1201 Amendments of Bernd LUCKE
Amendment 15 #
2018/2624(RSP)
Paragraph 1
1. Regrets that the procedure for the appointment of the new Secretary-General of the European Commission on 21 February 2018 was conducted in a manner which aroused widespread irritation and disapproval in public opinion, among Members of the European Parliament and within the European civil service; notes that the result of this procedure constitutes a reputational riskhas damaged the reputation and integrity of not only for the European Commission but for all the European Union institutions;
Amendment 38 #
2018/2624(RSP)
Paragraph 6
6. Takes note that the new Secretary- General was transferred in the interest of the service under Article 7 of the Staff Regulations and that the position was not published because the post was not considered vacant; hence no official could apply since the procedure was organised through a reassignment with post rather than as a transfer in the strict sense with proper publication of the vacant post; stresses that such a procedure for the post of Secretary-General is unacceptable, and against the spirit of implementing the rules for the appointment of EU officials, who are servants of the citizens of the European Union;
Amendment 73 #
2018/2624(RSP)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16 a. Stresses that there have been clear and continued failings by the European Commission in the communication of the processes and procedures for the appointment of the Secretary-General of the Commission to both the public and the press; in this regard notes that the European Commission published its response to the Budgetary Control Committee’s questions at 03h00 on Sunday the 25th March 2018; stresses that in the interest of transparency and informing the broadest possible audience on a matter of public interest, such a working practice is unacceptable;
Amendment 74 #
2018/2624(RSP)
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16 b. Notes that throughout the European Parliament’s investigation into the appointment of the Secretary-General of the European Commission, neither the Commission President or the Secretary- General of the Commission have appeared before the Members of the European Parliament, notes that this is against the spirit of inter-institutional cooperation and the spirit of transparency and openness; stresses that the debates within the European Parliament are intended to give the public and the press the opportunity to scrutinise the work of the EU institutions and hold them to account;
Amendment 85 #
2018/2624(RSP)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18 a. Expresses serious concerns over the impartiality and objectivity of the President of the European Commission, given that the President of the Commission has publically threatened to resign if the appointment of the newly appointed Secretary-General is not honoured;
Amendment 120 #
2018/2624(RSP)
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24 a. Is deeply concerned about a report by the German magazine "Der Spiegel" about rude and inappropriate language used by Mr Selmayr in addressing a Spiegel journalist; notes that such language, if it was indeed used by Mr Selmayr, would be a flagrant violation of Article 12 of Regulation No. 31 (EEC) ("the Statute"), notes with great concern that the Commission did not follow up on the Spiegel report with an investigation of the incident, is deeply concerned that Commissioner Öttinger did not bring the incident to the attention of his colleagues prior to the appointment of Mr. Selmayr, is deeply concerned that the undisputed Spiegel report may reflect adversely on Mr Selmayrs position as Secretary General of the Commission;
Amendment 122 #
2018/2624(RSP)
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24 a. Notes that when Mr. Selmayr was appointed, the rules were applied in such a way that only he could succeed; concludes therefore, that this seems very likely to be a case of favouritism; considers that the procedure must be re- opened, with the term of opening being extended by an additional month to give candidates from the individual Member States an opportunity to apply for the role;
Amendment 127 #
2018/2624(RSP)
Paragraph 24 b (new)
24 b. Notes with great concern that the same Spiegel report quotes Mr Selmayr as saying he would never again give the Spiegel journalist any bit of information, notes that Article 17 of Regulation No. 31 (EEC) ("the Statute") prohibits the unauthorised disclosure of information received in the line of duty for all officials, regardless of rank, notes with great concern that the Commission did not follow up on the Spiegel report with an investigation of Mr Selmayr possibly leaking information to the media and presumably doing so on a regular basis, is deeply concerned that Commissioner Öttinger did not bring the incident to the attention of his colleagues prior to the appointment of Mr.Selmayr, is bewildered by Commissioner Öttinger's opinion, expressed in the Budgetary Control Committee, that Mr Selmayr leaked information to the journalist only confidentially, affirms that an official shall refrain from any unauthorised disclosure of unpublished information received in the line of duty and that this also holds for the Secretary General of the Commission;
Amendment 23 #
2018/2005(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Underlines that trade is not an end in itself, but that an inclusive, free and fair trade policy aligned with the SDGs can contribute to poverty eradication provided trading partners ensure property rights, the rule of law and competitive markets; recalls the principle of policy coherence for development, requiring that the objectives of development cooperation be taken into account in policies that are likely to affect developing countries; calls on the EU to systematically evaluate the impact of its trade policies on developing countries;
Amendment 38 #
2018/2005(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Reiterates the importance of the multilateral rules-based order as the most effective way to achieve an inclusive global trading system; emphasises the importance of comprehensivadequate provisions on social, labour and environmental standards in trade agreements; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to include a chapter on Trade and Sustainable Development in all trade agreements;
Amendment 60 #
2018/2005(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Strongly supports the further mainstreaming of digital technologies and services in the EU’s development policy; calls on the Commission to increasMember States and on the Commission to reshape their ODA such that more investments in developing countries' digital infrastructure in the Global Souths encouraged.
Amendment 56 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) Article 175 of the Treaty provides, inter alia, that all Member States should coordinate their economic policies in such a way as to promote the overall harmonious development of the Union and attain the objectives on economic social and territorial cohesion set out in Article 174.
Amendment 57 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2 a (new)
Recital 2 a (new)
(2a) Cohesion policy based on Articles 174 and 175 of the Treaty applies to the Union in its entirety and must not exclude any Member State from its scope.
Amendment 60 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3
Recital 3
(3) At Union level, the European Semester of economic policy coordination is the framework to identify national reform priorities from the European perspective and monitor their implementation. Member States develop their own national multiannual investment strategies in support of thoseeir reform priorities. Those strategies should be presented alongside the yearly National Reform Programmes as a way to outline and coordinate priority investment projects to be supported by national and/or Union funding. Theypreferably by private sector funds. National and/or Union funding may contribute to some projects. The strategies should also serve to use Union funding in a coherent manner and to maximise the added value of the financial support to be received notably from the programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, the European Investment Stabilisation Function and InvestEU, where relevant.
Amendment 73 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
Recital 8
(8) Other Union instruments and programmes also provide a significant contribution to improving conditions underpinning certain investments in Member States, which can be conducive to or be part of such reforms. In particular, the Union Funds covered by Regulation (EU) No YYY/XX of the European Parliament and of the Council [CPR] link investment to enabling conditions (formerly known as ex-ante conditionalities), foresee a macroeconomic governance mechanism and may finance costs of structural reforms linked to investments in policy areas relevant for cohesion policy. However, currently, no instrument foresees direct financial support that provides incentives for theall Member States to implement reforms in all policy areas, in response to challenges identified in the European Semester. Moreover, there is currently no instrument providing specific and targeted financial and technical support to Member States whose currency is not the euro in their efforts to implement reforms that are relevant for joining the euro area.
Amendment 82 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) In order to allow for the provision of the different types of support needed and to cater for the specificity of each component, threewo separate but complementary instruments should be set out within the framework of the Programme, namely a reform delivery tool, and technical support instrument, and a dedicated convergence facility for supporting preparation for euro-area membership.
Amendment 87 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
Recital 13
(13) The Programme's overall objective is the enhancement of cohesion, competitiveness, productivity, growth, and employment. For that purpose, it should provide financial incentives for addressing challenges of a structural nature, and should help to strengthen the administrative capacity of theall Member States insofar as their institutions and economic and social sectors are concerned.
Amendment 91 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
Recital 14
(14) Specific objectives should be set for each instrument of the Programme. With regard to the reform delivery and technical support tool, they should consist of fulfilling concrete milestones and targets set out in relation to the completion of reform commitments, which would trigger the release of the financial incentives. With regard to the technical support instrumentFurther, they should be to assist national authorities in their endeavours to design and implement reforms, by taking into account good practices and lessons learned from peers. Those objectives should be pursued in all Member States under those twois instruments and, in the context of the convergence facility, by those Member States whose currency is not the euro and which have taken demonstrable steps towards adopting the single currency within a given time-frame.
Amendment 96 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
Recital 15
(15) In order to ensure that the reforms supported by the Programme address all the key economic and societal areas, both financial support and technical support under the Programme should be provided by the Commission, upon request from any Member State, in a broad range of policy domains, which include areas related to public financial and asset management, institutional and administrative reform, business environment, the financial sector, markets for products, services and labour, education and training, sustainable development, public health and social welfare.
Amendment 112 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
Recital 19
(19) With regard to the reform delivery and technical support tool, it is necessary to identify the types of reforms that should be eligible for financial support. To ensure their contribution to the objectives of the Programme, the eligible reforms should be those addressing the challenges identified in the context of the European Semester of economic policy coordination, including those proposed to address the country- specific recommendations.
Amendment 116 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20
Recital 20
(20) In order to ensure a meaningful incentive for all Member States to complete structural reforms, it is appropriate to establish a maximum financial contribution available for them under the instrument for each stage of allocation and under each call. That maximum contribution should be calculated on the basis of the population of Member States. To ensure that the financial incentives are spread throughout the whole period of application of the Programme, the allocation of funds to the Member States should be made in stages. In the first stage lasting twenty months, half (EUR 11 00420 000 000) of the overall financial envelope of the reform delivery and technical support tool should be made available to Member States, during which they could receive up to their maximum allocation by submitting proposals for reform commitments.
Amendment 121 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
Recital 21
(21) In the interest of transparency and efficiency, in the subsequent stage lasting until the end of the Programme, a system of periodic calls should be set out by the Commission to allocate the remaining half (EUR 11 00420 000 000) of the overall financial envelope of the instrument, plus the amounts unused from the previous stage. Simple procedures should be organised to that effect. Under each call, all Member States should be invited to submit reform proposals concurrently, and could be awarded their maximum financial contribution on the basis of their reform proposals. In the interest of transparency, the first call organised by the Commission during the second stage should be for an amount corresponding to the remaining part (EUR 11 000 000 000) of the overall financial envelope of the instrument. Further calls should be organised by the Commission only where the overall financial envelope has not been fully used. The Commission should adopt and publish an indicative calendar of the further calls to be organised, and should indicate, at each call, the remaining amount of the overall envelope, which is available under that call.
Amendment 124 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22
Recital 22
(22) It is necessary to establish a process for the submission of proposals for reform commitments by the Member States, and the content thereof. With a view to ensuring the expediency of procedures, a Member State should submit the proposal for reform commitments together with its national reform programme, but in the form of a separate annex, which may also be submitted at a different point in time. While participation in the Programme is voluntary, Member States experiencing excessive imbalances should be particularly encouraged to come forward with reform proposals under the reform delivery and technical support tool, which address the problems that led to such excessive imbalances.
Amendment 158 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 32
Recital 32
(32) With regard to the technical support instrumentobjective in the reform delivery and technical support tool, Member States have increasingly taken up technical support under the SRSP, beyond initial expectations. Almost all Member States have requested support under the SRSP and requests are distributed across all policy areas covered by that programme. For that reason, the main features of the SRSP should be maintained, including the actions eligible for financing under the technical support instrument.
Amendment 161 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 37
Recital 37
(37) Provisions on the implementation of the technical support component of the reform delivery and technical support instrument should be laid down, in particular the management modes, the forms of funding for the technical support measures and the content of work programmes, which should be adopted by way of implementing acts. In view of the importance of sustaining the efforts of Member States in pursuing and implementing reforms, it is necessary to allow for a co-financing rate for grants of up to 100% of the eligible costs. To allow for a rapid mobilisation of technical support in case of urgency, provision should be made for the adoption of special measures for a limited period of time. To that effect, a limited amount of the budget within the work programme of the technical support instrument should be set aside for special measures.
Amendment 163 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 38
Recital 38
(38) The convergence facility should aim at providing both financial support and technical support to Member States (in addition to that already available under the two other instruments of the Programme), whose currency is not the euro and which have taken demonstrable steps towards adopting the single currency within a given time-frame, with a view to helping them prepare for membership in the euro area. To that effect, "demonstrable steps" should consist of a formal letter from the government of the Member State concerned to the Commission stating its clear commitment to join the euro area within a reasonable and defined timeframe and presenting a credible, time-bound roadmap, after consultation with the Commission, for implementing concrete measures to prepare for successful participation in the euro area, including steps to ensure full alignment of its national legislation with the requirements under Union law (including the Banking Union).
Amendment 167 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 40
Recital 40
(40) In the interest of consistency and simplification, the financial and technical support components carried out under the convergence facility should follow the same rules and implementation process as the other instruments under the Programme. Therefore, relevant provisions relating to the reform delivery tool and the technical support instrumenttool under the Programme should also apply to the relevant components of the convergence facility, complemented by certain specific rules.
Amendment 169 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 41
Recital 41
(41) As regards eligibility of reforms and actions, there should be some additional rules on fixing the maximum indicative allocation, and on the proposals for reform commitments, requests for technical support, and the related assessment process. In particular, under the financial support component of the convergence facility, an additional financial contribution should be available for allocation to the eligible Member States over and above the financial contribution to be allocated under the reform delivery and technical support tool, which should be granted in return for additional reforms undertaken by the Member State concerned.
Amendment 172 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 48
Recital 48
Amendment 184 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the reform delivery and technical support tool;
Amendment 185 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 198 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point a
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) as regards the reform delivery and technical support tool, the Programme shall provide Member States with financial incentives with a view to achieving the milestones and targets of the structural reforms as set out in the reform commitments entered into by Member States with the Commission and shall support the efforts of the national authorities in improving their administrative capacity to design, develop and implement reforms, including through exchange of good practices, appropriate processes and methodologies and a more effective and efficient human resources management;.
Amendment 200 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point b
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point b
Amendment 235 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point a
(a) up to EUR 22 00840 000 000 for the reform delivery and technical support tool;
Amendment 240 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Amendment 247 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point c – introductory part
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point c – introductory part
(c) up to EUR 2 160 000 000 for the convergence facility, of which:
Amendment 248 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point c – point i
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point c – point i
Amendment 252 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point c – point ii
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point c – point ii
Amendment 258 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Article 7 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Where, by the 31 December 2023, under the convergence facility, a non-euro-area Member State has not taken demonstrable steps to adopt the single currency within a given time-frame, the maximum amount available for that Member State under the financial support component of the convergence facility pursuant to Article 26 shall be reallocated to the reform delivery and technical support tool referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of this paragraph. The Commission shall adopt a decision to that effect after having given the Member State concerned the possibility to present its observations within a period of two months of the communication of its conclusions.
Amendment 260 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 3
Article 7 – paragraph 3
3. The financial envelope for the Programme may also cover expenses pertaining to preparatory, monitoring, control, audit and evaluation activities, which are required for the management of the Programme and the achievement of its objectives, in particular studies, meetings of experts, information and communication actions, including corporate communication of the political priorities of the Union, in so far as they are related to the objectives of this Regulation, expenses linked to IT networks focusing on information processing and exchange, including corporate information technology tools, and all other technical and administrative assistance expenses incurred by the Commission for the management of the Programme. Expenses may also cover, under each of the threewo instruments referred to in Article 3, the costs of other supporting activities such as quality control and monitoring of technical support projects on the ground and the costs of peer counselling and experts for the assessment and implementation of structural reforms.
Amendment 264 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Chapter 2 – title
Chapter 2 – title
Reform Delivery and Technical Support Tool
Amendment 265 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – title
Article 8 – title
Eligible reforms of the reform delivery component
Amendment 281 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2
Article 10 – paragraph 2
2. For a period of twenty months from the date of application of this Regulation, the Commission shall make available for allocation EUR 11 00420 000 000, which represents 50% of the overall envelope referred to in point (a) of Article 7(2). Each Member State may propose to receive up to the full amount of the maximum financial contribution, referred to in Article 9, to fulfil reform commitments proposed in accordance with Article 11 or request technical support.
Amendment 285 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 3
Article 10 – paragraph 3
3. For the period starting after the end of the period referred to in paragraph 2, the Commission shall make available for allocation EUR 11 00420 000 000, which represent the remaining 50% of the overall envelope for the reform delivery and technical support tool referred to in point (a) of Article 7(2), plus the amount that has not been allocated in accordance with paragraph 2, on the basis of calls organised and published under the reform delivery and technical support tool. The first call shall be for allocating EUR 11 00420 000 000.
Amendment 291 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 1
Article 11 – paragraph 1
1. A Member State wishing to receive support for structural reforms under the reform delivery and technical support tool shall submit a proposal for reform commitments to the Commission. That proposal shall set out a detailed set of measures for the implementation of structural reforms in response to challenges identified in the European Semester process and shall contain milestones, targets and a timetable for the implementation of the reforms over a maximum period of three years. The proposal may include a request for technical support. The proposal shall, for each reform objective, identify an appropriate pre-existing quantitative indicator suitable to measure the degree by which the objective has been achieved. The proposal shall specify the targeted value of each such indicator over the course of the reform process.
Amendment 307 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point e a (new)
Article 11 – paragraph 3 – point e a (new)
(ea) the need for technical support, if any, and
Amendment 310 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 7 – introductory part
Article 11 – paragraph 7 – introductory part
7. The Commission shall assess the nature and importance of the proposal for reform commitments, and, if applicable the request for technical support, and, for that purpose, shall take into account the following criteria:
Amendment 338 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 8
Article 11 – paragraph 8
8. For the purpose of the assessment of the proposals for reform commitments and requests for technical support submitted by Member States, the Commission may be assisted by experts.
Amendment 342 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 9
Article 11 – paragraph 9
9. The Economic Policy Committee, set up by Council decision 2000/604/EC on the Composition and Statutes of the Economic Policy Committee31 , may provide its opinion on the proposals for reform commitments and requests for technical support submitted by Member States. __________________ 31Council Decision of 29 September 2000 on the composition and the statutes of the Economic Policy Committee (2000/604/EC) (OJ L 257, 11.10.2000, p. 28–31)
Amendment 363 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – point a
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the elements that led to the achievement of the reform commitments were fully or to a substantial part reversed; or
Amendment 369 #
Amendment 370 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Pursuant to the objectives set out in point (b) of Article 4 and point (b) of Article 5(2), the technical support component of the reform delivery and technical support instrument shall finance, in particular, the following types of action:
Amendment 375 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1
Article 19 – paragraph 1
1. A Member State wishing to receive technical support under this instrumcomponent shall submit a request for technical support to the Commission, identifying the policy areas and the priorities for support within the scope of the Programme as set out in Article 6. The Commission shall organise calls under the technical support instrument, which will set appropriate deadlines for the submission of requests. The Commission may provide guidance on the main elements to be included in the request for support.
Amendment 381 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – title
Article 21 – title
Other financial contributions to the technical support instrumcomponent
Amendment 382 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1
Article 22 – paragraph 1
Actions financed under the reform delivery and technical support instrument may receive support from other Union programmes, instruments or funds under the Union's budget provided that such support does not cover the same cost.
Amendment 383 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – title
Article 23 – title
Implementation of the reform delivery and technical support instrument
Amendment 384 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1
Article 23 – paragraph 1
1. The Commission shall implement the reform delivery and technical support instrument under the Programme in accordance with the Financial Regulation.
Amendment 385 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
Article 23 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. The measures of the technical support instrumcomponent under the Programme may be implemented either directly by the Commission or, indirectly, by entities and persons other than Member States in accordance with Article XX of the Financial Regulation. In particular, Union support for actions pursuant to Article 19 shall take the form of:
Amendment 386 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
Article 23 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
In order to implement the reform delivery and technical support instrument under the Programme, the Commission shall adopt work programmes by way of implementing acts, and inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof.
Amendment 387 #
Amendment 396 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 1 (new)
Article 27 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 1 (new)
– The proposal for Reform commitments referred to in paragraph 1 shall, for each reform objective, identify an appropriate pre-existing quantitative indicator suitable to measure the degree by which the objective has been achieved. The proposal shall specify the targeted value of each such indicator over the course of the reform process.
Amendment 402 #
2018/0213(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) optimise mechanisms for coordinationensure to avoid duplication of effort; and
Amendment 45 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3
Recital 3
(3) Member States should conduct their economic policies andin such a way as to ensure economically sustainable economic growth and the efficient use of scarce resources in a market economy committed to providing a sufficient level of social security. Without compromising these objectives, Member States should coordinate themir economic policies in such a way as to attain the objective of strengthening economic, social, and territorial cohesion.
Amendment 50 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
Recital 4
(4) The unprecedented financial crisis and economic downturn that hit the world and the euro area has shown that in the euro area available instruments such as the single monetary policy, automatic fiscal stabilisers and discretionary fiscal policy measures at national level are insufficient to absorb large asymmetric shockswas a huge symmetric shock which had a negative impact on all euro area countries and on almost all other countries in the world. Countries recovered from the ensuing economic downturn at very different speeds depending on the structural characteristics of their economies and the economic policies enacted in response to the common shock. The single currency clearly aggravated the recovery for euro area countries whose competitiveness on international markets was low.
Amendment 56 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4 a (new)
Recital 4 a (new)
(4a) An asymmetric shock is a shock which harms some countries while other countries benefit from the shock or are not affected at all. As such, the financial crisis was clearly not an asymmetric shock. The Commission is encouraged to invest in capacity building by brushing up basic economic knowledge of its staff.
Amendment 58 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
Recital 5
(5) In order to facilitate macroeconomic adjustment and cushion large asymmetric shocks in the current institutional set-up, Member States whose currency is the euro and other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) have to rely more heavily on remaining instruments of economic policy, such as structural reforms, increases in market flexibility, automatic fiscal stabilisers and other discretionary fiscal measures, making the adjustment more difficult overall. The sequence of the crisis in euro area also suggests strong reliance on the single monetary policy to provide for macro-economic stabilisation in severe macro-economic circumstances.
Amendment 63 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) TIn response to the financial crisis has resulted in a pro-cyclical pattern for fiscal policies, which has been detrimental to the quality of public finances and in particular for public investment. In turn, that shortcoming has contributed tomany Member States have enacted counter-cyclical fiscal policies, while other countries, in particular those under EFSF or ESM programmes, enacted contractionary fiscal policies in both the recession and the subsequent recovery. Different policies are one, but certainly not the only reason widespread differences in macroeconomic performance between Member States, imperilling cohesion.
Amendment 67 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
Recital 7
(7) Additional instruments are therefore necessary to avoid in the future that large asymmetric shocks result into deeper and broader situations of stress and weaken cohesionNo evidence exists that the Euro area has ever been hit by an asymmetric shock.
Amendment 72 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
Recital 8
(8) In particular, in order to support Member States whose currency is the euro to respond better to rapidly changing economic circumstances and stabilise their economy by preserving public investment in the event of large asymmetric shocks,no convincing argument exists for establishing a European Investment Stabilisation Function (EISF) should be established.
Amendment 80 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
Recital 9
Amendment 84 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) EISF should be a Union instrument which complements national fiscal policies. It should be recalled that Member States should pursue sound fiscal policies and build up fiscal buffers in favourable economic times. If they do so, they comply with the Treaties and have no need for EU support measures.
Amendment 91 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) At Union level, the European Semester of economic policy coordination is the framework to identify national reform priorities and monitor their implementation. Member States develop their own national multiannual investment strategies in support of those reform priorities. Those strategies should be presented alongside the yearly National Reform Programmes as a way to outline and coordinate priority investment projects to be supported by national and/or Union funding. They should also serve to use Union funding in a coherent manner and to maximise the added value of the financial support to be received notably from the programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development,, the EISF and InvestEU, where relevant.
Amendment 98 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
Recital 12
Amendment 101 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
Recital 13
(13) EISFU support shouldmay be given in case one or several Member States whose currency is the euro or other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) are confronted with a large asymmetric shock. Changes in unemployment rates are highly correlated with business cycle fluctuations in such Member States. Strong increases in national unemployment rates above their long-term averages are a clear indicator of a large shock in a specific Member State. Asymmetric shocks affect one or several Member States significaThe existence of such shocks can only be established by market data which are exogenous with respect to government policies. Adverse developments in unemployment may clearly have their root in ill-designed government policies. Moreover, adverse developments in unemployment in one countlry moare strongly than the average of Member Statesno proof for the asymmetry of a macroeconomic shock.
Amendment 107 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
Recital 14
Amendment 114 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
Recital 15
(15) Strict eligibility criteria based on compliance with decisions and recommendations under the Union's fiscal and economic surveillance framework over a period of twoen years before the request for EISF support should be fulfilled by the Member State requesting EISF support in order not to diminish the incentive for that Member State to pursue prudent budgetary policies.
Amendment 131 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
Recital 18
(18) EISF support should take the form of loans to the Member States concerned. That instrument would provide them with financing to continue executing public investment granted under market conditions and subject to a debt sustainability analysis by a highly-reputed and politically neutral academic institution.
Amendment 134 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
Recital 19
(19) In addition to loans, no interest rate subsidies should be granted to the Member States concerned to cover the interest costs incurred on such loans, as a specific type of financial assistance under Article 220 of the Financial Regulation. Such an interest rate subsidy would provide additional support in parallel to the loan for Member States undergoing an asymmetric shock and facing tight financing conditions on the financial markets.
Amendment 137 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20
Recital 20
(20) With a view to swifefficiently provide EISF support, the competence for granting the loans when the eligibility and activation criteria are fulfilled and deciding on granting interest rate subsidies should under no means be entrusted to the Commission. Rather, the Council should be entrusted, provided the Council approves of such loans in a unanimous decision.
Amendment 141 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
Recital 21
(21) Member States should invest the support received under EISF in eligible public investment and also maintain the level of public investment in general compared to the average level of public investment over the five last years in order to ensure that the objective pursued by this Regulation is achieved. In that respect, there is the expectation that Member States should give priority to maintaining eligible investment in programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.which has a clearly identified European added value. They should critically review the level of public investment compared to the level of public investment which is deemed sustainable.
Amendment 150 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
Recital 23
(23) The maximum level of eligible public investment that could be supported by EISF loan for a Member State should be automatically set on the basis of a formula which captures the ratio of public eligible investment to gross domestic product (GDP) in the Union over a period of five years before the Member State concerned requests a loan and its GDP over the same period. The maximumPublic investment should always be in line with the productivity effects it generates. Mechanical and automatically set level s of eligible public investment should also be scaled by means of scaling factor (α) towards the fixed ceiling in the Union budget. That factor is determined such that with hindsight of the recent crisis, all the EISF support could have been provided to the Member States concerned, had the mechanism been in placeentail a waste of resources and remind attentive observers of the huge misallocation of funds in centrally planned economies.
Amendment 153 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24
Recital 24
Amendment 159 #
2018/0212(COD)
Amendment 161 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26
Recital 26
Amendment 165 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
Recital 27
Amendment 173 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 28
Recital 28
Amendment 176 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29
Recital 29
(29) TUnder no means should the Commission should be in charge for managing the assets of the Stabilisation Support Fund in a safe and prudent manner.
Amendment 177 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30
Recital 30
(30) In order to increase the impact of public investment and potential EISF support the quality of Member States' public investment systems and practices should be ensured and where appropriate strengthened. An assessment by the Commission should be carried out regularly and take the form of a report and if warranted contain recommendations to improve the quality of public investment systems and practices in Member States. A Member State couldFor its public investment, a Member State may request technical assistance from Commission. The latter could undertake technical missions.
Amendment 182 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31
Recital 31
Amendment 185 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 32
Recital 32
Amendment 188 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33
Recital 33
Amendment 195 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 35
Recital 35
Amendment 196 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36
Recital 36
Amendment 202 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2
Article 1 – paragraph 2
2. The EISF shall provide financial assistance in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies for public investment to a Member State which is experiencing a large asymmetric shock, provided the public investment projects have a clearly identified European added value.
Amendment 210 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 3
Article 1 – paragraph 3
3. EISF support shall be available for all Member States whose currency is the euro and for other Member States that participate in the exchange rate mechanism referred to in Article 140(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
Amendment 217 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 3
(3) 'eligible public investment' means: (a) the public investment in support of policy objectives as defined in Regulation (EU) No [XX] of [XX] [insert reference to new Common Provisions Regulation]16 and (b) any expenditure in areas of education and training as deshown to have a clearly identifined in Annex A to Regulation (EU) No 549/2013 and not covered in point (a);European added value. _________________ 16 [Insert correct reference to new version of Common Provisions Regulation]
Amendment 226 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 4
(4) 'EISF support' means Union financial assistance within the meaning of Article [220] of the Financial Regulation in the form of loans and interest rate subsidies under the EISF in support of eligible public investment;
Amendment 231 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 a (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 a (new)
(6a) 'asymmetric shock' means a macroeconomic event, beyond the control of a certain Group of Member States (‘Member States concerned’), having large negative impact on the Member States concerned while having no significant negative impact on other Member States.
Amendment 232 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 b (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 b (new)
(6b) 'large negative impact of a shock' means a difference of more than three percentage points between two IMF forecasts for the real GDP of the calendar year which follows the year in which the shock took place, the difference being calculated between the last IMF forecast preceding the shock and the first IMF forecast after the shock.
Amendment 233 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 c (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6 c (new)
(6c) 'no significant negative impact of a shock' means a difference of less than half a percentage point between two IMF forecasts for the real GDP of the calendar year which follows the year in which the shock took place, the difference being calculated between the last IMF forecast preceding the shock and the first IMF forecast after the shock.
Amendment 240 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) a decision of the Council establishing that no effective action has been taken to correct its excessive deficit under Article 126(8) or Article 126(11) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in the twoen years prior to requesting support from the EISF;
Amendment 247 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) a decision of the Council in accordance with Article 6(2) or Article 10 of Council Regulation (EU) No 1466/9719 establishing that no effective action has been taken to address the observed significant deviation in the twoen years prior to requesting support from the EISF; _________________ 19 Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1
Amendment 253 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) two successive recommendations of the Council in the same imbalance procedure in accordance with Article 8(3) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council20 on grounds that the Member State concerned has submitted an insufficient corrective action plan in the twoen years prior to requesting support from the EISF; _________________ 20 Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 25
Amendment 259 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point d
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) two successive decisions of the Council in the same imbalance procedure in accordance with Article 10(4) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council having established non-compliance by the Member State concerned on grounds that it has not taken the recommended corrective action in the twoen years prior to requesting support from the EISF;
Amendment 272 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 2
Article 3 – paragraph 2
Amendment 278 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. A Member State shall be considered to experience a large asymmetric shock if the Commission and the Council concur that a clearly identified macroeconomic event (‘the shock’) was beyond the control of the Member State and the following activation criteria are simultaneously fulfilled:
Amendment 282 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the quarterly national unemployment rate exceedFor the Member State concerned, the average unemployment rate in the Member State concerned over a period of 60 quarters pre is a difference of more than three percentage points between two IMF forecasts for the real GDP of the calendar year which follows the year in which the shock took place, the differenced being the quarter during which the request is made;calculated between the last IMF forecast preceding the shock and the first IMF forecast after the shock.
Amendment 289 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) the quarterly national unemployment rate increased above one percentage point in comparison to the unemployment rate observed in same quarter of the previous yearFor at least three Member States, there is a difference of less than half a percentage point between two IMF forecasts for the real GDP of the calendar year which follows the year in which the shock took place, the difference being calculated between the last IMF forecast preceding the shock and the first IMF forecast after the shock.
Amendment 297 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2
Article 4 – paragraph 2
Amendment 299 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 3
Article 4 – paragraph 3
Amendment 310 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Amendment 321 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
The year following the disbursement of the EISF loan, the Commission shall examine whether the Member State concerned has respected the criteria referred to in paragraph 1. In particular, the Commission shall also verify the extent to which the Member State concerned has maintained eligible public investment in programmes supported by the Union under the European Regional Development Fund, the Cohesion fund, the European Social Fund, the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.
Amendment 326 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point b
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point b
Amendment 342 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2
Article 6 – paragraph 2
2. The Commission shall decide the terms of the EISF support. The decision shall contain the amount, the average maturity, the pricing formula, and the availability period of EISF loan and the amount of the interest rate subsidy, and the other detailed rules needed for the implementation of the support. When deciding on the terms of the EISF support, the Commission shall take into account the amount deemed to be sustainable within the meaning of Article [210(3)] of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No XX (the ‘Financial Regulation’) under the own resources ceiling for payment appropriations.
Amendment 359 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Without prejudice to paragraph 3, tThe amount of an EISF loan (S) shall be determined in accordance with the following formula:not exceed thirty percent of the total costs of the eligible investment project. Overhead costs shall not count towards the total costs of the investment project.
Amendment 362 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Amendment 366 #
Amendment 371 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
Amendment 377 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4
Amendment 396 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9
Article 9
Amount of EISF interest rate subsidies 1. An interest rate subsidy (IRS) shall contribute to the interest costs of the EISF loan incurred by the Member State. The amount of an EISF interest rate subsidy shall be determined in accordance with the following formula: For the purpose of this provision, ‘interest rate cost’ means the amount of interest based on the pricing formula determined in the decision of the Commission referred to in Article 6(2) taking into account any refinancing in accordance with Article 12(4); 2. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 21, to amend this Regulation by determining the percentage referred to in paragraph 1 if this appears necessary in view of the implementation of the agreement or the eventual deferral of payments under Article 18(2).rticle 9 deleted
Amendment 405 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. In case the ESM or its legal successor provides financial assistance to Member States in support of eligible public investment under modalities and conditions consistent with this Regulation, the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 21 in order to:no further assistance shall be granted.
Amendment 407 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point a
Amendment 408 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 410 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – point c
Amendment 423 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Part 5 – title 2
Part 5 – title 2
Amendment 427 #
Amendment 445 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 20 – paragraph 2
Article 20 – paragraph 2
2. By [DATE two years after the entry into force of this Regulation] at the latest, and every five years after, the Commissionan independent scientific institute selected by the Member State which has the lowest ratio of Investment Stabilisation Function loans over nominal GDP, shall examine the quality of the public investment management systems and practices in Member States. The Commissionindependent scientific institute shall prepare a report containing a qualitative assessment and a score based on a set of indicators and, if necessary, recommendations to improve the quality of the public investment management systems and practices. The report shall be made public.
Amendment 39 #
2018/0172(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 4
Recital 4
(4) In accordance with multilateral agreements37 and Union waste legislation38 , Member States are required to ensure sound waste management to prevent and reduce marine litter from both sea and land sources. In accordance withis context, the Union water legislation39 Member States are also required to tackle marine litter where it undermines the attainment of good environmental status ofshould actively seek commitments from all international partners, in particular their marine waters, inc polludting as a countribution to United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 14es, to promote concerted action. _________________ 37 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972 (London Convention) and its 1996 Protocol (the London Protocol), Annex V of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. 38 Directive 2008/98/EC and Directive 2000/59/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2000 on port reception facilities for ship- generated waste and cargo residues (OJ L 332, 28.12.2000, p. 81). 39Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy (OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1) and Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive) (OJ L 164 25.6.2008, p. 19).
Amendment 45 #
2018/0172(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) For certain single-use plastic products, suitable and more sustainable alternatives are not yet readily available and the consumption of most such single- use plastic products is expected to increase. To reverse that trend and promote efforts towards more sustainable solutions Member States should be required to take the necessary measures to achieve a significant reduction in the consumption of those products, without compromising food hygiene or food safety, good hygiene practices, good manufacturing practices, consumer information, or traceability requirements set out in Union food legislation44 . Measures taken by Member States should not distort the competition between producers located in the Union and producers not subject to Union legislation. They should apply equally to domestically produced and imported goods of the same type. _________________ 44 Regulation (EC) 178/2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law (OJ L 31, 1.2.2002, p.1-24), Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs (OJ L 139, 30.4.2004, p.1-54), Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 on materials intended to come into contact and other relevant legislation related to food safety, hygiene and labeling (OJ L 338, 13.11.2004, p.4-17).
Amendment 48 #
2018/0172(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 14
Recital 14
(14) Certain single-use plastic products end up in the environment as a result of inappropriate disposal through sewers or other inappropriate release into the environment. Therefore, single-use plastic products that are frequently disposed of through sewers otherwise inappropriately disposed of should be subject to marking requirements. The marking should inform consumers about appropriate waste disposal options and/or waste disposal options to be avoided and/or about the negative environmental impacts of litter as a result of inappropriate disposal. The Commission should be empowered to establish a harmonised format for the marking and when doing so should, where appropriate, test the perception of the proposed marking with representative groups of consumers to ensure that it is effective and clearly understandableMember States should lay down rules on substantial fines and penalties which apply to those responsible for the release of the litter into the environment and enforce these rules properly.
Amendment 50 #
2018/0172(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 15
Recital 15
(15) With regard to single-use plastic products for which there are no affordable, readily available suitable and more sustainable alternatives, Member States should, always act in line with the polluter pays principle, also introduce extended producer responsibility schemes to when covering the costs of waste management and, the clean-up of litter as well asnd the costs of awareness-raising measures to prevent and reduce such litter. Where consumers are the polluters, these costs may be recovered as charges at the point of final sale. Producer extended responsibility schemes may be applied if it can be ensured that no competitive distortion arises and imported products and domestically produced products are treated with equal effect on market prices.
Amendment 55 #
2018/0172(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 16
Recital 16
(16) The large portion of plastic stemming from abandoned, lost and discarded fishing gear containing plastic in marine litter indicates that the existing legal requirements46 do not provide sufficient incentives to return such fishing gear to shore for collection and treatment. The indirect fee system envisaged under Union law on port reception facilities for the delivery of waste from ships takes away the incentive for ships to discharge their waste at sea, and ensures a right of delivery. That system ishould, however, benot sufficiently effective. It should be strengthened and supplemented by further financial incentives for fishermen to bring their fishing gear waste on shore to avoid any potential increase in the indirect waste fee to be paid. As plastic components of fishing gear have a high recycling potential, Member States should, in line with the polluter pays principle, introduce extended producer responsibility for fishing gear containing plastic to facilitate separate collection of waste fishing gear and to finance sound waste management of such fishing gear, in particular recycling. _________________ 46 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, Directive 2000/59/EC and Directive 2008/98/EC.
Amendment 58 #
2018/0172(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 18
Recital 18
(18) In order to prevent littering and other inappropriate forms of disposal resulting in marine litter containing plastic, consumers need to be properly informed about the most appropriate waste disposal options available and/or waste disposal options to be avoided, best practices with regard to waste disposal and the environmental impact of bad disposal practices as well as about the plastic content in certain single-use plastic products and fishing gear. Therefore, Member States should be required to take awareness raising measures ensuring that such information is given to the consumers. The information should not contain any promotional content encouraging the use of the single-use plastic products. Member States should be able to choose the measures which are most appropriate based on the nature of the product or its use. Producers of single-use plastic products and fishing gear containing plastic should cover the costs of the awareness raising measures as part of their extended producer responsibility obligationper care must be taken that no competitive distortion arises between domestic producers of single-use plastic products and fishing gear containing plastic and competitors which are allowed to sell their products in the Single Market. Therefore, the costs of the awareness raising measures should be borne by those who dispose of the products inappropriately.
Amendment 66 #
2018/0172(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 22
Recital 22
(22) Pursuant to paragraph 22 of the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making of 13 April 201648 , the Commission should carry out an evaluation of this Directive. That evaluation should be based on experience gathered and data collected during the implementation of this Directive and data collected under Directive 2008/56/EC or Directive 2008/98/EC. The evaluation should provide the basis for an assessment of possible further measures and an assessment whether, in view of monitoring of marine litter in the Union, the Annex listing single-use plastic products needs to be reviewed. The evaluation should also consider whether scientific and technical progress that has taken place in the meantime, including the development of biodegradable materials and the development of criteria or a standard for biodegradability of plastics in the marine environment, as foreseen in the European Plastics Strategy, allows the setting of a standard for biodegradation of certain single-use plastic products in the marine environment. That standard would include a standard to test if, as a result of physical and biological decomposition in the marine environment, plastics would fully decompose into carbon dioxide (CO2), biomass and water within a timescale short enough for the plastics not to be harmful for marine life and not lead to an accumulation of plastics in the environment. If that is the case, single-use plastic products that meet such a standard could be exempted from the prohibition on placing on the market. While the European Strategy for Plastics already envisages action in this area, it also recognises the challenges in relation to determining a regulatory framework for plastics with biodegradable properties due to different marine conditions across seas. _________________ 48The evaluation should also assess economic impact on sectors most exposed by this Directive, including compliance costs. _________________ 48 OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1. OJ L 123, 12.5.2016, p. 1.
Amendment 67 #
2018/0172(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 24
Recital 24
(24) In order to ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Directive, implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission in respect of the methodology for the calculation of the annual consumption of the single-use plastic products for which consumption reduction objectives have been set, the specifications for the marking to be affixed on certain single-use plastic products and the format of the information to be provided by Member States and compiled by the European Environment Agency on the implementation of this Directive. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council49 . _________________ 49 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers (OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13).
Amendment 75 #
2018/0172(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 5
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 5
(5) ‘placing on the market’ means the first making available of a product on the Union market;
Amendment 76 #
2018/0172(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Member States shall take the necessary measures to achieve a significant reduction in the consumption of the single-use plastic products listed in Part A of the Annex on their territory by … [sixtwo years after the end-date for transposition of this Directive].
Amendment 91 #
2018/0172(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 2
Article 6 – paragraph 2
2. For the purposes of this Article metal caps or lshall not be considered to have a significant part made of plastic. Lids with plastic seals shall not be considered to have a significant part made of plastic.
Amendment 92 #
2018/0172(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 7
Article 7
Amendment 94 #
2018/0172(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 7 a (new)
Article 7 a (new)
Article 7 a Reducing inappropriate disposal Member States shall lay down rules on substantial fines and penalties which apply to those responsible for the inappropriate release of single-use plastic products into the environment and enforce these rules properly. The fines and penalties shall be imposed on operators of wage disposal and sewage systems if these systems do not prevent the leakage or release of single-use plastic products into the environment.
Amendment 95 #
2018/0172(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 1
Article 8 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure thatstablish extended producer responsibility schemes are established for all single-use plastic products listed in Part E of the Annex placed on the Union market, in aprovided that no competitive distortion arises and imported products and domestically produced products are treated with equal effect on market prices. Accordance with the provisions on extended producer responsibility in Directive 2008/98/EC shall be ensured.
Amendment 63 #
2018/0171(COD)
(1) Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities (‘SBBSs’) canmight be able to address some vulnerabilities that have been exposed by or have resulted from the 2007-2008 financial crisis. More specifically, SBBSs canmight be able to help banks and other financial institutions better diversify their sovereign exposures, further weaken the bank- sovereign nexus and enhance the supply of low-risk euro denominated assets. SBBSs could in addition render bonds issued in small and less liquid national markets more attractive for international investors, which can foster private sector risk sharing and risk reduction and promote a more efficient allocation of risks among financial operators.
Amendment 67 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) Under the existing legal framework, SBBSs would be treated as securitisations and thus be subject to additional charges and discounts relative to the charges and discounts faced by the euro area sovereign bonds in the underlying portfolio. Those additional charges and discounts would hinder the production and use of SBBSs by the private sector, despite the fact that SBBSs do not carry the risks associated with securitisations that justify such charges and discountscarry lesser risks than those associated with other types of securitisations. However, some risks such as warehouse risks or fraudulent behaviour by SPE staff prevail. SBBS should therefore be subject to a regulatory framework that better takes into account the unique features and properties of SBBSs to enable that product to emerge on the market. To that end, the removal of regulatory obstacles is necessary.
Amendment 68 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2 a (new)
Recital 2 a (new)
(2a) A sufficiently large first-loss tranche outside the banking system will be key to reducing the bank-sovereign nexus. Accordingly, only the senior tranche of SBBSs should enjoy the full removal of regulatory restrictions for securitisation provided for in this Regulation.
Amendment 72 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
Recital 5
(5) To achieve the objectives of geographic risk diversification within the Banking Union and the internal market, the underlying portfolio of SBBSs should be composed of sovereign bonds of Member States whose currency is the euro. To avoid currency risks only euro- denominated sovereign bonds issued by Member States whose currency is the euro should be allowed for inclusion in the SBBSs underlying portfolio. To ensure that sovereign bonds of each euro-area Member State contribute to the production of SBBSs in line with each Member State's stake in the stability of the overall euro area, the relative weight of the national sovereign bonds in the SBBSs’ underlying portfolio should be very close to the relative weight of the respective Member States in the key for subscription by the national central banks of Member States of the European Central Bank's capital.
Amendment 74 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 a (new)
Recital 5 a (new)
(5a) Issuers of SBBS should be free to determine the relative weights of the national sovereign bonds in the SBBSs’ underlying portfolio. This is beneficial because it increases product diversity and allows issuers to tailor SBBS supply to market demand. As such it increases the likelihood that a viable market for SBBS will develop. Implementing powers should be conferred on the Commission to decide whether the size of the senior tranche of an SBBS issue whose relative weights differ significantly from Member States’ shares in the capital of the ECB should be set to a level lower than seventy percent.
Amendment 76 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) To provide for a high quality low- risk asset and at the same time cater for investors' different levels of risk appetite, an SBBS issue should be composed of both a senior tranche and one or more subordinated tranches. The senior tranche, corresponding to at most seventy percent of the nominal value of an SBBS issue, should keep the SBBS issue expected loss rate in line with that of the safest euro area sovereign bonds, taking into account the risk and correlation of the sovereign bonds in the SBBSs underlying portfolio of sovereign bonds. The subordinated tranches should provide for protection to the senior tranche. The seniority of the tranches should determine the order in which losses on the underlying portfolio of sovereign bonds should be borne by investors. To limit the risk of the junior tranche (the tranche bearing losses before any other tranche), the nominal value of the junior tranche should however be at least 210 percent of the outstanding nominal value of the entire SBBSs issue.
Amendment 78 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 9
Recital 9
Amendment 80 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) The fixedmaximum size of the senior tranche of each SBBS issue may be reduced for future SBBSs issuances where, due to adverse market developments that severely disrupt the functioning of sovereign debt markets in a Member State or in the Union, a smaller size is required to ensure continued high credit quality and low risk for the senior tranche. When such adverse market developments end, the size of the senior tranche for future SBBSs issuances should be brought back to its initial value of at most seventy percent. To ensure that SBBSs are standardised, the variation of the senior tranche should be allowed only following a decision of the Commission, ensuring that all senior tranches of SBBSs issues issued at the same time have the same size.
Amendment 81 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) Investors should be protected as much as possible from the risk of insolvency of the institution that acquires the sovereign bonds ('original purchaser') for the purposes of assembling the SBBSs underlying portfolio. For that reason, only special purpose entities (‘SPEs’) that are exclusively devoted to the issuance and management of SBBSs and that do not undertake any other activities, such as providing credit, should be allowed to issue SBBSs. For the same reason, SPEs should be subject to strict asset segregation requirements.
Amendment 82 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
Recital 13
(13) Only the senior tranches from products that fulfil the requirements regarding the composition and maturity of the underlying portfolio as well as the size of the senior and the subordinated tranches as provided for in this Regulation should enjoy the same regulatory treatment as the regulatory treatment granted to sovereign exposures in terms of capital requirements, concentration limits, and liquidity.
Amendment 85 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
Recital 14
(14) A system of self-attestcertification by SPEsESMA should ensure that an SBBS issue complies with the requirements of this Regulation. ESMA should therefore keep a list of SBBSs issued, enabling investors to verify whether a product that is offered for sale as an SBBS is indeed an SBBS. For the same reason, ESMA should indicate in that list whether any sanction in relation to a SBBS has been imposed and remove from that list those products that are found to be in violation of this Regulation.
Amendment 87 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
Recital 15
(15) Investors should be able to rely on the nocertification of SBBSs by SPEs to ESMA and on the information provided by SPEs. Information on SBBSs and the sovereign bonds in the SBBSs underlying portfolio should empower investors to understand, assess and compare SBBSs transactions and not to rely solely on third parties, including credit rating agencies. That possibility should enable investors to act prudently and to carry out their due diligence efficiently. Information on SBBSs should therefore be freely available to investors, via standardised templates, on a website that ensures continuous accessibility.
Amendment 93 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
Recital 17
(17) Investors in different financial sectors should be able to invest in the senior tranches of SBBSs under the same conditions as they invest in the underlying euro area sovereign bonds. Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council15 , Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council16 , Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council17 and Directive (EU) 2016/2341 of the European Parliament and of the Council18 should therefore be amended to ensure that the senior tranches of SBBS are granted the same regulatory treatment as their underlying assets across the various regulated financial sectors. _________________ 15 Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities (UCITS) (OJ L 302, 17.11.2009, p. 32). 16 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (CRR) (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p.1). 17 Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II) (OJ L 335 17.12.2009, p. 1). 18 Directive (EU) 2016/2341 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2016 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision (IORPs) (OJ L 354, 23.12.2016, p.37).
Amendment 101 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
2. The relative weight of sovereign bonds of every Member State within an SBBSs' underlying portfolio (‘baseline weight’) shall be equal to the relative weight of the contribution to the European Central Bank (ECB) by that Member State in accordance with the key for subscription, by the national central banks of Members States, of the ECB's paid-in capital as laid down in Article 29 of the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Unionshall be determined by the SPE in response to market demand.
Amendment 102 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Amendment 103 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 3
Article 4 – paragraph 3
Amendment 109 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 4
Article 4 – paragraph 4
Amendment 110 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 5
Article 4 – paragraph 5
Amendment 115 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1
Article 6 – paragraph 1
1. An SBBSs issue shall be composed of one senior tranche and one or more subordinated tranches. The outstanding nominal value of the senior tranche shall be at most seventy percent of the outstanding nominal value of the entire SBBSs issue and shall be determined by the SPE in response to market demand. The number and the outstanding nominal values of the subordinated tranches shall be determined by the SPE, subject to the limitation that the nominal value of the junior tranche shall be at least two percent of the outstanding nominal value of the entire SBBSs issue.
Amendment 118 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
2. Where adverse developments severely disrupt the functioning of sovereign debt markets in a Member State or in the Union, and where that disruption has been confirmed by the Commission in accordance with paragraph 4, SPEs shall lower the outstanding nominal value of the senior tranche to sixty percentby at least ten percentage points for any SBBSs issue issued after that confirmation.
Amendment 121 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) ESMA has been nocertified of that financial product in accordance with Article 10(1) and the financial product has been included in the list referred to in Article 10(2).
Amendment 124 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1
Article 10 – paragraph 1
1. An SPE shall submit an application for certification of an SBBS issue by notifying ESMA at least one week before issuance of an SBBSs issue by means of the template referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article that an SBBSs issue meets the requirements of Articles 4, 5 and 6. ESMA shall inform the SPE's competent authority thereof without undue delay.
Amendment 129 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2
Article 10 – paragraph 2
2. ESMA shall maintain on its official website a list of all SBBSs issues that have been nocertified by SPEsESMA. ESMA shall update that list instantly and remove any SBBSs issue that is no longer considered to be an SBBSs issue following a decision of competent authoritiesESMA in accordance with Article 15.
Amendment 138 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
1. Member States shall designate one or morESMA shall be the competent authoritiesy to supervise the compliance of SPEs with this Regulation. Member States shall inform the Commission and ESMA about those competent authorities and, where relevant, about how their functions and duties are divided.
Amendment 140 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Article 13 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Amendment 142 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Amendment 145 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part
Amendment 149 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 2
Article 14 – paragraph 2
2. A competent authority that has clear and demonstrable grounds that an SPE is in breach of this Regulation shall promptly inform ESMA in a detailed manner the competent authority of the Member State where the SPE is established. The competent authority of the Member State where the SPE is established. ESMA shall take appropriate measures, including the decision referred to in Article 15.
Amendment 151 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 3
Article 14 – paragraph 3
3. Where the SPE persists in acting in a manner that is clearly in breach of this Regulation despite measures taken by the competent authority of the Member State where it is established, or because that competent authority has failed to take measures within a reasonable time, the competent authority that has detected a breach of this Regulation may, after informing the competent authority of the Member State where the SPE is established andESMA, ESMA, may take all appropriate measures to protect investors, including prohibiting the SPE from carrying out any further marketing of SBBSs within its territory and taking the decision referred to in Article 15.
Amendment 156 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1
Article 15 – paragraph 1
1. Where there are reasons to believe that an SPE in infringement of Article 9 has used the designation ‘SBBS’ to market a product that fails to comply with the requirements set out in that Article, the competent authority of the Member State where the SPE is establishedESMA shall follow the procedure provided for in paragraph 2.
Amendment 158 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
2. Within 15 days after becoming aware of the possible infringement referred to in paragraph 1 the competent authority of the Member State where the SPE suspected of the infringement is establishedESMA shall decide whether Article 9 has been infringed and shall notify ESMA and the other relevant competent authorities thereof, including the competent authorities of the investors, when known. A competent authority that disagrees with the decision taken shall notify all other relevant competent authorities about its disagreement without undue delay. Where that disagreement is not resolved within three months of the date on which all relevant competent authorities have been notified, the matter shall be referred to ESMA in accordance with Article 19 and, where applicable, Article 20 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. The conciliation period referred to in Article 19(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 shall be one month.
Amendment 161 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Amendment 163 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Where the relevant competent authorities agreeESMA finds that the infringement by the SPE is related to non-compliance with Article 9 in good faith, ithey may decide to grant the SPE a period of maximum threone months to remedy the identified infringement, starting from the day the SPE was informed of the infringement by the competent authorityESMA. During that period, an SBBS appearing on the list maintained by ESMA pursuant to Article 10(2) shall continue to be considered an SBBS and shall be kept on that list.
Amendment 165 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 16 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Without prejudice to the right for Member States to lay down criminal sanctions pursuant to Article 17, competent authoritiesESMA shall impose on the SPE or the natural person managing the SPE the appropriate remedial measures, including the decision referred to in Article 15, and the appropriate administrative sanctions set out in paragraph 3 where SPEs:
Amendment 168 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
Article 16 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
3. Competent authoritiesESMA, when determining the type and level of administrative sanctions, shall take into account the extent to which the infringement was intentional or results from negligence and all other relevant circumstances, including, where appropriate:
Amendment 171 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 4
Article 16 – paragraph 4
4. Member StatesESMA shall ensure that any decision imposing the remedial measures or administrative sanctions is properly reasoned and is subject to a right of appeal.
Amendment 173 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1
Article 17 – paragraph 1
Member States that have laid down criminal sanctions for the infringement referred to in Article 16(1) shall give their competent authorities all the necessary powersallow ESMA to liaise with judicial, prosecuting, or criminal justice authorities within their jurisdiction and to receive from, and to provide to, other competerelevant authorities and ESMA specific information about criminal investigations or proceedings commenced for the infringements referred to in Article 16(1).
Amendment 174 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
1. Competent authoritiesESMA shall publish on theirits website any decision imposing an administrative sanction in respect of which there is no longer a right of appeal and which is imposed for an infringement as referred to in Article 16(1) without undue delay and after the person concerned has been informed.
Amendment 177 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
2. Competent authoritiesESMA shall publish the administrative sanction on an anonymous basis, in accordance with national law, in any of the following circumstances:
Amendment 179 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 3
Article 18 – paragraph 3
3. Competent authoritiesESMA shall ensure that information published under paragraph 1 or 2 remains on theirits official website for five years. Personal data shall be retained on the official website of the competent authority only for the period necessary.
Amendment 182 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 20
Article 20
Amendment 184 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1
Article 21 – paragraph 1
Directive 2009/65/EC
Article 54a – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 54a – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) apply the same derogation or grant the same waiver for UCITS to invest up to 100% of their assets in the senior tranches of SBBSs as defined in Article 3(3) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted] in accordance with the principle of risk- spreading where those competent authorities consider that unit-holders in the UCITS have a protection that is equivalent to that of unit- holders in UCITS complying with the limits laid down in Article 52;
Amendment 186 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1
Article 22 – paragraph 1
Directive 2009/138/EC
Article 104 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1
Article 104 – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 1
For the purposes of the calculation of the Basic Solvency Capital Requirement, exposures to the senior tranches of sovereign bond-backed securities as defined in Article 3(3) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted] shall be treated as exposures to Member States' central governments or central banks denominated and funded in their domestic currency.
Amendment 190 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 268 – paragraph 5
Article 268 – paragraph 5
5. By way of derogation from the first paragraph, the senior tranches of sovereign bond-backed securities as defined in Article 3(3) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted] may always be treated in accordance with the first paragraph of this Article.;
Amendment 192 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 325 – paragraph 4
Article 325 – paragraph 4
4. For the purpose of this Title, institutions shall treat exposures in the form senior tranches of sovereign bond- backed securities as defined in Article 3(3) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted] as exposures to the central government of a Member State.;
Amendment 194 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 390 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 2
Article 390 – paragraph 7 – subparagraph 2
The first subparagraph shall apply to exposures tohe senior tranches of sovereign bond-backed securities as defined in Article 3(3) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted]..
Amendment 196 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1
Article 24 – paragraph 1
Directive (EU) 2016/2341
Article 18a – paragraph 1
Article 18a – paragraph 1
1. In their national rules regarding the valuation of assets of IORPs, the calculation of own funds of IORPs, and the calculation of a solvency margin for IORPs, Member States shall treat the senior tranches of sovereign-bond backed securities, as defined in Article 3(3) of Regulation [reference of the SBBS Regulation to be inserted], in the same way as euro area sovereign debt instruments.
Amendment 22 #
2018/0135(CNS)
Proposal for a decision
Recital 1
Recital 1
(1) The Own Resources System of the Union must ensure adequate resources for the orderly development of the policies of the Union, subject to the need for strict budgetary discipline. The development of the Own Resources System can and should also participate, to the greatest extent possible, in the development of the policies of the Union.
Amendment 37 #
2018/0135(CNS)
Proposal for a decision
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) In order to better alignreform the Union'’s financing instruments with its policy priorities, to better reflect the Union's budget role for the functioning of the Single Market, to better support the objectives of Union policies and to reduce Member States' Gross National Income- based contributions to the Union's annual budget, it is necessary to introduce new categories of Own Resources based on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, the national revenue stemming from the European Union Emissions Trading System and a national contribution calculated on the basis of non-recycled plastic packaging wastesystem of own resources, it would be necessary to have convincing arguments why a financing system predominantly relying on GNI resources would not be transparent, equitable and easy to understand.
Amendment 42 #
2018/0135(CNS)
Proposal for a decision
Recital 6 a (new)
Recital 6 a (new)
(6 a) A necessary precondition for any reform of the Union’s financing instruments is a proper impact assessment of the distributive effects of such a reform. In particular, it is essential to know by how much the resources contributed by each Member State would probably change.
Amendment 43 #
2018/0135(CNS)
Proposal for a decision
Recital 6 b (new)
Recital 6 b (new)
(6 b) Any reform of the Union’s financing instruments must respect the principle that the Union does not have the power to tax its citizens.
Amendment 44 #
2018/0135(CNS)
Proposal for a decision
Recital 6 c (new)
Recital 6 c (new)
(6 c) The Common Corporate Tax Base cannot be used for establishing an own resource of the Union as long as some Member States do not participate in this project.
Amendment 45 #
2018/0135(CNS)
Proposal for a decision
Recital 7
Recital 7
Amendment 51 #
2018/0135(CNS)
Proposal for a decision
Recital 8
Recital 8
(8) The Union considers as a priority to achieve its emission reduction target of at least 40% between 1990 and 2030 as committed under the Paris Climate Agreement. The European Union Emissions Trading System is one of the main instruments put in place to implement this objective and generates revenue through the auctioning of emission allowances. Considering the harmonised nature of the European Union Emissions Trading System as well as the funding provided by the Union to foster mitigation and adaptation efforts in the Member States, it ismay be appropriate to introduce a new Own Resource for the EU budget in this context. This new Own Resource should be based on the allowances to be auctioned by Member States, including transitional free allocation to the power sector. In order to take account of the specific provisions for certain Member States provided for in Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council20 , allowances redistributed for the purposes of solidarity, growth and interconnections as well as allowances dedicated to the Innovation Fund and the Modernisation Fund should not be counted for determining the Own Resource contribution. _________________ 20 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32)must be shaped in a transparent and equitable way where all polluters are charged in the same way for the pollution they cause.
Amendment 54 #
2018/0135(CNS)
Proposal for a decision
Recital 9
Recital 9
(9) In line with the Union strategy on plastics, the Union budget can contribute to reduce pollution from plastic packaging waste. An Own Resource which is based on a national contribution proportional to the quantity of plastic packaging waste that is not recycled in each Member State will provide an incentive to reduce the consumption of single-use plastics, foster recycling and boost the circular economy. At the same time, Member States will be free to take the most suitable measures to achieve those goals, in line with the principle of subsidiarityHowever, the Union does not have a mandate to introduce taxes on waste or non-recycled plastic products. Therefore, own resources can only result from this line of policy if the policy measures can narrowly reflect the polluter-pays principle.
Amendment 57 #
2018/0135(CNS)
Proposal for a decision
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) It is necessary to avoid that Member States which benefit from corrections are confronted with a significant and sudden increase in their national contributions. It is therefore necessary to provide for temporary corrections in favour of Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden by means of lump sum reductions to their Gross National Income-based contributions during a transitional period. Those corrections should be phased out by the end of 2025.
Amendment 61 #
2018/0135(CNS)
Proposal for a decision
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) The retention, by way of collection costs, of 20 % of the amounts collected by the Member States for traditional Own Resources constitutes a high share of Own Resources not being made available to the Union Budget. The collection costs retained by Member States from the traditional Own Resources should be restored from 20% to the original level of 10% to better align financial support for customs equipment, staff and information with the actual costs and needis retention should be calibrated in such a way that Member States are not only compensated for the collection costs e. g. for customs equipment, staff and information, but in excess of this also include a net benefit to the Member States which encourages them to completely and efficiently collect the resources from their citizens.
Amendment 64 #
2018/0135(CNS)
Proposal for a decision
Recital 13
Recital 13
(13) The integration of the European Development Fund into the EU budget will need to be accompanied by an increase in the ceilings established in the Own Resources decision. A sufficient margin between the payments and the own resources ceiling is necessary to ensure that the Union is able - under any circumstances - to fulfil its financial obligations, even in times of economic downturns. The Own Resources ceiling should therefore be increased to a level of 1,29 % of the sum of the Member States’ Gross National Income at market prices for appropriations for payments and of 1,35 % for the appropriations for commitments.
Amendment 67 #
2018/0135(CNS)
Proposal for a decision
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) the application of a uniform call rate to a share of Value Added Tax receipts collected from the standard rated taxable supplies divided by the national Value Added Tax standard rate; the actual call rate shall not exceed 2 %; proper provisions must be established which prevent an erosion of this tax base by decisions of Member States granting an increasing range of goods and services non-standard VAT-rates;
Amendment 69 #
2018/0135(CNS)
Proposal for a decision
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point c
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point c
Amendment 74 #
2018/0135(CNS)
Proposal for a decision
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point e
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point e
Amendment 77 #
2018/0135(CNS)
Proposal for a decision
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Amendment 84 #
2018/0135(CNS)
Proposal for a decision
Article 2 – paragraph 2
Article 2 – paragraph 2
Amendment 96 #
2018/0135(CNS)
Proposal for a decision
Article 6 – paragraph 2
Article 6 – paragraph 2
2. Member States shall retain, by way of collection costs, 120 % of the amounts referred to in Article 2(1)(a).
Amendment 341 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 9 – paragraph 1
Article 9 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that a credit servicer provides its services in respect of the management and enforcement of a credit agreementwhen a creditor does not perform itself the credit servicing activities, the credit servicer appointed in accordance with Article 15(1) provides its services in respect of the management and enforcement of the creditor’s rights under a credit agreement or of the credit agreement itself on the basis of a writtencredit servicing agreement with a creditor.
Amendment 366 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 12 – paragraph 11
Article 12 – paragraph 11
11. Member States shall ensure that where, after having informed the home Member State no adequate and effective measures were taken in a reasonable time or despite measures taken bywithin three months the competent authorities of the homst Member State Member State or in an urgent case, the credit servicer continues to be in breach of the obligations under this Directive,are entitled to take appropriate administrative penalties and remedial measures in order to ensure compliance with the applicable rules after informing without delay the competent authorities of the hostme Member State are entitled to take appropriate administrative sanctions or penalties and remedial measures in order to ensure compliance with the provisions of this Directive withi. In addition, the competent authorities of the host Member State may prohibit further activities of such credit servicers in its Member State until an adequate and effective decision its territory after informing without delaaken by the competent authoritiesy of the home Member State or a remedial measure is taken by the credit servicer.
Amendment 373 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – title
Article 13 – title
Right to information regarding the credit agreementcreditor’s rights under a non-performing credit agreement or the non-performing credit agreement itself
Amendment 376 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 1
Article 13 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that a creditor shall provide alls the necessary information to a credit purchaser to enable that credit purchaser assess the value of the credit agreement and the likelihood of recovery of the value of that agreement prior to entering into a contract for the transfer of that credit agreementregarding the creditor’s rights under a non-performing credit agreement or the non-performing credit agreement itself and, if applicable, the collateral, to a credit purchaser to enable that credit purchaser assess the value of the creditor’s rights under a non-performing credit agreement or the non-performing credit agreements itself and the likelihood of recovery of the value of that agreement prior to entering into a contract for the transfer of that creditor’s rights under a non-performing credit agreement or of that non-performing credit agreement while ensuring the protection of information made available by the creditor and the confidentiality of business data.
Amendment 378 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. Member States shall require a credit institution or the subsidiary of a credit institution that transfers as that transfer a creditor’s rights under a non-performing credit agreement or the non-performing credit agreements itself to a credit purchaser to inform the competent authorities designated in accordance with Article 20(3) of this Directive and Article 4 of Directive 2013/36/EU39 of the following: _________________ 39Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activ, for each transfer about the legal entity identifier (LEI) of the credit purchaser or where such identifier does not exist about: (i) the identity of the credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit purchaser or members of the purchaser's management or administitutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and reprative organ and the persons who hold qualifying holdings in the purchaser within the mealning Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338).of point (36) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; and (ii) the address of the purchaser. Additionally, the credit institution shall inform about at least the following:
Amendment 379 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – point a
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the type of asset securing the credit agreement, including information on whether it is a credit agreement concluded with consumersaggregated outstanding balance of the creditor’s rights under the non-performing credit agreements or of the non-performing credit agreements transferred;
Amendment 380 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – point b
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) the nominal value of the non- performing credit agreement;
Amendment 381 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – point c
Article 13 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) the identity and address of the borrower and of the credit purchason whether the transfer includes creditor’s rights under the non- performing credit agreements or non- performing credit agreements concluded with consumers and, where applicable, of its representative designated in accordance with Article 17 the types of assets securing them, when applicable.
Amendment 382 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 3
Article 13 – paragraph 3
3. The competent authorities referred to in paragraph 2designated in accordance with Article 20(3) of this Directive shall communicate without delay the information referred to in that paragraph and any other information that they might consider to be necessary for carrying out their task according to this Directive to the competent authorities of the home Member State whereof the credit purchaser or its representative, designated in accordance with Article 17, is established and of the Member State where the borrower is established or resident.
Amendment 384 #
Amendment 391 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 14 – paragraph 1
Article 14 – paragraph 1
1. EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards that specify the formats to be used by creditors who are credit institutions for the provision of information as set out in Article 13(1), in order to provide detailed information on their credit exposures in the banking book to credit purchasers for the screening, financial due diligence and valuation of the credit agreementor’s rights under a non-performing credit agreement or of the non-performing credit agreement itself. EBA shall specify in the implementing technical standards the required data fields for creditor’s rights under a non-performing credit agreement or for the non-performing credit agreement itself in order to meet the information requirements as set out in Article 13(1).
Amendment 394 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 14 – paragraph 2
Article 14 – paragraph 2
2. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by [31 December 2018]12 months from the entry into force of the Directive.
Amendment 396 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 15 – paragraph 1
Article 15 – paragraph 1
Amendment 403 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 15 – paragraph 2
Article 15 – paragraph 2
2. Member States shall ensure that a credit purchaser is not subject to any additional administrative requirements for the purchase of creditor’s rights under a non-performing credit agreement or the non-performing credit agreements itself other than as provided for by the national measures transposing this Directive, the consumer protection law or governing contract law. Member States shall ensure that relevant Union and national law concerning in particular the enforcement of contracts, consumer protection, borrower's rights and criminal law continues to apply to the credit purchaser upon the transfer of the creditor’s rights under a credit agreement or the credit agreement itself to the credit purchaser. The level of protection provided under Union and national law to consumers and other borrowers shall not be affected by the transfer of the creditor’s rights under a credit agreement or the credit agreement itself to the credit purchaser.
Amendment 404 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 15 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 15 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. This Directive is without prejudice to national powers regarding credit registers, including the power to require information to credit purchasers regarding the creditor’s rights under a credit agreement or the credit agreement itself and its performance.
Amendment 408 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 15 – paragraph 2 b (new)
Article 15 – paragraph 2 b (new)
2 b. This Directive does not affect Member States’ laws extending the scope of the Directive or imposing additional requirements to credit purchasers that do not hold a licence in accordance with Regulation No 575/2013 and Directive2013/36/EU.
Amendment 410 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 15 – paragraph 2 c (new)
Article 15 – paragraph 2 c (new)
2 c. Member States may allow credit purchasers to engage natural persons to service the credits they acquired. Those natural persons should be subject to anational regulation and supervision regime and should not benefit from the freedom to provide services in another Member State in accordance with this Directive.
Amendment 415 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 19 – title
Article 19 – title
Transfer of a credit agreement by a credit purchaseror’s rights under a non-performing credit agreement or the non-performing credit agreement itself by a credit purchaser and communication to the competent authority
Amendment 416 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 19 – paragraph 1
Article 19 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall requireWhen a credit purchaser or, whtransferes applicable, its representative designated in accordance with Article 17, that transfers a creditor’s rights under a non-performing credit agreement or the non-performing credit agreements itself to another credit purchaser to inform the competent authorities referred to in Article 18(1) of the transfer, the identity and address of the new credit purchaser and, where applicable, its representative, Member States shall require the appointed credit servicer to inform the competent authorities of the home Member State for each transfer about the new credit purchaser’s legal entity identifier (LEI) or where such identifier doesignated in accordance with Article 17. not exist about:
Amendment 417 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point i (new)
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point i (new)
(i) the identity of the new credit purchaser or members of the new purchaser's management or administrative organ and the persons who hold qualifying holdings in the new purchaser within the meaning of point (36) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; and
Amendment 418 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point ii (new)
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point ii (new)
(ii) the address of the new purchaser.
Amendment 419 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 (new)
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 (new)
Additionally, on an aggregated level, the credit purchaser shall inform at least the following:
Amendment 420 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point iii (new)
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point iii (new)
(iii) the aggregated outstanding balance of the creditor’s rights under the non-performing credit agreements or of the non-performing credit agreements transferred;
Amendment 421 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point d (new)
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point d (new)
(d) the nominal value of the non- performing credit agreement;
Amendment 422 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point e (new)
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point e (new)
(e) on whether the transfer includes creditor’s rights under non-performing credit agreements or non-performing credit agreements concluded with consumers and the types of assets securing them, when applicable.
Amendment 424 #
2018/0063(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 19 – paragraph 2
Article 19 – paragraph 2
2. Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities referred to in paragraph 1 shall transmit without undue delay the information received in accordance with Article 13(3) to the competent authorities of the Member State where the new credit purchaser and, where applicable, its representative is domiciled or established.
Amendment 458 #
Amendment 65 #
2018/0060(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) An integrated financial system will enhance the resilience of the European Monetary Union to adverse shocks by facilitating private cross-border risk- sharing, while at the same time reducing the needcall for public risk-sharing. In order to achieve these objectives, the Union should complete the Banking Union and further develop a Capital Markets Union. Addressing high stocks of NPEs and their possible future accumulation is essential to completing the Banking Union as it is essential for ensuring competition in the banking sector, preserving financial stability and encouraging lending so as to create jobs and growth within the Union.
Amendment 67 #
2018/0060(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3
Recital 3
(3) In July 2017 the Council in its 'Action Plan to Tackle Non-Performing Loans in Europe' called upon the Member States and various institutions to take appropriate measures to further address the high number of NPEs in the Union. The Action Plan sets out a comprehensive approach that focuses on a mix of complementary policy actions in four areas: (i) bank supervision and regulation; (ii) reform of restructuring, insolvency and debt recovery frameworks; (iii) developing secondary markets for distressed assets; (iv) fostering restructuring of the banking system. Actions in these areas are to be taken at national level and at Union level, where appropriate. The Commission announced a similar intention in its 'Communication on completing the Banking Union' of 11 October 201716 , which called for a comprehensive package on tackling NPLs within the Union. _________________ 16 COM(2017) 592 final, 11.10.2017.
Amendment 74 #
2018/0060(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
Recital 5
(5) The prudential backstop should not prevent competent authorities from exercising their supervisory powers in accordance with Directive 2013/36/EU. Where competent authorities ascertain on a case-by-case basis that, despite the application of the prudential backstop for NPEs established in this Regulation, the NPEs of a specific institution are not sufficiently covered, they may make use of the supervisory powers envisaged in Directive 2013/36/EU, including the power referred to in Article 104(1)(d) of that Directive. It is consequently possible for the competent authorities to go, on a case- by-case basis, beyond the requirements under this Regulation for the purpose of ensuring sufficient coverage for NPEs.
Amendment 91 #
2018/0060(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 8
Recital 8
(8) Secured NPEs are generally entail less riskxpected to result in less of a loss than unsecured NPEs, as the credit protection securing the loan gives the institution a specific claim on an asset or against a third party in addition to the institution's general claim against the defaulted borrower. In the case of an unsecured loan, only the general claim against the defaulted borrower would be available. Given the higher riskloss expected ofn unsecured loans, a stricter calendar should be applied. An exposure which is only partly covered by collateral should be considered as secured for the covered part, and as unsecured for the part which is not covered by collateral.
Amendment 151 #
2018/0060(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2
Article 1 – paragraph 2
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 47a – paragraph 6 a (new)
Article 47a – paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. An exposure shall cease to be classified as non-performing if it is part of a portfolio of performing or non- performing exposures which satisfies all of the following conditions: (a) The portfolio has been purchased by a specialised debt restructurer according to paragraph 7 a. (b) The price at which the portfolio has been purchased is clearly documented. (c) The net payments derived from the portfolio in the period prior to its purchase were no less than the price of the portfolio according to (b) multiplied by a market rate of interest (the ‘benchmark interest rate’) determined by EBA to be approximately equal to the average rate of return on portfolios of performing exposures of the same type. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the benchmark interest rates for different classes of exposures.EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2020. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the preceding subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Amendment 152 #
2018/0060(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2
Article 1 – paragraph 2
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 47a – paragraph 6 b (new)
Article 47a – paragraph 6 b (new)
6 b. For the purposes of Article 36(1)(m), all exposures in a portfolio purchased by a specialised debt restructurer according to paragraph 7 a shall be classified as non-performing if over more than 90 days the payments derived from the portfolio are less than the product of the benchmark interest rate and the book value of the portfolio, computed as its purchasing price according to point (b), corrected for any adjustments according to Article 47c(1) (b).
Amendment 159 #
2018/0060(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2
Article 1 – paragraph 2
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 47a – paragraph 7a (new)
Article 47a – paragraph 7a (new)
7 a. For the purpose of paragraph 6a and paragraph 6b ‘specialised debt restructurer’ means an institution (on a consolidated basis if applicable) that comply with all of the following conditions during the preceding financial year: (a) the management body of the purchasing institution has implemented a clear and effective internal decision process for the purchase of exposures from other institutions; (b) the book value of its own originated loans does not exceed 10 % of the aggregate book value of its loans (including purchased performing and non-performing exposures);
Amendment 170 #
2018/0060(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2
Article 1 – paragraph 2
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 47c – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Article 47c – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
For the purposes of Article 36(1)(m), institutions shall determine the applicable amount of insufficient coverage forseparately for each non- performing exposures to be deducted from Common Equity Tier 1 items by subtracting the amount determined in point (b) from the amount determined in point (a):
Amendment 179 #
2018/0060(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 2
Article 1 – paragraph 2
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 47c – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b – introductory part
Article 47c – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b – introductory part
(b) the sum of the following items provided they relate to a specificthe same non- performing exposure:
Amendment 95 #
2018/0043(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 1
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point 1
(1) 'covered bond' means a debt obligation issued under public supervision according to Article 18 by a credit institution and swhich is a dual recoured by a cover pool of assets which covered bond investors have direct recourse to as preferred creditorsse instrument according to Article 4, which is bankruptcy remote according to Article 5, for which the assets in the cover pool are segregated according to Article 12, and which is collateralised by eligible assets according to Article 6 or Article 6a;
Amendment 152 #
2018/0043(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 6 a (new)
Article 6 a (new)
Article 6 a Cover assets for ordinary covered bonds 1. Member States may allow the issuance of covered bonds secured by high quality cover assets not referred to as eligible in points (a) to (g) of Article 129(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In this case, Member States shall require that cover assets provide the credit institution issuing covered bonds with claims for the payment of a clearly determined amount of money as set out in paragraph 2 and secured by collateral assets as set out in paragraph 3. Member States shall also require that the choice of cover assets mitigates cover pool risk as set out in paragraph 4. 2. Member States shall lay down rules ensuring that the claim for payment referred to in paragraph 1 meets the following legal requirements: (a) Each claim is collateralised by assets for which a public register records ownership and collateral rights or is a loan to a public undertaking as defined in Article 2(b) of Commission Directive 2006/111/EC. (b) Each collateralised claim is secured by a legally established mortgage, charge, lien or other guarantee and each of these is enforceable. (c) the mortgage, charge, lien or guarantee referred to in (b) enable the credit institution issuing covered bonds to receive the payment of the claim in due time and at reasonable cost. For the purposes of points (a) and (b), Member States shall lay down rules ensuring the prompt filing or registration of mortgages, charges, liens or guarantees on the claims in the cover pool. For the purposes of points (b) and (c), Member States shall ensure that credit institutions issuing covered bonds assess both the enforceability of claims and the expected length of legal proceedings before including such claims in the cover pool. 3. Member States shall lay down rules ensuring that the collateral assets referred to in paragraph 1 meet either of the following requirements: (a) for physical assets either the market or the mortgage lending value can be determined or, if this is not possible, the asset is valued by rules laid down by the Member State; (b) for assets in the form of exposures to a counterparty, the counterparty's safety and soundness is inferred from its tax- raising powers or from being subject to either public supervision or an on-going credit assessment by an independent professional third party. For the purposes of this point, the rating by a nominated ECAI shall be regarded as an independent third party's credit assessment. For the purposes of the asset valuation rules referred to in point (a), Member States shall require that the collateral physical asset is valued by an independent valuer. Moreover, they shall lay down a valuation methodology and process designed to yield values which are equal to or less than the unknown market or mortgage lending value of an asset at the moment of inclusion in the cover pool. 4. Member States shall ensure the risk mitigation referred to in paragraph 1 by imposing the following requirements: (a) all collateral for cover pool assets shall be adequately insured against the risk of loss or damage and the claim out of the insurance shall be part of the substitution assets of the cover pool; (b) physical assets referred to in paragraph 3 (a) serve as collateral for cover pool claims with at most 60% of their value determined according to the applicable rules referred to in paragraph 3; (c) assets in the form of exposures to a counterparty referred to in paragraph 3 (b) shall be cover pool eligible at a discount rate applicable to their nominal amount and not exceeding - 90% of the exposure in case the counterparty has tax raising powers, - 80% of the exposure in case the counterparty is under public supervision, - 60% of the exposure in case the counterparty is subject to an ongoing credit assessment by an independent professional third party. Member States shall ensure that credit assessments of independent professional third parties clearly identify a threshold for credit qualities which the professional third party considers to be of investment grade. Exposures to counterparties shall not be eligible as cover pool assets if a credit assessment of an independent professional third party falls below its own threshold for investment grade quality. (d) The cover pool assets shall be sufficiently granular to enable risk diversification. For the purposes of this point, sufficient granularity shall mean that the cover pool contains at least 500 exposures, loans or other types of claims all of which shall have some degree of idiosyncratic risk. (e) The cover pool shall be free of material concentration. For the purposes of this point, material concentration shall mean that aggregate exposure to a single obligor exceeds 2% of the nominal cover pool value.
Amendment 244 #
2018/0043(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 2
Article 16 – paragraph 2
2. The cover pool liquidity buffer shall cover the net liquidity outflow for 180 calendar days except in those periods of stress in which the liquidity buffer must be used to cover the net liquidity outflow of the covered bond programme.
Amendment 246 #
2018/0043(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 16 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. Member States shall ensure that credit institutions may monetise their liquid assets to cover their net liquidity outflows during stress periods, even if such a use of liquid assets may result in their liquidity coverage ratio falling below requirements in paragraph 2 during such periods.
Amendment 250 #
2018/0043(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point a
Article 16 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – point a
(a) assets qualifying as level 1, level 2A and level 2B assets pursuant to Articles 10, 11 and 12 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/61, valuated in accordance with Article 9 of that Delegated Regulation and segregated in accordance with Article 13 of this Directive;
Amendment 267 #
2018/0043(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 4
Article 16 – paragraph 4
4. Where the credit institution issuing covered bonds is subject to liquidity requirements set out in other acts of Union or national law, Member States may decide that the national rules transposing paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 do not apply throughout the period foreseen in those acts of Union or national law.
Amendment 1 #
2017/2253(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 8 a (new)
Citation 8 a (new)
- having regard to the International Regulatory Strategy Group report on "The EU's Third Country Regimes and Alternatives to Passporting";
Amendment 18 #
2017/2253(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
D a. whereas equivalence decisions should also adhere to the international principle of non-discrimination, between third countries themselves, and between EU and third country firms;
Amendment 119 #
2017/2253(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10 a. Believes that equivalence decisions and international agreements should also explicitly adhere to a binding principle of non-discrimination in the same way as the approach followed and promoted by the World Trade Organisation; non- discrimination between third countries themselves, so that all are assessed on the same transparent basis and on the same timeframes and regularity; and between EU and third country firms, so that a higher standard should not be applied to comparable non-EU firms than would be required of EU firms, simply on the basis of nationality;
Amendment 122 #
2017/2253(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
Amendment 139 #
2017/2253(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Notes that the Commission has the right to withdraw equivalence decisions, and believes that Parliament should be consulted in a timely manner before such a withdrawal decision is taken; calls for the introduction of clear procedures and timelines governing the adoption, withdrawal or suspension of equivalence decisions;
Amendment 145 #
2017/2253(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Is concerned that there is no consistent framework for ongoing supervision of an equivalent third country’s regime; considers that the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) should be equipped with the power to monitor regulatory developments in third countries and demands that Parliament should be kept informed of ongoing regulatory monitoring in third countries;
Amendment 151 #
2017/2253(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14 a. Calls for the need for third countries who have been granted equivalence to discuss new regulations prior to implementation with ESAs to ensure that it is within the parameters of equivalence; notes that third countries should closely monitor developments in EU legislation to ensure they can adapt accordingly;
Amendment 167 #
2017/2253(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Calls for equivalence decisions to be reviewed at least once every three years by the relevant ESA and for such reviews to be made public;
Amendment 187 #
2017/2253(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
Amendment 24 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
B a. whereas levels of public debt persist at high levels and remain a drag on growth;
Amendment 25 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
Recital B b (new)
B b. whereas growth has to an important degree relied upon unconventional and, in the long term, unsustainable monetary policy; whereas this monetary policy has failed to create a momentum for productivity-enhancing reforms;
Amendment 27 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
Amendment 38 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
C a. whereas EFSI has not had much of an effect beyond financing projects that would have been financed by other commercial and promotional banks anyway;
Amendment 44 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas employment is expected to continue to expand, while some labour market indicators and the relatively high level of ‘involuntary’ part-time work, suggest persistent labour market difficulties aggravating inequalitiin some member states;
Amendment 49 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas both employment and unemployment rates are still higher than in 2008; whereas hidden unemployment (unemployed, willing to work, but not actively searching for employment) stood at 20 % in 2016;
Amendment 57 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas tax avoidance, tax evasion and aggressive tax planning have caused billions in losses of potential revenues for the public finances of several Member States, to the benefit of large corporations;
Amendment 63 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
F a. whereas the stability of financial institutions in the Eurozone is still a matter of grave concern; whereas there is slight progress on reducing non- performing loans; whereas this progress is clearly insufficient;
Amendment 66 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
F a. whereas structural reforms in the Member States are needed in order to create the conditions for sustained and sustainable growth;
Amendment 69 #
2017/2226(INI)
F b. whereas close to zero interest rates severely distort the intertemporal allocation of capital; whereas a flat yield curve severely damages the traditional borrowing and lending business model of banks and drives them into riskier business activities;
Amendment 71 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F c (new)
Recital F c (new)
F c. whereas public debt levels have increased further in most member states and may be hard to sustain when interest rates return to normal levels;
Amendment 83 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Highlights, however, the persistent structural problem of insufficient growth of potential output and productivity, flanked by too low a level of investments and wages, leading to persistent social inequalities;
Amendment 103 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
Amendment 130 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Welcomes the improvements in public finances, in particular the gradually declining debt/GDP ratios for the EU and euro area and falling headline budget deficits; recalls that, while many Member States have limited fiscal leeway for implementing sustainable, growth-friendly structural reforms, some Member States still have large surpluses which should be used to sustain investments and growth across the EU growth-friendly structural reforms do not require fiscal space but rather legislative and administrative efforts aimed at strengthening market forces and private sector initiatives;
Amendment 139 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. recalls the need to reduce the levels of public debt and rebuild fiscal buffers, to help the European economies to be more resilient to shocks, especially in highly indebted countries; warns about higher financing costs in the future once monetary policy accommodation is reduced, especially in the euro area;
Amendment 144 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)
Paragraph 4 b (new)
4 b. asks the Commission to not only focus on public debt levels, but also take into account the implications for sustainable economic growth of an excessive rise in household and corporate debt;
Amendment 147 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Recalls the importance ofat public investment for boosting and leveraging investment in the EU; considers that the policy mix proposed in the AGS 2018 should be further developed to remedy the current decrease in public investment in the EU; highlights that this decrease also affects local and regional authorities, threatenmay crowd out private investment; recalls that private investment depends on private sector competitiveness; recalls that monetary policy cannot boost private sector competitiveness and that public investment can do so only ing their ability to deliver quality public services case of infrastructure investment;
Amendment 171 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Asks for aRejects any revision of the accounting standards ( European System of National and Regional Accounts, ESA 2010) to ensure a depreciation of investments over a longer period, which would allow budgetary margins to recover and permit the realisation of infrastructure projectsmotivated by the desire to paint a rosier picture of the Eurozone economy;
Amendment 175 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Underlines thatNotes the social priorities in the European Ssemester ; demands the Country-Specific Recommendations should achieve the objectives set out in the Pillar of Social Rightsnecessary respect for the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; stresses that Member States must continue to have sufficient flexibility in implementing an appropriate social policy;
Amendment 192 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Underlines that economic policy and social rights fall in the exclusive competence of the Member States;
Amendment 197 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
Amendment 213 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Welcomes the fact that the AGS 2018 acknowledges the need for efficient and fair tax systems to ensure sustainable finance and reverse the current fall in capital income taxation; supports the Commission’s initiatives to achieve increased transparency, a reformed VAT system and a common consolidated corporate tax base;
Amendment 230 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Regrets that the overall neutral fiscal stance proposed in the recommendations for thQuestions the usefulness of an aggregate eEuro aArea, even though the fiscal stance is expected to be slightly expansionary in a number of Member States in 2018, does not appear to fully support the strengthening of economic growth and job creation fiscal stance ; insists on the full and unambiguous implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact;
Amendment 242 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Insists on a common effort to bring euro area expenditure on R&D closer to the EU2020 targets; cCalls for proper policies and investment to ensure equal access to higher education and training;
Amendment 255 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Recalls that the role of the Member States is to guarantee access to quality education and training; emphasizes that access alone will not help unless matched by diligence and efforts on the side of those trained and educated;
Amendment 267 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to adopt adequate measures to help refugees settle and integrate and to anticipate at an early stage the requirements for facilitating their smooth transition to the labour market, as well as ensuring that public services are provided with sufficient resources; stress; emphasizes that social partners should play a key role in facilitating the integration of migrants and preventing them from suffering from labour abuse;
Amendment 273 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
Amendment 288 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Underlines that a fiscal capacity – on top of existing capacities, and not through redeployments that woulddoes not fall undermine the vital role currently played by structural funds and cohesion policy – represents a necessary tool for increasing incentives for convergence and to counter asymmetric or symmetric economic shocksEU’s competences as defined in Article 3 TFEU;
Amendment 289 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Underlines that a fiscal capacity – on top of existing capacities, and not through redeployments that would undermine the vital role currently played by structural funds and cohesion policy – represents a necessary tool for increasing incentives for convergence and to counter asymmetric or symmetric economic shockas a shock-absorber is not required since governments with access to financial markets can play this role themselves;
Amendment 305 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
Amendment 323 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
Amendment 339 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
Amendment 358 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Underlines that any further step towards a deepening of the EMU must go hand in hand with stronger democratic controls; insists that, to this end, the role of the European Parliament and national parliaments must be strengthened; asks to include trade unions in the negotiation process at both national and European level; urges the launch of the long- awaited negotiation of an interinstitutional agreement (IIA) on the Semesteris unable to solve its underlying problem of a lack of exchange rate flexibility;
Amendment 14 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 14 a (new)
Citation 14 a (new)
- – havingregard to Article 123(1) of the TFEU,
Amendment 16 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 16 a (new)
Citation 16 a (new)
- having regard to the Judgment C- 62/14 of the European Court of Justice(ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, June 16, 2015), in particular paragraphs 70, 97, 101, 102,104, 106 and 109.
Amendment 27 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
C a. Whereas in its decision of 18 July 2017 the German Constitutional Court requested a preliminary ruling by the European Court of Justice on the compatibility of the ECB’s public sector purchase programme(PSPP) with EU primary law.
Amendment 77 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
Amendment 102 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Recalls that, according to Eurostat, average inflation was just 0.2 % in 2016, while inflation excluding energy prices stood at 0.9 %; emphasizes that a rate of inflation close to but below 1% is even more price stability than an inflation rate close to but below 2%.
Amendment 108 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. recalls that, according to a study published by the Bank for International Settlements, periods with very low or even negative inflation rates have only rarely entailed periods of low growth rates, the Great Depression being the most notable exception[1];[1] Borio, Claudio, Magdalena Erdem, Andrew Filardo and Boris Hofmann (2015):The costs of deflation:a historical perspective.BIS Quarterly Review, March 2015, pp.31-54.
Amendment 118 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Is concernedNotes that the ECB will likely not reach its inflation target for at least six consecutive years and will remain below the medium-term target level of 2 % until at least 2020 despite pursuing a very accommodative monetary policy, which indicates that the economy is not operating at full capacity;
Amendment 122 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Acknowledges that without the ECB’s policy package, inflation would be almost 0.5 % lower on average than the rate currently projected for the years 2016-2019;it is quite unclear how effective the ECB’s policy package has been in increasing inflation and what quantitative effect, if any, it will have in the future.
Amendment 136 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Agrees with the ECB that in order to reach the inflation target, supportive fiscal policies and socially balanced productivity-enhancing reforms are required;monetary measures alone are unlikely to reach the inflation target.
Amendment 141 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. Notes that fiscal policies can only be supportive if productivity and competitiveness of the private sector are improved as a consequence of entrepreneurial investment decisions, increases in human capital and structural reforms aimed at better functioning product and factor markets.
Amendment 145 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
Amendment 157 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Points out that, while the effects of the ECB’s monetary policy on the real economy have been very limited, banks have been able to access funding at virtually no, or very low, cost, which has directly subsidised their balance sheets;deplores the fact that the size of this subsidy, despite representing a clear fiscal spillover effect of monetary policy, is not monitored and published,
Amendment 170 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Asks the ECB to consider complementing its price stability objective with nominal GDP growth targeting;Emphasizes that the ECB should not target nominal GDP since monetary policy measures cannot systematically improve the drivers of real growth.
Amendment 185 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls that, in accordance with Article 3 of its Statute, the ECB must support ‘the general economic policies of the Union’, including, as stated in Article 3 of the TEU, ‘the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth’;f this does not compromise the objective of price stability.
Amendment 196 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10 a. Notes that the current recovery in bank and market lending is geographically unevenly distributed among the Member States and has not so far wholly produced the expected effect on the existing investment gap in the euro area;
Amendment 209 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Underlines the positive effect of the ECB monetary policy on growth, employment and the financing costs of Member States, non-financial companies and households; is concerned about the low returns earned on savings and about the long-run sustainability of pensions and life insurance companies;
Amendment 216 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12 a. Believes that the ECB should carefully assess the benefits and side- effects of its policy and consider to end its expansionary measures as soon as it deems appropriate;
Amendment 222 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Notes that according to the ECB, economic recovery in the Eurozone has relied on the fall in oil prices and the ECB’s monetary policy, which will add a cumulative 1.7 % to growth in the period 2016-2019, with no sizable positive contribution from fiscal policy so far;
Amendment 229 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
Amendment 254 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Points out that while unemployment has decreased, aggregate demand in the euro area remains subdued, largely as a result of the rise in poor quality, temporary, low-paid jobs; calls on the ECB to evaluate how this pheno;points out that demand managemenont is slowing the recovery and explore ways to stimulate demand in spite of wage stagnationclearly not covered by the mandate of the ECB;
Amendment 276 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Stresses that excessive current account surpluses in some Member States must be corrected through appropriate fiscal policies;ay be due to insufficient competitiveness in other Member States, stresses that current account surpluses are capital exports in favour of countries with the corresponding current account deficits, many of which are clearly in need of foreign investment
Amendment 287 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16 a. Stresses that current account management is clearly not covered by the mandate of the ECB;
Amendment 308 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18 a. Points out that the ECB hasfew instruments left to fend off adverse macroeconomic shocks;
Amendment 320 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Agrees with the ECB that a bank’s profitability depends on its business model, low interest rates notwithstanding; stresses that an almost flat term structure of the interest rate greatly reduces the profitability of banks in one of its most important areas of business activity, the provision of credit for long-term investments;
Amendment 323 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20 a. Underlines the fact that a prolonged period of flat yield curve could lessen the profitability of banks, especially if they do not adjust their business models, and could create potential risks, in particular for private savings and pension and insurance funds;warns that a decline in the profitability of banks could dampen their willingness to develop lending activity;points particularly to the negative effect of such an interest rate policy on local and regional banks and savings banks with little funding from financial markets, and to risks in the insurance and pensions sector;calls therefore for specific and continued monitoring of the negative interest rate tool, its implementation and its effects;emphasises the need for proper, prudent, timely management of the winding-down of this ultra-low (negative) interest rate policy;
Amendment 339 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21 a. Remains concerned by the still significant levels of non-marketable assets and asset-backed securities put forward as collateral to the Eurosystem in the framework of its refinancing operations;reiterates its request to the ECB to provide information on which central banks have accepted such securities and to disclose valuation methods regarding such assets;underlines that such disclosure would be beneficial for the purpose of parliamentary scrutiny of the supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB;
Amendment 342 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21 b. Calls on the ECB to carefully assess the risks of a future resurgence of asset and housing bubbles owing to its ultra-low (negative) interest rate policy, especially in the light of much-increased lending volumes and disproportionately high prices in the property sector, particularly in some big cities, and believes that it, together with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), should put forward proposals for designing specific macroprudential recommendations in this regard;
Amendment 345 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 c (new)
Paragraph 21 c (new)
21 c. Notes that the ECB’s APP has lowered bond yields in most Member States to unprecedented levels;warns against the risk ofexcessively high valuations on the bond markets, which would be difficult to handle if interest rates start to rise again in the absence of a sufficiently robust recovery, particularly for the countries involved in the excessive deficit procedure or with high levels of debt;points out that a sudden reversal of interest rates from currently low levels along the yield curve carry important market risks for financial institutions with a significant proportion of mark-to- market financial instruments;
Amendment 347 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 d (new)
Paragraph 21 d (new)
21 d. Takes account of the fact that some Member States may be using ultra- low (negative) interest rate policy to defer necessary structural reforms and the consolidation of their primary public deficits, particularly at central government level, and points in this connection to the Stability and Growth Pact commitments;recognises that one of the reasons contributing to budgetary surpluses in some Member States has been the negative interest rates of their public debt;emphasises that national economic policies should be coordinated, particularly within the euro area;underlines that the unavoidable process of exiting from unconventional monetarypolicy will be a very complex one which will have to be carefully planned in order to avoid negative shocks on the capital markets;
Amendment 348 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 e (new)
Paragraph 21 e (new)
21 e. Notes with concern that TARGET 2 imbalances are still rising in the euro area despite a narrowing in trade imbalances pointing to continued capital outflows from the euro area periphery;
Amendment 359 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Calls the ECB’s attention to the need for the sufficiently wide coverage of recent stress tests vis-à-vis the resolution or liquidation of certain banks; recalls that some banks which had passed the ECB’s stress test were on the verge of bankruptcy not much later; calls for more realistic stress test scenarios;
Amendment 388 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
Amendment 398 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 a (new)
Paragraph 26 a (new)
26 a. Emphasizes that CSPP purchases aimed at supporting specific EU policy objectives would clearly not be covered by the mandate of the ECB.
Amendment 412 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
Amendment 423 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
Amendment 463 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
Amendment 474 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 a (new)
Paragraph 33 a (new)
33 a. Emphasizes that monetary policy measures aimed at supporting Greece or other troubled Eurozone countries would clearly not be covered by the mandate of the ECB.
Amendment 478 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Calls on the ECB to assess all the consequences of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and to stand ready to support banks in relocating their activities in the euro area; considers the strengthening of oversight for euro-clearing outside the euro area to be of the utmost importance;
Amendment 486 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34 a (new)
Paragraph 34 a (new)
34 a. Emphasizes that the support of specific banks relocating their activities to the euro area would clearly not be covered by the mandate of the ECB;
Amendment 502 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Believes that ECB profits from seigniorage revenue shouldcannot be considered an EU budgetary resource, since they are directly linked to a fully developed, sui generis European policybelong to the ECB’s shareholders;
Amendment 5 #
2017/2053(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. WelcomesTakes note of the work of the High Level Group on Own Resources, and in particular the measures aimed at reducing the share of the GNI-based contribution, which is residual in nature; argues that this reduction should be compensated for by the use of genuine own resources;
Amendment 21 #
2017/2053(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that preference should be given to genuine European own resources, such as a tax based on the common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) and a contribution based on a definitive VAT system, thereby delivering a fairer system for European citizens with respect to the EU budgetthe right to tax European citizens should remain an exclusive competence of the Member States;
Amendment 31 #
2017/2053(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Stresses that, despite the need for sufficient financial resources for the EU, not raising the tax burden on citizens is important
Amendment 36 #
2017/2053(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Advocates the establishment of a budgetary capacity for the Eurozone that would perform functions of macroeconomic Rejects the proposal to estabilisation and bring about economic and social convergence; considers, moreover, that this capacity should be financed through own resources specific toh a budgetary capacity for the eEuro area, such as a tax on financial transactions, a bank levy and a share of the ECB’s profitszone;
Amendment 53 #
2017/2053(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. ConsiderEmphasizes that the EU should be able to issue zero-risk debt assets in order to offset the volatility in own resources’ revenues;must not issue any type of public debt, since Article 310 (1) TFEU requires revenue and expenditure in the annual budget to be in balance.
Amendment 65 #
2017/2053(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses, with a view to achieving common EU and Eurozone economic governance objectives, the need for adequate financial support, which should bimportance of the no-bailout principle financed by genuine own resources in order to ensure democratic legitim Article 125 TFEU and strict adherence to the Stability and Growth Pacyt;
Amendment 66 #
2017/2053(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
Amendment 79 #
2017/2053(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
Amendment 93 #
2017/2053(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
Amendment 1 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas covered bonds (CBs) are instruments with a long-established track record of low default rates and reliable payments; helping to finance around 20% of European mortgages and representing more than € 2,000 bn of liabilities in Europe in 2015; whereas ca. 90% of CBs worldwide are issued in nine European countries;
Amendment 3 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
A a. whereas CBs played a key role in the funding of credit institutions, in particular during the crisis, whereas the 2008-2014 episode of increasing spreads in CB prices across Member States is no compelling evidence of market fragmentation, since the spreads were highly correlated with spreads in government bonds and were possibly mere reflections of underlying risks in cover pools, whereas an appropriate risk sensitivity of covered bonds prices across Member States is evidence of well- functioning and well integrated markets;
Amendment 4 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
Recital A b (new)
A b. whereas there is significant cross- border investment in European CB markets, whereas CBs have a well- diversified investor base where banks feature prominently with a market share of roughly 35 % between 2009 and 2015, whereas the market share of asset managers, insurance companies and pension funds has shrunk by almost 20 percentage points and was basically replaced by higher Central Bank investments in CBs;
Amendment 5 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A c (new)
Recital A c (new)
A c. whereas under its expansionary monetary policy the Eurosystem is by far the largest single investor in CBs, owning almost one third of the total euro benchmarks issued by euro area issuers, whereas the market share of the European Central Bank is so large that the ECB enjoys considerable market power;
Amendment 6 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A d (new)
Recital A d (new)
A d. whereas CBs are attractive debt instruments since they are - up to the level of collateral in the cover pool - exempted from the bail-in tool in Article 44 of the BRRD, whereas CBs which are compliant with Article 129 of the CRR enjoy preferential risk weight treatment;
Amendment 7 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A e (new)
Recital A e (new)
A e. whereas one factor in bank demand for CBs is the preferential regulatory treatment for CBs in the LCR Delegated Act which allows banks to include CBs in the liquidity buffer even if they are not LCR eligible under Basel Rules;
Amendment 8 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A f (new)
Recital A f (new)
A f. whereas CB programmes, under some conditions, are exempted from initial margin requirements against counterparty credit risk in derivative transactions;
Amendment 9 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A g (new)
Recital A g (new)
A g. whereas CBs may, at national discretion, be exempted from the EU requirements on large exposures;
Amendment 10 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A h (new)
Recital A h (new)
A h. whereas the positions of unsecured bank creditors are adversely affected by asset encumbrance due to overcollateralization (OC) requirements but not by the principle of debt finance with segregated cover pools, whereas such operations involving loan-to-value ratios well below 100% generally improve the positions of unsecured bank creditors to the extent that these reserves are not needed to satisfy claims against the cover pool;
Amendment 11 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A i (new)
Recital A i (new)
A i. whereas CBs feature prominently on the asset side of the balance sheets of many banks, whereas it is essential for financial stability that these assets remain at maximum safety and liquidity, whereas this objective should not be undermined by innovations in CBs which allow issuers to transfer risk to investors at their discretion;
Amendment 12 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A j (new)
Recital A j (new)
A j. whereas CB issuances with conditional maturity extension (soft-bullet and conditional pass-through (CPT) structures) have increased by 8% p. a. to 45% in April 2016, whereas such options mitigate liquidity risk in mismatched cover pools, reduce OC requirements and help to avoid fire sales, whereas, however, maturity extensions shift issuer risk to the investors, whereas preferential regulatory treatment should only be granted to debt instruments which are particularly safe;
Amendment 14 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
B a. whereas CB markets are lagging behind in Member States without national tradition or where their growth is impeded by sovereign risk or difficult macroeconomic conditions;
Amendment 17 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
Recital B b (new)
B b. whereas there are several very successful national frameworks for CBs, grounded on historical and legal factors and partly embedded in national law; whereas those national frameworks share fundamental characteristics, in particular the dual recourse, the segregation of cover pools with low-risk assets and special public supervision; whereas it may prove beneficial to extend these principles to other types of debt instruments;
Amendment 20 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B c (new)
Recital B c (new)
B c. whereas market participants have undertaken initiatives to foster the development of CB markets, such as the creation in 2013 of the Covered Bond Label (CBL) and the Harmonized Transparency Template (HTT);
Amendment 23 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B d (new)
Recital B d (new)
B d. whereas following a supervisory review the EBA has identified best practices for CBs' issuance and supervision and assessed national frameworks' alignment with those practices;
Amendment 24 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B e (new)
Recital B e (new)
B e. whereas in response to the COM's public consultation a large majority of stakeholders has indicated opposing complete harmonisation and investors have emphasized to value product diversity; whereas stakeholders have shown cautious support for EU legislation provided that it is principles based and builds on existing frameworks respecting in particular the characteristics of national frameworks;
Amendment 40 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Calls for a clear definition of CBs in a European Directive; insists that the definition for securitiedebt instruments henceforth called ‘covered bonds’ must not fall below the standards currently set by Article 129 of the CRR; requests that securitiedebt instruments incompatible with this definition but compatible with Article 52(4) of the UCITS Directive are properly defined in the same directive under a name clearly distinct from ‘covered bonds’; suggests that this name may be ‘European Secured Notes’; (ESNs);
Amendment 41 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Supports the principle that the only eligible cover pool assets for CBs should be assets which cannot be moved out of the country or assets fully backed by government authorities;
Amendment 43 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 b (new)
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3 b. Supports keeping a preferential regulatory treatment for CBs over other forms of collateralised debt; notes that ESNs would be exempted from the bail-in tool in Article 44 of the BRRD; underlines that European legislation on minimum standards is warranted for all debt instruments which benefit from preferential regulatory treatment;
Amendment 44 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 c (new)
Paragraph 3 c (new)
3 c. Encourages the development, for all securities which are compatible with Article 52 (4) UCITS, of a legal framework whose principles would be laid down in the directive, calls on Member States to integrate these principles in national law and their insolvency proceedings, properly distinguishing between CBs and ESNs;
Amendment 45 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 d (new)
Paragraph 3 d (new)
3 d. Emphasizes that a sound legal framework for CBs and ESNs would have a potential to make ESNs more transparent, more liquid and more cost efficient than securities which make use of contractual arrangements, points out that this may help ESNs to finance riskier activities such as SME credits, consumer credits or infrastructure investments which lack government guarantees, points out that the development of ESNs should not be restricted as long as no systemic risks are discernible;
Amendment 46 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 e (new)
Paragraph 3 e (new)
3 e. Encourages setting minimum supervisory standards in the directive which reflect identified best practices for both CBs and ESNs; encourages supervisory convergence across the EU;
Amendment 47 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 f (new)
Paragraph 3 f (new)
3 f. Calls for the directive to increase transparency with respect to information about cover pool assets and the legal framework ensuring dual recourse and segregation of the cover pool assets in the case of issuer insolvency or resolution, insists that also in this respect the directive be principles-based focusing only on informational requirements;
Amendment 48 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 g (new)
Paragraph 3 g (new)
3 g. Calls on the ECB to gradually disengage from CB markets in the near future, calls on private investors which have been crowded out by the ECB to resume their lending activities at previous levels;
Amendment 51 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 – introductory part
Paragraph 4 – introductory part
4. Calls on the Commission to propose a Directirevision of the European banking legislation which specifies the regulatory treatment of CBs and ESNs, giving clear preference to CBs over ESNs and possibly over defining CBs and ESNs, includingifferent types of ESNs; calls on the Commission to present its proposals for CBs and ESNs simultaneously in order to avoid market disruptions during transition phases.; calls on the Commission to include in this definition all the following common principles:
Amendment 54 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 – point b – paragraph 1 – point i
Paragraph 4 – point b – paragraph 1 – point i
i) a claim on the issuer of the securitydebt instrument equal to the full payment obligations attached to it, and
Amendment 60 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 – point d
Paragraph 4 – point d
d) The CB isCBs and ESNs are bankruptcy remote, i.e. it is ensured that the issuer’'s payment obligations are not automatically accelerated in the event of the issuer’'s insolvency or resolution;
Amendment 67 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 – point e
Paragraph 4 – point e
e) Overcollateralisation (OC) is applied to the cover poolCBs and ESNs are overcollateralised. By an extent to be determined in national law, the value of all cover pool assets must always be greater than the net present value of outstanding payment obligations. The values of cover pool assets isare at all times to be determined on the basis of market prices when market prices are available and on the basis of face values adjusted for market conditions and downside risks if no market prices are available;
Amendment 80 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 – point h – paragraph 1 – point ii
Paragraph 4 – point h – paragraph 1 – point ii
ii) the features of specific programmes meet the applicable requirements both prior to issuance of and until maturity of the security.debt instrument;
Amendment 81 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 – point h – paragraph 1 – point ii a (new)
Paragraph 4 – point h – paragraph 1 – point ii a (new)
ii a) the covered bond's compliance with relevant requirements (including in relation to eligibility of cover assets and coverage) is subject to ongoing, regular and independent monitoring;
Amendment 90 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 – point i a (new)
Paragraph 4 – point i a (new)
i a) The maturity of the CB cannot be extended, except in the event of insolvency or resolution of the issuer and with approval by the competent supervisory authority; the maturity extension should not exceed one year;
Amendment 95 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 – point a
Paragraph 5 – point a
a) The securitydebt instrument is fully collateralised by assets defined by Article 129(1)(a)-(d) and (f) of the CRR and satisfies the additional requirements of Article 129(23) and (7) of the CRR;
Amendment 100 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 – point b
Paragraph 5 – point b
b) The maximum LTV parameters for mortgages are set by European law in such a way that they do not surpass the LTV ratios currently fixed in Article 129 CRR, but are subject to regular review and adjustment in line with independent assessments (stress tests) of pricing conditions which might prevail in the relevant real estate markets under stress; the use of loan-to-mortgage lending values rather than loan-to-market values should be encouraged;
Amendment 102 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 – point c
Paragraph 5 – point c
Amendment 108 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Emphasises that the risk weights assigned to CBs in European legislation must reflect market assessments of underlying risks; underlines the need to eliminatremove market distortions by ensuring that the same applies to all other types of securitiedebt instruments that enjoy preferential regulatory treatment;
Amendment 117 #
2017/2005(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9 a. Underlines the importance of a level playing field to ensure fair competition in financial markets; emphasizes that European legislation must not discriminate between different types of CBs unless there are good reasons to assume that these differ either in terms of safety or in terms of liquidity;
Amendment 40 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
Recital 16
(16) Investment firms should be considered small and non-interconnected for the purposes of the specific prudential requirements for investment firms where they do not conduct investment services which carry a high risk for clients,if size and kind of their activities markets or themselves and whose size means they are less unlikely to cause widespread negative impacts for clients and markets in case risks inherent in their business materialise or in case they fail. Accordingly, small and non-interconnected investment firms should be defined as those that do not deal on own account or incur risk from trading financial instruments, have nolimited client assets or money under their control, have assets under both discretionary portfolio management and non-discretionary (advisory) arrangements of less than EUR 1.2 billion, handle fewer than EUR 100 million per day of client orders in cash trades or EUR 1 billion per day in derivatives, and have a balance sheet smaller than EUR 100 million and total gross annual revenues from the performance of their investment services of less than EUR 30 million.
Amendment 43 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
Recital 19
(19) All investment firms should calculate their capital requirement with reference to a set of K-factors which capture Risk-To-Customer (‘RtC’), Risk- to-Market (‘RtM’) and Risk-to-Firm (‘RtF’). The K-factors under RtC capture client assets under management and ongoing advice (K-AUM), assets safeguarded and administered (K- ASA), client money held (K-CMH), and customer orders handled (K-COH).
Amendment 49 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
Recital 23
(23) The K-factors under RtC are proxies covering the business areas of investment firms from which harm to clients can conceivably be generated in case of problems. K-AUM captures the risk of harm to clients from an incorrectthe discretionary management of customer portfolios or poor execution and provides reassurance and customer benefits in terms of the continuity of service of ongoing portfolio management and advice. K-ASA captures the risk of safeguarding and administering customer assets, and ensures that investment firms hold capital in proportion to such balances, regardless of whether they are on its own balance sheet or segregated in other accounts. K-CMH captures the risk of potential for harm where an investment firm holds the money of its customers, regardless of whether they are on its own balance sheet or segregated in other accounts. K-COH captures the potential risk to clients of a firm which executes its orders (in the name of the client, and not in the name of the firm itself), for example as part of execution-only services to clients or when a firm is part of a chain for client orders.
Amendment 56 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36
Recital 36
(36) To ensure investor protection as well as the integrity and the stability of financial markets in the Union, the Commission, when adopting an equivalence decision, should take into account the potential risks posed by the services and the activities that firms from thatcentral role that the Union plays in worldwide financial markets and ensure that the application of third- country requirements does not prevent Union investors and issuers from investing in or obtaining funding from third countries or third-country investors and issuers from investing, raising capital or obtaining other financial services in Union markets unless that is necessary for objective and evidence-based prudential reasons, including potential risks posed by the services and the activities which a third-country firm could carry out in the Union following that decision. Their systemic importance should be considered based on criteria such as the likely scale and scope of service provision Commission should initiate the equivalence assessment on its own initiative. The equivalence assessment should be outcome-based; it should assess to what extent the respective third-country regulatory and superformance of activities by firms from the third country concerned. For the same purpose, the Commission may consider appropriate to take into account whether the third county is identified as a non- cooperative jurisdiction for tax purposes under the relevant Union policy or as a high-risk third country pursuant to Article 9(2) of Directive (EU) 2015/84932 . visory framework achieves similar and adequate regulatory effects and to what extent it meets the same objectives as Union law. The Commission may delay or discard any initiation of equivalence assessments if the third county is identified as a non- cooperative jurisdiction for tax purposes under the relevant Union policy or as a high-risk third country pursuant to Article 9(2) of Directive (EU) 2015/84932. When initiating equivalence assessments, the Commission should be able to prioritise among third-country jurisdictions taking into account the materiality of the equivalence finding to Union firms and clients, the existence of supervisory and cooperation agreements between the third country and the Union or its Member States, the existence of an effective equivalent system for the recognition of investment firms authorised under foreign regimes as well as the interest and willingness of the third country to engage in the equivalence assessment process. The Commission should monitor any significant changes to the regulatory and supervisory framework of the third country and review the equivalence decisions where appropriate. __________________ 32 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73).
Amendment 59 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 25
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 25
(25) ‘K-AUM’ or ‘K-factor in relation to assets under management (AUM)’ means the capital requirement relative to the value of assets that an investment firm manages for its clients under both discretionary portfolio management and non- discretionary arrangements constituting investment advice, including assets delegated to another undertaking and excluding assets that another undertaking has delegated to the investment firm;
Amendment 84 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 2
Article 11 – paragraph 2
2. ABy way of derogation from paragraph 1 an investment firm that meets the conditions set out in Article 12(1) shall at all times only have capital which amounts to the highest of the amounts specified in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1.
Amendment 85 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 3
Article 11 – paragraph 3
3. Where competent authorities consider that there has been an exceptional material change in the business activities of an investment firm, they may require the investment firm to be subject to a different capital requirement referred to in this Article, in accordance with Title IV, Chapter 2, section IV of Directive (EU) ---- /--[IFD].
Amendment 91 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point c
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point c
(c) ASA (or assets safeguarded and administered) calculated in accordance with Article 19 is zeroEUR [XXX] million;
Amendment 94 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point d
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point d
(d) CMH (or client money held) calculated in accordance with Article 18 is zeroEUR [XXX] million;
Amendment 100 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point e
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point e
(e) DTF (daily trading flow) calculated in accordance with Article 32 is zero;EUR [xxx] million.
Amendment 101 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point f
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point f
(f) NPR (net position risk) or CMG (clearing member guarantee) calculated in accordance with Articles 22 and 23 is zero;EUR [xxx] million.
Amendment 104 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point g
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point g
(g) TCD (trading counterparty default) calculated in accordance with Article 26 is zero;EUR [xxx] million.
Amendment 106 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 12 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. ESMA shall be empowered to adopt implementing acts adjusting the thresholds in paragraph 1(c), (d), (e), (f) and (g). ESMA shall make use of this power whenever the size of the thresholds may constitute a barrier to market entry or a threat to financial stability.
Amendment 107 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Article 12 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Where an investment firm no longer meets all the conditions set out in paragraph 1, it shall not be considered a small and non- interconnected investment firm with immediate effectafter a period of 3 months, calculated from the date when the threshold has been exceeded.
Amendment 108 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 12 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. For the purposes of points (a) to (d) of paragraph 1, an investment firm shall not be considered to be a small and non-interconnected investment firm in the event that the investment firm exceeds, on an average rolling basis, the applicable threshold during the preceding 12 month period.
Amendment 109 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2 b (new)
Article 12 – paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. For the purposes of points (e), (f) and (g) of paragraph 1, an investment firm shall not be considered to be a small and non-interconnected investment firm after a period of three months from the date on which the threshold was not met.
Amendment 111 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 4
Article 12 – paragraph 4
4. Where an investment firm which has not met all of the conditions set out in paragraph 1 subsequently meets those conditions, it shall be considered, subject to approval by the competent authority, a small and non-interconnected investment firm after a period of 63 months from the date when those conditions are met.
Amendment 113 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2
Article 13 – paragraph 2
2. Where the competent authority considers that there has been an exceptional material change in the activity of an investment firm, the competent authority may adjust the amount of capital referred to in paragraph 1.
Amendment 114 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
Article 13 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
EBSMA, in consultation with ESMBA, and taking into account Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/488 shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to further specify the calculation of the requirement referred to in paragraph 1.
Amendment 116 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
Article 13 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2
EBSMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by [nine month from the date of entry into force of this Regulation].
Amendment 117 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – table 1 – column K-Factors – first cell
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – table 1 – column K-Factors – first cell
Assets under management under both discretionary portfolio management and non-discretionary (advisory) arrangements
Amendment 122 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 15 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. ESMA shall be empowered to adopt implementing acts adjusting the K- DTF coefficients in Table 1. ESMA shall make use of this power if in situations of market stress the K-DTF requirements seem overly restrictive and detrimental to financial stability.
Amendment 123 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 4
Article 15 – paragraph 4
4. Where competent authorities consider that there has been an exceptional material change in the business activities of an investment firm that impacts the amount of a relevant K-factor, they may adjust the corresponding amount in accordance with Article 36(2)(a) of Directive (EU) ----/-- [IFD].
Amendment 131 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
For the purposes of calculating K-CMH, CMH shall be the rolling average of the value of total daily client money held, measured at the end of each business day for the previous 312 calendar months.
Amendment 132 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Article 18 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
CMH shall be the average or simple arithmetic mean of the daily measurements in the 312 calendar months.
Amendment 137 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. Where an investment firm has been holding client money for less than 312 months, it may use business projections to calculate K-CMH, subject to the following cumulative requirements:
Amendment 145 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1
Article 21 – paragraph 1
The RtM K-factor requirement for the trading book positions of an investment firm dealing on own account, whether for itself or on behalf of a client shall be the highlower of K-NPR calculated in accordance with Article 22 or K-CMG calculated in accordance with Article 23.
Amendment 153 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point a
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point a
(a) the [simplified standardised] approach set out in Chapters 2 to 4 of Title IV of Part Three of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 where the investment firm's trading book business is equal to or less than EUR 300 million;
Amendment 155 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Amendment 158 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Amendment 164 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point d
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point d
Amendment 165 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
If conditions set out in points (a) to (d) are satisfied, K-CMG shall be the highest total amount of initial margin posted to the clearing member by the investment firm over the preceding 3 months.
Amendment 166 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Article 23 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
EBSMA, in consultation with ESMBA, shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the calculation of the amount of the initial margin referred to in paragraph 1(c).
Amendment 168 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Article 23 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
The EBSMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by [nine months from the date of entry into force of this Regulation].
Amendment 175 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – point a – point i
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – point a – point i
(i) OTC derivatives traded with central governments and central banks of Member States; not subject to an assistance program of the European Stability Mechanism or a comparable institution.
Amendment 176 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – point a – point ii
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – point a – point ii
(ii) OTC derivatives cleared through a qualifying central counterparty (QCCP) or through a clearing bank which is a clearing member of a QCCP;
Amendment 178 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
For the purposes of K-TCD, the capital requirement shall be determined by the following formula: Capital requirement = Exposure value * RF where RF is a risk factor of 1.6% defined uniformly across counterparties.
Amendment 217 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 40 – paragraph 2 – point d
Article 40 – paragraph 2 – point d
(d) exposures to recognised exchanges as defined in Article 4(1)(72) of Regulation (EU) 575/2013, to qualifying central counterparties (QCCP) or to clearing members.
Amendment 220 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point b
Article 42 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – point b
(b) unencumbered cash, including the investment firm’s unencumbered cash pooled at group level.
Amendment 228 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 47 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 47 – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 232 #
Amendment 264 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 59 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
Article 59 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
(fa) the provisions set out in Article 46 and 47 of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 and their alignment with a consistent framework for equivalence in financial services.
Amendment 318 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 61 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point a
Article 61 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point a
Regulation (EU) No 600/2014
Article 47 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Article 47 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Where the services provided and the activities performed by third-country firms in the Union following the adoption of the decision referred to in the first subparagraph are likely to be of systemic importance for the Union, the legally binding prudential and business conduct requirements referred to in the first subparagraph may only be considered to have equivalent effect to the requirements set out in the acts referred to in that subparagraph after a detailed and granular assessment. For these purposes of this assessment, the Commission shall also assess and take into account the supervisory convergence between the third country concerned and the Union.
Amendment 324 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 61 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point c
Article 61 – paragraph 1 – point 2 – point c
Regulation (EU) No 600/2014
Article 47 – paragraph 5
Article 47 – paragraph 5
5. ESMA shall monitor the regulatory and supervisory developments, and the enforcement practices and other relevant market developments in third countries for which equivalence decisions have been adopted by the Commission pursuant to paragraph 1 in order to verify whether the conditions on the basis of which those decisions have been taken are still fulfilled. The Authority shall submit a confidential report on its findings to the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council on an annual basis.’’.
Amendment 17 #
2017/0358(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 10 – point 1
Recital 10 – point 1
Amendment 25 #
2017/0358(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 23
Recital 23
(23) The revenues of investment firms in the form of fees, commissions and other revenues in relation to the provision of different investment services are highly volatile. Limiting the variable component of remuneration to a portion of the fixed component of remuneration would affect the firm’s ability to reduce remuneration at times of reduced revenues and could lead to an increase of the firm’s fixed cost base, leading in turn to risks for the firm’s ability to withstand times of economic downturn or reduced revenues. To avoid those risks, a single maximum ratio between the variable and the fixed elements of remuneration should not be imposed on non-systemic investment firms. Instead, those investment firms should set appropriate ratios themselves.
Amendment 27 #
2017/0358(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 24
Recital 24
(24) In response to the growing public demand for tax transparency and to promote investment firms’ corporate responsibility, it is appropriate to require that investment firms, unless they qualify as small and non-interconnected, disclose certain information, including information on profits made, taxes paid and any public subsidies received.
Amendment 37 #
2017/0358(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 8 a (new)
Article 8 a (new)
Amendment 66 #
2017/0358(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Member States shall require investment firms except those which qualify as small and non-interconnected to disclose by Member State and by third country in which the investment firm has a branch or a subsidiary that is a financial institution as defined in Article 4(1)(26) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the following information on an annual basis:
Amendment 80 #
2017/0358(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 26 – paragraph 4
Article 26 – paragraph 4
Amendment 94 #
2017/0358(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 28 – paragraph 2
Article 28 – paragraph 2
Amendment 112 #
Amendment 132 #
2017/0358(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 31
Article 31
Amendment 136 #
2017/0358(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 32
Article 32
Amendment 182 #
2017/0143(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 a (new)
Recital 1 a (new)
(1a) For many people, old age pensions constitute an essential part of their retiree’s income and the existence of a well-functioning pensions system is therefore of great importance in their fundamental right to “lead a life of dignity and independence and to participate in social and cultural life”, as recognised in Article 25 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
Amendment 190 #
2017/0143(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 b (new)
Recital 1 b (new)
(1b) A substantial part of old age pensions is provided under public pay-as- you go-schemes, where out-payments are adjusted to the level of contributions received. If governments feel that contributions are insufficient to cover the needs of the old generation, the perceived deficit in the pension system may negatively impact on the sustainability of public finances. Income adequacy and financial sustainability of national pension systems is crucial to the stability of all Member States. Their exclusive competence - as determined by the Treaties - regarding the organisation and the management of pension systems must therefore be respected under all conditions.
Amendment 195 #
2017/0143(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 c (new)
Recital 1 c (new)
(1c) The Union is facing several challenges, including demographic challenges because of the fact that Europe is an ageing continent. In addition, career patterns, the labour market and the distribution of wealth are undergoing radical changes, not least as a result of the digital revolution. If national security systems are not adjusted to a globalised knowledge economy with open borders, labour mobility and migration, Member States should enact reforms which address these deficiencies.
Amendment 198 #
2017/0143(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1 d (new)
Recital 1 d (new)
(1d) Priority should be given to further developing, strengthening and reforming the existing first (public), second (occupational) and third (capital-based) pillars of the national pensions systems. In particular, more weight should be placed on accrued pension entitlements from second and third pillar funded schemes in Member States with unfavourable demographics. It would be desirable that a Pan-European Personal Pension Product (PEPP) complements and strengthens the market for individual pension products across the Union without distorting competition.
Amendment 579 #
2017/0143(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
Article 23 – paragraph 3 – introductory part
3. The PEPP key information document shall be a stand-alone document, clearly separate from marketing materials. It shall not contain cross-references to marketing material. It may contain cross-references to other documents including a prospectus, but the cross reference shall not be a substitute for any information required to be included in the PEPP key information document. Such information shall always be directly included in the key information document. In addition to the information set out in Article 8(3)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 1286/2014, the section titled “What is this product?” shall contain the following information:
Amendment 608 #
2017/0143(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 5
Article 23 – paragraph 5
5. Potential PEPP savers shall also be provided with information on the past performance ofaverage annual rate of return on total investments related to the PEPP scheme covering a minimum of the last five years, or, where the scheme has been operating for fewer than five years, covering all thefull calendar years that the scheme has been operating, as well as with information. The average annual rate of return shall be calculated net of all relevant costs and shall include changes in the market prices onf the structure of costs borne by PEPP savers and PEPP beneficiariesunderlying capital instruments evaluated at the first and last day of business over the relevant time period. Fixed and one-off costs of the PEPP provider shall be broken down to PEPP schemes in proportion to the market values of the capital instruments at the last day of business in each calendar year. Potential PEPP savers shall be warned that past performance of a PEPP scheme has no predictive power for its performance in the future.
Amendment 636 #
2017/0143(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Prior to the conclusion of a PEPP-related contract, theEPP providers and distributors may provide advice. Potential PEPP savers may opt for a contract without advice. PEPP provider ors and distributor referred to in Arts shall ensure that the costs of advice are borne by those who seek advice. Where advicle 19(c) of this Regulationis provided prior to the conclusion of a PEPP-related contract, the PEPP provider or distributor shall specify, on the basis of information obtained from the PEPP saver, the retirement-related demands and the needs of that PEPP saver and shall provide the PEPP saver with objective information about the PEPP in a comprehensible form to allow that PEPP saver to make an informed decision.
Amendment 640 #
2017/0143(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Amendment 691 #
2017/0143(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)
Amendment 747 #
2017/0143(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 36 – paragraph 1
Article 36 – paragraph 1
1. The PEPP saver shall be able to opt for a different investment option once every five years of accumulation in the PEPPterms for modification of the investment option shall be listed in the PEPP contract and in the Key Information Document.
Amendment 763 #
2017/0143(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 1
Article 37 – paragraph 1
1. The default investment option shall ensure capital protection for the PEPP saver, on thbasic PEPP shall be a simple, low-risk product that can be beasis of a risk-mitigation technique that results in a safe investment strly acquired, including through digital channels, in many Member Stategys.
Amendment 817 #
2017/0143(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 40 – paragraph 2
Article 40 – paragraph 2
Amendment 880 #
2017/0143(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 2
Article 52 – paragraph 2
2. The choice of the form of out- payments for the decumulation phase shall be exercised by PEPP savers upon conclusion of a PEPP contract and can be changed once every five years thereafter during the accumulation phase, if applicableor at any later point in time if mutually agreed.
Amendment 47 #
2017/0138(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 6 a (new)
Recital 6 a (new)
(6a) Recent tax-related leaks have also underlined the need for better information exchange on aggressive tax planning arrangements. To highlight one example, it is scandalous that despite of various inquiries on Apple’s tax practices, its recent Jersey-based tax avoidance structure was only revealed with the Paradise Papers leak.
Amendment 56 #
2017/0138(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 9 a (new)
Recital 9 a (new)
(9a) The constantly growing role and importance of intellectual property rights in the business models and tax structures of large corporations further underline the urgency of better information exchange on tax avoidance arrangements, given the various easy options that the use of immaterial rights give for artificial transfer of profits.
Amendment 57 #
2017/0138(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 9 b (new)
Recital 9 b (new)
(9b) The lack of comprehensive, public country-by-country reporting on relevant financial figures of major multinational enterprises has contributed into the poor reliability of aggregated data on offshore structures, highlighted by the fact that many of the recent high-profile tax avoidance structures are not visible in the current commercial corporate financial account databases. These gaps in statistics hinder the attempts of tax authorities to conduct risk assessments on risk jurisdictions and underlines the need for greater information exchange on tax planning structures.
Amendment 14 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas a number ofcertain Member States have been coerced into reducing budget deficits and cutting theirto deal with severe budget deficits, increased debt levels and, as a result, cuts on social spending,; which has undermined public health, educaereas - unlike investment - transfers and government consumption, social security and housing systemshould never be debt- financed;
Amendment 27 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas tax avoidance and tax evasion schemes have deprived countries of revenue that is essential for a robust social state and public welfare policies, leading to worsening povertyreduced government revenue which could be spent on better conditions for economic growth, rising incomes and social policies;
Amendment 37 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas, according to thea ILO2 , transfers and social benefits are the most powerfulresearch paper made on 13 G20 nations, redistributive social transfer and tax policies were important factors for reducing inequalitiesmitigating income inequalities; whereas this is not at all surprising; _________________ 2 Decomposing income inequality into factor income components: Evidence from selected G20 countries, p. 1.
Amendment 43 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
D a. whereas reducing inequality by redistributive policies may entail serious disincentives for the productive use of labor and capital, thereby increasing unemployment and reducing the fiscal scope for social policies;
Amendment 51 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Recital D b (new)
Recital D b (new)
D b. whereas some member states are launching pilot projects for testing universal basic income policies, such as in Finland, where a random sample of 2,000 unemployed persons will receive an unconditional sum of EUR 560 per month, which should produce an adequate incentive to accept temporary and part-time work;
Amendment 56 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Recital D c (new)
Recital D c (new)
D c. whereas universal basic income could be one of the solutions for reforming social security, cutting red tape, poverty and unemployment;
Amendment 64 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Stresses that urgent practical steps need to be taken to eradicfurther mitigate poverty and social exclusion and promote the fair distribution of income and wealth;
Amendment 81 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Calls for priority to be given, when shaping macroeconomic poreducing social inequalities by enabling people to make best use of their gifts and capabilicties, to reducing social inequalities and guaranteeing universal free access to public social servicecalls for focusing social support on those which are both poor and unable to earn a sufficient income by their own efforts;
Amendment 90 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 (new)
Paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 (new)
Points out that social policies may use as instruments either minimum income or minimum wages but not both, points out that social policies are an obligation of the state and not an obligation of private employers; points out that mimimum wage laws are at risk of contributing to the loss of jobs for low-skilled workers;
Amendment 91 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 – point 1 (new)
Paragraph 2 – point 1 (new)
(1) Points out that social support must always be distinctively lower than wage income for those who work;
Amendment 101 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Points out that an increase in social transfers and progressive, fair and redistributive tax systems, alongside measures to combat tax avoidance and tax evasion, are prerequisites forcan increase economic, social and territorial cohesion;
Amendment 115 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Argues that minimum income schemes are essential transitional instruments in reducing and fighting poverty, and they should be seen as a social investment;
Amendment 132 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
Amendment 120 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Considers that - as the Greek haircut has shown - there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes, however, that modifying its prudential treatment could have a significant effect on the financial sector, which calls for caution in reform efforts; awaits with interest the results of the international work on this issue; considers that, in the end, a better regulatory framework, be it European or international, will be needed even of Eurozone Member States and that, consequentially, sovereign risk must not be considered as risk free assets in balance sheets;
Amendment 142 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers it essential to ensure the comparability of risk-weighted assets across institutions in order to allow for effective supervision; welcomes the work done internationally to streamline the resort to internal models, as well as the introduction of a leverage ratio to act as a backstop; recalls, however, that the regulatory changes planned should not result in significant increases in capital requirements, nor in order to cushion the financial institutions appropriately against future shocks hitting the financial sector; points out that increased capital requirements need not harm the ability of banks to finance the real economy, in particular SMEs;
Amendment 319 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Stresses that it is crucial to harmonise the hierarchy of claims in bank insolvency across Member States in order to make the implementation of the BRRD more consistent and effective; is concerned by the multitude of exceptions far beyond deposits up to EUR 100 000;
Amendment 364 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Is aware of the potential benefitrisks of an EDIS; is nevertheless of the opinion that risk reduction measures as well as a link between political responsibility and the bearing of the occurring costs are an indispensable counterparty to its establishment in order to prevent moral hazard, and that such measures should preferably precede risk sharing;
Amendment 382 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. WelcomeRejects a European approach to deposit insurance, which must make it possible to address outstanding DGSD implementation issues and phase in the risk reduction measures;
Amendment 405 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Highlights that Article 114 seems to be an inappropriate legal basis for the establishment of both the EDIS and the DIF;
Amendment 423 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. WelcomeRejects the establishment of loan facility agreements between the SRF and the Banking Union Member States; is of the opinion, nevertheless, that this solution is not sufficient to do away with the bank- sovereign vicious circle and that the work on a common fiscal backstop for the SRF, which should be fiscally neutral over the medium term, should continue step by steponly another step into a debt and liabilities union;
Amendment 900 #
2016/2114(REG)
Parliament's Rules of Procedure
Rule 15 – paragraph 1
Rule 15 – paragraph 1
The President, Vice-Presidents and Quaestors shall be elected by secret ballot, in accordance with Rule 182. Nominations shall be with consent. They may only be made by a political group or by at least 40 Members. However, if the number of nominations does not exceed the number of seats to be filled, the candidates may be elected by acclamation. Members shall be permitted to serve a maximum of two terms in the office of President pursuant to Rule 19(1), regardless of whether they are served consecutively or not.
Amendment 39 #
2016/2101(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas political developments such as the question of the UK’'s membership of the Union, relations with Russia and, the refugee crisis and the unwillingness of Member States to commit to serious structural reforms have compounded uncertainties and further served to inhibit investment;
Amendment 99 #
2016/2101(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Welcomes the Commission’s continuing approach to limit the number of recommendations and its effort to mainstream the semester by covering mainly key priority areas of macroeconomic and social relevance, when setting the policy objectives for the next 18 months; reiterates that this facilitates the implementation of recommendations according to a comprehensive and meaningful range of economic and social benchmarks;
Amendment 117 #
2016/2101(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Stresses that Europe’s long economic crisis has shown that there is a strong need to focus on public and private investmentacilitate private investment and increase public investment in areas such as education and infrastructure, in order to enhance the EU’s competitiveness;
Amendment 141 #
2016/2101(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Underlines that the still-too-high unemployment rates show that the capacity to create jobs in most Member States is still limited; emphasises that further action is needed, in consultation with social partntakeholders and in accordance with national practices, to make labour markets more inclusivecompetitive and open to job-creation overall;
Amendment 154 #
2016/2101(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
Amendment 166 #
2016/2101(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Welcomes the Commission’s recommendation for three Member States to exit the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP); agrees with the Commissionstates that large and consistent current account surpluses reflect a clear need to stimulate demand and investment in order to cope with the challenges of the future regarding transport and communications, the digital economy, education and research, climate change, energy, environmental protection and the ageing population; calls on the Commission to continue to support budgetary policies that underpin growth and recovery in all Member States and support sustainable structural reformsn undervalued internal exchange rate and constitute a case of "beggar-thy- neighbour policy" of countries with such undervalued internal exchange rates; calls on the Commission to develop legal and technical procedures to enable countries to leave the Eurozone if they wish to do so;
Amendment 190 #
2016/2101(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Notes that further measures are needed to reduce non-performing loans (NPL) in the euro area and to increase the ability of banks to lend to the real economy, notably to SMEs;
Amendment 203 #
2016/2101(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Underlines the fact that investment has so far lagged and failed to lead to sustainable and inclusiveeconomic growth in the EUurozone and that under the current circumstances, monetary policy alone is unlikely to bring about recovery, even though the rules madneither expansionary monetary nor fiscal policy will return the Eurozone necessary by banking union have imposed more stringent financial criteria on banks; considers that a coordinated fiscal expansion is also needed onomies to their long-term potential growth path in the absence of exchange rates reflecting the EU, therefore, in line with the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact and its flexibility clauses, in order to place emphasir relative competitiveness; underlines that the best way to help the most affected countries to significantly lower unemployment in the medium term is oan public and private investmentexit from the currency union;
Amendment 230 #
2016/2101(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Emphasises the need to improve the EU’s overall capacity to create and sustain jobs and thus to tackle high levels of unemployment, while considering that migrationtackle high levels of unemployment by structural reforms and an exit from the Eurozone, while considering that migration of well- educated young citizens of non-EU countries could play an important role in compensating for the negative effects of the ageing population; emphasises, however, that this alone cannot be the main response to address structural demographic, labour market or fiscal challenges but that it should be complemented with efficient public expenditure, especially in high-quality social and environmentally sustainable investments and lower taxes on labour;
Amendment 247 #
2016/2101(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Highlights the importance of resilientflexible labour markets where an appropriate trade-off is maintained between economic, social and human costs in accordance with the EU values of solidarity and subsidiarityinterests of employers and employees, with a focus on the upgrading of educational systems and vocational education;
Amendment 267 #
2016/2101(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Invites the Commission to give priority to measures that reduce the obstacles to greater investment flows, which arise at both an EU level from a lack of clarity regarding strategies that are to be followed, especially in the fields of energy, transport, communications and the digital economy, as well as from the effect on bank lending in the wake of the adoption of the banking union, and a national level from cumbersome legal systems, corruption, lack of transparency, outdated bureaucracy, inadequate digitalisation of public services, lack of mutual recognition of academic and technical qualifications in the professions and certain services sectors, and educational systems that remain out of synch with modern requirements;
Amendment 293 #
2016/2101(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Underlines the importance of better addressing the high tax wedge on labour given that high taxation diminishes incentives for the inactive, the unemployed, second earners and low-wage earners to return to employment, by promoting a growth-friendly tax shift towards consumption andreducing the overall size of government and by promoting a tax shift towards more neutral taxes and smart environmental taxes;
Amendment 1 #
2016/2064(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
Amendment 9 #
2016/2064(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Strongly supports the ambition of the Commission to overcome the investment gap and strengthen the incentives in the private sector to invest in and boost the sustainable growth of the European economies; for this reason, however, firmly opposes the activities of the EFSI that undermine these goals and are not a solution but rather part of the problem;1a __________________ 1a As of July 2016, the EFSI approvals ensured 37% of its original goal of €315 billion in the new investments (289 approved transactions in total). Some say the existence of these investments is a success of its own, as they would not have existed without the fund. This statement is a mistake that indicates lack of economic understanding.
Amendment 10 #
2016/2064(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)
Paragraph 1 b (new)
Amendment 11 #
2016/2064(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 c (new)
Paragraph 1 c (new)
1c. Reminds that in principle, there are little differences between the EFSI and standard European funds; believes that the main difference is in the extent of support - while standard European funds finance most of the costs of the supported projects, the EFSI provides a loan for the part of the project; thus, EFSI can support more projects for less taxpayers' money but only in the cost of dead-weight loss, shifting of resources and moral hazard;
Amendment 12 #
2016/2064(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 d (new)
Paragraph 1 d (new)
1d. Acknowledges the dead-weight loss; reminds that EFSI supported financing of Normandy Dairy Production Facility and Polish milk powder factory while there is a general excess capacity in the diary production; reminds also that the same applies for the EFSI support of the wind farms while there are excess capacities for the electricity production in Europe; believes that EFSI must stop financing ordinary projects which deforms standard market competition; 1c __________________ 1cThe EIB declares that the EFSI “remains focused on the specific objective of addressing the market failure in risk- taking, which hinders the investment in Europe. In doing so, the EFSI will also increase the volume of high risk projects supported by the EIB Group.” The EFSI also finances a Slovak PPP project; a construction of approximately 27 km of the D4 motorway around Bratislava, which is to connect to the R7 expressway (outside the scope of EIB financing). Paradoxically, while the contribution to the transport capacity of the D4 remains controversial, the more necessary R7 will not receive an EFSI funding. Moreover, there is no reason to assume this D4 PPP project would not find sufficient funding without a help from the EFSI.
Amendment 13 #
2016/2064(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
Amendment 14 #
2016/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Takes note of the large investment gap in Europe, which the Commission estimates at a minimum of EUR 200-300 billion a year; , highlights in particular, against this backdrop, the market needs in Europe for high-risk financingthe creation of investment opportunities, for instance in the fields of R&D, energy and ICT; is concerned by the fact that the most recent data on national accounts do not indicate any surge in investment since the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) was launched, leading to risks of continued subdued growth and continuing high unemployment rates; stresses that closing this investment gap is key to reviving growth, fighting unemployment and attaining long-term EU policy objectives; calls, therefore, on the Member States to ensure that an accommodative investment environment is in place;
Amendment 20 #
2016/2064(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
Amendment 32 #
2016/2064(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Urges that moral hazard shall not be overlooked; stresses that even partial loses of the investments supported by EFSI can cause 100% loss of the European taxpayers money due to high level of leverage the EFSI uses; stresses also that taxpayers unwillingly bear the risks of the failed investments;
Amendment 34 #
2016/2064(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
Amendment 40 #
2016/2064(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Stresses that profitability of projects cannot be counted simply by looking at the cash flows; stresses that, in addition to adjustments for lost income from alternative use of the resources (e.g. what would happen if the resources were never taken from the hands of the taxpayers), the investment risk calculation must be considered as well; believes that, since risk is what seems to be one the main reasons for the lack of private investments in the EU, its inclusion can throw many EFSI projects into red numbers;4a __________________ 4a The profitability of the investments approved by the EFSI should not be compared to the situation where no other investments are made by the private sector. Instead, the profitability of the EFSI should be compared to an alternative scenario in which the public sector eliminates the investment uncertainty it created and which caused the investment gap in the first place: deficit public spending; failure of the regulatory role of the banking system; and bureaucratic, regulatory and tax burden it forced on private investors. These are the key issues that have not yet been addressed.
Amendment 41 #
2016/2064(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
Amendment 45 #
2016/2064(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Acknowledges that the most important effect of EFSI activities is shifting of resources as every euro the EFSI lends for the investments it supports is a euro that was taken from the hands of a private lender; stresses that, if a private entrepreneur makes an investment that EFSI is willing to support, he will not realize an investment that he could otherwise accomplish without the help from EFSI;5a __________________ 5aEvery investment inevitably carries a level of risk and therefore investing is a natural role for the private sector. When people invest their own capital, they carefully consider potential profits and losses of their investments as well as the credibility of the borrower. Risks (and thus both profits and losses) stay in private hands. If the EFSI applies high standards set by professional investors from the private sector, there will be no reason for its existence, as its role will already be fulfilled by the private sector. The very existence of the EFSI is therefore problematic: the EFSI uses public resources to incite investments that are too risky for private lenders to take, while the private sector and taxpayers bear the risks of failing EFSI investments.
Amendment 47 #
2016/2064(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
Amendment 52 #
2016/2064(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Underlines that the EFSI shifts the capital from the market-driven projects where they would be most effective to the projects driven by the EFSI bureaucrats where they are less effective; underlines that economy as a whole therefore loses;6a __________________ 6aThe EFSI is an entity that does not solve the causes of the investment gap, but rather shifts the risks that private lenders are not willing to take to all European taxpayers. The resources of the Public sector are solely those it has obtained in taxes from the Private sector. Every public euro used for the activities of the EFSI is therefore missed in the private sector, which makes the situation for the future of private investments even worse.
Amendment 53 #
2016/2064(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 b (new)
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6b. Acknowledges that EFSI enables avoiding fiscal rules; stresses that national contributions to EFSI are considered one-off measures, respectively a "relevant factor" in terms of assessing the deficit; as a result, stresses that several countries struggling with fiscal problems including the ones with public debt exceeding 60% GDP cap rule or 3% GDP deficit rule pledged billions of euros in contributions on EFSI projects;
Amendment 57 #
2016/2064(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
Amendment 63 #
2016/2064(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Recommends to reject the Commission proposal to extend the EFSI beyond 2018 and to stop providing any further loans from the EFSI.
Amendment 318 #
2016/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Stresses that, due to a very strong uptake reflecting the high market demand, the SME Window was further reinforced by EUR 500 million from the IIW Debt Portfolio under the existing legislative framework; notes further that, as of June 30th 2016, signed operations under the IIW reached only 9% of the total targeted volume; welcomes that, due to the flexibility of the EFSI Regulation, the additional financing was granted to benefit SMEs and small mid-caps; intends to monitor closely the allocation of the guarantee under the two windows;
Amendment 387 #
2016/2064(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 49
Paragraph 49
49. Acknowledges that EFSI alone - and on a limited scale- will probably not be able to close the investment gap in Europe, but that it nevertheless constitutes a central pillar of the EU’s investment plan and signals the EU’s determination to tackle this issue; calls for further proposals to be made on how to permanently boost investment in Europe; calls on the Commission to postpone its proposal for the extension of EFSI until an extensive impact assessment shows that EFSI is achieving its objectives and has positive macroeconomic effects;
Amendment 2 #
Amendment 3 #
2016/2063(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 3
Citation 3
- having regard to the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, in particular Article 15 and 21 thereof,
Amendment 29 #
2016/2063(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the inflation target is getting harder to reach owing to consolidation of demographic trECB's policy is based on the assumption that the inflation target can be controlled via money supply and interest rate while monetary developmendts and the full impact of trade globalisation on a high-unemployment European socisuggest that this might hold for capital markets but does not seem to have a current effect on goods marketys;
Amendment 54 #
2016/2063(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
Recital J a (new)
Ja. whereas in a monetary union monetary policy cannot be tailored to developments in particular countries;
Amendment 57 #
2016/2063(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J b (new)
Recital J b (new)
Jb. whereas the ECB's president has continued to stress the urgency of much- needed structural reforms in the Eurozone;
Amendment 59 #
2016/2063(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J c (new)
Recital J c (new)
Jc. whereas Article 123 TFEU and Article 21 of Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank prohibit the monetary financing of governments;
Amendment 68 #
2016/2063(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Stresses that the euro area continues to suffer from a high level of unemployment and excessive low inflation and that, in addition, the euro area is facing a very low level of productivity growth, which is the result of the lack of investment since the beginning of the crisis; acknowledges in this regard that some problems of the weaker euro area economies are due to the impossibility of a nominal depreciation in the Eurosystem; notes that the high level of public debt and the huge number of non- performing loans in the banking sector in some Member States are still fragmenting the euro area financial market, thus reducing room for manoeuvre to support the most fragile economies;
Amendment 81 #
2016/2063(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Acknowledges that, confronted with this very complex environment and the risks of a prolonged period of low inflationIs concerned that, the ECB was not within the terms of its mandate iwhen adopting extraordinary measures to lift inflation back up to the medium-term objective of 2 %; points out that the ECB bond-buying programmes violates at least the intent, if not the letter, of Article 123 TFEU; urges the ECB to refrain from assuming a political role and monetary financing government deficits; notes that, since the launching of the APP in March 2015, and owing to targeted long-term refinancing operation (TLTRO) programmes targeted at the real economy, financialng conditions have improved, which has promoted a recovery in lending to firms and households in the euro area slightly;
Amendment 93 #
2016/2063(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
Amendment 110 #
2016/2063(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Agrees with ECB President Mario Draghi that the singleConsiders that monetary policy canis not stimulate aggregate demand unless it is complemented by sound fiscal policies and ambitious structural reform programmes at Member State level; recalls that the main benefit of monetary policy is to safeguard price stability in order to guarantee a stable environment for investment; considers that monetary policy is not the appropriate tool to solve the structural problems of the European economythe appropriate tool to solve the structural problems of the European economy; Believes that non-standard monetary policy must not be used as a pretext for Member states to defer fiscal consolidation and structural reforms;
Amendment 129 #
2016/2063(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Underlines that structural reforms in the economy and the labour market should also fully take into account the demographic trends in Europe, in order to create incentives for a more balanced demographic structure that would make it easier to maintain an inflation target of around 2 %; urges the ECB to contribute to creating conditions incentivising Member States to implement ambitious structural reforms to enhance flexibility and competition in product and labour markets;
Amendment 136 #
2016/2063(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Notes, however, that even though the impactsize of unconventional monetary policy measures has been significant, inflation is not expected to converge to the 2 % medium-term objective at the 2017 horizon; notes that the current weak recovery in bank and market lending has not whollyyet produced the expectedany major effect on the existing investment gap in the euro area so far;
Amendment 146 #
2016/2063(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Deplores the existing, albeit gradually decreasing, gaps between the financing rates granted to SMEs and those granted to bigger companies, between lending rates on small and large loans, and between credit conditions for SMEs located in different euro area countries, but recognises the limits of what monetary policy can achieve in this respect; stresses that the lack of trust and transparency in the banking system as well as the persistent need for balance sheet adjustments affect the availability of credit for SMEs in some Member States and dampens economic activity;
Amendment 185 #
2016/2063(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Recognises the existence of distributional consequences of the ECB policies, which can be perceived astend to increasinge inequalities, but believes that the ECB policies are the right ones to lower the costs of credit for citizens and SMEs and enhance employment in the euro areay;
Amendment 196 #
2016/2063(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Stresses the prerequisites defined by the Court of Justice that have to be met by any purchase of government bonds of Member States of the Euro zone on the secondary market by the European System of Central Banks ("ESCB"): purchases are not announced, the volume of the purchases is limited from the outset, there is a minimum period between the issue of the government bonds and their purchase by the ESCB that is defined from the outset and prevents the issuing conditions from being distorted, the ESCB purchases only government bonds of Member States that have bond market access enabling the funding of such bonds, purchased bonds are only in exceptional cases held until maturity and purchases are restricted or ceased and purchased bonds are remarketed should continuing the intervention become unnecessary;
Amendment 223 #
2016/2063(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Recalls that the independence of the ECB for the conduct of monetary policy, as enshrined in the Treaties, is crucial to the objective of safeguarding price stability; asks all governments to avoid statements questioning the role played by the institution within its mandate;
Amendment 236 #
2016/2063(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Asks the European Central Bank to specifically identify and measure the effects of the central bank's actions throughout the economy;
Amendment 241 #
2016/2063(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16b. Asks the European Central Bank to better explain to the public where and how its actions affect the economies of the member states, particularly in view of recent unorthodox monetary policy measures;
Amendment 246 #
2016/2063(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 c (new)
Paragraph 16 c (new)
16c. Notes that the ECB's policy to address financial stability risks solely with macro prudential tools is in contradiction with the BIS' view that macro prudential policy is a complement and not a substitute to monetary policy;
Amendment 43 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas the Commission is the Guardian of the Treaties and must ensure a level playing field for all companies in the single market; whereas tax avoidance was often possible by silent collusion between multinational companies and government authorities in some Member States, whereas such collusion must be suspected to be illegal state aid, whereas in the 25 years between 1991 and 2015 the Commission concluded only 65 state aid cases; whereas the tax ruling practice in some Member States suggests that the number of actual tax-related state aid cases is much higher; whereas the procedure applied and selection criteria chosen by the Commission to start in- depth investigation of a few cases suspected of illegal state aid in the form of tax rulings is not transparent and possibly arbitrary;
Amendment 46 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas supposedly one third of all corporate investments are channelled through offshore financial constructions;
Amendment 52 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas convergence of tax policies should also be accompanied by greater controls and more investigations of harmful tax practices; whereas the Commission has started new formal investigations regarding tax treatment of MNEs; whereas a number of investigations by the Commission in matters of state aid were still ongoing at the time of adoption of this report; whereas certain Member States have initiated recovery procedures against some MNEs; whereas the Commission should not only investigate a limited number of dubious tax treatments but consider in a non-selective and unbiased way all cases suspected to be illegal state aid by means of preferential tax treatments;
Amendment 70 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas some specific tax jurisdictions actively contribute to designing aggressive tax policies on behalf of MNEs who thereby avoid taxation; whereas the corporate tax rate in some jurisdictions is close or equal to zero per cent; whereas the complexity of different tax systems create a lack of transparency which is globally harmful; whereas also on the national level corporate tax systems often suffer from a lack of transparency;
Amendment 85 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas some specific tax jurisdictions are not willingslow to reform their tax systems, despite the ongoing global initiatives and despite the fact that some of them are involved in the work of the OECD;
Amendment 99 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas some financial institutions have played a role as intermediaries in setting up complex legal structures leading to aggressive tax planning schemes used by MNEs, as evidenced in ‘LuxLeaks’ and the ‘Panama Papers’; whereas legal loopholes and lack of coordination, cooperation and transparency between countries create an environment that facilitates tax evasion; whereas banks could have played a positive role in combating the erosion of national tax bases by, for instance, using the means of exchange of information at their disposal in a more cooperative spirit;
Amendment 235 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Calls on the Commission to better explain the criteria by which a very limited number of suspicious tax ruling cases have been selected for review by the Commission, reiterates its concern that tax rulings could be used to give selective benefits to companies and distort competition, stresses that the Commission must ensure an equal playing field between MNEs and SMEs also in retrospect;
Amendment 242 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Strongly emphasises that the work of whistleblowers is crucial for revealing scandals of tax evasion and avoidance, and that, therefore, protection for whistleblowers needs to be legally guaranteed and strengthened EU-wide; notes that the European Court of Human Rights and the Council of Europe have undertaken work on this issue; considers that courts and Member States should ensure the protection of legitimate business secrets while in no way hindering, hampering or stifling the capacity of whistleblowers and journalists to document and reveal illegal, wrongful and harmful practices wto the re this is clearly and overwhelmingly in the public interestlevant authority, and, if the relevant authority does not take appropriate action, to the general public; regrets that the Commission has no plans for prompt action on the matter;
Amendment 248 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. NotWelcomes that the Commission has launched a consultation on dispute settlement mechanisms to avoid double taxation;
Amendment 266 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Calls on the Commission to come up as soon as possible withpropose a method, possibly involving decisions by an independent, scientific body, for setting up a common Union list of uncooperative jurisdictions (i.e. a ‘blacklist of tax havens’), based on sound and objective criteria, including full implementation of OECD recommendations, BEPS actions and Automatic Exchange of Information standards, and welcomes the Commission’s intention to reach an agreement on such a list within the next six months; calls on the Member States to endorse that agreementsks Member States to endorse the method without delay; calls on the Union to set up a blacklist as soon as the method has been accepted by a qualified majority of Member States, preferably by the end of 2016;
Amendment 286 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Calls for a concrete Union regulatory framework for sanctions against the blacklisted non-cooperative jurisdictions, including, but not limited to, the possibility of reviewing and, in the last resort, suspending free trade agreements and prohibiting access to Union funds; calls for the sanctions also to apply to companies, banks, and accountancy and law firms, and to tax advisers proven to be involved within illegal activities in those jurisdictions;
Amendment 295 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Calls on the Member States to renegotiate their bilateral tax treaties with third countries in order to introduce anti- abuse clauses and thus prevent ‘treaty shopping’; stresses furthermore thatthat this renegotiation is in the best interest of each Member State so that there is no reason to assume this process wcould be expedited considerablhandled in a more expeditious way if the Commission were mandated by Member States to negotiate such tax treaties on behalf of the Unionto act on their behalf;
Amendment 305 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Recommends introducing an EU- wide withholding tax, in order to ensure that all profits generated within the Union are taxed at least oncesubject to tax before leaving it; notes that such a proposal should include a refund system to prevent doublethis can be accomplished by refining national corporate and capital gains taxation laws;
Amendment 323 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
Amendment 332 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
Amendment 342 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Observes that some national tax administrations, probably with the silent consent of their political leadership, have actively designed, offered or approved tax planning schemes for multinational enterprises;
Amendment 348 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22a. Is concerned about the lack of transparency and adequate documentation within national tax administrations pertaining to the competitive effects of transfer price decisions, patent box settings, tax rulings and other elements of discretionary corporate taxation;
Amendment 370 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Stresses the need for concrete sanctions, including the possibility of revoking business licences for professionals and companies proved to be involved in designing, advising on the use of, or utilising illegal aggressive tax planning and evasion schemes; requests that the Commission explore the feasibility of introducing proportional financial liability for tax advisers engaged in unlawful tax practices;
Amendment 371 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
Amendment 393 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Urges the Commission to propose as soon as possible a clear legal framework to guarantee the effective protection of whistleblowers, as well as of journalists and other persons connected with the press who aid and facilitate them; calls on the Member States to revise their current legislation on the protection of whistleblowers with a view to preventing prosecution in such cascases in which whistleblowers have acted in nothing but the public interest;
Amendment 430 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
Amendment 461 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
38. Calls for the creation of a new Union Tax Policy Coherence and Coordination Centre to guarantee the proper and coherent functioning of the single market and the implementation of international standards; believes that this new body should be in charge of monitoring Member States’ tax policies at Union level, of ensuring that no new harmful tax measures are implemented by Member States, of monitoring compliance of Member States with the common Union list of uncooperative jurisdictions, of ensuring and fostering cooperation between national tax administrations (e.g. training and exchange of best practices), and tof initiatinge academic programmes in the field; believes that by doing so this Centreode of Conduct Group could help prevent new tax loopholes emerging thanks to uncoordinated policy initiatives between Member States, and counteract tax practices and standards that would upset, obstruct or interfere in the proper functioning and rationale of the single market; considers that the Centre could benefit from the pooling of expertise at Union and national level, so as to reduce the burden on the taxpayer;
Amendment 499 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45
Paragraph 45
Amendment 510 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 46
Paragraph 46
46. Stresses the need for a comprehensive EU/US approach on the implementation of OECD standards and on beneficial ownership; stresses furthermore that good governance clauses and the full BEPS action plan should be included emphasizes that unilateral steps by the EU beyond BEPS may have detrimental effects on future US willingness to agree on bi- or multilateral measures as the US might be frustrated with seeing the Transatlantic Trade Investment Partnership (TTIP) in order to ensure a level playing field,EU just acting as it pleases, regrets that this might have negative repercussions on the aim of createing more value for society as a whole and combating tax fraud and avoidance;
Amendment 526 #
2016/2038(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 48
Paragraph 48
48. Regrets deeply that the timeframe for the present report has not allowed for a thorough examination of the ‘Panama Papers’ case; stresses the urgent need for a full and proper follow-up by Parliament in this regard; underlines the immense political importance of analysing the modus operandi of theax authorities, companies and private citizens involved with the Panama papers scandal with a view to tackling legislative loopholes;
Amendment 25 #
2016/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas VAT is a tax on consumption that should only be levied on the final consumer so as to achieve a significant reduction in administrative and financial costs along the supply chain and reduce the possibility ofcharging VAT along the supply chain involves significant administrative and financial costs, whereas VAT is ultimately borne by the final consumer, whereas directly charging consumers may greatly reduce administrative and financial costs and may reduce the volume of VAT-related fraud;
Amendment 38 #
2016/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Takes the view that the expert advice on which the Commission’'s proposals for the programme of action are based contains a number of valuable indicators forrecommendations; emphasizes that the Commission's list of proposals aimed at achieving a robust, simple and fraud- proof VAT system is not exhaustive;
Amendment 51 #
2016/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Takes the view that the Commission should examine all possible options equally without prejudging the outcome and should include them in the legislative processpropose the best options to combat fraud even if these require a change in the VAT directive and may be met with resistance in the Council;
Amendment 53 #
2016/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Notes that, over the last 23 years, the necessary VAT reform calls for concerted efforts; notes theat unanimity requirementous approval in the Council has greatly hampered the necessary VAT reforms and that concerted efforts requires a VAT reform sufficiently flexible to accommodate the specific needs of each country, insists that each country be free to charge needed to reach agreement on a definitive VAT systemVAT in the way which best fits its needs so long as this does not affect the functioning of the common market;
Amendment 57 #
2016/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Notes that the country-of- destination principle is compatible with both a standard-charge and a reverse- charge system of VAT collection, takes the view that the functioning of the common market is not adversely affected if Member States freely opt for one or the other way to charge VAT;
Amendment 106 #
2016/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. NotEmphasizes that the current plethora of VAT rates causes greatross-country diversity of VAT rates is of little concern if the country-of-destination principle is consistently applied, notes that different VAT rates for different product categories within the same country distort the efficient use of resources in the common market and cause information costs and uncertainty for companies involved in cross-border trading;
Amendment 129 #
2016/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Takes the view that the complete abolition of minimum tax rates as an alternative, as advocated by the Commission, might cause considerable distortions of competition and problemswould not affect the functioning of the common market inf the single market and can only be sancountry-of-destination principle were consistently applied; takes the view that the introductioned i of the reverse charge procedure, isf introduced forended by a Member State, should be at all levels and types of VAT and not only for individual sectors which are particularly susceptible to fraud;
Amendment 134 #
2016/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
Amendment 149 #
2016/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Takes the view that the present complicated system could be considerably simplified if the goods and services eligible for reduced taxnumber of exemptions from the regular VAT rates were determined jointly at EU levelould be greatly reduced;
Amendment 216 #
2016/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25 a (new)
Paragraph 25 a (new)
25a. Welcomes the Commission's intention to lift the VAT-exemption for small quantities of goods imported from third countries;
Amendment 236 #
2016/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Calls for a treaty change so that the ordinary legislative procedure, with co-decision by Parliament and the Council, can be introduced in the context of the VAT DirectiveEmphasizes that tax legislation is in the exclusive competence of the Member States, emphasizes that a group of at least nine Member States may engage in enhanced cooperation according to Article 329 (1) TFEU, calls on the Commission to support proposals of enhanced cooperation which aim at combatting fraud and reducing administrative burdens in terms of VAT;
Amendment 33 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
Recital 1
(1) Money laundering and the associated financing of terrorism and organised crime remain significant problems at the Union level, thus damaging the integrity, stability and reputation of the financial sector and threatening the internal security and the internal market of the Union. In order to tackle those growing problems and also reinforce the application of Directive 2015/849/EU34 , this Directive aims to tackle money laundering by means of criminal law, allowing for better cross- border cooperation between competent authorities. _________________ 34 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p.73).
Amendment 40 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 3
Recital 3
(3) Union action should continue to take particular account of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations and instruments of other international bodies active in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. The relevant Union legal acts should, where appropriate, be further aligned with the International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation adopted by the FATF in February 2012 (the ‘revised FATF Recommendations’). As a signatory to the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS No. 198), the Union should transpose without delay the requirements of that Convention into its legal order.
Amendment 42 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 5
Recital 5
(5) The definition of criminal activities which constitute predicate offences for money laundering should be sufficiently uniform in all the Member States. Member States should apply the crime of money laundering to all offences that are punishable with imprisonment of a level defined in this Directive. To the extent that the application of these penalties thresholds does not already do so, Member States should include a range of offences within each of the categories designated by the FATF. Where categories of offences, such as terrorism or environmental crimes, are set out in Union law, this Directive refers to such legislation. This ensures that the laundering of the proceeds of the financing of terrorism and wildlife trafficking are punishable in the Member States. Any kind of punishable involvement in the commission of a predicate offence or money laundering activity, such as participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling, should be considered as a criminal activity for the purposes of this Directive. In cases where Union law allows Member States to provide for other sanctions than criminal sanctions, this Directive should not require Member States to establish those cases as predicate offences for the purposes of this Directive.
Amendment 50 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 8
Recital 8
(8) Where money laundering activity does not simply amount to the mere possession or use, but also involves the transfer or the concealing and disguise of property through the financial system and results in further damage than that already caused by the predicate offence, such as damaging the integrity of the financial system, that activity should be punished separately. Member States should thus ensure that such conduct, including cases of acquisition, mere possession and use, is also punishable when committed by the perpetrator of the criminal activity that generated that property (so-called self- laundering).
Amendment 51 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
Recital 9
(9) In order for money laundering to be an effective tool against organised crime, it should noFor the effective countering of money laundering by criminal law measures, a conviction should be possible without being necessary to identify the specifics of the crime that generated the property, the type of crime that generated the property, let alone require a prior or simultaneous conviction for that crime. Prosecutions for money laundering should also not be impeded by the mere fact that the predicate offence was committed in another Member State or third country, provided it is a criminal offence in that Member State or third country. Member States may establish as a prerequisite the fact that the predicate offence would have been a crime in its national law, had it been committed therecrime. Moreover, Member States should take the necessary measures to ensure that the lawful origin of property, wealth and assets is demonstrated by the investigated person in every case involving large amounts of money of unclear origin, suspicious acquisitions or bank transactions, money transfer schemes such as hawala or any other potential proceeds of crime. Prosecutions for money laundering should also not be impeded by the mere fact that the predicate offence was committed in another Member State or third country, or that the person being investigated comes from a Member State where she/he is protected by immunity from prosecution, arrest and detention (such as politically exposed persons and magistrates, inter alia).
Amendment 61 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) This Directive aims to criminalise money laundering when committed intentionally. Intention and knowledge may be inferred from objective, factual circumstances. As this Directive provides for minimum rules, Member States are free to adopt or maintain more stringent criminal law rules for money laundering. Member States may, for example,should also provide that money laundering committed recklessly or by serious negligence constitutes a criminal offence.
Amendment 68 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) In order to deter money laundering throughout the Union, Member States should lay down minimum types and levels of penalties when the criminal offences defined in this Directive are committed. Where the offence is committed within a criminal organisation within the meaning of Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA37 8 or where the perpetrator abused their professional position to enable money laundering or when the perpetrator is a politically exposed person, Member States should provide for aggravating circumstances in accordance with the applicable rules established by their legal systems. _________________ 37 Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against organised crime, (OJ L 300, 11.11.2008, p. 42)
Amendment 70 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 12
Recital 12
(12) Given the mobility of perpetrators and proceeds stemming from criminal activities, as well as the complex cross- border investigations required to combat money laundering, all Member States should establish their jurisdiction in order to enable the competent authorities to investigate and prosecute such activities. Member States should thereby ensure that their jurisdiction includes situations where an offence is committed by means of information and communication technology from their territory, whether or not based in their territory. To ensure the success of investigations and the prosecution of money laundering offences, those responsible for investigating or prosecuting such offences should make use of effective and improved investigative tools, such as those used in combating organized crime or other serious crimes. These tools should be adapted to the latest evolutions in the field of cybercrime and money laundering, including by using bitcoins, cryptocurrencies and ransomeware attacks.
Amendment 108 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing at the time of receipt or at the time of use in economic and financial activities, that such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such an activity.
Amendment 121 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point b
Article 3 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) the identity of the perpetrator of the criminal activity, the type of crime that generated the property or other circumstances relating to that criminal activity;
Amendment 129 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 3
Article 3 – paragraph 3
3. The offences referred to in points (a) and (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 shall also apply to persons who committed or participated in the criminal activity from which the property was derived.
Amendment 130 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 3 a (new)
Article 3 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Each Member State shall ensure that the conduct referred to in paragraph 1 shall be a punishable laundering offence in cases where the offender: a) suspected that the property was proceeds; b) ought to have assumed that the property was proceeds.
Amendment 131 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 3 b (new)
Article 3 – paragraph 3 b (new)
3b. Each Member State shall ensure that the conduct referred to in paragraph 1 shall be subject to prosecution and conviction even if the suspected person has been granted immunity from prosecution, arrest and detention in her/his country of origin or within the European institutions.
Amendment 132 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1
Article 4 – paragraph 1
Each Member State shall ensure that inciting, aiding and abetting and attemptingparticipation in, inciting, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, counselling and facilitating in any way an offence referred to in Article 3 shall be punishable.
Amendment 138 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 2
Article 5 – paragraph 2
2. Each Member State shall ensure that the offences referred to in Article 3 shall be punishable by a maxinimum term of imprisonment of at least four years, at least in serious casesthree years, particularly where aggravating circumstances described in Article 6 are applicable.
Amendment 144 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Amendment 153 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(aa) the offender is a politically exposed person in the sense of Directive 2015/849 or the case involves corruption of elected officials; or
Amendment 154 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point a b (new)
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point a b (new)
(ab) the criminal modus operandi involves the use of bearer shares, offshore jurisdictions, shell companies, illegal transfers of funds through systems such as Hawala, cash couriers, smurfing activities or non-governmental organisations; or
Amendment 155 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point a c (new)
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point a c (new)
(ac) the suspect operates as a professional money launderer for two or more different criminal groups; or
Amendment 156 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point a d (new)
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point a d (new)
(ad) the property or money being laundered are a result of the offences defined by Directive 2017/541 or of illicit arms trafficking; or
Amendment 166 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 7 – paragraph 2
Article 7 – paragraph 2
2. Member States shall ensure that legal persons can be held liable where the serious negligence, lack of supervision or control by a person referred to in paragraph 1 has made possible the commission of any of the offences referred to in Articles 3 and 4 for the benefit of that legal person by a person under its authority.
Amendment 167 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 7 – paragraph 3
Article 7 – paragraph 3
3. Liability of legal persons under paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not exclude criminal proceedings against natural persons who are incite the commission of or arers, conspirators, perpetrators of , or are accessories (including facilitators or counsellors) to any of the offences referred to in Articles 3 and 4.
Amendment 171 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 1 a (new)
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point 1 a (new)
(1a) the exclusion of that legal person from entitlement to European Union funds and the permanent prohibition for that legal person to enter into contracts with public authorities;
Amendment 183 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 9 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 9 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. When an offence referred to in Articles 3 and 4 falls within the jurisdiction of more than one Member State and when any of the Member States concerned can validly prosecute on the basis of the same facts, the Member States concerned shall cooperate in order to decide which of them will prosecute the offender, with the aim of centralising proceedings in a single Member State. The following factors shall be taken into account, by order of priority: a) the territory of the Member State where the offence was committed; b) the nationality or residency of the offender; c) the country of origin of the victims; d) the territory where the offender was found. Member States may have recourse to Eurojust in order to facilitate cooperation between their judicial authorities and the coordination of their actions.
Amendment 190 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 10 – title
Article 10 – title
Investigative tools and confiscation measures
Amendment 193 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 10 – paragraph 1
Article 10 – paragraph 1
1a. Each Member State shall ensure that specific training and effective investigative tools, such as those used in countering organised crime or other serious crimes are available to persons, units or services responsible for investigating or prosecuting the offences referred to in Articles 3 and 4. Such tools and training need to be adapted to the latest evolutions in the field of cybercrime and money laundering, including by using bitcoins, cryptocurrencies and ransomeware attacks. 1b. Each Member State shall ensure that their competent authorities freeze or confiscate, as appropriate, in accordance with Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, the property derived from and the instrumentalities used in committing or attempting to commit any of the offences referred to in this Directive. The provisions of Paragraph 2 apply irrespective of the fact that a natural or a legal person has committed the laundering of proceeds or the predicate offence.
Amendment 201 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 10 a (new)
Article 10 a (new)
Amendment 203 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by [124 months after adoption] at the latest. They shall immediately communicate the text of those provisions to the Commission.
Amendment 208 #
2016/0414(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 13 – paragraph 1
Article 13 – paragraph 1
The Commission shall, by [124 months after the deadline for implementation of this Directive], submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council, assessing the extent to which the Member States have taken the necessary measures to comply with this Directive.
Amendment 80 #
2016/0413(COD)
Draft legislative resolution
Citation 2
Citation 2
– having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 33 and 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C8- 0001/2017),
Amendment 82 #
2016/0413(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Citation 1
Citation 1
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 33 and 114 thereof,
Amendment 83 #
2016/0413(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) The re-introduction into the economy of illicit proceeds and the diversion of money to finance illicit activities create distortions and unfair competitive disadvantages to law-abiding citizens and companies, and are therefore a threat to the functioning of the internal market. Moreover, it fosters criminal and terrorist activities which endanger the security of Union citizens. Accordingly, the Union has taken action to protect itself.
Amendment 101 #
2016/0413(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
Recital 15
(15) Prepaid cards are non-nominal cards storing or providing access to monetary value or funds which can be used for payment transactions, for acquiring goods or services or for redemption of currency and which are not linked to a bank account. They are widely used for a variety of legitimate purposes and some of these instruments also present a clear social interest. As such prepaid cards are easily transferrable and can be used to transfer considerable value across external borders. It is therefore necessary to include certain types of prepaid cards in the definition of cash, in particular if they can be bought without customer due diligence procedures (“anonymous prepaid cards”). This will allow for the possibility to extend the measures to certain types of prepaid cards if the evidence justifies it and with due regard to proportionality and practical enforceability.
Amendment 106 #
2016/0413(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
Recital 16
(16) For the prevention of money laundering and the financing of terrorism, an obligation to declare should be imposed on natural persons entering or leaving the Union. In order not to restrict free movement unduly or overburden citizens and authorities with administrative formalities, the obligation should be subject to a threshold of EUR 10 000 or its equivalent in if the total value of cash they carry in any currency, commodities used as a highly liquid store of value, bearer- negotiable instruments, and anonymous pre-paid cards' worth or o valued at their currencies. Itmaximum store of money exceeds a threshold of EUR 10 000. The obligation to declare should apply to natural persons carrying such amounts on their person, in their luggage or in the conveyance in which they cross the external border. They should be required to make the cash available to the competent authorities for control. In order not to restrict free movement unduly or overburden innocent citizens and authorities with administrative formalities, natural persons carrying less such cash should not be obliged to submit a declaration.
Amendment 108 #
2016/0413(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
Recital 17
(17) As regards movements of cash that is not accompanied by its owner, sender, intended recipient or their representative, such as cash entering or leaving the Union in postal packages, courier shipments, unaccompanied luggage or containerised cargo, the competent authorities at the external border should have the power to require the sender or the recipient or their representative to make a disclosure declaration. Such disclosure should cover a number of elements, such as the origin, destination, economic provenance and intended use of the funds, which are not covered by the usual documentation submitted to customs, such as shipping documents and customs declarations. This will allow the competent authorities to carry out risk analysis and concentrate their efforts on those shipments which they deem to present the highest risk, while not imposing systematic additional formalities. The disclosure obligation should be subject to a threshold identical tosignificantly lower than that for cash carried by natural persons.
Amendment 128 #
2016/0413(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29
Recital 29
(29) In order to encourage compliance and deter circumvention, Member States should introduce penalties for non- compliance with the obligations to declare or disclose. The penalties should apply only to the failure to declare or disclose under this Regulation and should not take into account the criminal activity potentially associated with the cash, which may be the object of further investigation and measures falling outside the scope of this Regulation. They should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, and not go beyond what is required to encourage compliance. Member States should agree on a uniform set of penalties to prevent the flow of illicit cash using the points of entry with the lowest penalties for noncompliance.
Amendment 146 #
2016/0413(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point a – indent 4
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point a – indent 4
- certain types of prepaid cards referred to in Annex I;
Amendment 154 #
2016/0413(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point f
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point f
(f) 'prepaid card' means a non-nominal card storing or providing access to monetary value or funds which can be used for payment transactions, for acquiring goods or services or for redemption of currency and which is not linked to a bank account;
Amendment 169 #
2016/0413(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1
Article 4 – paragraph 1
1. Where unaccompanied cash of a value of EUR 102 000 or more is entering or leaving the Union, the competent authorities of the Member State through which the cash is entering or leaving may, following a risk analysis, require the sender or the recipient or their representative to make a disclosure declaration. The obligation to declare shall not be deemed to be fulfilled if the information provided is incorrect or incomplete or the cash is not made available for control.
Amendment 220 #
2016/0413(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 4 a (new)
Article 12 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. The period of retention may be extended once with another period which shall not exceed five additional years if - after they have carried out a thorough assessment of the necessity and proportionality of such further retention and consider it to be justified for the fulfilment of their tasks with respect to the fight against money laundering or terrorist financing, the Financial Intelligence Unit determines that further retention is required or; - after they have carried out a thorough assessment of the necessity and proportionality of such further retention and consider it to be justified for the fulfilment of their tasks with respect to providing effective controls as regards the obligation to declare laid down under this Regulation, competent authorities determine that further retention is required.
Amendment 225 #
2016/0413(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 1
Article 13 – paragraph 1
Each Member State shall introduce penalties to apply in the event of failure to comply with the obligation to declare laid down in Articles 3 and 4. Such penalties shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Member States shall aim at introducing a uniform set of penalties across the Union.
Amendment 262 #
2016/0413(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Annex I – point 3
Annex I – point 3
3. The following prepaid cards shall be considered cash in accordance with Article 2(1)(a)(iv): anonymous prepaid cards which can be bought without customer due diligence procedures (indication of name, address and date of birth).
Amendment 25 #
2016/0406(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 4
Recital 4
(4) In order to limit the risk of fraud shifting between Member States, all Member States that fulfil certain criteria as regards their fraud level, in particular in relation to carousel fraud, and who are able to establish that other control measures are not sufficient to combat that fraud,which would find this useful should be allowed to use a GRCM.
Amendment 26 #
2016/0406(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 5
Recital 5
(5) In addition, also bordering Member States that encounter a serious risk of shift of fraud to their territory, because of the authorisation of that mechanism in another Member State, should be allowed to use the GRCM, where other control measures would be insufficient to combat that risk of fraud.
Amendment 27 #
2016/0406(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
Recital 9
Amendment 28 #
2016/0406(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) Member States choosing to apply the GRCM should requestnotify the Commission to authorise the application of the GRCM and provide relevant information in order to enable the Commission to assess that requestand provide relevant information. Where necessary, the Commission should be able to request additional information.
Amendment 29 #
2016/0406(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
Recital 11
Amendment 31 #
2016/0406(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Directive 2006/112/EC
Article 199 c
Article 199 c
Until 30 June 20228 a Member State may, as a Generalised Reverse Charge Mechanism (GRCM), provide that the person liable for payment of VAT is the taxable person to whom supplies of goods and services are made above a threshold of EUR 10 000 per invoice, by derogation from Article 193.
Amendment 32 #
2016/0406(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Directive 2006/112/EC
Article 199 c
Article 199 c
Amendment 34 #
2016/0406(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Directive 2006/112/EC
Article 199 c
Article 199 c
Amendment 35 #
2016/0406(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Directive 2006/112/EC
Article 199 c
Article 199 c
Amendment 36 #
2016/0406(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Directive 2006/112/EC
Article 199 c
Article 199 c
4. Member States wishing to apply the GRCM shall submit a request tonotify the Commission and provide the following information:
Amendment 37 #
2016/0406(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Directive 2006/112/EC
Article 199 c
Article 199 c
Amendment 38 #
2016/0406(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Directive 2006/112/EC
Article 199 c
Article 199 c
Amendment 39 #
2016/0406(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Directive 2006/112/EC
Article 199 c
Article 199 c
Amendment 40 #
2016/0406(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Directive 2006/112/EC
Article 199 c
Article 199 c
Amendment 41 #
2016/0406(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Directive 2006/112/EC
Article 199 c
Article 199 c
Member States not applying the mechanism shallmay submit an interim report to the Commission as regards the impact in its territory of other Member States applying the GRCM no later than 30 June 2019, insofar the GRCM will have been applied for at least one year in one Member State by that date.
Amendment 42 #
2016/0406(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1
Directive 2006/112/EC
Article 199 c
Article 199 c
If at least one Member State applies the GRCM, Member States not applying the mechanism shallmay submit a final report to the Commission as regards the impact in its territory of other Member States having applied the GRCM no later than 30 September 20228.
Amendment 17 #
2016/0371(CNS)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point b Regulation (EU) No 904/2010
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point b Regulation (EU) No 904/2010
The provisions of this Section shall apply from 1 January 2021. Member States shall exchange all information referred to in Subsection 2 without delay, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
Amendment 25 #
2016/0370(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 (new)
Directive 2006/112/EC
Article 28 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 28 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Where a taxable person acting in his own name but on behalf of another person takes part in a distance sale of goods imported from third countries or territories in consignment of an intrinsic value of less than EUR 150, or the equivalent in national currency, including cases where a telecommunications network, an interface or a portal is used for that purpose, that taxable person shall be deemed to have received and supplied those services themselves.
Amendment 28 #
2016/0370(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Directive 2006/112/EC
Article 58 – paragraph 2 – point a
Article 58 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the supplier is established or, in the absence of an establishment, has his permanent address or usually resides in only one Member State; and
Amendment 29 #
2016/0370(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Directive 2006/112/EC
Article 58 – paragraph 2 – point b
Article 58 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) services are provided to customers located in any Member State other than the Member State referred to in point (a); and
Amendment 31 #
2016/0370(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Directive 2006/112/EC
Article 58 – paragraph 2 – point c
Article 58 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) the total value, exclusive of VAT, of such supplies does not in the current calendar year exceed EUR 1035 000, or the equivalent in national currency, and did not do so in the course of the preceding calendar year.
Amendment 35 #
2016/0370(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Directive 2006/112/EC
Title V – Chapter 3 a – Article 59 c – paragraph 1 – point c
Title V – Chapter 3 a – Article 59 c – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) the total value, exclusive of VAT, of the supplies covered by these provisions does not in the current calendar year exceed EUR 1035 000, or the equivalent in national currency, nor did it do so in the course of the preceding calendar year.
Amendment 43 #
2016/0370(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 30
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 30
Directive 2006/112/EC
Title XII – Chapter 7 – Article 369 y – paragraph 1
Title XII – Chapter 7 – Article 369 y – paragraph 1
Where the person for whom the imported goods in consignments of an intrinsic value not exceeding EUR 150 are destined does not opt for the applicaspecial scheme referred to in Section 4 of the standard arrangements forChapter 6 is not used for the importation of goods, including for the application of a reduced VAT rate in accordance with Article 94(2) consignments of an intrinsic value not exceeding EUR 150, the Member State of importation shall permit the person presenting the goods to customs on behalf of the person for whom the goods are destined within the territory of the Community to make use of special arrangements for declaration and payment of import VAT in respect of goods for which the dispatch or transport ends in that Member State.
Amendment 81 #
2016/0337(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
Recital 1
(1) Companies which seek to do business across frontiers within the Union encounter serious obstacles and market distortions owing to the existence and interaction of 28 disparate corporate tax systems. Furthermore, tax planning structures have become ever-more sophisticated over time, as they develop across various jurisdictions and effectively take advantage of the technicalities of a tax system or of mismatches between two or more tax systems for the purpose of reducing the tax liability of companies. Although those situations highlight shortcomings that are completely different in nature, they both create obstacles which impede the proper functioning of the internal market. Action to rectify those problems should therefore address both types of market deficiencies.
Amendment 113 #
2016/0337(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 4
Recital 4
(4) Considering the need to act swiftly in order to ensure a proper functioning of the internal market by making it, on the one hand, friendlier to trade and investment and, on the other hand, more resilient to tax avoidance schemes, it is necessaryuseful to divide the ambitious CCCTB initiative into two separate proposals. At a first stage, rules on a common corporate tax base should be enacted, before addressing, at a second stage, the issue of consolidation.
Amendment 122 #
2016/0337(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 5
Recital 5
(5) Many aggressive tax planning structures tend to feature in a cross-border context, which implies that the participating groups of companies possess a minimum of resources. On this premise, for reasons of proportionality, the rules on a common base should be mandatory only for companies which belong to a group of a substantial size. For that purpose, a size- related threshold should be fixed on the basis of the total consolidated revenue of a group which files consolidated financial statements. Since this Directive aims at a new standard for corporate taxation for all business in Europe, no more than five years after implementation and conditional on a positive assessment of what has been achieved, the threshold should be lowered to zero. In addition, to ensure coherence between the two steps of the CCCTB initiative, the rules on a common base should be mandatory for companies which would be considered as a group should the full initiative materialise. In order to better serve the aim of facilitating trade and investment in the internal market, the rules on a common corporate tax base should also be available, as an option, to companies which do not meet those criteria.
Amendment 165 #
2016/0337(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 13
Recital 13
Amendment 182 #
2016/0337(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 19
Recital 19
(19) In order to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of this Directive, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission with respect of (i) taking into account changes to the laws of Member States concerning the company forms and corporate taxes and amend Annexes I and II accordingly; (ii) laying down additional definitions; (iii) enacting detailed rules against tax avoidance in a number of specified fields relevant to the allowance for growth and investment ; (iv) defining the concepts of legal and economic ownership of leased assets in more detail; (viii) calculating the capital and interest elements of lease payments and the depreciation base of leased assets; and (viv) defining more precisely the categories of fixed assets subject to depreciation. It is of particular importance that the Commission carry out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level. The Commission, when preparing and drawing up delegated acts, should ensure a simultaneous, timely and appropriate transmission of relevant documents to the European Parliament and the Council.
Amendment 205 #
2016/0337(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) it belongs to a consolidated group for financial accounting purposes with a total consolidated group revenue that exceeded EUR 750 000 000 during the financial year preceding the relevant financial year; the total consolidated group revenue of EUR 750 000 000 shall be lowered to zero over a time period of ten years;
Amendment 243 #
2016/0337(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. A taxpayer shall be considered to have a permanent establishment in a Member State other than the Member State in which it is resident for tax purposes when it has a fixed place in that other Member State through which it carries on its business, wholly or partly, including in particular:
Amendment 269 #
2016/0337(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 9 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
Article 9 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
Amendment 344 #
2016/0337(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 53 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 53 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
By way of derogation from points (c) and (d) of Article 8, a taxpayer shall not be exempt from tax on foreign income that the taxpayer received as a profit distribution from an entity in a third country or as proceeds from the disposal of shares held in an entity in a third country where that entity in its country of tax residence is subject to a statutory corporate tax rate lower than half of the statutory tax rate that the taxpayer would have been subject to, in connection with such foreign income, in the Member State of its residence for tax purposes.
Amendment 43 #
2016/0336(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
Recital 1
(1) Companies which seek to do business across frontiers within the Union encounter serious obstacles and market distortions owing to the existence and interaction of 28 disparate corporate tax systems. Furthermore, tax planning structures have become ever-more sophisticated over time, as they develop across various jurisdictions and effectively take advantage of the technicalities of a tax system or of mismatches between two or more tax systems for the purpose of reducing the tax liability of companies. Although those situations highlight shortcomings that are completely different in nature, they both create obstacles which impede the proper functioning of the internal market. Action to rectify these problems should therefore address both these types of market deficiencies.
Amendment 66 #
2016/0336(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 4
Recital 4
(4) Considering the need to act swiftly in order to ensure a proper functioning of the internal market by making it, on the one hand, friendlier to trade and investment and, on the other hand, more resilient to tax avoidance schemes, it is necessaryuseful to divide the ambitious CCCTB initiative into two separate proposals. At a first stage, rules on a common corporate tax base should be agreed, before addressing, at a second stage, the issue of consolidation. Because these changes of regimes are significant steps in the completion of the internal market they need flexibility in order to be properly executed. Hence, as the internal market encompasses all Member States, they should be introduced in all Member States. However, if the Council fails to adopt unanimous decision on either step to establish a CCCTB, it is appropriate to initiate, without delay, the procedure for a Council decision authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of CCTB and CCCTB.
Amendment 86 #
2016/0336(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 5 a (new)
Recital 5 a (new)
(5a) All things being equal the switch to a common consolidated corporate tax base may result in loss or gain of fiscal revenues for Member States. In order to compensate losses, a temporary compensation fund is created, financed with the fiscal surplus from Member States with gain in fiscal revenue, due to the new regime. Compensation will be based on an assessment of the tax revenues that would have been obtained if the tax laws as of 31 December 2016 had been applicable. The compensation fund expires five years after entry into force of this Directive, unless the Council unanimously decides otherwise.
Amendment 107 #
2016/0336(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) The formula apportionment for the consolidated tax base should comprise three equally weighted factors, namely labour, assets and sales by destination. Those equallyfactors, namely labour, assets and sales by destination. The weights attributed to these factors should be determined by a Council decision guided by the principle that the sum of the absolute values of all gains and losses of fiscal revenue in those Member States which participate in the CCCTB system should be minimal when applied to the data of a specific base year equal or prior to the year of entry into force of this Directive. Moreover, the weighted factors should reflect a balanced approach to distributing taxable profits amongst the relevant Member States and should ensure that profits are taxed where they are actually earned. Labour and assets should therefore be allocated to the Member State where the labour is performed or the assets are located, and would thereby give appropriate weight to the interests of the Member State of origin, whilst sales should be allocated to the Member State of destination of the goods or services. To account for differences in the levels of wages across the Union and thus allow for a fair distribution of the consolidated tax base, the labour factor should comprise both payroll and the number of employees (i.e. each item counting for half). The asset factor, on the other hand,he asset factor should comprise all fixed tangible assets, but not intangible and financial assets because of their mobile nature and the resulting risk that the rules of this Directive could be circumvented. Where, due to exceptional circumstances, the outcome of the apportionment does not fairly represent the extent of business activity, a safeguard clause should provide for an alternative method of income allocation.
Amendment 126 #
2016/0336(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 17
Recital 17
Amendment 216 #
2016/0336(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – formula
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – formula
Amendment 74 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) General purpose prepaid cards have legitimate uses and constitute an instrument contributing to financial inclusion. However, anonymous prepaid cards are easy to use in financing terrorist attacks and logistics. It is therefore essential to deny terrorist this means of financing their operations, by further reducing the limits and maximum amounts under which obliged entities are allowed not to apply certain customer due diligence measures provided by Directive (EU) 2015/849. Thus, while having due regard to consumers' needs in using general purpose prepaid instruments and not preventing the use of such instruments for promoting social and financial inclusion, it is essential to lower the existing thresholds for general purpose anonymous prepaid cards and suppresseliminate the customer due diligence exemption for their online use.
Amendment 79 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 14 a (new)
Recital 14 a (new)
(14a) Competent authorities supervising credit and financial institutions for compliance with this Directive should be able to cooperate and exchange confidential information, regardless of their respective nature or status. To this end, such competent authorities should have an adequate legal basis for exchanging confidential information and cooperate to the widest extent possible, consistent with the applicable international standards in this field.
Amendment 80 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 14 b (new)
Recital 14 b (new)
(14b) Information of a prudential nature relating to credit and financial institutions, such as information relating to fit and properness of directors and shareholders, the internal control mechanisms, the governance or the compliance and risk management, is often indispensable for an adequate AML/CFT supervision of such institutions. Vice- versa, AML/CFT information is also important for the prudential supervision of these institutions. Therefore, exchange of confidential information and collaboration between AML/CFT competent authorities of credit and financial institutions and prudential supervisors should not be hampered unintentionally by legal uncertainty which may stem from a lack of explicit provisions in this field. Such clarification of the legal framework is even more important since prudential supervision has, in a number of cases, been entrusted to non-AML/CFT supervisors, such as the European Central Bank.
Amendment 87 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 21
Recital 21
(21) The specific factor determining the Member State responsible for the monitoring and registration of beneficial ownership information of trusts and similar legal arrangements should be clarified. In order to avoid that, due to differences in the legal systems of Member States, certain trusts and similar legal arrangements are not monitored or registered anywhere in the Union, a. All trusts and similar legal arrangements should be registered where they are administeredincluding inter alia Treuhand, Stiftung, Privatstiftung, Usufruct Fiducia, or Fideicomiso, which operate in the Union should be registered in an EU Member State and be obliged to disclose beneficial ownership information to competent and law enforcement authorities in all other Member States. In order to ensure the effective monitoring and registration of information on the beneficial ownership of trusts and similar legal arrangements, cooperation among Member States is also necessary.
Amendment 95 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 22
Recital 22
(22) Public access by way of compulsory disclosure of certain information on the beneficial ownership of companies provides additional guarantees to third parties wishing to do business with those companies. Certain Member States have taken steps or announced their intention to make information contained in registers of beneficial ownership available to the public. The fact that not all Member States would make information publicly available or differences in the information made available and its accessibility may lead to different levelCertain Member States have taken steps or announced their intention to make information contained in registers of beneficial ownership available to the public. This may enhance public scrutiny, but may also give rise to innocent citizens being unjustly publicly associated with wrongdoing and causing irreparable damage to their reputation and business interest. Therefore, access to beneficial ownership information should only be granted to competent authorities ofr protection of third parties in the Union. In a well- functioning internal market, there is a ersons with a legitimate interest who can guarantee a high level of data protection, while any further access should be determineed for coordination to avoid distortionby Member States.
Amendment 97 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 23
Recital 23
(23) Public access alsoAccess granted on behalf of legitimate interests allows greater scrutiny of information by civil society, including by the press or civil society organiszations, and contributes to preserving trust in the integrity of business transactions and of the financial system. It can contribute to combating the misuse of legal entities and legal arrangements both by helping investigations and through reputational effects, given that anyone who could enter into transactions with them is aware of the identity of the beneficial owners. It also facilitates the timely and efficient availability of information for financial institutions as well as authorities, including authorities of third countries, involved in the fight against these offenc. On the other hand, proper protection of privacy precludes or limits opportunities for abuse of vulnerable persons and misuse of private information for commercial purposes.
Amendment 98 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 26
Recital 26
(26) A fair balance should be sought in particular between the general public interest in corporate transparency, law enforcement demands and in the prevention of money laundering and the data subjects' fundamental rights. The set of data to be made available to the public should be limited, clearly and exhaustively defined, and should be of a general nature, so as to minimize the potential prejudice to the beneficial owners. At the same time, informationan individual´s right to self-determine data release. The set of data to be made accessible ton the public should not significantly differ from the data currently collected. In order to limit the interference with the right to respect for their private life in general and to protection of their personal data in particular, that that information should relate essentially to the status of beneficial owners of businesses and trustsbasis of legitimate interest should be comprehensive, clearly and exhaustively defined, and should strictly concern the sphere of economic activity in which the beneficial owners operate.
Amendment 101 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 28
Recital 28
(28) The personal data of beneficial owners should be publicly disclosed in order to enable third parties and civil society at large to know who the beneficial owners are. The enhanced public scrutiny will contribute preventing the misuse of legal entities and legal arrangements, including tax avoidance. Therefore, iIt is essential that this information remains publicly available through the national registers and through the system of interconnection of registers for 10 years after the company has been struck off from the register. However, Member States should be able to provide by law for the processing of the information on beneficial ownership, including personal data for other purposes if such processing meets an objective of public interest and constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a democratic society to the legitimate aim pursued.
Amendment 110 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 34
Recital 34
(34) It is essential to take into account the particularities of trusts and similar legal arrangements, as far as publicly available information on their beneficial owner is concerned. Irrespective of their qualification under national law, a distinction should be drawn between, on the one hand, trusts which consist of any property held by or on behalf of a persMember States may allow competent authorities to exempt on a case by case basis trusts and similar legal arrangements, which do not have the objective of making a profit or whose profit are exclusively spent on charrying on a business which consists of or includes the management of trusts, and acting as trustee of a itable or otherwise altruist in the course of that business with a view to gain profit, and, on the other hand, any other trusts. Given the nature of the first category of trusts, information on their beneficial owners should be made publicly available through compulsory disclosure. Access should be given to the same limited set of data on the beneficial owner as in the case of companieic non-political causes, from reporting requirements or other administrative burdens.
Amendment 114 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 35
Recital 35
Amendment 118 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 36
Recital 36
(36) With a view to ensure a coherent and efficient registration and information exchange, Member States should ensure that their authority in charge of the register set up for the beneficial ownership information of trusts and other legal arrangements similar to trusts cooperates with its counterparts in other Member States, sharing information concerning trusts governed by the law of the first Member State and administered in another Member Stateand other similar legal arrangements to trusts.
Amendment 212 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point c
Directive 2015/849/EU
Article 12 – paragraph 3
Article 12 – paragraph 3
3. Member States shall ensure that Union credit institutions and financial institutions acting as acquirers only accept payments carried out with prepaid cards issued in third countries where such cards meet requirements equivalent to those set out in points (a), (b), (c) of the first subparagraph of Article 13(1) and Article 14, or can be considered to meet the requirements in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article;. The information shall be monitored regularly and financial institutions shall allocate appropriate resources to carry out this task.
Amendment 275 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point a a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point a a (new)
Directive 2015/849/EU
Article 30 – paragraph 5 a (new)
Article 30 – paragraph 5 a (new)
(aa) the following paragraph 5a is inserted: 5a. The information held in the register referred to in paragraph 3 of this article on any corporate and legal entities other than those referred to in Article 1a(a) of directive (EC) 2009/101 shall be accessible to public authorities only. For the purpose of this paragraph, access to the information on beneficial ownership shall be in accordance with data protection laws. Member States shall not introduce a fee to cover the administrative cost. For the purpose of this directive a legitimate interest shall be documented by either (a) statutes or mission statements of non-governmental organizations with a positive track record of actions aimed at money laundering, tax evasion or financial criminal activities including terrorism or (b) a positive track record of previous activities relevant to the fight against money laundering, tax evasion or financial criminal activities including terrorism.
Amendment 292 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point a
Directive 2015/849/EU
Article 31 – paragraph 1 –subparagraph 1
Article 31 – paragraph 1 –subparagraph 1
Member States shall ensure that this Article applies to trusts and other types of legal arrangements having a structure or functions similar to trusts, such as, inter alia, fTreuhand, Stiftung, Privatstiftung, Usufruct Fiduciea, Treuhand or fideicomisoor Fideicomiso, and all other similar in terms of structure or function, existing or future legal arrangements.
Amendment 310 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point c
Directive 2015/849/EU
Article 31 – paragraph 4
Article 31 – paragraph 4
4. Member States shall ensure that the information held in the register referred to in paragraph 3a is accessible in a timely and unrestricted manner by competent authorities and FIUs, without alerting the parties to the trust concerned. They shallmay also ensure thatprovide obliged entities are allowed timely access to that information, pursuant to the provisions on customer due diligence laid down in Chapter II. Member States shall notify to the Commission the characteristics of those mechanisms.
Amendment 339 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point e
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 – point e
Directive 2015/849/EU
Article 31 – paragraph 7 a – subparagraph 1
Article 31 – paragraph 7 a – subparagraph 1
In exceptional circumstances laid down in national law, where the access referred to in paragraphs 4 and 4aoint b of paragraph 5 would expose the beneficial owner to the risk of fraud, kidnapping, blackmail, violence or intimidation, or where the beneficial owner is a minor or otherwise incapable, Member States may provide for an exemption from such accessa competent authority may grant a temporary exemption to all or part of the information on the beneficial ownership on a case-by-case basis. When an exemption is granted this has to be clearly indicated in the register.
Amendment 363 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Directive 2015/849/EU
Article 32 a – paragraph 3 a (new)
Article 32 a – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Those Member States which have not already done so shall establish national property registers and exchange the national data with competent authorities of other Member States. In order to facilitate the exchange of information the Commission shall develop, with FIUs, a standardised template for national competent authorities to use to submit the data.
Amendment 409 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 21 a (new)
Amendment 445 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Directive 2009/101/EC
Article 7 b – paragraph 3
Article 7 b – paragraph 3
Amendment 456 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Directive 2009/101/EC
Article 7 b – paragraph 5
Article 7 b – paragraph 5
Amendment 461 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 2 a (new)
Article 2 a (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 56 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
Article 56 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
Amendment 463 #
2016/0208(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 2 b (new)
Article 2 b (new)
Directive 2009/138/EC
Article 68 – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)
Article 68 – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)
Amendment 4 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)
Citation 1 a (new)
– having regard to the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), in particular Article 5 thereof;
Amendment 7 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)
Citation 2 a (new)
– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 123, 125, 126 and 140 thereof;
Amendment 8 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 b (new)
Citation 2 b (new)
– having regard to the Protocols 12 and 13 to the TEU and TFEU;
Amendment 9 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 3
Citation 3
Amendment 10 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4
Citation 4
Amendment 39 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the Member States of the Eurozone should comply with the Maastricht criteria;
Amendment 40 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
Recital A b (new)
Ab. whereas Article 5 TEU lays down the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality which apply to the exercise of Union competences;
Amendment 41 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A c (new)
Recital A c (new)
Ac. whereas Article 123 TFEU prohibits the monetary financing of governments;
Amendment 42 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A d (new)
Recital A d (new)
Ad. whereas according to Article 125 TFEU it is illegal for a Member State to be liable for the liabilities of another Member State;
Amendment 43 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A e (new)
Recital A e (new)
Ae. whereas Protocols 12 and 13 to the TEU and TFEU lay down the so-called Maastricht criteria;
Amendment 92 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws of EMU through legislation such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, as well as through the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such as the ESM;
Amendment 129 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
Recital J a (new)
Ja. whereas this ruling is highly controversial and subject to harsh criticism by legal experts;
Amendment 130 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
Recital J a (new)
Ja. whereas the ESM is not formally under parliamentary control;
Amendment 131 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J b (new)
Recital J b (new)
Jb. whereas the crisis revealed considerable democratic deficits in economic and financial policies, areas of European policy of particular significance for the citizens; whereas some Member States now see themselves subject to austerity policies which their parliaments would never have decided on their own, while other Member States see themselves forced to grant sizeable loans or guarantees in order to avoid a breakup of the euro; whereas, because of the spill over effects of national economic and fiscal policy decisions on the economies of other Euro area Member States, their national parliaments are thus effectively deprived of their budgetary autonomy;
Amendment 134 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J c (new)
Recital J c (new)
Jc. whereas any reform of the EMU economic governance structure should respect the will of the EU Member States that have an opt-out from having to introduce the euro currency to retain their respective currencies;
Amendment 136 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J d (new)
Recital J d (new)
Jd. whereas due consideration should be given to the mutual spill-over effects of the EMU and non-euro area members;
Amendment 137 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J e (new)
Recital J e (new)
Je. whereas Union and national policy makers and parliamentarians should continuously explain to their citizens the benefits and possible downsides of a single currency, including the costs and risks linked to a break-up of the euro area;
Amendment 139 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J f (new)
Recital J f (new)
Jf. whereas there is no wide public support for establishing a formal system of fiscal transfers within the Economic and Monetary Union;
Amendment 144 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that the Werner Report in 1970 highlighted the fact that a monetary union would require all the essential features of national public budgets to be decided at Community levelseveral Member States failed to comply with the Maastricht Criteria, both regarding their annual budgets and their total indebtedness;
Amendment 145 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
Amendment 161 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policies;
Amendment 182 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States, aggravated and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mere existence of the euro area;
Amendment 193 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
Amendment 211 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Considers that, where a Member State whose currency is the euro is unwilling to further surrender its budgetary sovereignty, it should be given the option of leaving the euro area without leaving the EU; invites the Commission and the Eurogroup – acting in liaison with the ECB – to assist in such a scenario the Member State concerned with practical steps to make a withdrawal from the euro area feasible and as smooth as possible;
Amendment 222 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Observes that the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional and legally contested loose monetary policy measures; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reform;
Amendment 226 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
Amendment 239 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. AcknowledgesTakes into account the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack Regulations; welcomnotes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership;
Amendment 254 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. RecallNotes the four pillars set out in the Five Presidents’ Report: completing the economic, financial and fiscal Union and strengthening democratic accountability, legitimacy and the institutional setting; emphasisnotes that this report reiterates the view set out in the Blueprint of the Commission and the Four Presidents’ Report, coordinated by then President of the European Council Mr Herman van Rompuy, that a shock absorption capacity at euro area level is needed to complement automatic stabilisers at national level, whose functioning is limited, as was shown during the crisisand calls for a shock absorption capacity at euro area level; stresses that any such mechanism, by its mere institutional set-up, risks to lack accountability and democratic legitimacy if it becomes just a new layer of governance which risks to cause moral hazard;
Amendment 273 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of cleariterates that the Member States whose currency is the euro must comply with the Maastricht criteria;
Amendment 284 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Argues that convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro-area and national level are key, notably to preventing permanent transfers and moral hazardis not the only way forward and poses a high risk of moral hazard; emphasizes that enforcing a credible no bail-out clause would also lead to these ends without requiring a burdening coordination and enforcement effort;
Amendment 295 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocksare core elements for the functioning of the euro area;
Amendment 314 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
Amendment 337 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resourcan enormous amount of resources at the expense of taxpayers in other countries;
Amendment 338 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resourcesa direct link between decision making and accountability;
Amendment 348 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Considers that three differente theoretical founcdations have to be fulfilled; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a wholefor macroeconomic "imbalances" and "shocks" are insufficiently specified, prone to confusing cause and effect, and too vague to shape the new economic governance structure of the EMU;
Amendment 361 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Emphasises that resilience to external shocks is increased by Member States implementing structural reforms which increase the flexibility and market orientation of the economy, emphasizes that such reforms also reduce the likelihood of large imbalances; emphasizes that the link between democratic decision-making and financial accountability must not be severed;
Amendment 364 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
Amendment 388 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
Amendment 403 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
Amendment 422 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
Amendment 439 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Notes that the euro currency was supposed to contribute to more unity in Europe, but instead led to more divisiveness because of tensions between creditor and debtor countries of the euro area;
Amendment 483 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Stresses that significant progress in convergence and sustainable structural reforms is needed in order to reconcile fiscal consolidation, growth, jobs, productivity, and competitiveness and the Europeandifferent national social models so as to effectively prevent asymmetric shock; considers that financial support from the European level for the implementation of agreed structural reforms in the Member States, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, is therefore indispensable;
Amendment 487 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24a. Stresses that structural reforms will only be successfully implemented if a Member State is convinced that these are beneficial to the country and its population, thus rejects the idea to provide financial support from the EU for structural reforms which a country would not enact on its own;
Amendment 492 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
Amendment 505 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
Amendment 521 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1
Paragraph 26 – indent 1
Amendment 529 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2
Paragraph 26 – indent 2
Amendment 551 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1
Amendment 560 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2
Amendment 573 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
Amendment 597 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Is convinced that increased convergence within the euro area will significantly increase the capacity of its Member States to absorb asymmetric shocks; believes, however, thatBelieves that, no matter how great the efforts regarding convergence and sustainable structural reforms, asymmetric shocks with an impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the strong integration of the euro area Member Statesneglected preconditions for an optimal currency area; stresses, therefore, the need to have an instrument available for this emergency which provides an immediate stabilisation effectto make possible a withdrawal from the euro area without withdrawing from the EU;
Amendment 608 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
Amendment 620 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 a (new)
Paragraph 29 a (new)
29a. Notes that proposals for a shock absorption function at euro area level reflect the dominance of macro-managing than curing structural problems; believes that, while it may be tempting at first sight to allow counter-cyclical policies via a euro area treasury for highly indebted countries that would otherwise face market pressure, this possibility would reduce the need for consolidation since the ability to conduct counter-cyclical policies is a good reason to seek for fiscal space; considers therefore that a euro area fiscal capacity would make it even harder to reach the goals of the Stability and Growth Pact as amended by the Six- Pack and the Two-Pack;
Amendment 621 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 a (new)
Paragraph 29 a (new)
29a. warns that a fiscal capacity at EU level counteracts incentives for structural reforms and fiscal consolidation and will drive debt financing of government expenditures beyond reasonable levels;
Amendment 627 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
Amendment 643 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
Amendment 671 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Considers that the EMF should provide the financial resources for either of these models, which could require increasing the amount of capital; points out that the fund should avoid long-term redistribution effects by ensuring Member States’ contributions are balanced over the cycle;long-term redistribution effects should be avoided by ensuring that the Member States' contributions to the EU budget are balanced over the cycle; reiterates that no Member State can be liable for the liabilities of another Member State nor for their commitments.
Amendment 681 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; recalls that the EMF should be used as an appropriate financial resource;
Amendment 692 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 a (new)
Paragraph 33 a (new)
33a. proposes that the Euro be dissolved in an orderly manner before external shocks force a disorderly exit of Member States from the Euro;
Amendment 696 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Considers that in the case of symmetric shocks brought about by a lack of internal demand, monetary policy alone cannot reignite the economy, particularly in a context of zero lower bounds; is therefore convinced that public and private investment must be increased, the administrative burden reduced and a proper regulatory framework developed, with a view to stimulating potential growththat are caused by a lack of confidence must be diminished by addressing the flaws of the EMU´s economic governance structure;
Amendment 705 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34 a (new)
Paragraph 34 a (new)
34a. Considers that monetary policy cannot reignite the economy, particularly in a context of zero lower bounds;
Amendment 708 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
Amendment 730 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Considers that instability in the financial sector could also pose severe challenges for the euro area as a whole; urgesemphasizes that the completion of the Banking Union in order to lessen these challenges; calls for the fiscal capacity to operaims at improving the confidence in the financial sector in some Member States as a fiscal backstop for the Banking Union, as agreedt the expense of the perception of the financial sector stability in othe SRMrs;
Amendment 742 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Points out that theany fiscal capacity haswould have to be of significant size in order to be able to address these euro-area-wide shocks and to finance its functions; insists thwarns against creat in order to provide sufficient financial resources, the euro area fiscal capacity, including the EMF, should be able to increase the issuance of equities via a rise in guarantees; considers that these common issued equities should have the highest credit rateg net contributor and net receiver countries out overstretching solidarity and seeding tension;
Amendment 755 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
38. Stresses that the Community methodsubsidiarity and proportionality principles should prevail in the development of economic governance for the euro area; urges that no reinforcement of intergovernmental structures should take place in parallel with existing structures;
Amendment 766 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Calls urgently for the European Parliament and national parliaments to be given a strengthened role in the renewed economic governance framework in order to reinforce democratic accountability; calls for increased national ownership in the European Semester in order to improve compliance with the CSRsstrict enforcement of the no bail-out clause in order to reinforce democratic accountability;
Amendment 791 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Considers that in order to provide for a genuine EMU, a euro area treasury should be created for collective decision- making, supervision and management of the budgetary capacity for the euro area; calls for the inclusion of thi to be in equilibrium, a country which considers that the costs tareasury wit outweighing the European Commission with full macroeconomic, fiscal and financial competences; calls for a vice-presidentbenefits of a membership of the Eeuropean Commission to head the treasury and simultaneously to act as president of the Eurogroup; urges full accountability of this treasury to the European Parliament area should be able to choose to leave;
Amendment 800 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41 a (new)
Paragraph 41 a (new)
41a. Considers that any Member State should be free to join the euro area or to choose to leave it;
Amendment 803 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
Amendment 821 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Acknowledges that the current political climate characterised by deep inequality, mistrust and uncertainty is not conducive to proper reforms to achieve and complete EMUhas been caused, among others, by pursuing the completion of the EMU regardless of economic objections; believes, therefore, that a comprehensive roadmap, including clear milestones within an agreed timetable and taking into account the political situation, should be urgently adopted with a clear commitment by euro area Heads of State and Government to achieving a genuine and complete EMU;
Amendment 5 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 10 a (new)
Citation 10 a (new)
– having regard to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols regulating the conduct of armed conflict and seeking to limit its effects,
Amendment 15 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas human mobility is at an unprecedentedly high level, with 244 million international migrants, owing to various reasonsdue to violent conflict, destabilisation, inequalities and poverty, including the doubling of the world’s population since 1960; whereas international migration occurs primarily within the same region and between developing countries;
Amendment 43 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas regional conflicts, political oppression and violence, abuse of human rights and poverty require bigger geopolitical solutions in order to foster sustainable stability and peace; whereas this is a challenge of the international community and not just the EU;
Amendment 55 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D b (new)
Recital D b (new)
Db. whereas an effective way of helping large numbers of refugees and asylum seekers is in improving the conditions and offering assistance to conflict regions as well as neighbouring countries offering humanitarian assistance;
Amendment 92 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the increase in human mobility, if managed in a safe, orderly, regular and responsible manner, can provide significant benefits, as recognised by the 2030 Agenda, but these are often largely undoverestimated; whereas the ageing of the European population requires, among other measures, relying on foreign workers in order to guarantee an adequate balance between active and retired people;
Amendment 97 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas due to cultural differences and a widespread lack of proper qualifications and language skills refugees and migrants from developing countries are not the solution for the demographic problem of the social security systems within Europe; whereas even successful integration in the labour market would only widen the contributor base to the same extent as it generates new claims;
Amendment 105 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)
Recital F b (new)
Fb. whereas humanitarian assistance in conflict and neighbouring regions and countries leads to an improvement of these countries; whereas the emigration of skilled workers from these countries has the opposite effect;
Amendment 106 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F c (new)
Recital F c (new)
Fc. whereas the track record of integrating Turkish or Arabic immigrant groups is very disappointing in a number of Member States, whereas in an economically successful Member State like Germany with free public education between 25% and 30% of the citizens with a migratory background from Turkey or the Middle East (first or second generation) do not have any educational degree at all, whereas according to recent data between 25% and 35% of these people are unemployed and up to 35% are dependent on social welfare;
Amendment 125 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Underlines the fact that we are witnessing in today’s world an unprecedented level of human mobility, and stresses that one of the most urgent actions the international community must undertake is the strengthening of a common response to address the challenges and opportunities that this phenomenon represents; stresses that this response must be guided by the fullshould aim at protection ofng the rights and dignity of everyone forced by any circumstance to flee theito flee, in particular thomes in search of a better lifse who are most vulnerable; underlines that, though their treatment is governed by separate legal frameworks, refugees and migrants have the same universal human rights and fundamental freedoms, which need to be safeguarded regardless of their status; recalls that the EU must abide by its values and principles in all common policies and promote them in its external relations;
Amendment 139 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Stresses that well-managed international migration represents an important contribution to socioeconomic development, as it has done historically, and that it is necessary to encourage this by changing the current narrative and developing a positive one,the unprecedented and unsustainable flow of refugees and migrants to the European Union threatens the effective functioning of the Schengen Area and the European Union's and the Member States' immigration systems; underlines in this respect the importance of a coherent strategy of the whole European Union to countering xenophobic, populist and nationalistic discourses, and adopting policies focussed on the medium and long term and not exclusively guided by immediate political pressures, while also addressing legitimate concerns regarding border management, social protection for vulnerable groups and integration of refugees and migrants; emphasizes the need for an effective control of the EU's external border to reduce the pressure on the littoral states of the Mediterranean, especially Greece and Italy; welcomes the measures Spain had implemented and recognizes the success of those;
Amendment 157 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Recognises that the humanitarian aid system is dangerously overstretched and that it will never be sufficient to respond to forced displacement crises, in particular given the protracted nature of a majority of them; welcomes therefore the new policy framework outlined in the Commission communication on ‘Forced Displacement and Development’ of April 2016; notes the importance of promoting closer humanitarian-development links and the need to engage with different partners – governments, local authorities, civil society, including refugees themselves, and the private sector – to develop targeted evidence-based strategies to tackle this challenge and to gradually end dependence on humanitarian assistance in existing displacement situations by fostering resilience and enabling the displaced to live in dignity as contributors to their host countries, until voluntary return or resettlement;
Amendment 195 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Emphasizes the fact that the EU is the world's largest donor of humanitarian aid to ameliorate the living conditions of refugees;
Amendment 200 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Stresses the crucial role of women in cases of forced displacement, not only as they are more vulnerable to certain abuse, but also because of the role they play in responding to emergencies, their socioeconomic contributions and their active participation in conflict resolution and prevention; notes that a focus on women’s empowerment is therefore necessary to address the deeper causes of forced displacement; reiterates the importance of adding a gender perspective to the EU policies addressing movements of migrants and refugees;
Amendment 216 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Recalls that children – particularly unaccompanied ones –, people with disabilities and the elderly are particularly vulnerable to abuse, including sexual and gender-based violence and discrimination, even once they have reached places deemed secure; calls for these groups to be given special assistance and humanitarian protection as part of their resettlement;
Amendment 225 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2
Subheading 2
Better managed international migration: a global responsibilityMuch room for improvement for the EU and its Member States
Amendment 231 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Welcomes the UN General Assembly High-Level Meeting to Address Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants of 19 September 2016 and the hosting of the Leaders’ Summit by the USA, as migration flows are a global responsibility which demand a global response and enhanced cooperation between all stakeholders; welcomes the outcome of these summits as the expression of a political commitment of unprecedented force, initiating the path towards a truly international sharing of responsibilities for refugees and large migration movements; deeply regrets however the lack of specific pledges or legally binding commitments in terms of aid or reform, which are needed to close the current gap between rhetoric and reality; calls on all the parties involved to ensure continued political engagement, and cooperation, exchange of knowledge and experience with partner countries, CSOs and local authorities, funding and concrete acts of solidarity in support of host countries; calls for the EU and its Member States to take the lead in international efforts, particularly as regards ensuring that the agreements –including the future compacts on refugees and on safe, orderly and regular migration – are swiftly put into practice, establishing follow-up mechanisms as needed;
Amendment 237 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Welcomes the UN General Assembly High-Level Meeting to Address Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants of 19 September 2016 and the hosting of the Leaders’ Summit by the USA, as migration flows are a global responsibility which demand a global response and enhanced cooperation between all stakeholders; welcomes the outcome of these summits as the expression of a political commitment of unprecedented force, initiating the path towards a truly international sharing of responsibilities for refugees and large migration movements; regrets however the lack of specific pledges or legally binding commitments in terms of aid or reform, which are needed to close the current gap between rhetoric and reality; calls on all the parties involved to ensure continued political engagement, funding and concrete acts of solidarity in support of host countries; calls for the EU and its Member States to take the lead in international efforts, particularly as regards ensuring that the agreements –including the future compacts on refugees and on safe, orderly and regular migration – are swiftly put into practice, establishing follow-up mechanisms as needed;
Amendment 245 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Calls on the EU and its Member States to demonstrate by words and deeds that the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) must not and will not be abused by people who falsely pretend to be victims of persecution;
Amendment 249 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7b. Calls on the EU and its Member States to make every effort to identify people who have deliberately destroyed their identity documents or who lie about their country of origin or about the persecution they claim to have suffered; calls on the EU and its Member States to make every effort to return these people to where they come from or to any other safe country outside of the EU;
Amendment 251 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 c (new)
Paragraph 7 c (new)
7c. Calls on the EU to ensure that asylum seekers who entered the EU via Greece and moved on to other EU Member States can be returned to Greece in line with the provisions of the Dublin system; emphasizes that this requires that Greece overhauls its asylum system such that the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights do no longer object to refugees being sent back to Greece on the grounds of fundamental deficiencies of the Greek asylum system; asks that financial aid to Greece under the current third restructuring program be conditioned on Greece's asylum system meeting at least certain minimum standards acceptable to the highest European Courts;
Amendment 252 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 d (new)
Paragraph 7 d (new)
7d. Asks the Commission to fully investigate which misperceptions exist in developing countries about the possibilities for migrants to be admitted to the EU and about the conditions under which immigrants may live and work in the EU if admitted; asks the Commission to develop an effective communication strategy to correct any such misperceptions in developing countries, making full use of the internet and social media to propagate the necessary information to the targeted recipients;
Amendment 262 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Underlines that the resettlement of forcibly displaced persons is a responsibility of the international community; considers it crucial to implement as a matter of urgency a coordinated response in third countries to grant asylum for people in need of international protection, instead of and/or offer any needed support, financial or in kind, to alleavingate the burden on theborne by front-line states or countries neighbouring conflict zones; highlights the fact that financial support is outpaced by the scope and scale of displacement, compounded by the lack of solutions to address the root causes of this forced displacement;
Amendment 275 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Stresses that improving the living and education standards in developing countries is crucial to reduce migration, notes that developed countries are happy to assist in accomplishing this task which, however, is the prime responsibility of governments in developing countries;
Amendment 279 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 b (new)
Paragraph 8 b (new)
8b. Confirms that the right to grant asylum and the right to accept refugees, including the number of refugees, is primarily the competence of Member States acting in full compliance with international and national laws; underlines the need to respect the principle of subsidiarity by the authorities of the European Union and the other Member States;
Amendment 315 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Stresses that EU external action should be forward-looking instead of mainly reactive with changing objectives in response to new crises; recalls that the migration phenomenon stems from a complex set of causes such as a growing population, poverty, insufficient job creation, political instability and climate change; emphasizes that poverty and child mortality have been greatly reduced in many African and other developing countries over the last decades;
Amendment 344 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Calls for the establishment of a genuine, value-based common European migration policy – with adequate legal channels for migration as a sustainable long-term policy to promote growth and cohesion within the EU – in order to set a clear framework for EU relations with third countries; wWelcomes the EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015- 2020), which envisages closer cooperation with third countries, but underlines that the implementation of a common EU legal migration policy would be instrumental in breaking the business model of smugglers;
Amendment 355 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Calls for the establishment of a genuine, value-based common European migration policy – with adequate legal channels for migration as a sustainable long-term policy to promote growth and cohesion within the EU – in order to set a clear framework for EU relations with third countries; welcomes the EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015-2020), which envisages closer cooperation with third countries, but underlines that the implementation of a common EU legal migration policy would be instrumental in breaking the business model of smugglers; and tackling the exploitative trade of human trafficking;
Amendment 366 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Asks the EU to negotiate agreements with southern Mediterranean Countries such that refugees and migrants saved from distress at sea can be safely brought to these countries and can be assured to receive from them any assistance they may legitimately require;
Amendment 375 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Welcomes the new Partnership Framework with third countries as a signal of real political action; stresses that the success of the approach outlined in the communication of June 2016 depends on the EU’s capacity to offer real, commonly agreed incentives to third countries and is concerned by the limited offer mainly focused on border management or Assisted Voluntary Return schemes, which – while essential and needed – constitute only a partial response to the situation; highlights the need to balance and complement this response, focusing on the development of local economies, qualification and regional mobility and improved levels of protection in countries of transit and origin;
Amendment 390 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
Amendment 409 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Emphasises that returns and readmission is the most effective way to protect potential refugees as it functions as deterrence and therefore destroys the business model of human traffickers; underlines the importance of a common list from the EU of safe third countries in this respect;
Amendment 424 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
Amendment 447 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Is extremely concerned by the continuing conflict in Syria, in which violence against civilians, attacks on civilian infrastructures and hospitals and violations of international humanitarian law over the past five years have led to the forced displacement of half of the country; expresses its full support to Lebanon and Jordan, which continue to demonstrate extraordinary solidarity in hosting millions of refugees in spite of limited resources;
Amendment 449 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Is extremely concerned by the continuing conflict in Syria, in which violence against civilians and violations of international humanitarian law over the past five years have led to the forced displacement of half of the country; expresses its full support to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, which continue to demonstrate extraordinary solidarity in hosting millions of refugees in spite of limited resources;
Amendment 457 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Calls upon the Commission to fully investigate any reports of inhumane treatment of refugees both in and outside of the EU;
Amendment 462 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 b (new)
Paragraph 16 b (new)
16b. Recommends the negotiation of readmission contracts with countries like Pakistan, Morocco and Algeria, paying full respect to international law and human rights and taking into consideration each country and region's own singularities;
Amendment 465 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 c (new)
Paragraph 16 c (new)
16c. Stresses the need for the return of illegal migrants and rejected asylum seekers to their country of origin or the third country of departure while fully respecting the Geneva Convention, international law and human rights;
Amendment 473 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Supports the Commission’s proposal for a new and ambitious External Investment Plan (EIP) to mobilise investments in developing third countries; considers that supporting private sectors in third countries while fostering an environment of good governance and business practices should not be presented as a new measure but should be further enhanced; ; calls on the Commission to ensure coherence between financing instruments – for example with the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the European Development Fund (EDF) – and projects in order to focus the EU’s assistance on priorities and to avoid the scattering of funds and efforts;
Amendment 480 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Emphasises that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the largest share of the EU budget, accounting for around 40% of total spending, and for the most part is comprised of subsidies to farmers and landowners; stresses that subsidising EU farmers can distort trade to the disadvantage of the agricultural sector in developing countries; urges the EU to recognize that the EU's CAP is partially incoherent with its development goals and the goal of its agenda on migration;
Amendment 488 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
Amendment 500 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Underlines that increasing EU funds would deprive Member States of resources urgently needed to integrate refugees and migrants;
Amendment 517 #
2015/2342(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
Amendment 22 #
2015/2317(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Calls on the Commission to create a list of existing incoherencies between different policies in the five priority areas in their upcoming 2017 report on PCD; considers that the Commission should analyse different methods and instruments to remedy these incoherent policies;
Amendment 38 #
2015/2317(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Recognises that implementing PCD correctly will require an appropriate level of resources and staff; urges that PCD focal points in national ministries and EU delegations be granted the necessary resources to put in place national and European strategies on PCDthis does not automatically imply an extension of resources allocated but rather calls for an efficient use thereof;
Amendment 39 #
2015/2317(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Emphasises the importance of preventing the PCD approach and the SDGs from resulting in red tape and overregulation for EU citizens and enterprises;
Amendment 45 #
2015/2317(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11a. Calls on the Commission to include concrete strategies for the implementation of PCD in their upcoming 2017 report on PCD; emphasises that these strategies should propose answers on how to avoid and cope with incoherencies between different policies;
Amendment 48 #
2015/2317(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Acknowledges that the EU is facing its biggest refugee crisis since World War II; stresses that strengthening the link between mWelcomes the adoption of the European Agenda on Migration and, which development policies is essential to address the root causes of this phenomenon; welcomes the adoptions a comprehensive response to the fact that in many aspects the huge migratory pressure ofn the European Agenda on Migration, which develops a comprehensive response to the crisis (COM(2015)0240)U is caused by a lack of economic, political and social progress in developing countries;
Amendment 112 #
2015/2317(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Emphasises that the CAP is the largest share of the EU budget, accounting for around 40% of total spending, and for the most part is comprised of direct subsidies to farmers and landowners; stresses that subsidising EU farmers can distort trade to the disadvantage of the agricultural sector in developing countries; urges the Commission to recognise in their upcoming 2017 report on PCD that the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is partially incoherent with the SDGs target goal 2b and goal 8 on inclusive growth;
Amendment 120 #
2015/2317(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Calls on the Commission to recognize that some actions for climate protection like the EU "biofuel policy" or the "carbon tax on aviation" can have negative unintended consequences for developing countries;
Amendment 140 #
2015/2317(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22a. Calls on the Commission to re-assess the selection process of the five priority areas migration, trade and finance, food security, climate change and security; emphasises that these priority areas are not the only ones possible and suggests the incorporation of health, education and governance as additional priority areas;
Amendment 69 #
2015/2285(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. WelcomesTakes note of the 2016 Annual Growth Survey package and the proposed policy mix of investment, structural reform and fiscal responsibility, with increased emphasis on domestic demand and convergence, complementing accommodative monetary policies;
Amendment 339 #
2015/2285(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. WelcomesTakes note of the recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area as a way to deepen policy coordination in the follow-up to the Five Presidents’ Report;
Amendment 343 #
2015/2285(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
Amendment 359 #
2015/2285(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
Amendment 5 #
2015/2233(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Stresses that EU trade and investment policies are interlinked with EU development policies and have an impact on developing countries; calls for the Commission to respect the principle of Policy Coherence for Development in all trade negotiations; stresses the need to focus onaim at the effective implementation and monitoring of the sustainable development chapters in trade agreements, in line with the Sustainable Development Goals;
Amendment 8 #
2015/2233(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Stresses that free trade in services enables developing countries to take advantage of competitively lower labour costs and thus to increase exports to the EU in both goods and services; stresses that this will induce income growth and poverty alleviation in developing countries;
Amendment 9 #
2015/2233(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Emphasises that complaints of social dumping by developed countries unfairly ignore the fact that developing countries cannot yet provide levels of social protection similar to advanced economies; stresses that the social dumping discussion must not be abused by developed countries for protectionist purposes, i.e. to justify inappropriate barriers to free trade and competition; emphasizes that it is mutually beneficial if companies in all countries specialize on the provision of services where they have comparative advantages rather than preserving the status quo of their activities;
Amendment 10 #
2015/2233(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 c (new)
Paragraph 1 c (new)
1c. Regrets that only a limited number of developing countries participates in the TiSA negotiations; urges the Commission and the parties currently involved to encourage more developing countries to participate;
Amendment 11 #
2015/2233(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 d (new)
Paragraph 1 d (new)
1d. Emphasises that a lack of financial services or insufficient competition on financial markets leads to sometimes horrendous interest rates on private credits in many underdeveloped regions of the world; notes that this is an important impediment to investment and economic growth since functioning financial markets that provide financing for investment projects are vital for growth; stresses in this regard that opening developing countries to financial services provided by foreign financial institutions can play a key role in supporting developing countries to progress; stresses further that as a precondition for this the legal and regulatory environment of developing countries must meet the minimum standards of advanced economies and must in particular facilitate the use of collateral; asks developing countries to commit in the TiSA agreement to reforms deemed necessary to meet these standards;
Amendment 12 #
2015/2233(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 e (new)
Paragraph 1 e (new)
1e. Stresses that service exports for instance in telecommunication, in R&D activities or in software design and other IT-related services have greatly benefited a number of developing countries in recent years; emphasises that there is likely a large potential for similar benefits for many other developing countries and that this can be fostered by participating in trade agreements such as TiSA;
Amendment 14 #
2015/2233(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Urges the Commission to increase transparency and democratic accountability on the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) negotiation process,; urges critics of TiSA and on allther trade policies, by duly taking into account concerns expressed by trade unions and civil society organisations, including the CSOs of developing countriesagreements to publicly acknowledge that the Commission has as of late made considerable efforts to this end and that transparency and information provided by the Commission are much greater than commonly thought;
Amendment 25 #
2015/2233(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. RejecSupports TiSA and other macro-trade agreements on the basis that they are a tool to bypass multilateral and democratic fora in which developing countries are properly represented in order to set global standards; recalls that TiSA, contrary to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), does not currently have special and differential treatment provisions; urges the Commission to immediately propose such a clause based on GATS Article IVwith developing countries on the grounds that these benefit participating developing countries by increasing competition and reducing transaction costs;
Amendment 32 #
2015/2233(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
Amendment 46 #
2015/2233(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. RejecSupports TiSA and other macro-trade dealtrade agreements with developing countries, taking the view that they are a tool for the privatisation of public services and liberalisation of public procurement, such public services and public procurement being key elements for sustainable development and for ensuring respect for people’s dignityliberalisation which will lead to higher competition, innovation, lower costs for consumers, more jobs and thus higher welfare in participating developing countries; asks the Commission to respect the policy space of developing countries’' governments and parliaments to take decisions in order to ensure internationally agreed standards on labour, the environment and human rights;
Amendment 52 #
2015/2233(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
Amendment 59 #
2015/2233(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
Amendment 4 #
2015/2220(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Stresses the importance of the Central Asia region for the EU in terms of its economic potential, energy diversification as well as for geostrategic and security interests;
Amendment 7 #
2015/2220(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Points to the fact that there is also considerable diversity in the region, not least in endowments of natural resources such as fossil fuels and arable land, and – partly as a consequence of this – in the countries’ current levels of human and economic development; stresses the importance of taking into account the cultural differences within the region as well as between it and the EUon one side and an inter-dependency of the countries in the region on the other side;
Amendment 12 #
2015/2220(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Notes that expectations of a transition towards Western models of democracy have been stalled or derailed, and that there is instead strong, and in some instances suffocating, authoritarianism; notes that the civil war in Tajikistan in the 1990s, insufficient commitment to human development and little readiness to engage in regional cooperation have slowed down, and in some cases even reversed, economic and social transformation; notes the problematic dependency of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and to a lesser extent Uzbekistan on remittances from migrant workers in Russia and Kazakhstan; also notes the rapidly growing economic dependence on China and Russia;
Amendment 13 #
2015/2220(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Stresses that Central Asian countries face external shocks, namely the economic slowdown in Russia and China, ongoing geopolitical tensions and the conflict in Ukraine; emphasises further that dropping commodity prices impact the oil exporting countries of the region; notes that behind this background the region's growth rate in the years since 2014 is expected to be roughly half of the last decades average;
Amendment 14 #
2015/2220(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 b (new)
Paragraph 4 b (new)
4b. Underlines that despite rapid economic growth in recent years the region faces high poverty rates, high income inequality and a declining life expectancy especially in rural areas where 80-90% of the population lives; stresses that the process of privatization during the economic transition has to a large extent left the mountainous regions behind; underlines that here women are particularly affected, as many men migrate into cities in search of employment, leaving women with the entire burden of farm and family work;
Amendment 15 #
2015/2220(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 c (new)
Paragraph 4 c (new)
4c. Emphasises that it is vital for a sustainable economic development in the region to deepen regional integration and increase intraregional trade, focus on transport networks and logistic services, improve business climate and legislative and regulatory framework especially for small and medium-sized enterprises;
Amendment 18 #
2015/2220(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Emphasises that climate change is creating major threats and that another major earthquake could well occur in souCentral Asia is a region exposed to a variety of natural hazards; being one of the world's most seismically active zone earthquakes remain the predominant th-reastern Central Asiat while climate change poses an ecological challenge for the region;
Amendment 39 #
2015/2220(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Proposes the launch of an EU initiative to support the pursuit of selected Sustainable Development Goals in the region., with measurable outcomes which represent value for money for European taxpayers;
Amendment 70 #
2015/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Notes with concern the varying degrees of commitment demonstrated by Member States to implementing last year's CSRs; stresses the importance of the implementation of the CSRs in order to ensure consistent and fair implementation of the economic governance framework across Member States; deplores in this context the non-binding nature of the recommendations;
Amendment 117 #
2015/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. WelcomesTakes note of the entry into force of the regulation on the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), aimed at boosting private investment in the EU, and calls on all relevant stakeholders to ensure its swift and effective implementation;
Amendment 187 #
2015/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Stresses the need for Member States to adapt their public finances by conducting a counter-cyclical policy when necessary and making full use of the existing flexibility clauses foreseen in the legislation; considers that Member States with high debt levels in particular must continue with growth-friendly fiscal consolidation and urgently implement the recommended structural reforms, while those with more fiscal space should use it to accelerate investmentbe able to conduct fiscal and economic policies they deem necessary while assuming full responsibility for its consequences; emphasises that this reinforcement of sovereignty and accountability can only be sustainable if the no bail-out clause of Art. 125 TFEU is restored;
Amendment 242 #
2015/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Deplores the fact that the CSRs suffer from lack of ownership at national level and from a democratic accountability mechanism; calls, in this context, for an increased role for national parliaments in the preparemphasizes, however, that the democratic legitimization of the Nnational Reform Programmes (NRPs); stresses that increased ownership is a crucial factor for the successful implementation of the CSRs and, in the longer term, for the success of the Europe 2020 strategyeconomic policies is much stronger than the democratic legitimization of CSRs;
Amendment 253 #
2015/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Affirms that a credible commitment to the principle of no-bailout would reinstall ownership on national level without much need of further rules of economic governance, thus reinforcing the sovereignty and responsibility of Member States in terms of economic and fiscal policies;
Amendment 274 #
2015/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Underlines the destructive impact of an overvalued currency on exports, production, employment, wages, income, government revenue and social security systems; calls on the Commission to explore innovative ways of lessening the need for painful internal devaluation;
Amendment 275 #
2015/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)
Paragraph 18 b (new)
18b. Emphasizes that a currency union - in a currency area which is far from optimal - necessarily leaves some Member States trapped with a currency which is overvalued vis-à-vis other members in the currency union; deplores that no easy remedy for the disadvantaged members of the currency union exists and that internal devaluation implies great and long-lasting sacrifices of people living in these Member States;
Amendment 276 #
2015/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 c (new)
Paragraph 18 c (new)
18c. Calls on the Commission to openly acknowledge the fact that some problems of the weaker euro area economies are due to the impossibility of a nominal depreciation in the Eurosystem;
Amendment 277 #
2015/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 d (new)
Paragraph 18 d (new)
18d. Insists that European Semester documents be intellectually honest by discussing the full range of policy options available to tackle problems related to the overvaluation of a currency and to lessen the effects of austerity policies on ordinary people;
Amendment 289 #
2015/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Rejects as incompatible with the very core of national sovereignty all attempts to gradually transfer the budget autonomy of national parliaments to European bodies or institutions; insists that the latter have no competence to go beyond the level of non-binding recommendations (CSRs);
Amendment 290 #
2015/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 b (new)
Paragraph 19 b (new)
19b. Emphasizes that the European Fiscal Board will not have any more competences than are already with the Commission today, hence warns that the EFB may be a completely superfluous body whose only effect is additional costs for the taxpayer;
Amendment 1 #
2015/2132(BUD)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Notes how the pace of economic recovery and long-term growth prospects in the EU are being affected by the slowdown in investment, reflecting in part budgetary constraints in the Member States; welcomes therefore the draft budget’s strong emphasis, in point 1.1, on creating fresh impetus for jobs, growth and investment;
Amendment 10 #
2015/2132(BUD)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Highlights the crucial role to be played byNotes that the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) is supposed to play a crucial role in closing gaps not covered by the market and in attracting private investments; welcomes the agreement reached by the co-legislators on the increase regrets that the underlying contributions to the EFSI to EUR 3 billion, to be found from the overall budgetary margins in the period 2016 to 2020; reaffirms its determination to further reduce the budgetary impact on Horizon 2020 and the Connectauses of the proclaimed investment gap and the sluggish growth ing Europe Facility (CEF)are not addressed;
Amendment 16 #
2015/2132(BUD)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
Amendment 25 #
2015/2132(BUD)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Draws attention to the crucial role of the three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) in relation to EU-level financial supervision and the banking union; emphasises that the 2016 draft budget mustshould only provide for a sufficientn increase in budgetary resources for the ESAs to address the ever-increasing range of tasks being assigned to them, as well as external factors such as exchange rate fluctuations and genif deemed necessary and by internal increases in levels of payredeployment;
Amendment 44 #
2015/2132(BUD)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Calls on the Commission, when to firmly implementing the planned restructuring measures with regard to staff cuts, to focus on its main priorities; emphasises, in that regard, the need to increase staffing in the Directorate-General for Competition, and particularly the department responsible for state aid, so as to ensure that taxation practices in relation to tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect which are questionable under state aid rules can, in future, be properly investigated, thus helping to make corporate taxation in the European Union fairer;
Amendment 15 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Regrets that EU investment in 2013 decreased by 13% compared with the pre- crisis period with investment in some countries decreasing 25% and even by as much as 60% in others, creating a dangerous investment imbalance in the EU; is of the opinion that this constitutes a major challenge forwhose fundamental causes cannot be treated by the EIB;
Amendment 23 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes the urgent need for an increase in EIB lending activityprivate, self-sustained investment;
Amendment 37 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
Amendment 45 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Emphasises that in order for the EIB to be able to support set economic goals, trust in the soundness of the financial situation of the institution itself as well as in the projects it supports are key; therefore, the bank’s lending activities have to be of high quality;
Amendment 54 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Takes note of the establishment of the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI) and emphasises the need for the EFSI to function in an effective, transparent and fair way and to take into account that priority should be given to projects in strategic sectors, countries in adjustment programmes and regions which have difficulties in attracting funding because of their high risk environmentonly support projects which are technically and economically sound and viable;
Amendment 82 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Calls on the EIB to refrain from cooperating with financial partners with a proven negative track record and to enforce prevention measures against tax havens, fraud and evasion as well as aggressivjurisdictions officially declared to be tax havoidanceens by the OECD;
Amendment 94 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Calls on the EIB to re-evaluate the private- public partnerships in terms of their profitability for the relevant economies and soto provide services to the cieties and to examine alternative methods of fuzens reliably, at high quality and ing, possibly through increasing public investments a cost-efficient way;
Amendment 100 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Underlines in this context that Member States where private-public partnerships are less developed could consider guidelines to encourage more efficient use of this type of contracts;
Amendment 112 #
2015/2115(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Stresses that the positive impact of the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) on money and credit dynamics remains modest, with new loans to enterprises still weak and with significant differences across euro area economies; notes that since the launch of the APP, medium-term inflation expectations have risen, gradually converging towards the target of 2 %, while the risks of a deflation trap may have decreased; asks the ECB to apply the APP to all Member States, without discrimination;
Amendment 152 #
2015/2115(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
Amendment 182 #
2015/2115(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Notes that austerity policiesthe introduction of the Euro caused an interest rate convergence among the Euro Area and induced a credit-financed boom in the countries in Europe's periphery; notes further that after the burst of the bubble austerity policies were deemed necessary in a number of Member States and have contributed to stagnation and recession, with damaging effects on euro area members’ public accounts, levels of unemployment and social cohesion; states the fact that these member states cannot cope with their debt burden via austerity policy making a debt relief the only possible starting point to solve the underlying causes of the crisis;
Amendment 225 #
2015/2115(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Calls for a thorough assessment of the Troika’s modus operandi and of the ECB’s involvement in the Troika and Quadriga frameworks, with a view to clarifying and redefining the scope of responsibilities and ensuring greater democratic accountability in the adoption and implementation of bailout programmes; invites the Council to reconsider the involvement of the ECB and IMF in the Troika;
Amendment 244 #
2015/2115(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
Amendment 256 #
2015/2115(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
Amendment 1 #
2015/2095(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Considers that the migration crisis can be addressed only within the context of a European approach and not by bilateral meetings among Members States; calls for a new European agenda on migration under the leadership of the Commission and the European Council, underpinned by solidarity among the Member States. This agenda might include the replacement of the Dublin regulation with a centralised European asylum system; calls for compliance with the Schengen acquis and the Dublin Regulation by all Member States as well as solidarity among the Member States; reaffirms the need, in reorienting EU migration policy, to take account of the absorption capacity of Member States and to distinguish clearly between those entitled to asylum and refugees on the one hand and economic migrants on the other; considers it essential to respect both the rights of those entitled to asylum and refugees and economic migrants and to insist that they comply with their obligations; stresses the need not to impede Member States in the application of existing national and EU law, even when it comes to immigration control measures or demanding that those entitled to asylum and refugees meet their obligations;
Amendment 32 #
2015/2095(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Considers it essential, as a long-term measure, to improve living conditions in developing countries; considers it necessary that EU Member States conduct development cooperation in a more focused manner than in the past ; considers it useful to hold consultations about the possibility of sponsoring individual countries, whereby one EU Member State would be responsible for at least one developing country and provide model and comprehensive development aid for infrastructure, agriculture, education, health, justice and administration; considers that, given the current political situation, country sponsorships of this kind should focus on the Middle East and Africa as a matter of priority;
Amendment 36 #
2015/2095(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Calls on the Commission and Member States to take measures that are effective both immediately and in the long term to combat people-trafficking in the countries of origin, transit and destination; calls on Member States to apply existing laws consistently and, where necessary, to adjust their national laws accordingly; considers it necessary for this purpose to enter into cooperation with the countries of North Africa and the Middle East, which will make it possible to completely prevent the illegal landing of boats through the use of naval forces; notes that migrants who wish to go illegally to Europe by boat and ship should be returned to their countries of departure, provided they are not subject to persecution in these countries; notes, furthermore, that all other migrants who cannot be returned to their country of origin, should be brought to a UN protection area or a third country willing to accept them, in which they are not subject to persecution; stresses that asylum applications should also be lodged outside the EU;
Amendment 37 #
2015/2095(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 c (new)
Paragraph 2 c (new)
2c. Stresses that asylum seekers and refugees should make their applications, as a matter of principle, in the diplomatic representation of an EU Member State outside the European Union, so as to avoid the costs, deprivation and danger of illegal entry; stresses the need to increase the staff in the representations of EU Member States accordingly; considers it essential to agree with countries in North Africa and the Middle East to establish safe initial reception centres, where asylum and refugee procedures can be operated; advocates that the Commission and Member States should in return pay financial compensation or commit significantly more resources to development cooperation;
Amendment 38 #
2015/2095(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 d (new)
Paragraph 2 d (new)
2d. Calls on Member States and the Commission to support the establishment and robust enforcement of UN protection zones and provide sufficient financial resources and staff to this end; recalls that in civil wars the United Nations should create protection zones where people can find refuge; stresses the need to apply the United Nations‘ right of intervention provided for by international law if a State is manifestly unable to exercise its State authority; considers it vital that the protection zones should be militarily protected by the international community and equipped with the necessary infrastructure to enable people to remain in their home region;
Amendment 41 #
2015/2095(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to maximise the positive contribution of migration and human mobility in global development, as recognised objectively to analyse positive, negative and problematic aspects of migration and ensure that the findings of this analysis inform the first time in the post- 2015 development agenda and the proposed Sustainable Development Goals and their migration targetsir policy in all relevant areas (development, integration, education, social affairs, labour market, housing, etc.);
Amendment 44 #
2015/2095(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to take action and, where necessary, to adjust the legal framework accordingly so as to allow asylum seekers apprehended without identity cards in a Member State to be transferred forthwith firstly to a safe third country outside the EU, where asylum seekers can seek to obtain substitute documents; considers it necessary that the Commission and Member States conclude agreements to this effect with any third countries that declare themselves ready to receive and treat in a humane manner asylum-seekers without papers in return for financial aid and staff support; considers it reasonable to expect asylum seekers who receive hospitality to earn a living themselves after an appropriate transition period;
Amendment 46 #
2015/2095(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 b (new)
Paragraph 3 b (new)
3b. Calls on the Commission and Member States to use existing readmission agreements with safe countries of origin to allow the voluntary departure or deportation of rejected asylum seekers and, where necessary, swiftly to conclude further readmission agreements;
Amendment 6 #
2015/2058(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Expresses concerns about the level of corruption and untransparent public administration in many developing countries which hinders tax revenues from being invested in state-building, public services or public infrastructure;
Amendment 8 #
2015/2058(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 b (new)
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Stresses that when negotiating tax treaties with developing countries, taxes should be levied in the country in which value added is created and the aggregate tax burden should be roughly proportional to all kinds of public services provided by the government and used by the citizens;
Amendment 19 #
2015/2058(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Calls for the immediate introduction of a consolidated common tax base for corpn Automatic Exchange of Information tax in order to standardise tax returnsmechanism;
Amendment 23 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas taxation can be a reliable and sustainable source of development finance if there is a progressivn incentive compatible taxation regime, an effective and efficient tax administration to promote tax compliance, and transparent and accountable use of public revenue;
Amendment 26 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas fair tax regimes may provide vital finance to governments to cover citizens’' rights to basic services, such as healthcare and education for all, and whereas effective redistributive fiscal policies are essential incontribute to decreasing the effect of growing inequalities;
Amendment 31 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
Amendment 38 #
2015/2058(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Calls on the Commission to set up an programme to assist developing countries in combating tax fraud which should include in particular human resources training and the development of administrative structures, corruption and inefficiencies in public administration;
Amendment 39 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas developing countries still rely heavily on taxes from trade, which exposes national budgets to volatile commodity price, and are having difficulties in shifting to other types of domestic resources;
Amendment 43 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)
Recital F b (new)
Fb. whereas corporate tax revenues constitute a significant share of developing countries' national income, and in the past years developing countries have continually lowered corporate tax rates;
Amendment 45 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas, comparatively speaking, developing countries raise substantially less revenue than advanced economies (with a tax-to-GDP ratio ranging between 10 to 20%, as opposed to 30 to 40% of OECD economies) and are characterised by extremely narrow tax bases,; and whereas there is - especially in the least industrialised countries (LICs) - considerable potential for increasbroadening the tax-to-GDP ratio, especially in the least industrialised countries (LICs) base, thus allowing for lower tax rates without lowering the tax-to-GDP ratio;
Amendment 50 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas developing countries have been offering various tax incentives and exemptions, leadinglower level of public services and public infrastructure on the one hand and various non-transparent tax incentives and exemptions not based on a proper cost- benefit analysis on the other, they often tend to compete against each other when offering the most favourable tax treatments. This may lead to harmful tax competition and a ‘'race to the bottom’' that brings greater benefit to multinational corporations (MNCs) than to developing countries;
Amendment 53 #
2015/2058(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Notes that the most effective way to help developing countries is helping them to develop fair and efficient tax systems and to provide technical support to their tax administrations to help them to maintain sustainable domestic taxation systems;
Amendment 54 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Recital H a (new)
Ha. whereas some developing countries pursue aggressive tax policies which encourage tax avoidance and tax evasion; whereas such practices are detrimental to the citizens both of developed countries and other developing countries;
Amendment 54 #
2015/2058(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 b (new)
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6b. Encourages developing countries to implement tax reforms which combine a broadening of the tax base with lower individual tax rates;
Amendment 55 #
2015/2058(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 c (new)
Paragraph 6 c (new)
6c. Calls on developing countries to set an end to all types of tax policies which encourage tax avoidance and tax evasion detrimental to other countries and to their own citizens; urges developing countries to fully cooperate with developed countries in the elimination of such practices;
Amendment 57 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H b (new)
Recital H b (new)
Hb. whereas tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions that allow banking or financial information to be kept private, combined with 'zero-tax' regimes to attract capital and revenues that should have been taxed in other countries, generate harmful tax competition with a loss of an estimated $189 billion of tax revenue annually;
Amendment 60 #
2015/2058(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Calls on the OSCEECD and the G20 to abide by their pledges and adopt the latest BEPS measures in 2015;
Amendment 65 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas many developing countries cannot attain even the minimum tax level necessary to finance their basic functioning, their public services and their efforts to reduce poverty; whereas tax avoidance and tax evasion are certainly not the only causes for government dysfunction and insufficient poverty reduction;
Amendment 67 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)
Recital I a (new)
Ia. whereas a recent impact assessment carried out by the Netherlands government concluded that the Dutch tax system facilitated avoidance of withholding tax, leading to foregone dividends and interest from withholding tax revenues in developing countries in the range of 150-550 million euros per year;
Amendment 67 #
2015/2058(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
Amendment 74 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
K. whereas it is not at all obvious that revenue raising can have an important role to play in rebalancing gender inequalities;
Amendment 77 #
2015/2058(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Supports increased participation of developing countries in the structures and procedures of international tax cooperation; encourages developing countries to participate in the OECD multilateral convention negotiations and aims at improving the OECD Model Tax Convention. Calls for a code of conduct to be established for governments of the countries concerned in order to ensure tax systems are managed efficiently;
Amendment 81 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Calls on the Commission to put forward an action plan, in the form of a communication, on supporting developing countries in fighting tax dodgingcorruption and tax dodging, reducing barriers to international trade and setting up fairer tax systems, taking into account the work undertaken by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD in advance of the Financing for Development Conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to be held from 13 to 16 July 2015, and the impact of international tax treaties on developing countries;
Amendment 83 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Expresses concerns about the level of corruption and non-transparent public administration in many developing countries which hinder tax revenues from being invested in state-building, public services or public infrastructure;
Amendment 83 #
2015/2058(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
Amendment 88 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Stresses that tax avoidance and tax evasion represent a considerable financial loss for developing countries, and that taking appropriate measures at national, European and international level against these practices should be a top priority for the EU;
Amendment 97 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Encourages developing countries to implement tax reforms which combine a broadening of the tax base with lower individual tax rates;
Amendment 101 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Asks the Commission to give good governance in tax matters and fair tax collection a high place on the agenda in its policy dialogue (political, development and trade) and in all development cooperation agreements with partner countries, enhancing ownership and domestic accountability by fostering an environment where national parliaments are able to meaningfully contribute to the formulation and oversight of national budgets, including on domestic revenues and tax matters, and supporting the role of civil society in ensuring public scrutiny of tax governance and monitoring of cases of tax fraud, inter alia by setting up effective systems for protecting whistleblowers and journalistic sources;
Amendment 109 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Urges that information on beneficial ownership of companies, trusts and other institutions should be made publicly available in open-data formats, in order to prevent anonymous shell companies and similar legal structures from being used to finance illegal activities;
Amendment 114 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Calls on the EU and the Member States to enforce the principle that multinational companies, and especially those companies extracting natural resources, must adopt country-by-country reporting (CBCR) as standard, requiring them to publish as part of their annual report on a country-by-country basis for each territory in which they operate including the names of all subsidiaries, their financial performance, relevant tax information, assets and number of employees, and to ensure that this information is publicly available;
Amendment 119 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Calls for the establishment of a globally accepted definition of tax havens, of penalties for operators making use of them and of a blacklist of countries that do not combat tax evasion or accept it, as has been called for previously;
Amendment 120 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 b (new)
Paragraph 7 b (new)
7b. Calls on developing countries to set an end to all types of tax policies which encourage tax avoidance and tax evasion detrimental to other countries and to their own citizens; urges developing countries to fully cooperate with developed countries in the elimination of such practices;
Amendment 121 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 c (new)
Paragraph 7 c (new)
7c. Urges developing countries to decisively tackle the problem of domestic tax evasion and tax avoidance and reduce the size of the informal sector; urges them for this purpose to design an incentive compatible tax system with tax rates which are considered fair and affordable and the tax base in a simple, comprehensive way;
Amendment 131 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. UrgNotes the Commission and all the Member States, following the example of some Member States, to conduct impact assessments of European tax policies on developing countries, in order to strengthen policy coherence for development and remove pat the most effective way to help developing countries is to helping them to develop fair and efficient tax systems and to provide technical support to their tax administracticeons that have negative spillovers on developing countrieo help them maintain sustainable domestic taxation systems;
Amendment 138 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Stresses thant when negotiating tax treaties with developing countries, source- country taxation rights should be preservtaxes should be levied in the country in which value added is created, and the UN Model Tax Convention should be preferred to the OECD Model Tax Convention in order to avoid a bias towards developed countries’ interests and ensure a fair distribution of taxing rightaggregate tax burden should be roughly proportional to all kinds of public services provided by the government and used by the citizens;
Amendment 140 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Urges the EU and the Member States to ensure that the UN taxation committee is transformed into a genuine intergovernmental body equipped with additional resources, ensuring thatStrongly supports increased participation by developing countries in the structures and procedures of international tax cooperation; encourages developing countries canto participate equally in the global reform of existing international tax rulesin the OECD multilateral convention negotiations and aims at improving the OECD Model Tax Convention;
Amendment 147 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Stresses that gender analysis should be made central to tax justicetax evasion undermines government support to poor and lower- income households, in many of which women are disproportionately represented;
Amendment 156 #
2015/2058(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Calls on the EIB to ensure that companies that receive EIB support do not participate in tax evasion via offshore centres and tax havens, and to increase its transparency policy by, for example, making all of its reports and investigations publicly available;
Amendment 201 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital W
Recital W
W. whereas the overall efficiency of tax collection, the notion of tax fairness and the credibility of national tax administrations are not undermined only by aggressive tax planning and BEPS activities; whereas the Union should take similarly decisive action to address the problems of tax evasion and tax fraud within both corporate and individual taxation as well as problems relating to the collection of taxes other than corporate taxes; whereas those other elements of tax collection and administration represent a substantial part of the existing tax gap;
Amendment 206 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Recital X
Recital X
Amendment 233 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 1 – Subtitle 1 – indent 2 – point 1
Annex – title 1 – Subtitle 1 – indent 2 – point 1
the results of the Commission’s consultation into CBC-R, conducted between 17 June and 9 September 2015, which examined different options for the possible implementation of CBC-R in the Union; the results of the consultation should be considered particularly in relation to the protection of sensitive corporate data and company secrets;
Amendment 238 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 1 – subtitle 2
Annex – title 1 – subtitle 2
Amendment 246 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 1 – subtitle 3 – introductory part
Annex – title 1 – subtitle 3 – introductory part
The European Parliament calls on the European Commission to bring forward a proposal as soon as possible on a new mechanism whereby Member States are compelled to inform other Member States (initially via the Code of Conduct Group)and the Commission’s Directorate- General for Competition if they intend to introduce a new allowance, relief, exception, incentive or similar measure that could have a material impact on the effective tax rate in the Member State or on the tax base of another Member State.
Amendment 250 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 1 – subtitle 3 – indent 1
Annex – title 1 – subtitle 3 – indent 1
These notifications by Member States shall contain spillover analysessessments of the material impact of the new tax measures on other Member States and developing countries, to support the action of the Code of Conduct Group in identifying harmful tax practices.
Amendment 251 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 1 – subtitle 3 – indent 2
Annex – title 1 – subtitle 3 – indent 2
Amendment 261 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 1 – subtitle 4
Annex – title 1 – subtitle 4
Amendment 289 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 1 – subtitle 6
Annex – title 1 – subtitle 6
Amendment 305 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 1 – subtitle 7 – indent 2
Annex – title 1 – subtitle 7 – indent 2
Amendment 306 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 1 – subtitle 7 – indent 3
Annex – title 1 – subtitle 7 – indent 3
Amendment 308 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 1 – subtitle 7 – indent 4
Annex – title 1 – subtitle 7 – indent 4
Amendment 315 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 2 – subtitle 1
Annex – title 2 – subtitle 1
Amendment 324 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 2 – subtitle 1 – paragraph 1
Annex – title 2 – subtitle 1 – paragraph 1
As a first step, by June 2016, a mandatory Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB) in the Union, with an exemption for small- and medium-sized enterprises and companies with no cross-border activity, in order to have only one set of rules for companies operating in several Member States to calculate theirin order to have only one set of rules for calculating companies’ taxable profits.
Amendment 336 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 2 – subtitle 1 – paragraph 2
Annex – title 2 – subtitle 1 – paragraph 2
As a second step, as soon as possible and certainly no later than the end of 2017, a mandatory CCCTB, taking into due consideration the range of different options (factoring in the costs, for example, of incorporating small and medium enterprises and companies with no cross-border activity);
Amendment 339 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 2 – subtitle 1 – Paragraph 3
Annex – title 2 – subtitle 1 – Paragraph 3
Amendment 351 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 2 – subtitle 2
Annex – title 2 – subtitle 2
Recommendation B2. Strengthen the mandate and improve transparency of the Council’s Code of Conduct on Business Taxation Group The European Parliament calls on the Commission to bring forward a proposal to incorporate the Code of Conduct Group into the Community method, as a CounciThe European Parliament calls on the Commission to bring forward a proposal for further developing the Directorate- General Wforking group, with the participation of the European Commission and the European Parliament as an observer. • The Code of Conduct group (CoC Group) shall become more transparent and more accountable, including through: ° Regular provision, update and publication of its oversight of the extent to which Member States meet the recommendations set out by the Group in its six-monthly progress report to finance ministers; ° Regular provision, update and publication of a list every two years of harmful tax practices; ° Regular provision and publication of its minutes; ° Regular participation of Finance Ministers or senior officials, to raise the profile of the body. • The tasks of the CoC Group shall include: ° Identifying harmful tax practices in the Union; ° Proposing measures and timelines for the elimination of harmful tax practices, and monitoring the results of the recommendations/measures proposed; ° Review Competition to turn it into an autonomous Competition Agency independent of the Commission. The remit of the Competition Agency should include what are currently the tasks of the Directorate-General for Competition. The new Agency should also be tasked with proceeding against distortions of competition ing the reports on spillover effects of new tax measures provided by Member States as stipulated above, and assessing whether action is required; ° Proposing other initiatives focused on tax measures in the external policy of the Union; ° Improving enforcement mechanisms against those practices which facilitate aggressive tax planningsingle market caused by Member States’ granting companies selective tax advantages.
Amendment 371 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 3 – subtitle 1
Annex – title 3 – subtitle 1
Amendment 392 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 3 – subtitle 3 – indent 3 - point 7 a (new)
Annex – title 3 – subtitle 3 – indent 3 - point 7 a (new)
The Commission shall check whether existing trade agreements with countries identified as tax havens can be suspended or terminated.
Amendment 402 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 3 – subtitle 5 – indent 1 - point 3 a (new)
Annex – title 3 – subtitle 5 – indent 1 - point 3 a (new)
To ensure that all Member States potentially affected by a transfer pricing approval decision in any given Member State are informed of that decision by the Member State in question.
Amendment 405 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 3 – subtitle 7 – introductory part
Annex – title 3 – subtitle 7 – introductory part
The European Parliament calls on the European Commission to bring forward a proposal in the medium termwithout delay a proposal for:
Amendment 407 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 3 – subtitle 7 – indent 2
Annex – title 3 – subtitle 7 – indent 2
Tax policies that are not consistent with state aid policy should be specpublicly identified by the Commission in order to give companies and Member States guidance and improved legal certainty.
Amendment 414 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 3 – subtitle 8 – indent 4
Annex – title 3 – subtitle 8 – indent 4
Amendment 419 #
2015/2010(INL)
Motion for a resolution
Annex – title 4 – subtitle 1
Annex – title 4 – subtitle 1
Amendment 119 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 a (new)
Recital 5 a (new)
Amendment 120 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5 b (new)
Recital 5 b (new)
Amendment 298 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 1
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 1
Amendment 303 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 2
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 2
Amendment 308 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 3
Article 1 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – indent 3
Amendment 355 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41a – title
Article 41a – title
Amendment 378 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41a – paragraph 3
Article 41a – paragraph 3
Amendment 388 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41a – paragraph 4 a (new)
Article 41a – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. The Member State in which the DGS is registered shall be held liable for the rest of the liquidity shortfall of the DGS concerned, when the liquidity shortfall exceeds the limits set out in paragraph 4 of this Article.
Amendment 394 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41b – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 41b – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Deposits referred to in Article 6(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU shall be excluded from the calculation of the liquidity shortfall as determined in paragraph 1 and 2. The DIF shall not provide funding for measures referred to in Article 11(3) and (6) of Directive 2014/49/EU.
Amendment 397 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41c
Article 41c
Amendment 409 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Part IIa – title I – chapter 2
Part IIa – title I – chapter 2
Amendment 425 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Part IIa – title I – chapter 3
Part IIa – title I – chapter 3
Amendment 458 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation No 806/2014
Article 41i – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 41i – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. A participating DGS shall not be covered by EDIS in the reinsurance, co- insurance or full insurance phase, if the Commission, acting on its own initiative or upon a request of the Board or a participating Member State, decides and informs the Board accordingly, the DGS, the designated authority of the participating Member State within the meaning of point 18 of Article 2 of Directive 2014/49/EU, and the national competent authority or authorities, that at least one of the following disqualifying conditions is met:
Amendment 464 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation No 806/2014
Article 41i – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 41i – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the participating DGS has failed to comply with the obligations under this Regulation or under Articles 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 10 of Directive 2014/49/EU;
Amendment 468 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41i – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 41i – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. The Board shall monitor compliance with the provisions set out in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) on a continuous basis. If the Board identifies instances of non-compliance with any of the obligations under paragraph 1 (a) and (b), it shall immediately inform the Commission thereof.
Amendment 469 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41i – paragraph 1 b (new)
Article 41i – paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. If the Commission considers that at least one of the disqualifying conditions is met, it shall deliver a letter of formal notice to the DGS concerned and to the designated authority of the participating Member State within the meaning of point 18 of Article 2 of Directive 2014/49/EU, as well as to the national competent authority or authorities. It shall also inform the Member State or Member States concerned. In that letter, the Commission shall set out the reasons for considering disqualifying the participating DGS from coverage by EDIS. Within two months of receipt of such formal notice, the designated authority, in close cooperation with the DGS concerned and the national competent authority, shall: (a) take prompt corrective action to address the shortcomings identified and to ensure that the disqualifying conditions are no longer met; (b) submit to the Commission a reply in which they set out in detail the corrective action they have taken.
Amendment 470 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41i – paragraph 1 c (new)
Article 41i – paragraph 1 c (new)
1c. The Commission shall disqualify the participating DGS from coverage by EDIS in accordance with paragraph 1, where it, having assessed the corrective action taken and consulted with the Board, considers that the DGS or the designated national authority remain non-compliant.
Amendment 471 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation No 806/2014
Article 41i – paragraph 2
Article 41i – paragraph 2
2. When funding has already been obtained by a participating DGS and at least one of the disqualifying conditions referred to in paragraph 1 is met in relation to a payout event or a use in resolution, the Commission may order full or partial repayment of the funding to the DIFshall immediately order full repayment of the funding to the DIF within two years. The Member State in which the participating DGS is registered shall be held liable for full repayment, if, within the time limit set out in the first subparagraph, the participating DGS fails to repay in full the funding obtained.
Amendment 486 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41j – paragraph 1
Article 41j – paragraph 1
1. A participating DGS shall only be reinsured, co-insured or fully insured by EDIS during the year following any of the dates set out below, if, by that date,insured by EDIS if its available financial means raised by contributions referred to in Article 10(1) of Directive 2014/49/EU amount to at least the following percentages0.60% of the total amount of covered deposits of all credit institutions affiliated to the participating DGS: – by 3 July 2017: 0.14%; – by 3 July 2018: 0.21%; – by 3 July 2019: 0.28%; – by 3 July 2020: 0.28%; – by 3 July 2021: 0.26%; – by 3 July 2022: 0.20%; – by 3 July 2023: 0.11%; – by 3 July 2024: 0%. This is without prejudice to the first subparagraph of Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/49/EU.
Amendment 509 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 k
Article 41 k
Where a participating DGS has been informed by the competent authority about, or has otherwise become aware of, circumstances relating to a credit institution affiliated to that participating DGS that are likely to result in a payout event or its use in resolution proceedings, it shall inform the Board about such circumstances without delay if it intends to request coverage by EDIS. In this case the participating DGS shall also provide the Board with an estimate of the expected liquidity shortfall or liquidity need.
Amendment 528 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 n – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
Article 41 n – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)
(ba) within 3 months of the determination referred to in Article 41m, the Board shall establish a repayment plan that ensures that the funding provided by the Board under Article 41n will be repaid in full within five years by the participating DGS.
Amendment 533 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
Article 41 o – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
The Member State or Member States in which the participating DGS was established, officially recognised or approved in accordance with Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/59/EU shall guarantee repayment of the funds provided by the Board.
Amendment 534 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 1
Article 41 o – paragraph 1
1. The participating DGS shall repay in full the funding provided by the Board under Article 41n, less the amount of any excess loss cover in case of coverage under Article 41a or any loss cover in case of coverage under Article 41d or Article 41h.
Amendment 536 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 41 o – paragraph 1 a (new)
Amendment 537 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 1 b (new)
Article 41 o – paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. The following conditions for the repayment plan shall apply: (a) the minimum annual repayment by the participating DGS shall be 15 % of the funding provided by the Board under Article 41n; and (b) each year, the Board shall reassess the level of expected recoveries and recalibrate the repayment plan for the remaining years in accordance with that assessment.
Amendment 544 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 3 a (new)
Article 41 o – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. The repayment plan shall also establish the refunding path for the participating DGS to return to its target level as set out in Article 41j. The minimum yearly refunding of the participating DGS to return to its target level shall be 0.05 % of covered deposits or the amount remaining until the target level has been reached. In the event of insufficient funds, the repayment plan shall provide that the repayment of the funds provided by the DIF to the participating DGS shall take priority over the refunding of the participating DGS.
Amendment 545 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 3 b (new)
Article 41 o – paragraph 3 b (new)
3b. The Member State in which the participating DGS is registered shall be held liable for full repayment, if the participating DGS fails to repay in full the funding obtained within the time limit set out in point (b a) of Article 41n.
Amendment 546 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 o – paragraph 4
Article 41 o – paragraph 4
Amendment 558 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 50 a – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 50 a – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) once the net accumulated use of the DIF in the last consecutive 12 months reaches the threshold of 25% of the final target level, evaluateevaluate, an annual basis, the application of EDIS, in particular the use of the DIF, and provide guidance which the executive session shall follow in subsequent payout decisions, in particular, if appropriate, differentiating between the provision of funding and loss cover;
Amendment 578 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 a – paragraph 2
Article 74 a – paragraph 2
2. The Board shall use the DIF only in order to provide the funding to, and cover the losses of, participating DGS in the different stages set out in Article 1(2) andliquidity support to participating DGS in accordance with the objectives and the principles governing EDIS referred to in Article 6. Under no circumstances shall the Union budget or the national budgets be held liable for expenses or losses of the Fund.
Amendment 615 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 b – paragraph 2
Article 74 b – paragraph 2
Amendment 621 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 b – paragraph 3
Article 74 b – paragraph 3
Amendment 628 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 b – paragraph 4
Article 74 b – paragraph 4
Amendment 632 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 b – paragraph 5
Article 74 b – paragraph 5
Amendment 639 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 1
Article 74 c – paragraph 1
1. Each year during the reinsurance and co-insurance period, the Board shall, after consulting the ECB and the national competent authority and in close cooperation with the participating DGSs and designated authorities, determine for each participating DGS the total amount of ex-ante contributions that it may claim from the credit institutions affiliated to the respective participating DGS in order to reach or maintain the target levels provided for in Article 74b. The total amount of contributions shall not exceed the target levels provided for in Article 74b (1) and (2).
Amendment 663 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 4
Article 74 c – paragraph 4
Amendment 683 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 3
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 3
Amendment 692 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point b
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point b
(b) the ability of credit institution’s abffilityated to a participating DGS to meet its their short- and long-term obligations;
Amendment 694 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point c
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point c
(c) the stability and variety of the institutions sources of funding and itssources of funding of credit institutions affiliated to a participating DGS and their unencumbered highly liquid assets’;
Amendment 698 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point d
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point d
(d) the quality of the assets of credit institution’s assetsffiliated to a participating DGS;
Amendment 701 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point e
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point e
(e) the institution’s business model and management of credit institutions affiliated to a participating DGS;
Amendment 704 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point f
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point f
(f) the degree to which the assets of credit institution’s assetsffiliated to a participating DGS are encumbered.;
Amendment 709 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point f a (new)
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point f a (new)
(fa) the potential for a participating DGS to achieve a full and timely recovery from insolvency procedures;
Amendment 714 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point f b (new)
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 4 – point f b (new)
(fb) the level and diversification of exposure to sovereign debt by credit institutions affiliated to a participating DGS.
Amendment 721 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 d
Article 74 d
Amendment 749 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 g – paragraph 3
Article 74 g – paragraph 3
3. Any expenses incurred by the use of the borrowings specified in paragraph 1 shall be borne by Part III of the budget of the Board and not by the Union budget or the participating Member StatesDGS concerned.
Amendment 751 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 g – paragraph 3 a (new)
Article 74 g – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. The Member State in which the participating DGS is registered shall be liable for the liquidity shortfall of the participating DGS, when all available financial means of the DIF have been depleted, and when the DIF has, in accordance with paragraph 1b, exhausted the measures set out in paragraph 1 and 1a.
Amendment 112 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 3 a (new)
Recital 3 a (new)
(3a) It should be specified in this Directive that the activities of a dealer include not only the manufacturing but also the modification or conversion a firearm, such as the shortening of a complete firearm, and in addition the commercial modification or conversion of parts of firearms and of ammunition, and that, therefore, only authorised dealers should be permitted to engage in those activities. This Directive should not apply to reloading of ammunition for personal use or making legal modifications and conversions to a firearm for which a person has an authorization.
Amendment 152 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 4
Recital 4
(4) BCollectors and bodies concerned with the cultural and historical aspects of weapons and recognised as such by the Member State in whose territory they are established and shoulding in their possession firearms classified in category A acquired before the date of entry into force of this Directive should be able to keep those firearms in their possession subject to authorisation by the Member State concerned and provided that those firearms have been deactivat be able to keep and acquire firearms classified in category A subject to authorisation by the Member State concerned.
Amendment 172 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 5
Recital 5
Amendment 220 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
Recital 9
Amendment 279 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 13
Recital 13
(13) Furthermore, the risk of alarm weapons and other types of blank firing weapons being converted to real firearms is high, and in some of the terrorist acts converted arms were used. It is therefore essential to address the problem of converted firearms being used in criminal offences, notably by including them in the scope of the Directive. Technical specifications for alarm and signal weapons as well as for salute and acoustic weapons should be adopted in order to ensure that they cannot be converted into firearms.
Amendment 316 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 1 – point a
Article 1 – point 1 – point a
Directive 91/477/EEC
Article 1 – paragraph 1b
Article 1 – paragraph 1b
1b. For the purposes of this Directive, "essential component" shall mean the barrel, frame, receiver, slide or cylinder, bolt or breaech block and any device designed or adapted to diminish the sound caused by firing a firearm which, being separate objects, are included in the category of the firearms on which they are or are intended to be mounted.
Amendment 330 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 1 – point b
Article 1 – point 1 – point b
Directive 91/477/EEC
Article 1 –paragraph 1e
Article 1 –paragraph 1e
1e. For the purposes of this Directive, "broker" shall mean any natural or legal person, other than a dealer whose trade or business consists wholly or partly in buying, selling or arranging the transfer within a Member State, from one Member State to another Member State or exporting to a third country or importing into a Member State from a third country fully assembled firearms, their parts and ammunition.
Amendment 361 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 1 – point c
Article 1 – point 1 – point c
Directive 91/477/EEC
Article 1 – paragraph 1h
Article 1 – paragraph 1h
Amendment 406 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 2
Article 1 – point 2
Directive 91/477/EEC
Article 2 – paragraph 2
Article 2 – paragraph 2
2. This Directive shall not apply to the acquisition or possession of weapons and ammunition, in accordance with national law, by the armed forces, the police, the public authorities or by collectors and bodies concerned with the cultural and historical aspects of weapons and recognised as such by the Member State in whose territory they are established. Nor shall it apply to commercial transfers of weapons and ammunition of warproducts of the defence industry.
Amendment 434 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 3
Article 1 – point 3
Directive 91/477/EEC
Article 4 – paragraph 1
Article 4 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that any firearm or parand any essential component placed on the market has been marked and registered in compliance with this Directive.
Amendment 452 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 3
Article 1 – point 3
Directive 91/477/EEC
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
For the purposes of identifying and tracing each assembled firearm, Member States shall, at the time of manufacture of each firearm or at the time of import into the Union or as soon as possible thereafter, require a unique marking including the name of the manufacturer, the country or place of manufacture, the serial number and the year of manufacture, if not already part of the serial number. This shall be without prejudice to the affixing of the manufacturer's trademark.
Amendment 460 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 3
Article 1 – point 3
Directive 91/477/EEC
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Amendment 519 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 6
Article 1 – point 6
Directive 91/477/EEC
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point a
Amendment 536 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Directive 91/477/EEC
Article 5 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 5 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. The acquisition and possession of firearms shall only be permitted if, inter alia, there is good cause. Member States, whilst not being under any obligation in that regard, may decide that the acquisition and possession of firearms for the purpose of, for example, hunting, target shooting, self-defence, reservist training, various scientific, technical and testing activities and re-enactment of historical events, filmmaking or historical study constitutes good cause.
Amendment 549 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 6
Article 1 – point 6
Directive 91/477/EEC
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Member States shall provide for standard medical tests for issuing or renewing authorisations as referred to in paragraph 1 and shall withdraw authorisations if any of the conditions on the basis of which it wasthey were granted is no longer met.
Amendment 578 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 6
Article 1 – point 6
Directive 91/477/EEC
Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. This Directive is without prejudice to the ownership of firearms and ammunition acquired through inheritance. Member States shall prohibit the possession of such firearms by owners who are not duly authorised.
Amendment 590 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 6
Article 1 – point 6
Directive 91/477/EEC
Article 6 – paragraph 1
Article 6 – paragraph 1
Member States shall take all appropriate steps to prohibit the acquisition and the possession of the firearms and ammunition classified in category A and to destroy those. In exceptional and duly reasoned cases, the competent authorities may grant authorisations for the acquisition and possession of such firearms and ammunition wheld in violation of this provison and seizedre this is not contrary to public security or public order.
Amendment 620 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 6
Article 1 – point 6
Directive 91/477/EEC
Article 6 – paragraph 2
Article 6 – paragraph 2
Member States may authorise persons or bodies concerned with the cultural and historical aspects of weapons and recognised as such by the Member State in whose territory they are established to keep in theiracquire and possession firearms classified in category A acquired before [the date of entry into force of this Directive] provided they have been deactivated in accordance with the provisions that implement Article 10(b)when this is not contrary to public security or public order.
Amendment 660 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 7
Article 1 – point 7
Directive 91/477/EEC
Article 7 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 (new)
Article 7 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2 (new)
Amendment 731 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 12
Article 1 – point 12
Directive 91/477/EEC
Article 17 – paragraph 1
Article 17 – paragraph 1
The Commission shall submit every five years submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of this Directive, including a fitness check of the new provisions, accompanied, if appropriate, by proposals in particular as regards the categories of firearms of Annex I and the issues related to new technologies such as 3D printing. The first report shall be submitted by ... [two years after the date of entry into force of this Amending Directive].
Amendment 748 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 13 – point a – point i
Article 1 – point 13 – point a – point i
Directive 91/477/EEC
Annex I – part II – point A – category A – point 6
Annex I – part II – point A – category A – point 6
Amendment 751 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 13 – point a – point i
Article 1 – point 13 – point a – point i
Directive 91/477/EEC
Annex I – part II – point A – category A – point 6
Annex I – part II – point A – category A – point 6
6. Automatic firearms which have been converted into semi-automatic firearms; which have not been authorised in accordance with Article 10ba, with the exception of firearms converted prior to ... [the date of entry into force of this Amending Directive1a]; __________________ 1a In this case, Article 10ba shall be amended as follows: "Member States shall take measures to ensure that long semi-automatic firearms which have been converted from originally automatic firearms cannot be reconverted into automatic firearms. Mechanical design of any particular type of long semi- automatic firearms including conversions of any particular type of originally automatic firearms into semi-automatic firearms must be authorised for civilian use by a competent public authority before being placed on the market."
Amendment 755 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 13 – point a – point i
Article 1 – point 13 – point a – point i
Directive 91/477/EEC
Annex I – part II – point A – category A – point 6
Annex I – part II – point A – category A – point 6
6. AComponents with which a semi- automatic firearms which have can been converted into semi-an automatic firearm without sophisticated skills and tools;
Amendment 762 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 13 – point a – point i
Article 1 – point 13 – point a – point i
Directive 91/477/EEC
Annex I – part II – point A – category A – point 7
Annex I – part II – point A – category A – point 7
Amendment 778 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 13 – point a – point i
Article 1 – point 13 – point a – point i
Directive 91/477/EEC
Annex I – part II – point A – category A – point 8
Annex I – part II – point A – category A – point 8
Amendment 811 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 13 – point a – point iii
Article 1 – point 13 – point a – point iii
Directive 91/477/EEC
Annex I – part II – point A – category C – point 5
Annex I – part II – point A – category C – point 5
5. Alarm and signal weaponsFirearms under categories A, B and points 1 to 4 of category C, after having been converted to alarm, signal, salute and, acoustic weapons as well as replicas;, gas, paintball or airsoft, Flobert, or percussion lock weapons.
Amendment 822 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 13 – point a – point iii
Article 1 – point 13 – point a – point iii
Directive 91/477/EEC
Annex I – part II – point A – category C – point 6
Annex I – part II – point A – category C – point 6
Amendment 830 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 14 – point a
Article 1 – point 14 – point a
Directive 91/477/EEC
Annex I – part III – point a
Annex I – part III – point a
Amendment 838 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – point 14 – point c
Article 1 – point 14 – point c
Directive 91/477/EEC
Annex I – part III – paragraph 2
Annex I – part III – paragraph 2
Amendment 843 #
2015/0269(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive [36 months after publication toin the OJ]. They shall forthwith communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions.
Amendment 33 #
2015/0148(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 8
Recital 8
(8) In order to reflect technological progress in the sectors concerned and adjust them to the relevant period of allocation, provision should be made for the values of the benchmarks for free allocations to installations, determined on the basis of data from the years 2007-8, to be updated in line with observed average improvement. For reasons of predictability, this should be done through applying a factor that represents the best assessment of progress across sectors, which should then take into account robust, objective and verified data from installations so that sectors whose rate of improvement differs considerably from this factor have a benchmark value closer to their actual rate of improvement. Where the data shows a difference from factor reduction of more than 0.5% of the 2007-8 value higher or lower per year over the relevant period, the related benchmark value shall be adjusted by that percentage. Where, nonetheless, the rate of improvement is below 0.3%, the related benchmark value should be adjusted by that percentage. To ensure a level playing field for the production of aromatics, hydrogen and syngas in refineries and chemical plants, the benchmark values for aromatics, hydrogen and syngas should continue to be aligned to the refineries benchmarks.
Amendment 36 #
2015/0148(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 14
Recital 14
(14) The existing provisions which are in place for small installations to be excluded from the EU ETS allow the installations which are excluded to remain so, and ishould be extended to cover installations emitting less than 50,000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent in each of the three years preceding the year of application for exclusion. It should be made possible for Member States to update their list of excluded installations and for Member States currently not making use of this option to do so at the beginning of each trading period and halfway through the period. Installations emitting less than 5,000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent in each of the three years preceding the beginning of each trading period should be excluded from the EU ETS subject to revision every 5 years.
Amendment 40 #
2015/0148(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – point a
Directive 2003/87/EC
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 c
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 c
The total remaining quantity of allowances to be auctioned by Member States, except for half of the quantity of allowances referred to in Article 10a(8) which shall also be taken from the auction share, shall be distributed in accordance with paragraph 2.
Amendment 44 #
2015/0148(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – c a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 – c a (new)
Directive 2003/87/EC
Article 10 – paragraph 5
Article 10 – paragraph 5
(ca) Paragraph 5 is replaced by the following: "The Commission shall monitor the functioning of the European carbon market. Each year, it shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the functioning of the carbon market including the implementation of the auctions, liquidity and the volumes traded. If necessary,The report shall also address the interaction of the EU ETS with other climate and energy policies at the European level, including how these policies impact on the supply-demand balance of the EU ETS. Member States shall ensure that any relevant information is submitted to the Commission at least two months before the Commission adopts the report. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02003L0087-" Or. en 20140430&from=EN)
Amendment 45 #
2015/0148(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point a
Directive 2003/87EC
Article 10 a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Article 10 a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
"The Commission shall be empowered to adopt a delegated acts in accordance with Article 23. This act shall also supplementing this Directive by provideing for additional allocation from the new entrants reserve for significant production increases by applying the samthresholds referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article. The thresholds and allocation adjustments as apply in respect of both significant production increases and partial cessations of operation shall be the same. "
Amendment 46 #
2015/0148(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point b
Directive 2003/87/EC
Article 10 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 a – point i a (new)
Article 10 a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 a – point i a (new)
(ia) On the basis of information submitted pursuant to Article 11, the Commission shall identify that the rate of improvement does not exceed 0.3%. If so, the benchmark value shall be adjusted by 0.3% in respect of each year between 2008 and the middle of the period for which free allocation is to be made.
Amendment 47 #
2015/0148(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point d
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point d
Directive 2003/87/EC
Article 10 a – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1
Article 10 a – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1
"Member States shouldmay adopt financial measures in favour of sectors or sub- sectors which are exposed to a genuine risk of carbon leakage due to significant indirect costs that are actually incurred from greenhouse gas emission costs passed on in electricity prices, taking into account any effects on the internal market. Such financial measures to compensate part of these costs shall be in accordance with state aid rules."
Amendment 48 #
2015/0148(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point e
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 – point e
Directive 2003/87/EC
Article 10 a – paragraph 7 – point i a (new)
Article 10 a – paragraph 7 – point i a (new)
(ia) An installation is deemed to have significantly increased operations, provided that one sub-installation, which contributes to at least 30 % of the installation's final annual amount of emission allowances allocated free of charge or to the allocation of more than 50 000 allowances, increases its activity level in a given calendar year by at least 10% compared to the activity level used for calculating the sub- installation's allocation.
Amendment 49 #
2015/0148(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Directive 2003/87/EC
Article 10 b – paragraph 2 – introductory paragraph
Article 10 b – paragraph 2 – introductory paragraph
2. Sectors and sub-sectors where the product from multiplying their intensity of trade with third countries by their emission intensity is above 0.185 may be included in the group referred to in paragraph 1, on the basis of a qualitative assessment using the following criteria:
Amendment 52 #
2015/0148(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Directive 2003/87/EC
Article 10 b – paragraph 4
Article 10 b – paragraph 4
By 31 December 2019, the Commission shall adopt a delegated act for the precedingin accordance with Article 23 in relation to paragraphs 1 for activities at a 4- digit level (NACE-4 code) bas concerns paragraph 1ed on data for the five most recent calendar years available unless, ion accordance with Article 23, based on dthe basis of evidence, it is more appropriate for activities to be assessed at a for the three most recent calendar years availableurther aggregated or disaggregated level in which case that level of assessment shall be used.
Amendment 62 #
2015/0148(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive 2003/87/EC
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a
(8) In Article 11(1), the following second and third subparagraph iss are added: "A list of installations covered by this Directive for the five years beginning on 1 January 2021 shall be submitted by 30 September 2018, and lists for the subsequent five years shall be submitted every five years thereafter. Each list shall include information on production activity, transfers of heat and gases, electricity production and emissions at sub- installation level over the five calendar years preceding its submission. Free allocations shall only be given to installations where such information is provided. In the case of installations or sub- installations using benchmarks other than the product benchmarks, the improvements of energy efficiency shall not result in a decrease of free allocation pursuant to Article 10a. The Commission shall adopt an implementing act for this purpose in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 22a."
Amendment 63 #
2015/0148(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 a (new)
Directive 2003/87/EC
Article 27 – paragraph 1
Article 27 – paragraph 1
(22a) In Article 27 paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: "Following consultation with the operator, Member States may exclude from the Community scheme installations which have reported to the competent authority emissions of less than 250 000 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent and, where they carry out combustion activities, have a rated thermal input below 35 MW, excluding emissions from biomass, in each of the three years preceding the notification under point (a), and which are subject to measures that will achieve an equivalent contribution to emission reductions, if the Member State concerned complies with the following conditions: (a) it notifies the Commission of each such installation, specifying the equivalent measures applying to that installation that will achieve an equivalent contribution to emission reductions that are in place, before the list of installations pursuant to Article 11(1) has to be submitted and at the latest when this list is submitted to the Commission; (b) it confirms that monitoring arrangements are in place to assess whether any installation emits 250 000 tonnes or more of carbon dioxide equivalent, excluding emissions from biomass, in any one calendar year. Member States may allow simplified monitoring, reporting and verification measures for installations with average annual verified emissions between 2008 and 2010 which are below 5 000 tonnes a year, in accordance with Article 14; (c) it confirms that if any installation emits 250 000 tonnes or more of carbon dioxide equivalent, excluding emissions from biomass, in any one calendar year or the measures applying to that installation that will achieve an equivalent contribution to emission reductions are no longer in place, the installation will be reintroduced into the Community scheme; (d) it publishes the information referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) for public comment. Hospitals may also be excluded if they undertake equivalent measures. lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2003L0087:20090625:en:PDF)" Or. en (http://eur-
Amendment 65 #
2015/0148(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 b (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 b (new)
Directive 2003/87/EC
Article 27 a (new)
Article 27 a (new)
Amendment 66 #
2015/0148(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 c (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22 c (new)
Directive 2003/87/EC
Article 29
Article 29
(22c) Article 29 is replaced by the following: "If, on the basis of the regular reports on the carbon market referred to in Article 10(5), the Commission has evidence that the carbon market is not functioning properly, it shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council. The report may be accompanied, if appropriate, by proposals aiming at increasing transparency of the carbon market and addressing measures to improve its functioning. (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02003L0087-, including measures to limit the impact of overlapping Union-wide energy and climate policies on the supply-demand balance of the EU ETS." Or. en 20140430&from=EN)
Amendment 29 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
Recital 1
(1) The challenge posed by cross-border tax avoidance, aggressive tax planning and harmful tax competition has increased considerably and has become a major focus of concern within the Union and at global level. Tax base erosion is considerably reducing national tax revenues, which hinders Member States in applying growth- friendly tax policies. In particular, rulings concerning tax-driven structures lead to a low level of taxation of artificially high amounts of income in the country giving the advance ruling and may leave artificially low amounts of income to be taxed in any other countries involved. An increase in transparency is therefore urgently required in accordance with OECD standards. The tools and mechanisms established by Council Directive 2011/16/EU13 need to be enhanced in order to achieve this. __________________ 13 Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC (OJ L 64 of 11.3.2011, p. 1).
Amendment 35 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 a (new)
Recital 1 a (new)
(1a) Following the LuxLeaks scandal and by means of this report, the European Parliament expresses its strong determination not to tolerate tax fraud and tax avoidance as well as to advocate for fair distribution of a tax burden between citizens and companies.
Amendment 57 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 8
Recital 8
(8) Member States should exchange the basic information to be communicated also with the Commission, since the Commission must be able to assess independently, if this information is relevant for detecting illegal state aid. This would enable the Commission at any point in time to monitor and evaluate the effective application of the automatic exchange of information on advance cross- border rulings and advance pricing arrangements. Such communication will not discharge a Member State from its obligations to notify any state aid to the Commission.
Amendment 60 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 8 a (new)
Recital 8 a (new)
(8a) Before 1 October 2018 Member States should provide the Commission with an ex-post analysis of the effectiveness of this directive.
Amendment 91 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 3 – point 16 – point a
Article 3 – point 16 – point a
(a) not all the parties (including associated enterprises) to the transaction or series of transactions are resident for tax purposes in the Member State giving the advance cross-border ruling, or;
Amendment 92 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 3 – point 16 – point b
Article 3 – point 16 – point b
(b) any of the parties (including associated enterprises) to the transaction or series of transactions is simultaneously resident for tax purposes in more than one jurisdiction, or;
Amendment 170 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 23a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Article 23a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Information communicated to the Commission by an EU or EEA Member State under Article 23, as well as any report or document produced by the Commission using such information, may be transmitted to other EU Member States (and in case of reciprocity also EEA Member States). Such transmitted information shall be covered by the obligation of official secrecy and enjoy the protection extended to similar information under the national law of the EU Member State (and in case of reciprocity also EEA Member State) which received it.
Amendment 172 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 23a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Article 23a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Reports and documents produced by the Commission referred to in the first subparagraph may only be used by the EU or EEA Member States for analytical purposes but shall not be published or made available to any other person or body without express agreement of the Commission.
Amendment 124 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
Recital 4
(4) Throughout the economic and financial crisis, the Union has made efforts to promote growth, in particular through initiatives set out in the Europe 2020 strategy that put in place an approach for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. The European Investment Bank ('EIB') has also strengthened its role in instigating and promoting investment within the Union, partly by way of an increase in capital in January 2013. Further action is required to ensure that the investment needs of the Union are addressed and that the liquidity available on the market is used efficiently and channelled towards the funding of viable investment projects.
Amendment 126 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
Recital 4
(4) Throughout the economic and financial crisis, the Union has made efforts to promote growth, in particular through the focus on the necessity of structural reforms and through initiatives set out in the Europe 2020 strategy that put in place an approach for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. The European Investment Bank ('EIB') has also strengthened its role in instigating and promoting investment within the Union, partly by way of an increase in capital in January 2013. FurtherAlongside structural reforms, further specific and temporary action is required to ensure that the investment needs of the Union are addressed and that the liquidity available on the market is used efficiently and channelled towards the funding of viable investment projects.
Amendment 178 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) The purpose of the EFSI should be to help resolve the difficulties in financing and implementing productive investments in the Union and to ensure increased access to financing. It is intended that increased access to financing of profitable investment projects should be of particular benefit to small and medium enterprises. It is in the same degree also appropriate to extend the benefit of such increased access to financing to mid- cap companies, which are companies havingas well as other entities with up to 3000 employees. Overcoming Europe's current investment difficulties should contribute to strengthening the Union's competitiveness, growth potential and economic, social and territorial cohesion.
Amendment 271 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14 a (new)
Recital 14 a (new)
(14a) The use of public money cannot be justified by mere assertions of market failure. Convincing evidence thereof should be provided as a precondition for any form of State aid.
Amendment 299 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 15
Recital 15
(15) The EFSI should target projects withAdditionality over existing projects cannot be guaranteed by a higher risk- return profile than existing EIB. In fact, if State anid Union instruments to ensure additionality over existing operations. The EFSI should finance projects across the Union, including in the countries most affected by the financial crisis. The EFSI should only be used where financing is not available from other sources on reasonable termsis given for higher risk or lower return, this would set incentives to redesign existing projects as more risky or less profitable and thus render the allocation of capital less efficient.
Amendment 410 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22
Recital 22
(22) In accordance with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Infrastructure and project investments supported under EFSI should be consistent with State aid rules. To that end, the Commission has announced that it will formulate a set of core principles, for the purpose of State aid assessments, which a project will have to meet to be eligible for support under the EFSI. If a project meets these criteria and receives support from the EFSI, the Commission has announced that any national complementary support, will be assessed under a simplified and accelerated State aid assessment whereby the only additional issue to be verified by the Commission will be the proportionality of public support (absence of overcompensation). The Commission has also announced that it will provide further guidance on the set of core principles with a view to ensuring an efficient use of public fundsExisting rules on State aid should apply to the EFSI without any change.
Amendment 412 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
Recital 23
Amendment 527 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36
Recital 36
(36) SinceIt has yet to be shown that the objectives of this Regulation, namely to support investments in the Union and to ensure increased access to financing for companies having up to 3000 employees, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States by reason of the disparities in their fiscal capacity to act but can rather, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle ofnd proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives 5 of the Treaty on European Union,
Amendment 529 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36 a (new)
Recital 36 a (new)
(36a) The Stability and Growth Pact represents the Member States' commitment to maintain or attain a sustainable debt path in the medium-term. At the same time, its rules remain disrespected or discretionarily applied until today, putting the commitment's credibility at stake. The broader application of the investment clause to Member States' contributions to the EFSI could further undermine the EUs promise of sustainable debt developments and should only be granted with the utmost scrutiny.
Amendment 545 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
The Commission shall conclude annegotiate a draft agreement with the European Investment Bank (EIB) on the establishment of a temporary European Fund for Strategic Investments ('EFSI'). The EFSI Agreement shall be approved by the co- legislators, prior to the entry into force of this Regulation so as to ensure that the EFSI Agreement provides for the proper implementation of the Regulation. (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.)
Amendment 891 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1
Article 4 – paragraph 1
The Union shall provide a guarantee to the EIB for financing or investment operations carried out within the Union in accordance with State aid rules covered by this Regulation ('EU guarantee'). The EU guarantee shall be granted as a guarantee on demand in respect of instruments referred to in Article 6.
Amendment 475 #
2014/2248(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Considers that neitherstrict adherence to the Stability and Growth Pact norand the ‘no bail-out’ clause (Article 125 TFEU) provide the intended solutions, and that they have furthermore lost credibility in their current form, as the pact has been infringed by several Member States without political or legal consequences, while Greece has been bailed out on a large scale on three occasionsshould be reestabilshed;
Amendment 499 #
2014/2248(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Acknowledges the improvements brought by the European Semester, the six- pack and the two-pack aimed at addressing these issues, but concludes that they have not solved the problems; believes, moreover, that they have contributed to making the system overly complex, are not binding with regard to country-specific recommendations and do not cover spill- over effects between one Member State and another, or to the euro area or the EU as a whole;
Amendment 513 #
2014/2248(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
Amendment 527 #
2014/2248(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
Amendment 552 #
2014/2248(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
Amendment 577 #
2014/2248(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Stresses, however, that conditionality in this new debt instrument will only be credible if complemented by an insolvency procedure for sovereigns, which will not only provide predictability to the markets in the event of an insolvent state, but also safeguard market discipline for both Member States and private creditors;
Amendment 582 #
2014/2248(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
Amendment 602 #
2014/2248(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
Amendment 618 #
2014/2248(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
Amendment 636 #
2014/2248(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
Amendment 649 #
2014/2248(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
Amendment 668 #
2014/2248(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
Amendment 684 #
2014/2248(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
Amendment 694 #
2014/2248(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
Amendment 15 #
2014/2228(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph b
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph b
b. take immediate action to ensure that free and fair competition on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as market access, is addressed on the basis of the highest standards possible within the existing levels of protection, especially guaranteeing high standards within areas such as health and safety, consumer, labour and environmental legislation;
Amendment 57 #
2014/2228(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph e
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph e
e. take immediate action to ensure that aggressive tax planning,tax evasion and distortion of competition by e.g. moving of headquarters across the Atlantic to obtain competition-distorting conditions, are addressed;
Amendment 73 #
2014/2228(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph g
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph g
g. take immediate action to ensure reciprocal market access for European companies to public contracts in the United Statesto public contracts for European and American companies both in the United States and the European Union ; underlines that an imbalance of market access to public contracts constitutes unfair competition;
Amendment 82 #
2014/2228(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph h
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph h
h. take immediaterefrain from proactive measures against perceived American protectionism, and address legislation that hinders European market access to the United States, such as Buy American, Buy Amer; take immediate action to ensure that protectionist measures on both sides of the Atlantica and the American Job Actre reduced;
Amendment 90 #
2014/2228(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph i
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph i
Amendment 107 #
2014/2228(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph i a (new)
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph i a (new)
ia. take immediate action to ensure that Member States can opt out of the negotiated ISDS-mechanism; ensure that Member States which opt out of ISDS can contribute a country-specific annex to TTIP in which they may refer to national legislation which protects foreign investors or in which they may commit to other forms of dispute settlement including the possibility of state to state dispute settlement on behalf of investors or arbitration and dispute settlement mechanisms which exist or may be created within the framework of the WTO or as independent international courts;
Amendment 120 #
2014/2228(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph j
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph j
Amendment 122 #
2014/2228(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph j
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph j
j. acknemphasize that state-owlnedge the importance of state- owned enterprises for certain crucial services enterprises which provide certain crucial services should not be shielded from competition if it can be shown that competing private enterprises are able to provide the same type of services in approximately the same quality and reliability;
Amendment 131 #
2014/2228(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph k
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph k
k. stress the need to uphold the EU’s tradition for organising its public services, and call for an exclusion of public servicesemphasize that not all public services need to be provided exclusively by the state and that increasing private competition has often benefited consumers in areas such as telecommunication, education and health services, thus ask that public services not be excluded from the agreement;
Amendment 143 #
2014/2228(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph l
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph l
Amendment 146 #
2014/2228(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph l
Paragraph 1 – subparagraph l
l. propose that there should be no obligation in TTIP to expose sensitive sectorsinsist that detailed and convincing reasons must be supplied for classifying sectors as so sensitive that they may be exempted from opening up to competition under TTIP.
Amendment 10 #
2014/2221(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. Whereas in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis the eurozone in particular stands out as an area of unsatisfactory growth while the rest of the world is recovering;
Amendment 25 #
2014/2221(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Notices that the Annual Growth Survey 2015 does not satisfactorily address the underlying reasons for economic stagnation in the euro area;
Amendment 3 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas, according to the Commission services’ spring 2014 forecast, GDP in the euro area fell by 0.4 % in 2013 after a decline of 0.7 % in 2012, and whereas the Commission services expected a recovery, with GDP rising by 1.2 % in 2014 and by 1.7 % in 2015; whereas the Commission services' autumn 2014 forecast revised growth projections downward, with GDP rising by only 0.8 % in 2014 and 1.1 % in 2015;
Amendment 8 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas, according to the sameautumn forecast, unemployment in the euro area rose from 11.3 % at the end of 2012 to 121.9 % at the end of 2013, and may fall slightly to 11.86 % in 2014;
Amendment 10 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas there are major disparities among the unemployment rates in different Member States, with figures varying between 5 % and 268 %; whereas percentages for youth unemployment are evenmuch higher;, peaking at 58.3 % in Greece in 2013.
Amendment 20 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas, according to the Commission services’ springautumn 2014 forecast, the average inflation rate in the euro area was 1.34 % in 2013, down from 2.5 % in 2012; whereas inflation in the euro area has continued to be on a downward path since the beginning of 2014, reaching a low of 0.3 % in September;
Amendment 28 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the level of public and private investment in the euro area has been stagnating at levels significantly below those registered before the start of the crisis;
Amendment 33 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas credit to the private sector has moved further into negative territory, with an annual rate of change of -2.4% in December 2013, compared with -0.2% in December 2012; whereas the lack of credit affecting SMEs in some Member States is one of the main problems delaying thetrust and transparency in the banking system as well as the persistent need for balance sheet adjustments affect the availability of credit for SMEs in some Member States; whereas this dampens economic recoveractivity;
Amendment 37 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas financial fragmentation is still a major problempresent, with SMEs sufferfacing much higher borrowing costs depending on the country of the eurozone in which they are situated, creating distortions in the single marketrepresenting deeper underlying structural differences among Member States;
Amendment 42 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas the size of the euro system’s balance-sheet has declined steadily over the course of 2013, whereas it is unclear whether this reflectings receding financial fragmentation;
Amendment 52 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the swiftNotes the reaction of the ECB in the face of a very challenging environment, and the fact that monetary policy hwas succeedaimed inat reducing the level of stress in financial markets of the euro area, and inat restoring investors’ confidence in the soundness of the single currency; notes that this was reflected in the general reduction of long-term domestic yields – notably in the most indebted countries of the euro area – to unprecedented levels since the beginning of the crisis;
Amendment 78 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Considers that it is of utmost importance to create conditions for a rebound in investment in the euro area; calls on the ECB, in this taking into accountext, to that despite the ECB pursueing its actions in order to maintain favourable financing conditions and to reduce the financial fragmentation that remains highly penalising for private borrowers in many Member Statinvestments have not picked up yet; calls on the Member States, in this context, to work on the underlying causes of the financial fragmentation such as diverging risk structures that make lending more costly in respective countries;
Amendment 84 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Underlines that Mario Draghi, in his speech at the annual central bank symposium in Jackson Hole on 22 August 2014, stated that we need action on both sides of the economy, noting that: aggregate demand policies have to be accompanied by national structural reforms and policies; on the demand side, monetary policy can and should play a central role, which currently means an accommodative monetary policy for an extended period of time; there is little scope for fiscal policy to play a greater role alongside monetary policy especially since the sustainability of public debt needs to be taken into account; and no amount of fiscal or monetary accommodation can compensate for the necessary action on the supply side through structural reforms in the euro area;
Amendment 99 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. WelcomesTakes note of the measures announced by the ECB in June 2014 aimed at enhancing the functioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism; acknowledgnotices that the TLTRO introduces, for the first time, a link between loans to the non- financial private sector granted by banks and the amount of refinancing the banks can claim;
Amendment 111 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Notes that the ECB has announced that it will purchase asset-backed securities (ABS) and covered bonds in order to empower the credit-easing impact of the TLTROs; stresses that such interventions on ABS market must be conducted in a transparent manner that does not create excessive risks for the ECB’s balance sheet; believes that the transferring of bad debt to the ECB balance sheet is not an appropriate solution and unfairly burdens EU taxpayers;
Amendment 116 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Stresses its concern regarding the considerable fragmentation of lending conditions for SMEs across the eurozone countries, and by the existing gap between financing rates granted to SMEs and those granted to bigger companies; insists that these long-standing problems are not appropriately addressed by the recent measures announced by ECB to boost bank lending, and that the ECB should study the possibility of launching a specific programme to supportunderlying factors hindering SMEs' access to credit;
Amendment 126 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. WelcomNotes the fact that the ECB has repeatedly stated its readiness to use additional unconventional instruments within its mandate, and to alter the size or composition of its interventions, in the event of an excessively lengthy period of low inflation;
Amendment 135 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Stresses that the impact of the unconventional monetary policy measures currently in use on the real economy should not be overestimated; stresses that such measures are transitory in nature and that their main advantage is that they can givey aim at giving Member States time to consolidate their fiscal situation and implement structural reforms that will create conditions for economic activity to rebound;
Amendment 140 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Notes that conducting non-standard monetary policies for an extended period of time creates distortions on the capital market; asks the ECB to strike the right balance between the risk of exiting its accommodative monetary policy prematurely and the risks associated with further delaying such a departure;
Amendment 148 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Recalls that monetary policy alone cannot stimulate aggregate demand unless it is complemented by adequate fiscal and structural national reforms and policies that ultimately target the underlying reasons for the sluggish development;
Amendment 177 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. WelcomeAsserts the fact that the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the first pillar of the Banking Union, became fully operational on 4 November 2014; notes that this major step in European financial integration was achieved thanks to the successfulafter the completion of the preparatory work, including the Asset Quality Review (AQR);
Amendment 187 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Emphasises that the SSM contributes toaims at ensuring confidence in the euro area banking sector, and thus ato financial stability; recalls that democratic accountability of the new SSM towards European and national Parliaments is crucial to ensuring the credibility of the new supervisory regime; stresses, therefore, the importance of the Interinstitutional Agreement between Parliament and the ECB, concluded in November 2013, on the practical modalities of the exercise of democratic accountability over the SSM, and of its full implementation;
Amendment 205 #
2014/2157(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Recalls that the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), the second pillar of the Banking Union, will come into force by the beginning of 2015; stresses the need to continue developing the third pillar of the Banking Union;
Amendment 6 #
2014/2156(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas all possible resources from the Member States and the EU, including those of the EIB, need to be efficiently mobilised without delay to sustain public and private investments in line with the EU 2020 Strategythe EIB's 2013 report on Investment and Investment Finance in Europe concludes that it is uncertainty, not a funding shortage that deters investment in the European Union; therefore it is of utmost importance to solve Europe’s fundamental debt, banking and competitiveness crises, this being the only way to encourage sufficient private investment for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in line with the EU 2020 Strategy;
Amendment 14 #
2014/2156(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas particular efforts should be made to expand joint interventions (combinthe EIB's 2013 report on Investment and Investment Finance ing EIF or other guarantee tools) for financing SMEs or tangible anurope emphasises, with regard to SME financing, that a more diversified fintangible sustainable infrastructurecial market would reduce the likelihood of borrowing constraints;
Amendment 18 #
2014/2156(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas the selection for investments by the EIB should be made independently and on the basis of their viability, added value and impact on economic recovery;
Amendment 37 #
2014/2156(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. WelcomNotes in that context the acknowledgmentcall of the new President of the Commission thatfor bold and urgent action is required to revitalise the EU economy including, inter alia, an EU investment plan of at least EUR 300 billion over the next three years;
Amendment 50 #
2014/2156(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Takes note in that context of the establishment of a Task Force, led by the Commission and the European Investment Bank, with a view to identifying concrete actions to boost investment, including a pipeline of potentially viable projects of European relevance to be realised in the short and medium term; emphasises that this Task Force should explicitly identify hurdles and remedies for increasing investments and actively seek the involvement of Parliament, social partners and CSOs; warns that the Task Force could face political pressure to foster projects favoured by special interest groups, leading to a misallocation of funds to unprofitable investments that are not of public interest;
Amendment 58 #
2014/2156(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Urges the EIB to avoid the socialisation of losses and the privatisation of gains in the establishment of the European Fund for Strategic Investments;
Amendment 59 #
2014/2156(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Also calls on the Council, the Commission and the EIB Board of Governors to duly assess the redistribution effects the investment plan entails, namely a possible increase of investor profits at the costs of customers who have to pay for the usage of new infrastructure in order to ensure an appropriate return on investment;
Amendment 65 #
2014/2156(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Is of the opinion that, in this respect, appropriate EIB involvement in an EU investment plan will require a substantial increase in EIB lending and borrowing ceilings within the next five years with a view to significantly increasing its balance sheet size; points out that such an increase will imply a combination of a new capital increase and guarantees provided to new credit lines in the framework of the plan; warns that an increase in state funded investment is an imperfect substitute for profitable private investment and is aimed at curing symptoms rather than causes of Europe's economic crisis;
Amendment 66 #
2014/2156(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Notes that the level of investments differ from Member State to Member State, being particularly depressed in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain; warns the EIB Board of Governors that a low level of investment does not necessarily imply a particularly productive use of additional public or private funds; calls on the EIB Board of Governors to ensure that public money is invested wherever it is most productive and, in conjunction with the EU investment plan, to clearly specify the intended allocation of funds among the Member States;
Amendment 68 #
2014/2156(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6b. Calls on the EIB Board of Governors to further assess the investment gap in the EU regarding its composition, namely whether private or public investments are lacking; and to specify which kind of investments, private or public, are intended to be subject of support and what size of productive effects of the investment are expected;
Amendment 93 #
2014/2156(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Points out that risk-sharing instruments ultimately involving the provision of public subsidies should only be foreseen where there are market failures generating external costs or for the execution of missions of general interest such as the provision of public goods and services of general economic interest, bearing in mind that such a take always bears the risk of the socialisation of losses and the privatisation of returns;
Amendment 96 #
2014/2156(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Points out that any involvement of public resources in risk-sharing instruments and more specifically in first- loss tranches of investment vehicles should either be explicitly linked to the reduction of measurable external negative costs, the generation of measurable positive external costs or the implementation of public services obligations and services of general economic interest; points out that Article 14 TFEU provides a legal basis for establishing such a link by means of an ordinary legislative proposal; underlines that in praxis those links are unobservable and subject to political beliefs;
Amendment 128 #
2014/2156(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
Amendment 143 #
2014/2156(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
Amendment 3 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 9
Citation 9
Amendment 4 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 10
Citation 10
Amendment 5 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 12
Citation 12
Amendment 9 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 15
Citation 15
Amendment 11 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 16
Citation 16
Amendment 12 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 17
Citation 17
Amendment 17 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 18
Citation 18
Amendment 20 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 19
Citation 19
Amendment 22 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 20
Citation 20
Amendment 24 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 21
Citation 21
Amendment 28 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 23
Citation 23
Amendment 31 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 24
Citation 24
Amendment 33 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 25
Citation 25
Amendment 35 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 26
Citation 26
Amendment 38 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 28
Citation 28
Amendment 56 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
Amendment 66 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the Eurozone has a common monetary policy but each of the Eurozone members is sovereign in its fiscal policy decisions;
Amendment 67 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
Recital A b (new)
Ab. whereas heterogeneity among member states and asymmetric shocks may require very different economic policy responses in member states, whereas this provides a permanent challenge for the monetary union unless heterogeneity among member states can be reduced, fiscal and economic policies can be coordinated and the likelihood of severe asymmetric shock can be reduced;
Amendment 69 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A c (new)
Recital A c (new)
Ac. whereas the Eurozone has always tried to achieve convergence among member states using a rules-based approach, whereas these rules of economic governance have undergone many changes moving from a set of a few, easy to comprehend rules to a highly complex framework today;
Amendment 70 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A d (new)
Recital A d (new)
Ad. whereas many rules of economic governance have been disrespected many times, most prominently the no-bailout clause of Article 125 TFEU, whereas European facilities which provide credits to Member States unable to finance themselves on private capital markets violate the spirit of Article 125 TFEU;
Amendment 81 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas huge macroeconomic differences will continue to prevail between the Member States, also following the Troika’s interven in terms of debt ratios, deficit ratios, unemployment levels, current account balances and levels of social protection, with foherecasted GDP growth rates in 2014 rangiare likely to range between - 2.8 % in Cyprus and +4.6 % in Ireland, reflecting increasingly undermining growing internal divergences and a potential to undermine the monetary union;
Amendment 90 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas economic governance will be successful only if, in line with Article 125 TFEU, no Member State will feel pressed to assume liabilities or commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State;
Amendment 104 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
Amendment 120 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
Amendment 163 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
Amendment 184 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Notes that economic governance in the Euro zone set out with two simple rules to enforce sustainability of public finances, namely in terms of GDP a maximum 3 % threshold on the annual government budget deficit and a maximum 60 % threshold on the stock of government debt (Art. 126 TFEU in conjunction with Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure and Art. 125 TFEU);
Amendment 185 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Notes further that the two rules were complemented by two enforcement mechanisms, namely the possibility to impose sanctions for breaches of the 3% deficit threshold and the possibility to refuse bailouts by other member states based on Art. 125 TFEU;
Amendment 198 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Highlights the fact that the current economic governance framework does not allow for a proper debate on the economic perspective of the euro area or on an aggregate fiscal stance and does not address the different economic and fiscal situations on an equal footing; 3% deficit threshold was violated more than a hundred times by Euro Area members since 1995, yet sanctions were never imposed although the Council had, in 1997, agreed to always impose sanctions when excessive deficits were not timely corrected; concludes that the current economic governance framework needs a proper debate on the economic perspective of the euro area under a common monetary policy and sovereign national fiscal policies;
Amendment 216 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Highlights the fact that excessive deficits contributed to government debt levels surpassing the 60% debt ceiling for all Euro area members except Finland, Slovakia and Luxemburg, with many countries being close to or even far beyond 100% of government debt and some countries having reached debt levels which they were unable to sustain without a bailout;
Amendment 223 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes that major policy initiatives which included policy recommendations were based on economic forecasts that had not anticipated the low growth and inflation experienced and have not fully taken into account the underestimation of the size of the fiscal multiplier, the importance of spillover effects across countries in a period of synchronised consolidation and the deflationary impact of cumulative structural reformspillover effects across countries due to excessive and nonsustainable debt are major causes of economic distress;
Amendment 238 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Emphasizes that coordinated efforts by other member countries and by the ECB have prevented sovereign defaults at the cost of invalidating the no-bailout clause in Art. 125 TFEU as an enforcement mechanism;
Amendment 248 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Stresses that the current situation calls for closer and inclusive economic coordination (to increase aggregate demand, improve fiscal sustainability and allow for fair and sustainable structural reforms and related investments) and for swift reactions so as to correct the most obvious fault lines in the economic governance framework;
Amendment 264 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Notes that the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact obliged all member states to achieve a balanced budget (or a surplus) in the medium run and that member states agreed that under a balanced budget here would be sufficient flexibility across the business cycle to keep the deficit below 3%;
Amendment 265 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)
Paragraph 4 b (new)
4b. Notes that the balanced budget objective fell prey to German and French pressure in the 2005 SGP reform, allowing member states to define even the medium term objective (MTO) for the deficit as nonzero but not greater than 1% of GDP;
Amendment 266 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 c (new)
Paragraph 4 c (new)
4c. Notes that the 2005 SGP shifted the focus of deficit surveillance to the concept of "structural" deficits and obliged member states to reduce the structural deficit by 0.5% of GDP per year if the MTO had not yet been reached, unless lesser efforts were justified by economic reforms or "bad times";
Amendment 267 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 d (new)
Paragraph 4 d (new)
4d. Highlights that member states off their MTOs failed on a large scale to reduce their structural deficits by 0.5% per year, notes that during the 10 years between 2005 and 2014 only Malta complied in at least half of the years considered while all other countries which had not yet reached their MTOs more often than not reduced their structural deficits by much less than 0.5% per year or even increased their structural deficits; emphasizes that despite of this no sanctions, let alone fines have been imposed;
Amendment 276 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Warns that the accumulation of procedures makes the economic governance framework complex and not transparent enough, which is detrimental to the ownership and acceptance by national parliaments, social partners and citizens of guidelines, recommendations and reforms stemming from this framework;
Amendment 278 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Points out that the Six-Pack and Two- Pack legislations of 2011 and 2013 widened the scope of economic governance to various types of macroeconomic imbalances providing detailed specifications for their prevention and correction as well as a great amount of flexibility in the form of escape clauses for structural reforms, temporary violations, infrastructure investments and adverse business cycle conditions;
Amendment 279 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5b. Notes that these legislations constitute a further increase in complexity and decrease in transparency of the economic governance framework;
Amendment 280 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 c (new)
Paragraph 5 c (new)
5c. Notes that under the Two-Pack and Six-Pack legislations member states are still obliged to reduce their structural deficit by 0.5% per year as long as they have not reached their MTO while in the case of excessive debts the reduction must be "higher than" 0.5% per year;
Amendment 281 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 d (new)
Paragraph 5 d (new)
5d. Emphasizes that in terms of deficits there is some evidence for compliance in 2012 and 2013 mostly in crisis countries, but that the fiscal efforts are again expected to be broadly insufficient in 2014 and 2015; also emphasizes that other Country Specific Recommendations have largely been ignored by Member States;
Amendment 288 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
Amendment 294 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Points out that concepts such as "structural deficits" are not directly observable such that their definition involves degrees of arbitrariness, their quantification involves judgemental issues, both opening up room for unwanted and unwarranted discretion;
Amendment 295 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6b. Points out that the interpretation of current account deficits as "imbalances" may not be warranted if these deficits are used to finance investments which give rise to current account surpluses at a later point in time;
Amendment 296 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 c (new)
Paragraph 6 c (new)
6c. Insists that deficit financing is at the heart of most investment activities and that the Eurozone should encourage investment rather than discourage or control its external financing through questionable rules in the macroeconomic imbalance framework;
Amendment 297 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 d (new)
Paragraph 6 d (new)
6d. Is worried that the multitude of social indicators in the scoreboard will lead to a lack of clarity and distract emphasis from fiscal sustainability;
Amendment 298 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 e (new)
Paragraph 6 e (new)
6e. Concludes that economic governance has yet to show that the highly complex set of rules currently in use are more likely to induce fiscal discipline and debt sustainability than the simpler rules of previous years which did not work well because enforcement mechanisms like sanctions, fines and the no-bailout clause were discarded;
Amendment 302 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 2
Subheading 2
Amendment 307 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Underlines all the existNotes that the EU and the Euro area ing provisions under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) which have been put in place to ensure an anti-cyclical policy; finds it regrettable that these provisions were not put to full use in previous years, in the context of low inflation, low growth and high unemploymentarticular is in a difficult economic situation where growth is unsatisfactory, job creation is low, unemployment in some Member States is high and inflation much lower than targeted such that a prolonged period of stagnation or recession coupled with deflation is possible;
Amendment 322 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
Amendment 333 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Reminds that expansionary fiscal policies are limited by the degree of flexibility built into the current economic governance framework; warns that flexibility should not be increased by changing the current set of rules since this would compromise debt sustainability as the ultimate goal of economic governance;
Amendment 350 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Supports all the incentivesTakes note of the investment clause to finance the new European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), mainly by making national contributions to the fund fiscally neutral as regards the SGP; warns that contributions should not be made at the expense of the 3 % deficit threshold, and therefore calls for further clarification regarding the concrete treatment of these contributions in accordance with the new paradigm set out in the communication;
Amendment 358 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Warns that, given the current size of government debts, debt sustainability will become even more pressing an issue when interest rates in the Euro area come back to normal levels;
Amendment 359 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9b. Warns that high level of government debts which are not sustainable at "normal" interest levels may force the ECB to suppress interest rates for the indefinite future at the expense of wealth owners and entailing the risk of increased levels of inflation;
Amendment 360 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 c (new)
Paragraph 9 c (new)
9c. Emphasizes that under the current set of rules, the economic governance framework provides ample space to provide fiscal stimuli;
Amendment 361 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 d (new)
Paragraph 9 d (new)
9d. Warns that fiscal stimuli cannot replace structural reforms and that fiscal stimuli are not likely to be successful in an environment where structural reforms have not yet unfolded sizable effects, thus warns to press for even greater stimuli just because growth is not picking up;
Amendment 362 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 e (new)
Paragraph 9 e (new)
9e. Is concerned that the desire to fully exploit the flexibility of the current set of economic governance rules may reinforce the perception that economic governance is unable to impose fiscal discipline on member states; asks the Commission and the Council to credibly commit to the enforcement mechanisms of sanctions, fines, asks national governments to insist on the no-bailout principle of Article 125 TFEU;
Amendment 363 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 f (new)
Paragraph 9 f (new)
9f. Affirms that a credible commitment to the principle of no-bailout would enforce fiscal discipline on member countries without much need of further rules of economic governance, thus reinforcing the sovereignty and responsibility of member states in terms of economic and fiscal policies;
Amendment 364 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 g (new)
Paragraph 9 g (new)
9g. Concludes that a return to the principle of no-bailout and free, decentralized fiscal decisions of member states should be the overarching objective of the European Union's policy of economic governance;
Amendment 365 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 h (new)
Paragraph 9 h (new)
9h. Emphasizes that regulatory reforms like Basle III along with the asset quality review, the stress tests of the banking sector and the banking union can be viewed as increasing the credibility of the no-bailout principle, points out that further measures could be designed if there are concerns that these safeguards are still insufficient;
Amendment 366 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 i (new)
Paragraph 9 i (new)
9i. Emphasizes that adherence to the no- bailout principle reinforces the ties between responsibility and liability which are at the heart of a market economy;
Amendment 367 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 j (new)
Paragraph 9 j (new)
9j. Points out that this is in no contradiction to the principle of European solidarity since the European Union has well-established funds for regional development, cohesion and social policies which may aid countries in need of special support;
Amendment 368 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 k (new)
Paragraph 9 k (new)
9k. Stresses that the level of debt alone does not warrant the solidarity of other European countries as high debt does not indicate an underdeveloped economy or insufficient incomes of parts of the population but rather the fiscal irresponsibility of elected governments;
Amendment 369 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
Amendment 382 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
Amendment 394 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
Amendment 411 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
Amendment 423 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 3
Subheading 3
Amendment 434 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Believes that morthe room for flexibility and soft laws existsshould be cut such that fiscal consolidation is achieved under the SGP and in the European Semester; invites the Commission to build on this flexibility and to propose rule changes where neededlimit the degree of flexibility in the current set of rules;
Amendment 447 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
Amendment 466 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Insists that the Annual Growth Survey (AGS) and euro area recommendation must be better designed and put to better use to allow for a global economic debate, notably as regards convergence in the euro area; pProposes that the country- specific recommendations (CSRs) should be established on the basis of striking a better balance between the AGS and the macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP), and suggests that the euro area recommendation should be made compulsory following a proper debate with the European Parliament, with incentives being offered so as to encourage the implementation thereof; requests that the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) recommendation be joined together with the CSRs;nnual Growth Survey (AGS) and the macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP),
Amendment 487 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Asks the Commission to verify whether the current 1/20 rule on debt reduction is sustainable andfficient or whether it needs to be reconsidered;
Amendment 504 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
Amendment 529 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Believes that national fiscal councils couldmay play a useful role at EU level; requests the set-up of a European network allowing for an independent analysis of the economic perspective to be established as a basis for a proper political discussion among stakeholderin France, Greece, Italy and some other European Countries;
Amendment 540 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Believes that the MIP must be used in a more balanced manner between deficit and surplus countries, also to address countries with significant room for actionn objective manner to assess the development of key macroeconomic variables in the EU member states;
Amendment 562 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Calls on the Commission to explore ways in which to better align the preventive and corrective arms of the SGP, in particular regarding investment allowing temporary deviation from the MTO, or the adjustment path towards it, within the existence of a safety margin under the preventive arm;
Amendment 566 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Asks the Commission to take into account all relevant factors, including real growth and inflation, when evaluatingstrictly assess the economic and fiscal situations of Mmember Sstates under the EDP;
Amendment 576 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Insists on the need to clarify the way in which effective actions are taken into accounts concerned that some member states are in risk of breach on rules of the EDP; emphasises that member states should reduce their budget deficit to three percent of GDP by the end of 2015 with structural reforms; insists on the a strict and thorough interpretation of actions taken under the EDP;
Amendment 579 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
Amendment 592 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
Amendment 606 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Believes there is a strong need for less complexity, better ownership, more transparency and democracy in economic governance; believes that looking forward towards deeper integration cannot be achieved by adding a new layer of rules to the already existing onesmore national ownership and more transparency;
Amendment 621 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Acknowledges, based on the current situation, that the economic governance framework must be corrected and completshould be reassessed in both the medium and long tterm, in orderm to allow for the EU and the euro area to meet the challenges of convergence, long-lasting investment and reliancnalyse if the current framework has provided the desired results and set a timeline for returning to the principle of the no- bailout clause;
Amendment 633 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
Amendment 641 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Recalls that legislation implemented during the crisis on thewas basised ofn intergovernmental agreements lacks democratic accountability at EU level;
Amendment 646 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
Amendment 654 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
Amendment 680 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
Amendment 695 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
Amendment 714 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Recalls that the banking union was the result of the political will to avoid a financial crisis and that the same will is needed as regards a fiscal union in order to avoid a political crisis;
Amendment 738 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
Amendment 809 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
38. Requests that it be elaborated on the basis of a ‘4+1 Presidents’ approach, including the EP PresidentAsks that the four Presidents report takes due note of this report and recommends measures compatible with the sound economic principles underlying it; expects the Four Presidents reports to be introduced to the European Parliament by the June European Council;
Amendment 816 #
2014/2145(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Asks its President to representfollow closely this work and inform the Parliament ion this upcoming taskimportant developments on the basis of the mandate given by this resolution;
Amendment 8 #
2014/2144(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas an estimated EUR 1 trillion of potential tax revenue is lost every year in the EU due to tax fraud and tax avoidance21 ; whereas this loss is a major risk to the efficiency and fairness of the EU tax systems, and facilitates socially detrimental profiteering which leads to growing inequality among EU citizens it raises the tax burden on all bona fide citizens and companies; __________________ 21 http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxati on/tax_fraud_evasion/a_huge_problem/ind ex_en.htm
Amendment 30 #
2014/2144(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the European Semester has so far not succeeded in playsing an essential role in coordinating economic and fiscal policies in the Member States (MSs);
Amendment 34 #
2014/2144(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas the taxes in the Member States are very high compared to the rest of the world and threaten the international competitiveness of the Member States;
Amendment 38 #
2014/2144(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F b (new)
Recital F b (new)
Fb. whereas the current economic and financial crisis has led to a significant rise in public debt in Europe; whereas amongst others the excessive public and private debt in the Member States has triggered the current financial crisis;
Amendment 40 #
2014/2144(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F c (new)
Recital F c (new)
Fc. whereas in reaction to the costs of the banking crisis and the lower revenues due to the absence of economic growth in the after math of the eurocrisis, most MSs have chosen to raise revenues instead of lowering expenses;
Amendment 41 #
2014/2144(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F d (new)
Recital F d (new)
Fd. whereas during the period in question Jean-Claude Juncker was Minister for Finances (from 1989 to 2009), Prime Minister of Luxembourg (from 1995 to 2013), and first permanent President of the Eurogroup (from 2005 to 2013);
Amendment 47 #
2014/2144(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Notes that taxes finance the provision of public services such as e. g. infrastructure, public administration, education, health system, internal and external security; emphasizes that tax burdens and the supply of public services are tightly connected; reaffirms the sovereign right of each member state to establish its own policies in terms of taxation and in terms of provision of public services;
Amendment 49 #
2014/2144(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Insists on the general principle that taxes must be paid where public services are consumed; strongly condemns aggressive tax policies inducing taxpayers to shift their tax base out of countries in which they consume public services or benefit from a labour force which does so;
Amendment 50 #
2014/2144(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 c (new)
Paragraph 1 c (new)
1c. Rejects tax harmonisation which would be detrimental to the European economy as a whole and an infringement of states' rights; strongly supports the competition between member states and other jurisdictions in terms of taxation on the one hand and the supply of public services on the other hand;
Amendment 59 #
2014/2144(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Notes that tax policies must aim at fostering European competitiveness and lowering costs for European businesses, particularly Small and Medium-sized Enterprises;
Amendment 61 #
2014/2144(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Underlines that a low tax level is essential not only for the social welfare of families and households but also for competitiveness and new jobs; stresses the need for controlled and efficient public spending and stable public finances;
Amendment 84 #
2014/2144(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Notes that eliminating tax obstacles can play an important role in increasing citizens’ ability and confidence to work and – together with enterprises – invest in the EU;
Amendment 131 #
2014/2144(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Emphasises that EU member states and the European Commission where appropriate should take a leading role in discussions on the fight against alleged tax fraud or aggressive tax avoidance in the OECD, the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of information for Tax Purposes, and other relevant global fora;
Amendment 239 #
2014/2144(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
Amendment 269 #
2014/2144(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
Amendment 285 #
2014/2144(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
Amendment 3 #
2014/2122(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Underlines that ESMA’s role in promoting a common supervisory regime across the Single Market is essential to ensure betteraims at integrated and safer financial markets in the EU;
Amendment 6 #
2014/2122(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
Amendment 11 #
2014/2122(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Stresses with regard to the increasing expenses that the EU budget already faces difficulties due to outstanding payments; therefore urges ESMA to make efficient use of synergies arising from close cooperation with national supervisory agencies and to pay full respect to the principle of subsidiarity by refraining from any tasks assigned to national supervisory agencies; encourages ESMA to examine its internal administrative processes with a view to reducing administrative costs;
Amendment 20 #
2014/2122(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Concludes that ESMA’s mixed financing arrangement is inflexible, burdensome and a potential threat to its independence; therefore calls on the Commission to reconsider the financing arrangement in favour of an independent budget line from the EU budget and the introduction of fees by market participantsalls upon the Commission to consider funding the ESAs through direct contributions from financial market participants subject to direct ESA supervision, taking into account Article 38(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Amendment 3 #
2014/2121(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Underlines that EIOPA’s role in promoting a common supervisory regime across the Single Market is essential to ensure a betteraims at an integrated and safer insurance and pension sector in the EU;
Amendment 5 #
2014/2121(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
Amendment 9 #
2014/2121(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Stresses with regard to the increasing expenses that the EU budget already faces difficulties due to outstanding payments; therefore urges the EIOPA to make efficient use of synergies arising from close cooperation with national supervisory agencies and to pay full respect to the principle of subsidiarity by refraining from any tasks assigned to national supervisory agencies; encourages the EIOPA to examine its internal administrative processes with a view to reducing administrative costs;
Amendment 18 #
2014/2121(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Concludes that EIOPA’s mixed financing arrangement is inflexible, burdensome and a potential threat to its independence; therefore calls on the Commission to reconsider the financing arrangement in favour of an independent budget line from the EU budget and the introduction of fees by market participantsalls upon the Commission to consider funding the ESAs through direct contributions from financial market participants subject to direct ESA supervision, taking into account Article 38(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010.
Amendment 3 #
2014/2120(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Underlines that EBA’s role in promoting a common supervisory regime across the Single Market is essential to ensure a betteraims at an integrated and safer banking sector in the EU;
Amendment 5 #
2014/2120(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Is concerned that the competences of the EBA and the ECB's banking supervision may overlap; urges both institutions to prevent the build-up of redundant bureaucracies;
Amendment 6 #
2014/2120(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 b (new)
Paragraph 2 b (new)
2b. Stresses with regard to the increasing expenses that the EU budget already faces difficulties due to outstanding payments; therefore urges the EBA to make efficient use of synergies arising from close cooperation with national supervisory agencies and to pay full respect to the principle of subsidiarity by refraining from any tasks assigned to national supervisory agencies; encourages the EBA to examine its internal administrative processes with a view to reducing administrative costs;
Amendment 7 #
2014/2120(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
Amendment 21 #
2014/2120(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Concludes that EBA’s mixed financing arrangement is inflexible, burdensome and a potential threat to its independence; therefore calls on the Commission to reconsider the financing arrangement in favour of an independent budget line from the EU budget and the introduction of fees by market participantsalls upon the Commission to consider funding the ESAs through direct contributions from financial market participants subject to direct ESA supervision, taking into account Article 38(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC1. ______________________ 1 OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 48.
Amendment 11 #
2014/2059(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas account should be taken of the view expressed at the Lindau Nobel Laureate Meeting by a number of prominent holders of the Nobel Prize for Economics, that the recovery of the eurozone is inconceivable while retaining the euro;
Amendment 56 #
2014/2059(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Notes the fact that economic recoverydevelopment in the EU is under way; reiterates, however, that this recovery is fragile and uneven, and mustfragile and unbalanced; emphasises that a starting recovery in some countries is counterbalanced by slackening economic developments in other countries as well as by deflationary tendencies; notes that economic recovery should be sustained in order to deliver more growth and jobs in the medium term;
Amendment 60 #
2014/2059(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Notes that the most important targets of economic policy are to restore the Member States’ competitiveness and reduce unemployment;
Amendment 90 #
2014/2059(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Stresses, therefore, the importance of continuing the process of deep and sustainable structural reforms to deliver on growth and jobs; reiterates, in this connection, the fact that the EU cannot compete on costs alone, but that its member states needs to invest more in research and development, education and skills, and resource efficiency, both at national and European level;
Amendment 111 #
2014/2059(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Underlines the fact that the EMU is far from complete and reminds the Commission of its obligations and commitments tocurrently not enhanceing economic convergence and strengthen competitiveness in the EU; welcomes, in this respect, the commitment by the next President-elect of the Commission to deliver on the roadmap set out the report of 5 December 2012 entitled ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’growth and competitiveness in the euro area; reminds the Commission of its commitments to enhance competitiveness in the EU;
Amendment 247 #
2014/2059(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Stresses, once again,Reiterates its call on Member States to simplify their tax systems and reiterates its call to shift taxes from labour to consumption to make the use of resources more efficient and sustainable, to structure the taxation of economic activities in such a way as to offer growth incentives and to reduce spending where possible whilst continuing to meet their social responsibilities; calls on the Commission to take urgent action and develop a comprehensive strategy based on concrete legislative measures to fight tax fraud and tax evasion;
Amendment 284 #
2014/2059(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Believes that the biggest limitation on the EU economy is the lowlow level of private investment is not the cause but rather a symptom of a deep-rooted crisis whose origins lie in excessive levels of private investmentState and bank indebtedness and the lack of exchange-rate flexibility in the eurozone;
Amendment 325 #
2014/2059(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
Amendment 101 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 3 a (new)
Recital 3 a (new)
(3 a) Since the publication of the HLEG the Union and its Member States have adopted a vast variety of legislation aiming at breaking the link between sovereign and banks to avoid future bail- outs. In this context it is crucial to restore resolvability and liability of credit institutions. A structural reform of the banking sector can install transparency and eliminate cross subsidisation of trading activities by deposits eligible under the Deposit Guarantee Scheme in accordance with Directive 2014/49/EU1a. To assure a credible bail-in and, thus, a liability for risks and losses, significantly higher capital requirements than under current regulation are needed. The Financial Stability Board's proposal of a Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity represents a first step into this direction. __________________ 1aDirective 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on deposit-guarantee schemes. OJ L 173, 12.06.2014, p.149.
Amendment 513 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
Article 10 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 a (new)
Notwithstanding a decision by the competent authority to require a credit institution to not carry out trading activities listed in its conclusions, in due course and with due respect to market conditions, the competent authority may require capital ratios or liquidity requirements significantly larger than under CRR/CRD IV.