Activities of Bernd KÖLMEL related to 2015/2344(INI)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on budgetary capacity for the Eurozone PDF (616 KB) DOC (93 KB)
Amendments (62)
Amendment 4 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1 a (new)
Citation 1 a (new)
– having regard to the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), in particular Article 5 thereof;
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 a (new)
Citation 2 a (new)
– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 123, 125, 126 and 140 thereof;
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 2 b (new)
Citation 2 b (new)
– having regard to the Protocols 12 and 13 to the TEU and TFEU;
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 3
Citation 3
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 4
Citation 4
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas the Member States of the Eurozone should comply with the Maastricht criteria;
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A b (new)
Recital A b (new)
Ab. whereas Article 5 TEU lays down the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality which apply to the exercise of Union competences;
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A c (new)
Recital A c (new)
Ac. whereas Article 123 TFEU prohibits the monetary financing of governments;
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A d (new)
Recital A d (new)
Ad. whereas according to Article 125 TFEU it is illegal for a Member State to be liable for the liabilities of another Member State;
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A e (new)
Recital A e (new)
Ae. whereas Protocols 12 and 13 to the TEU and TFEU lay down the so-called Maastricht criteria;
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws of EMU through legislation such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, as well as through the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such as the ESM;
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas the ECJ ruled in the Pringle case that the ESM is consistent with the TFEU and opened the door to a possible integration of that mechanism into the acquis communautaire within the current limits of the Treaties;
Amendment 130 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
Recital J a (new)
Ja. whereas the ESM is not formally under parliamentary control;
Amendment 131 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J b (new)
Recital J b (new)
Jb. whereas the crisis revealed considerable democratic deficits in economic and financial policies, areas of European policy of particular significance for the citizens; whereas some Member States now see themselves subject to austerity policies which their parliaments would never have decided on their own, while other Member States see themselves forced to grant sizeable loans or guarantees in order to avoid a breakup of the euro; whereas, because of the spill over effects of national economic and fiscal policy decisions on the economies of other Euro area Member States, their national parliaments are thus effectively deprived of their budgetary autonomy;
Amendment 134 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J c (new)
Recital J c (new)
Jc. whereas any reform of the EMU economic governance structure should respect the will of the EU Member States that have an opt-out from having to introduce the euro currency to retain their respective currencies;
Amendment 136 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J d (new)
Recital J d (new)
Jd. whereas due consideration should be given to the mutual spill-over effects of the EMU and non-euro area members;
Amendment 137 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J e (new)
Recital J e (new)
Je. whereas Union and national policy makers and parliamentarians should continuously explain to their citizens the benefits and possible downsides of a single currency, including the costs and risks linked to a break-up of the euro area;
Amendment 139 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J f (new)
Recital J f (new)
Jf. whereas there is no wide public support for establishing a formal system of fiscal transfers within the Economic and Monetary Union;
Amendment 144 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that the Werner Report in 1970 highlighted the fact that a monetary union would require all the essential features of national public budgets to be decided at Community levelseveral Member States failed to comply with the Maastricht Criteria, both regarding their annual budgets and their total indebtedness;
Amendment 145 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
Amendment 161 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policies;
Amendment 182 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States, aggravated and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mere existence of the euro area;
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
Amendment 211 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Considers that, where a Member State whose currency is the euro is unwilling to further surrender its budgetary sovereignty, it should be given the option of leaving the euro area without leaving the EU; invites the Commission and the Eurogroup – acting in liaison with the ECB – to assist in such a scenario the Member State concerned with practical steps to make a withdrawal from the euro area feasible and as smooth as possible;
Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Observes that the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional and legally contested loose monetary policy measures; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reform;
Amendment 239 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. AcknowledgesTakes into account the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack Regulations; welcomnotes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership;
Amendment 254 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. RecallNotes the four pillars set out in the Five Presidents’ Report: completing the economic, financial and fiscal Union and strengthening democratic accountability, legitimacy and the institutional setting; emphasisnotes that this report reiterates the view set out in the Blueprint of the Commission and the Four Presidents’ Report, coordinated by then President of the European Council Mr Herman van Rompuy, that a shock absorption capacity at euro area level is needed to complement automatic stabilisers at national level, whose functioning is limited, as was shown during the crisisand calls for a shock absorption capacity at euro area level; stresses that any such mechanism, by its mere institutional set-up, risks to lack accountability and democratic legitimacy if it becomes just a new layer of governance which risks to cause moral hazard;
Amendment 273 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Believes that in order to regain trust, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of cleariterates that the Member States whose currency is the euro must comply with the Maastricht criteria;
Amendment 284 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Argues that convergence, good governance and conditionality enforced through institutions being held democratically accountable at the euro-area and national level are key, notably to preventing permanent transfers and moral hazardis not the only way forward and poses a high risk of moral hazard; emphasizes that enforcing a credible no bail-out clause would also lead to these ends without requiring a burdening coordination and enforcement effort;
Amendment 295 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocksare core elements for the functioning of the euro area;
Amendment 314 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
Amendment 338 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resourcesa direct link between decision making and accountability;
Amendment 348 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Considers that three differente theoretical founcdations have to be fulfilled; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a wholefor macroeconomic "imbalances" and "shocks" are insufficiently specified, prone to confusing cause and effect, and too vague to shape the new economic governance structure of the EMU;
Amendment 364 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
Amendment 388 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
Amendment 403 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
Amendment 422 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
Amendment 439 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Notes that the euro currency was supposed to contribute to more unity in Europe, but instead led to more divisiveness because of tensions between creditor and debtor countries of the euro area;
Amendment 483 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Stresses that significant progress in convergence and sustainable structural reforms is needed in order to reconcile fiscal consolidation, growth, jobs, productivity, and competitiveness and the Europeandifferent national social models so as to effectively prevent asymmetric shock; considers that financial support from the European level for the implementation of agreed structural reforms in the Member States, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, is therefore indispensable;
Amendment 492 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
Amendment 505 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
Amendment 521 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 1
Paragraph 26 – indent 1
Amendment 529 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 2
Paragraph 26 – indent 2
Amendment 551 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1
Amendment 560 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2
Amendment 573 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
Amendment 597 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Is convinced that increased convergence within the euro area will significantly increase the capacity of its Member States to absorb asymmetric shocks; believes, however, thatBelieves that, no matter how great the efforts regarding convergence and sustainable structural reforms, asymmetric shocks with an impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the strong integration of the euro area Member Statesneglected preconditions for an optimal currency area; stresses, therefore, the need to have an instrument available for this emergency which provides an immediate stabilisation effectto make possible a withdrawal from the euro area without withdrawing from the EU;
Amendment 608 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
Amendment 620 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 a (new)
Paragraph 29 a (new)
29a. Notes that proposals for a shock absorption function at euro area level reflect the dominance of macro-managing than curing structural problems; believes that, while it may be tempting at first sight to allow counter-cyclical policies via a euro area treasury for highly indebted countries that would otherwise face market pressure, this possibility would reduce the need for consolidation since the ability to conduct counter-cyclical policies is a good reason to seek for fiscal space; considers therefore that a euro area fiscal capacity would make it even harder to reach the goals of the Stability and Growth Pact as amended by the Six- Pack and the Two-Pack;
Amendment 627 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
Amendment 643 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
Amendment 671 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Considers that the EMF should provide the financial resources for either of these models, which could require increasing the amount of capital; points out that the fund should avoid long-term redistribution effects by ensuring Member States’ contributions are balanced over the cycle;long-term redistribution effects should be avoided by ensuring that the Member States' contributions to the EU budget are balanced over the cycle; reiterates that no Member State can be liable for the liabilities of another Member State nor for their commitments.
Amendment 681 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; recalls that the EMF should be used as an appropriate financial resource;
Amendment 696 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Considers that in the case of symmetric shocks brought about by a lack of internal demand, monetary policy alone cannot reignite the economy, particularly in a context of zero lower bounds; is therefore convinced that public and private investment must be increased, the administrative burden reduced and a proper regulatory framework developed, with a view to stimulating potential growththat are caused by a lack of confidence must be diminished by addressing the flaws of the EMU´s economic governance structure;
Amendment 708 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
Amendment 730 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Considers that instability in the financial sector could also pose severe challenges for the euro area as a whole; urgesemphasizes that the completion of the Banking Union in order to lessen these challenges; calls for the fiscal capacity to operaims at improving the confidence in the financial sector in some Member States as a fiscal backstop for the Banking Union, as agreedt the expense of the perception of the financial sector stability in othe SRMrs;
Amendment 742 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Points out that theany fiscal capacity haswould have to be of significant size in order to be able to address these euro-area-wide shocks and to finance its functions; insists thwarns against creat in order to provide sufficient financial resources, the euro area fiscal capacity, including the EMF, should be able to increase the issuance of equities via a rise in guarantees; considers that these common issued equities should have the highest credit rateg net contributor and net receiver countries out overstretching solidarity and seeding tension;
Amendment 755 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
38. Stresses that the Community methodsubsidiarity and proportionality principles should prevail in the development of economic governance for the euro area; urges that no reinforcement of intergovernmental structures should take place in parallel with existing structures;
Amendment 766 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Calls urgently for the European Parliament and national parliaments to be given a strengthened role in the renewed economic governance framework in order to reinforce democratic accountability; calls for increased national ownership in the European Semester in order to improve compliance with the CSRsstrict enforcement of the no bail-out clause in order to reinforce democratic accountability;
Amendment 791 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Considers that in order to provide for a genuine EMU, a euro area treasury should be created for collective decision- making, supervision and management of the budgetary capacity for the euro area; calls for the inclusion of thi to be in equilibrium, a country which considers that the costs tareasury wit outweighing the European Commission with full macroeconomic, fiscal and financial competences; calls for a vice-presidentbenefits of a membership of the Eeuropean Commission to head the treasury and simultaneously to act as president of the Eurogroup; urges full accountability of this treasury to the European Parliament area should be able to choose to leave;
Amendment 803 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
Amendment 821 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Acknowledges that the current political climate characterised by deep inequality, mistrust and uncertainty is not conducive to proper reforms to achieve and complete EMUhas been caused, among others, by pursuing the completion of the EMU regardless of economic objections; believes, therefore, that a comprehensive roadmap, including clear milestones within an agreed timetable and taking into account the political situation, should be urgently adopted with a clear commitment by euro area Heads of State and Government to achieving a genuine and complete EMU;