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21 a. Remains concerned by the still significant levels of non-marketable assets and asset-backed securities put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the framework of its refinancing operations;reiterates its request to the ECB to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities and to disclose valuation methods regarding such assets;underlines that such disclosure would be beneficial for the purpose of parliamentary scrutiny of the supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB;
Amendment 342 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21 b. Calls on the ECB to carefully assess the risks of a future resurgence of asset and housing bubbles owing to its ultra-low (negative) interest rate policy, especially in the light of much-increased lending volumes and disproportionately high prices in the property sector, particularly in some big cities, and believes that it, together with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), should put forward proposals for designing specific macroprudential recommendations in this regard;
Amendment 345 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 c (new)
Paragraph 21 c (new)
21 c. Notes that the ECB’s APP has lowered bond yields in most Member States to unprecedented levels;warns against the risk ofexcessively high valuations on the bond markets, which would be difficult to handle if interest rates start to rise again in the absence of a sufficiently robust recovery, particularly for the countries involved in the excessive deficit procedure or with high levels of debt;points out that a sudden reversal of interest rates from currently low levels along the yield curve carry important market risks for financial institutions with a significant proportion of mark-to- market financial instruments;
Amendment 347 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 d (new)
Paragraph 21 d (new)
21 d. Takes account of the fact that some Member States may be using ultra- low (negative) interest rate policy to defer necessary structural reforms and the consolidation of their primary public deficits, particularly at central government level, and points in this connection to the Stability and Growth Pact commitments;recognises that one of the reasons contributing to budgetary surpluses in some Member States has been the negative interest rates of their public debt;emphasises that national economic policies should be coordinated, particularly within the euro area;underlines that the unavoidable process of exiting from unconventional monetarypolicy will be a very complex one which will have to be carefully planned in order to avoid negative shocks on the capital markets;
Amendment 348 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 e (new)
Paragraph 21 e (new)
21 e. Notes with concern that TARGET 2 imbalances are still rising in the euro area despite a narrowing in trade imbalances pointing to continued capital outflows from the euro area periphery;
Amendment 359 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Calls the ECB’s attention to the need for the sufficiently wide coverage of recent stress tests vis-à-vis the resolution or liquidation of certain banks; recalls that some banks which had passed the ECB’s stress test were on the verge of bankruptcy not much later; calls for more realistic stress test scenarios;
Amendment 388 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
Amendment 398 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)
Paragraph 26 a (new)
26 a. Emphasizes that CSPP purchases aimed at supporting specific EU policy objectives would clearly not be covered by the mandate of the ECB.
Amendment 412 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
Amendment 423 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
Amendment 463 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
Amendment 474 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 a (new)
Paragraph 33 a (new)
33 a. Emphasizes that monetary policy measures aimed at supporting Greece or other troubled Eurozone countries would clearly not be covered by the mandate of the ECB.
Amendment 478 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Calls on the ECB to assess all the consequences of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and to stand ready to support banks in relocating their activities in the euro area; considers the strengthening of oversight for euro-clearing outside the euro area to be of the utmost importance;
Amendment 486 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34 a (new)
Paragraph 34 a (new)
34 a. Emphasizes that the support of specific banks relocating their activities to the euro area would clearly not be covered by the mandate of the ECB;
Amendment 502 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Believes that ECB profits from seigniorage revenue shouldcannot be considered an EU budgetary resource, since they are directly linked to a fully developed, sui generis European policybelong to the ECB’s shareholders;