Activities of Jakob von WEIZSÄCKER
Plenary speeches (17)
Independence of statistical authorities in the European Union and the case of Andreas Georgiou (debate) DE
Independence of statistical authorities in the European Union and the case of Andreas Georgiou (debate) DE
Independence of statistical authorities in the European Union and the case of Andreas Georgiou (debate) DE
The Economic and Monetary Union package (debate)
Clearing obligation, reporting requirements, risk-mitigation techniques and trade repositories (debate)
European Semester for economic policy coordination: Annual Growth Survey 2018 - European Semester for economic policy coordination: employment and social aspects in the Annual Growth Survey 2018 (debate)
Economic policies of the euro area (debate)
Possible evolutions of and adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the European Union - Improving the functioning of the European Union building on the potential of the Lisbon Treaty - Budgetary capacity for the Eurozone (debate)
Virtual currencies (short presentation)
Banking Union - Annual report 2015 (debate)
Banking Union - Annual report 2015 (debate)
Euro area recommendation - Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union (debate) DE
Euro area recommendation - Completing Europe's Economic and Monetary Union (debate) DE
Review of the economic governance framework: stocktaking and challenges (debate) DE
Review of the economic governance framework: stocktaking and challenges (debate) DE
Money market funds (debate) DE
Money market funds (debate)
Reports (1)
REPORT on virtual currencies PDF (328 KB) DOC (127 KB)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 as regards the clearing obligation, the suspension of the clearing obligation, the reporting requirements, the risk-mitigation techniques for OTC derivatives contracts not cleared by a central counterparty, the registration and supervision of trade repositories and the requirements for trade repositories PDF (671 KB) DOC (97 KB)
Institutional motions (3)
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the Srebrenica commemoration PDF (262 KB) DOC (67 KB)
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the situation in Hungary PDF (273 KB) DOC (72 KB)
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the latest tragedies in the Mediterranean and EU migration and asylum policies PDF (250 KB) DOC (70 KB)
Oral questions (1)
Autonomous driving PDF (197 KB) DOC (27 KB)
Written questions (8)
Criminal proceedings against the former head of ELSTAT PDF (194 KB) DOC (18 KB)
Directive 2001/113/EC - Fruit jams and sweetened chestnut purée PDF (101 KB) DOC (15 KB)
Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) PDF (104 KB) DOC (24 KB)
Too much finance II PDF (101 KB) DOC (24 KB)
Implementation and enforcement of TLAC PDF (103 KB) DOC (23 KB)
Closet tracking PDF (104 KB) DOC (24 KB)
Too much finance? PDF (101 KB) DOC (24 KB)
Funding opportunities for unemployed young persons following the discontinuation of the Leonardo da Vinci programme PDF (100 KB) DOC (23 KB)
Amendments (582)
Amendment 28 #
2018/2101(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas according to Eurostat figures from May 2018, unemployment in the EU and the euro area has now all but returned to pre-crisis levels, standing at 7.0 % and 8.4 % respectively; substantial differences between member states remain, and especially youth unemployment rates remain too high, standing at 15.1% and 16.8% respectively; whereas the number of employed people and labour force participation in the euro area were at their highest levels since the start of the Economic and Monetary Union in 1999;
Amendment 48 #
2018/2101(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
K. whereas at the end of 2017 the size of the Eurosystem balance sheet had reached an all-time high of EUR 4.5 trillion, growing by EUR 0.8 trillion compared to the end of 2016;
Amendment 80 #
2018/2101(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Warns, however, of the rise of uncertainties, which stem from the threat of increased protectionism, rising nationalism, the Brexit negotiations and rising divergences between Member States on the future of European integration, among other causes;
Amendment 167 #
2018/2101(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Emphasises that, in order to enhance the shock absorption capacity and the resilience of the Euro area, steps towards a common fiscal capacity should be undertaken, including by introducing a suitably designed European Unemployment Reinsurance Scheme;
Amendment 182 #
2018/2101(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Welcomes the adoption of the agreement on emergency liquidity assistance (ELA), which clarifies the allocation of responsibilities, costs and risks; notes that this agreement is to be reviewed in 2019 at the latest;
Amendment 193 #
2018/2101(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Stresses the need for euro area member states to pursue a joint regulatory strategy for the financial sector in the wake of Brexit, rather than engaging in harmful downward competition;
Amendment 40 #
2018/2100(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Takes note of the achievements of the Banking Union in fostering a truly single market, a level playing field and predictability for market actors; considers that a fully completed Banking Union will further strengthen financial stability and growth prospects in the EU and the completion of banking union needs to be pursued with greater urgency;
Amendment 96 #
2018/2100(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Welcomes the Commission proposal to reinforce the role of the EBA in anti-money laundering supervision in the financial sector; calls on the co-legislators adopt the proposal without undue delay and urges the need for enhanced cooperation and information sharing between national supervision authorities based on common standards within the EU and subject to EU level coordination and support where national authorities are overwhelmed;
Amendment 100 #
2018/2100(INI)
11a. Urges Member States to prevent a return to competitive deregulation and harmful tax competition, induced by the scramble of Member States to attract financial service business from the City of London, and calls on the EU27 to deepen common regulation and common supervision to pre-empt such harmful competition while enhancing the depth and breadth of the capital markets within the EU27;
Amendment 112 #
2018/2100(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Takes note of the on-going negotiations on the NPL package; welcomes the ECB addendum on NPLs and the work of the EBA on guidelines on management of non-performing and forborne exposures; welcomes the reduction in volume of NPLs over the past years; stresses that the risk to financial stability posed by NPLs is still significant; agrees with the Commission that the primary responsibility for reducing NPLs lies with the Member States, notably through efficient insolvency laws, and banks themselves but emphasises the interest of the EU to reduce the share of NPLs;
Amendment 14 #
2018/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas, according to the Commission’s forecasts, the GDP growth rate for the euro area was 2.4 % in 2017 and will dip slightly to 2.3 % in 2018 and to 2 % in 2019; whereas reconomic growth is still fragile and is expectent Euro area- wide growth should not lead to complacency and instead the Euro area needs to slow down in the face of many challenges such as higher oiimplement the necessary reforms both at the European level and the level of member states in order to be able to withstand symmetric and asymmetric shocks rather than such shocks leading to existential pcricses;
Amendment 42 #
2018/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
Ca. whereas the banking union has not been completed and the problem of the sovereign-bank-nexus has not yet been addressed comprehensively;
Amendment 67 #
2018/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers that growth-orientated fiscal policies are needed at the European level, alongside an appropriate monetary policy, in order to strengthen the European economyreforms need to be complemented with appropriate fiscal policies, alongside an appropriate monetary policy, throughout the business-cycle and especially in times of stress;
Amendment 144 #
2018/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls the importance of efficient regulation of the banking and financial sectors to forestall any new crises; reiterates that both sufficient levels of loss absorbing capital to make the bail-in requirements fully credible and a credible fiscal backstop to banking union are needed in order to protect the taxpayer and assure systemic stability;
Amendment 149 #
2018/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Emphasises the importance of a credible fiscal capacity at the level of the Euro area including an enhanced mechanism to handle acute crises to be organised around a European Monetary Fund and a fiscal backstop to banking union, an automatic macro-reinsurance and a euro area budget that can help stabilise investment and deal with unforeseen eventualities with the legitimacy that comes with democratic decision making at the European level;
Amendment 154 #
2018/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9b. Calls for the macro-insurance to be organised in the form of a European Unemployment Re-Insurance Scheme, combining self-insurance at the national level with reinsurance against large shocks in order to help weather future crises in a predictable and incentive compatible manner;
Amendment 165 #
2018/2007(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Asks the Commission to adopt a regulatory strategy aimed inter alia at measuring sustainability risks within the framework of capital adequacy rules; stresses that capital adequacy rules must be based on and fully reflect demonstrated risks; aims to initiate an EU pilot project within the next annual budget to begin developing methodological benchmarks for that purpose; emphasises the need to introduce a brown-penalizing factor into the prudential framework for financial institutions in order to adequately account for climate change risks associated with carbon-intensive assets;
Amendment 191 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33
Recital 33
(33) EISF should be considered as a first step in the development over time of a fully-fledged insurance mechanism to cater for macro-economic stabilisation. Currently, EISF would be based on loans and granting of interest rate subsidies. In parallel, it is not excluded that the ESM or its legal successor would be involved in the future by providing financial assistance to Member States whose currency is the euro facing adverse economic conditions in support of public investment. Moreover, a voluntary insurance mechanism with a borrowing capacity based on voluntary contributions by Member States could be set up in the future to provide for a powerful instrument for the purpose of macro-economic stabilisation against asymmetric shocksIn addition, a European Unemployment Re-Insurance Scheme should be set up in the future, combining self-insurance at the national level with reinsurance against large shocks in order to help weather future crises in a predictable and incentive compatible manner.
Amendment 458 #
2018/0212(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 – point d
Article 22 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 – point d
(d) the appropriateness of developing a voluntary insurance mechanismoptions for developing a European Unemployment Re-Insurance Scheme serving the purpose of macroeconomic stabilisation.
Amendment 166 #
2018/0178(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
Recital 13
(13) The Platform on Sustainable Finance and the recurring reviews of this Regulation by the Commission should cover whether it is necessary to move from common criteria for classifying economic activities as environmentally sustainable to a Union classification of environmentally sustainable activities and investments, especially in view of incentives for national governments to more generously classify economic activities as environmentally sustainable in order to attract more investment. A Union classification of environmentally sustainable economic activities should furthermore enable the development of future Union policies, including Union- wide standards for environmentally sustainable financial products and eventually the establishment of labels that formally recognise compliance with those standards across the Union. Uniform legal requirements for considering investments as environmentally sustainable investments, based on uniform criteria for environmentally sustainable economic activities, are necessary as a reference for future Union legislation aiming at enabling those investments, including the introduction of a brown-penalising factor into the prudential framework for financial institutions in order to adequately account for climate change risks associated with carbon-intensive assets.
Amendment 598 #
2018/0178(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – point f
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – point f
(f) advise the Commission on the possible need to amend this Regulation, especially concerning the necessity of establishing a Union classification of environmentally sustainable economic activities and investments in order to counter incentives to lower national implementation of the criteria.
Amendment 637 #
2018/0178(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point d
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) the use of the definition of environmentally sustainable investment in Union law, and at Member State level, including the appropriateness of setting up verification mechanism of compliance with the criteria set out in this Regulation or setting up a Union classification of environmentally sustainable economic activities and investments.
Amendment 180 #
2018/0171(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 a (new)
Article 18 a (new)
Amendment 150 #
2018/0048(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11 a (new)
Recital 11 a (new)
(11a) In relation to initial coin offerings (ICOs), the characteristics of such an instrument differ considerably from crowdfunding envisaged in this Regulation. ICOs usually do not use intermediaries, such as crowdfunding platforms, and often raise funds in excess of EUR 1 000 000. The inclusion of ICOs in this Regulation would not tackle the problems associated with ICOs holistically.
Amendment 60 #
2017/2253(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Notes, at the same time, that Brexit risks once more to incite harmful regulatory downward competition as financial hubs in the EU27 scramble to attract business from London. To prevent this, the remaining Member States need to commit to strengthening common European financial regulatory standards and practices and to coordinating wherever possible in order to manage the challenges of Brexit;
Amendment 220 #
2017/2253(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22 a. Calls on the Commission to assess the impact of new technologies on financial services in a timely manner and to propose common European regulatory and supervisory strategies where appropriate; stresses that the EU should play a key role in setting international standards for new technologies in order to pave the way for such innovation, to ensure consumer protection and to safeguard financial stability.
Amendment 46 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas employment is expected to continue to expand, while some labour market indicators and the relatively high level of ‘involuntary’ part-time work, suggest persistent labour market difficulties aggravating inequalities, especially with regard to young people and those with low educational attainment;
Amendment 61 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
F a. whereas the Banking Union remains incomplete without a renewed attempt to introduce a Bank Structural Reform in the spirit of the Liikanen Report to address effectively the too-big- to-fail problem and to safeguard taxpayers and depositors;
Amendment 251 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Insists on a common effort to bring euro area expenditure on R&D closer to the EU2020 targets; calls for proper policies and investment to ensure equal access to higher education and training and to enable citizens to adapt to the challenges posed by automation and digital technologies;
Amendment 299 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Underlines that a fiscal capacity – on top of existing capacities, and not through redeployments that would undermine the vital role currently played by structural funds and cohesion policy – represents a necessary tool for increasing incentives for convergence and to counter asymmetric or symmetric economic shocks; calls for further stabilization of the Euro area by increasing its capacity to absorb large-scale economic shocks and respective consequences for the labour market through the introduction of a European Unemployment Insurance Scheme, combining a self-insurance mechanism for national unemployment insurance systems with a European re- insurance as a solidarity mechanism for extreme shocks;
Amendment 330 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Calls for the completion of the Banking Union, including a credible European deposit-insurance scheme and a common fiscal backstop; is concerned that the too-big-to-fail problem has not been addressed effectively and therefore supports the effort to reinstate the Liikanen group to reassess whether large banks continue to pose systemic risks to financial stability;
Amendment 363 #
2017/2226(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Underlines that anyWelcomes further steps towards a deepening of the EMU combining enhanced responsibility to strengthen fiscal incentives of member states with solidarity to strengthen the protection of citizens against shocks; underlines that this must go hand in hand with stronger democratic controls; insists that, to this end, the role of the European Parliament and national parliaments must be strengthened; asks to include trade unions in the negotiation process at both national and European level; urges the launch of the long-awaited negotiation of an interinstitutional agreement (IIA) on the Semester;
Amendment 127 #
2017/2191(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Welcomes efforts by the Commission to make large digital companies pay their fair share of taxes in EU Member States; further welcomes the Commission decision taken against Luxembourg on the illegal tax benefits granted to Amazon (around EUR 250 million);
Amendment 131 #
2017/2191(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Underlines the need to tax digital companies according to their genuine activity in Member States by capturing turnover generated through digital platforms, thus avoiding a competitive disadvantage for companies carrying out business by means of a permanent physical presence;
Amendment 44 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas in 2016, the ECB’s net profit stood at EUR 1.19 mbillion compared with EUR 1.08 mbillion in 2015;
Amendment 243 #
2017/2124(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Considers that monetary policy alone is not sufficient to achieve a sustainable and more even and inclusive economic recovery, and that public and private investments should therefore be encouraged in the context of a moderately positive fiscal stance in the Eurozone as proposed by the Commission, and furthermore that steps towards a common fiscal capacity should be taken, for example by introducing a suitably designed European Unemployment Insurance Scheme;
Amendment 43 #
2017/2114(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the EU’s excessively low productivity and global competitiveness calls for structural reforms, continued fiscal efforts and investmentcontinued investments, innovations and reforms in Member States are needed in order to bring about sustained growth and employment, assure fiscal sustainability and achieve upward convergence with other global economies and within the EU;
Amendment 44 #
2017/2114(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
C a. whereas monetary policy designed to fight deflationary risks played a key role in stabilizing the euro area as a collateral benefit in recent years, monetary policy in the coming years will need to control inflationary pressures which will present a renewed challenge of fiscal sustainability for countries with below average growth rates and above average debt levels;
Amendment 62 #
2017/2114(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the gooenhanced performance of the European economy, supported by moderate GDP growth and decreasing, yet still high, unemployment rates; notes that the modest recovery remains fragile and that the development of GDP per capita is close to stagnation;
Amendment 117 #
2017/2114(INI)
5 a. Supports efforts to enhance the credibility of banking union by applying its rules both in letter and in spirit more reliably, by bolstering the availability of loss absorbing capital and by completing banking union with a European Deposits Insurance Scheme;
Amendment 165 #
2017/2114(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Takes the view that reforms to improve the business climate are needed to boost productivity and employment in the euro area; underlines in this context the importance of supply-side reforms being undertaken jointly with demand-side improvements;
Amendment 203 #
2017/2114(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
Amendment 218 #
2017/2114(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11 a (new)
Paragraph 11 a (new)
11 a. Stresses the need for a better coordination of taxation in the EU to fight unfair tax competition;
Amendment 280 #
2017/2114(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Considers that prudentsustainable fiscal policies play a fundamental role for the stability of the euro area and the Union as a whole; underlines that strong coordination of fiscal policies and compliance with the Union rules in this area are a legal requirement and key to the proper functioning of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU);
Amendment 326 #
2017/2114(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18 a. Calls for the introduction of a European Unemployment Insurance Scheme, combining a self-insurance mechanism that ensures counter-cyclical behaviour across the business cycle with a catastrophe insurance as a solidarity mechanism for extreme crises;
Amendment 398 #
2017/2114(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Considers it of great importance therefore that all Member States take the necessary policy action to address imbalances, in particular high levels of indebtedness and account surpluses, and commit to structural reforms ensuring the economic sustainability of each individual Member State, thereby ensuring the overall competitiveness and resilience of the European economy;
Amendment 59 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the Banking Union remains incomplete without the introduction of a common deposit insurance and a Bank Structural Reform in the spirit of the Liikanen Report to effectively address the too-big-to-fail problem and to safeguard taxpayers and depositors;
Amendment 76 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
E a. whereas a proper clean-up of bank balance sheets after the crisis has been delayed, still hampering economic growth;
Amendment 78 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E b (new)
Recital E b (new)
E b. whereas overall the capital and liquidity ratios of EU banks have slightly improved over the last year while many banks, including several large banks, remain significantly undercapitalised;whereas risks to financial stability remain;
Amendment 85 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E c (new)
Recital E c (new)
E c. whereas current favourable economic conditions constitute a window of opportunity to push necessary reforms to complete the Banking Union;
Amendment 136 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Reiterates its concerns about the high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in certain jurisdictions; agrees with the Commission that ‘Member States and banks themselves have a primary responsibility in tackling non-performing loans’4 ; welcomes, nonetheless, the work done by different EU institutions and bodies on this issue; calls on these actors and the Member States to duly implement the Council conclusions of 11 July 2017 on the action plan to tackle non-performing loans in Europe; welcomes the ECB’s intention to accelerate the clean-up of bank balance sheets and calls for a concerted effort to find a legally sound and practical way to get there without further delay; _________________ 4 Commission communication on completing the Banking Union, 11 October 2017, p. 15 (COM(2017)0592).
Amendment 242 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Calls for European oversight of large Central Counterparties (CCPs) based on an architecture similar to that of the Banking Union;
Amendment 245 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)
Paragraph 10 b (new)
10b. Regrets the withdrawal of the Bank Structural Reform file by the European Commission and calls for a renewed attempt to implement the findings of the Liikanen report and to introduce a reversal of the burden of proof regarding the risks contained in the balance sheets of the largest global banks;
Amendment 329 #
2017/2072(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Considers that a similar architecture to the Single Resolution Mechanism and Single Resolution Fund is required for Central Counterparties (CCPs) given their interconnectedness with systematically important banks and the cross-border implications of any resolution actions;
Amendment 48 #
2017/2071(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Emphasises the need for investment in projects fostering innovation, in order to create technological progress and achieve sustained growth;
Amendment 54 #
2017/2044(BUD)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Stresses that in the field of digitalisation of financial services, particularly with regard to distributed ledger technology (DLT), a further build- up of technical expertise is needed to be better able to react to potential challenges and therefore expressly supports continued funding for the Horizontal Task Force Distributed Ledger Technology;further calls for the development of use cases for governmental application to harness the innovative potential of the technology;
Amendment 41 #
2017/0359(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
Recital 16
(16) Investment firms should be considered small and non-interconnected for the purposes of the specific prudential requirements for investment firms where they do not conduct investment services which carry a high risk for clients, markets, Union taxpayers or themselves and whose size means they are less likely to cause widespread negative impacts for clients and, markets, and Union taxpayers in case risks inherent in their business materialise or in case they fail. Accordingly, small and non- interconnected investment firms should be defined as those that do not deal on own account or incur risk from trading financial instruments, have no client assets or money under their control, have assets under both discretionary portfolio management and non-discretionary (advisory) arrangements of less than EUR 1.2 billion, handle fewer than EUR 100 million per day of client orders in cash trades or EUR 1 billion per day in derivatives, and have a balance sheet smaller than EUR 100 million and total gross annual revenues from the performance of their investment services of less than EUR 30 million.
Amendment 102 #
2017/0358(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Member States shall ensure that where an investment firm benefits from extraordinary public financial support as defined to in Article 2(1)(28) of Directive 2014/59/EU, the following requirements apply:it does not pay any variable remuneration.
Amendment 104 #
2017/0358(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point a
Amendment 106 #
2017/0358(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 108 #
2017/0358(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – point c
Amendment 111 #
2017/0358(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 29 – paragraph 2
Article 29 – paragraph 2
Amendment 145 #
2017/0358(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point f a (new)
(fa) the risks posed to the security of network and information systems which investment firms use in their operations to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of its processes and data.
Amendment 19 #
2017/0326(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1
Recital 1
(1) In the context of the United Kingdom's notification on 29 March 2017 of its intention to leave the Union, pursuant to Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, the other 27 Member States, meeting in the margins of the General Affairs Council (‘Article 50’), selected Paris, France, as the new seat of the European Banking Authority. At the same time, another possible result of Brexit is harmful regulatory downward competition as financial hubs in the other 27 Member States scramble to attract business from London. To prevent that, the remaining Member States need to commit to strengthening common Union financial regulatory standards and practices and to coordinating wherever possible in order to manage the challenges of Brexit.
Amendment 199 #
2017/0136(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33
Recital 33
(33) The degree of risk posed by a systemically-important CCP to the financial system and stability of the Union varies. The requirements for systemically- important CCPs should therefore be applied in a manner proportionate to the risks that the CCP may present to the Union. Where ESMA and the relevant central bank(s) of issue conclude that a third-country CCP is of such systemic importance that additional requirements will not ensure the financial stability of the Union, ESMA should be able to recommend to the Commission that that CCP should not be recognised. In its recommendation, ESMA should assess the net benefits of such a move with regards to safeguarding the interests of EU taxpayers and financial stability. The Commission should be able to adopt an implementing act declaring that the third- country CCP should be established in the Union and authorised as such to provide clearing services in the Union.
Amendment 250 #
2017/0136(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7
Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010
Article 44b – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
Article 44b – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
(ca) tasks, actions, and decisions for the supervision of systemically important CCPs established in the Union pursuant to Article 22g of Regulation (EU) 648/2012.
Amendment 403 #
2017/0136(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 a (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Chapter 2 a – Article 22 a (new)
Chapter 2 a – Article 22 a (new)
7a. The following chapter is inserted: 'Chapter 2a The CCP - Single Resolution Fund Article 22a General provisions 1. The CCP-Single Resolution Fund (‘CCP-SRF’) is hereby established. 2. Prior to the establishment of a Single Resolution Board for CCPs (CCP- SRB), its revenues shall accumulate for up to 10 years to be used by the SRB as an additional financial backstop to the SRF for the activities within its mandate. 3. Once the CCP-SRB is established, it shall use the CCP-SRF only for the purpose of ensuring the efficient application of the resolution tools and the exercise of the resolution powers referred to in Chapter III of Regulation (EU) [on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparties and amending Regulations (EU) No 1095/2010, (EU) No 648/2012, and (EU) 2015/2365] and in accordance with the resolution objectives and the principles governing resolution referred to in Articles 21 and 23 of that Regulation. Under no circumstances shall the Union budget or the national budgets be held liable for the expenses or losses of the CCP-SRF. 4. The owner of the CCP-SRF shall be the Single Resolution Board. Once established, the CCP-SRB becomes the sole owner of the CCP-SRF 5. Contributions shall be raised in accordance with Articles 22b and 22c.
Amendment 404 #
2017/0136(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 b (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 b (new)
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 22 b (new)
Article 22 b (new)
Amendment 413 #
2017/0136(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 c (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 c (new)
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 22 c (new)
Article 22 c (new)
Amendment 417 #
2017/0136(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 d (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 d (new)
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 22 d (new)
Article 22 d (new)
Amendment 418 #
2017/0136(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 e (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 e (new)
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 22 e (new)
Article 22 e (new)
Amendment 421 #
2017/0136(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 f (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 f (new)
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 22 f (new)
Article 22 f (new)
Amendment 423 #
2017/0136(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 b (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 7 b (new)
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Chapter 2 b – Article 22 g (new)
Chapter 2 b – Article 22 g (new)
7b. The following chapter is inserted: 'Chapter 2b Supervision and oversight of Union CCPs Article 22g Supervision of systemically important CCPs established in the Union 1. ESMA shall determine whether a CPP established in the Union is systemically important or likely to become systemically important for the financial stability of the Union or for one or more of its Member States (Tier 2 CCP) in accordance with Article 25 (2a). 2. Where ESMA determines a CCP established in the Union to be systemically important or likely to become systemically important (Tier 2 CCP) in accordance with paragraph 1, ESMA shall have exclusive competence to carry out all tasks, actions and decisions required for prudential supervisory purposes, including those of the college and the competent authority, in relation to that CCP.'
Amendment 483 #
2017/0136(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 25 – paragraph 2 c – subparagraph 1 a (new)
Article 25 – paragraph 2 c – subparagraph 1 a (new)
The recommendation shall assess the net benefits of such a move with regards to safeguarding the interests of EU taxpayers and financial stability.
Amendment 36 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) Financial counterparties with a volume of activity in OTC derivatives markets that is too low to present an important systemic risk for the financial system and is too low for central clearing to be economically viable should be exempted from the clearing obligation while remaining subject to the requirement to exchange collateral to mitigate any systemic risk. The excess of the clearing threshold for at least one class of OTC derivative by a financial counterparty should however trigger the clearing obligation for all classes of OTC derivatives given the interconnectedness of financial counterparties and the possible systemic risk to the financial system that may arise if those derivative contracts are not centrally cleared. Financial counterparties that do not exceed the threshold should remain subject to all risk-mitigation techniques for derivative contracts not cleared by a CCP.
Amendment 40 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
Recital 7
(7) Non-financial counterparties are less interconnected than financial counterparties. They are also often active in only one class of OTC derivative. Their activity could therefore poses less of a systemic risk to the financial system than the activity of financial counterparties. The scope of the clearing obligation for non- financial counterparties should therefore be narrowed, so that those non-financial counterparties are subject to the clearing obligation only with regard to the asset class or asset classes that exceed the clearing threshold, while retaining their requirement to exchange collateral when any of the clearing thresholds is exceeded.
Amendment 47 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
Recital 12
(12) Intragroup transactions involving non-financial counterparties represent a relatively small fraction of all OTC derivative transactions and are used primarily for internal hedging within groups. Those transactions therefore do not significantly contribute to systemic risk and interconnectedness, yet the obligation to report those transactions imposes important costs and burdens on non- financial counterparties. Intragroup transactions where at least oneboth of the counterparties is aare non-financial counterpartyies should therefore be exempted from the reporting obligation.
Amendment 52 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
Recital 13
Amendment 66 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
Recital 19
(19) The fines ESMA can impose on trade repositories under its direct supervision should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive enough to ensure the effectiveness of ESMA’s supervisory powers and to increase the transparency of OTC derivatives positions and exposures. The amounts of fines initially provided for in Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 have revealed insufficiently dissuasive in view of the current turnover of the trade repositories, which could potentially limit the effectiveness of ESMA's supervisory powers under that Regulation vis-à-vis trade repositories. The upper limit of the basic amounts of fines should therefore be increased. Furthermore, the timespans for taking into account aggravating and mitigating factors have been ineffective and need to be changed.
Amendment 69 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 24
Recital 24
(24) Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 establishes that the clearing obligation should not apply to pension scheme arrangements (PSAs) until a suitable technical solution is developed by CCPs for the transfer of non-cash collateral as variation margins. As no viable solution facilitating PSAs to centrally clear has been developed so far, that temporary derogation should be extended to apply for a further three years. Central clearing should however remain the ultimate aimWithin that timeframe, the introduction of central clearing is reasonably possible considering that current regulatory and market developments enable market participants to develop suitable technical solutions within that time perio. No further extensions are to be foreseen since the financial stability benefits of central clearing for PSAs are well documented and any adverse incentive to further delay implementation should be avoided. With the assistance of ESMA, EBA, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (‘EIOPA’), ECB and ESRB, the Commission should monitor and promote the progress made by CCPs, clearing members and PSAs towards viable solutions facilitating the participation of PSAs in central clearing and prepare a report on that progress. That report should also cover the solutions every 6 months until the clearing exemption expires. That report should also cover the solutions, possibly including liquidity transformation of secure collateral via the ECB and the related costs and benefits for PSAs, thereby taking into account regulatory and market developments such as changes to the type of financial counterparty that is subject to the clearing obligation. In order to cater for developments not foreseen at the time of adoption of this regulation, the Commission should be empowered to extend that derogation for additional two years, after having carefully assessed the need for such an extension.
Amendment 73 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25
Recital 25
(25) The power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be delegated to the Commission in respect of specifying the conditions under which commercial terms relating to the provision of clearing services are considered to be fair, reasonable and non- discriminatory, and in respect of the extension of the period in which the clearing obligation should not apply to PSAs.
Amendment 103 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 4a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 4a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
A financial counterparty taking positions in OTC derivative contracts shall calculate, annuallyon an annual basis, its aggregate month- end average position for the months March, April and Mayprevious 12 months in accordance with paragraph 3.
Amendment 105 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 4a – paragraph 1– subparagraph 2 – introductory part
Article 4a – paragraph 1– subparagraph 2 – introductory part
Where the result of that calculation exceeds the clearing thresholds or where a financial counterparty can reasonably expect it to exceed the clearing thresholds specified pursuant to Article 10(4)(b)paragraph 3a, the financial counterparty shall:
Amendment 116 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 4a – paragraph 2
Article 4a – paragraph 2
2. A financial counterparty that has become subject to the clearing obligation in accordance with paragraph 1 and subsequently demonstrates to the relevant competent authority that its aggregate month-end average position for the months March, April and May of a given yearprevious 12 months no longer exceeds the clearing threshold referred to in paragraph 1, shall no longer be subject to the clearing obligation set out in Article 4.
Amendment 119 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 4a – paragraph 3 a (new)
Article 4a – paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. In order to ensure consistent application of this Article, ESMA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards, after consulting the ESRB and other relevant authorities, specifying the values of the clearing thresholds, in order to ensure broad participation in central clearing. After conducting an open public consultation, ESMA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by ... [six months following the date of entry into force of this amending Regulation]. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. After consulting the ESRB and other relevant authorities, ESMA shall periodically review the thresholds, and, where necessary, propose regulatory technical standards to amend them. Each Member State shall designate an authority responsible for ensuring that the obligation under paragraph 1 is met.
Amendment 147 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 6b – paragraph 5
Article 6b – paragraph 5
5. A suspension of the clearing obligation pursuant to this Article shall be valid for a period of threnot exceeding one months from the date of the publication of that suspension in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Amendment 148 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 6b – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1
Article 6b – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1
The Commission, after consulting ESMA and the ESRB, may extend the suspension referred to in paragraph 5 for additionalone or more periods of three months, with the total period of the suspension not exceeding twelve monthsone month not cumulatively exceeding six months from the end of the initial suspension period where the grounds for the suspension continue to apply. An extension of the suspension shall be published in accordance with Article 4.
Amendment 152 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 6b – paragraph 6 a (new)
Article 6b – paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Where the suspension is not renewed by the end of the initial period or by the end of any subsequent renewal period it shall automatically expire.
Amendment 154 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point a
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Counterparties and CCPs shall ensure that the details of any derivative contract they have concluded and of any modification or termination of the contract are reported in accordance with paragraph 1a to a trade repository registered in accordance with Article 55 or recognised in accordance with Article 77. The details shall be reported no later than the working day following the conclusion, modification or termination of the contract. In reporting the designation of counterparties and other entities, the reporting counterparties shall use a legal entity identifier established to identify counterparties and other entities that are legal persons. The legal entity identifier used shall comply with international standards, in particular those established by the Financial Stability Board.
Amendment 158 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point a
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
The reporting obligation shall not apply to intragroup transactions referred to in Article 3 where oneboth of the counterparties is aare non-financial counterpartyies.;
Amendment 165 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 9 – paragraph 1a – subparagraph 1 – point a
Article 9 – paragraph 1a – subparagraph 1 – point a
Amendment 170 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 7 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 9 – paragraph 1a – subparagraph 1 – point b
Article 9 – paragraph 1a – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) Where a financial counterpartiesy or CCP concludes a derivative contract with a non-financial counterparty which on its balance sheet dates does not exceed the limits of at least two of the three criteria defined in Article 3(3) of Directive 2013/34/EU, the financial counterparty or CCP shall be responsible for reporting on behalf of both counterparties. Counterparties not required to report the details of OTCtheir derivative contracts concluded with a non- financial counterparty that is not subject to the conditions referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 10(1) as well as for ensuring the accuracy of the details reported;shall ensure that the CCP or reporting counterparties receive all details necessary for them to comply with the reporting obligation and which the CCP or reporting counterparties cannot reasonably be expected to possess.
Amendment 179 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
A non-financial counterparty taking positions in OTC derivative contracts shall calculate, annuallyon an annual basis, its aggregate month- end average position for the months March, April and Mayprevious 12 months in accordance with paragraph 3.
Amendment 181 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part
Article 10 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part
Where the result of that calculation exceeds the clearing thresholds or where a non-financial counterparty can reasonably expect it to exceed the clearing thresholds specified pursuant to paragraph 4(b), that non- financial counterparty shall:
Amendment 185 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 10 – paragraph 2
Article 10 – paragraph 2
2. A non-financial counterparty that has become subject to the clearing obligation in accordance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 1 and subsequently demonstrates to the authority designated in accordance with paragraph 5 that its aggregate month-end average position for the months March, April and May of a given yearprevious 12 months no longer exceeds the clearing threshold referred to in paragraph 1 shall no longer be subject to the clearing obligation set out in Article 4.;
Amendment 201 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 16 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 16 – paragraph 1 a (new)
(9a) In Article 16, the following paragraph 1a is inserted: 1a. Where deemed necessary by the resolution authority of the CCP, in order to remove impediments to resolvability in accordance with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) [on CCP recovery and resolution], the resolution authority may require higher capital requirements.
Amendment 208 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 39 – paragraph 11
Article 39 – paragraph 11
11. Where the requiMember States’ national insolvency laws shall not premvent referred to in paragraph 9 is satisfied,a CCP from acting in accordance with Article 48 (5) to (7) with regard to the assets and positions recorded in those accounts shall not be considered part of the insolvency estate of the CCP or the clearing member.;referred to in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this Article.
Amendment 230 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 78 – paragraph 4 a (new)
Article 78 – paragraph 4 a (new)
(15a) In Article 78, the following paragraph is inserted: 4a. A trade repository shall identify and implement information security controls, to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of its processes and data. Those controls shall be identified within the context of a comprehensive information security risk management process, to ensure that the risks are appropriately identified and treated.
Amendment 239 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 85 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Article 85 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
By [PO please add date of entry into force + 2 years]of this amending Regulation + 6 months] and every 6 months thereafter until the clearing exemption expires, the Commission shall prepare a report assessing whether viable technical solutions have been developed for the transfer by PSAs of cash and non-cash collateral as variation margins and the need for any measures to facilitate those technical solutions.
Amendment 244 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 85 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part
Article 85 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – introductory part
ESMA shall, by [PO please add date of entry into force + 18 months]of this amending Regulation + 6 months] and every 6 months thereafter until the clearing exemption expires, in cooperation with EIOPA, EBA and the ESRB, submit a report to the Commission, assessing the following:
Amendment 247 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 85 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point a
Article 85 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point a
(a) whether CCPs, clearing members and PSAs have undertaken an appropriate effort and developed viable technical solutions facilitating the participation of PSAs in central clearing by posting cash and non-cash collateral as variation margins, including the implications of those solutions on market liquidity and procyclicality and their potential legal and further implications;
Amendment 250 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point b
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 85 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Article 85 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Amendment 257 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19 – point c
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Article 85 – paragraph 3 – point c
Article 85 – paragraph 3 – point c
(c) the impact of this Regulation on the level of clearing by financial counterparties other than those subject to Article 4a(2) and the distribution of clearing within that financial counterparty class, especially with regard to the appropriateness of the clearing thresholds referred to in Article 10(44 (3a);
Amendment 273 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Annex 1 – paragraph 1 – point -1 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Annex 1 – paragraph 1 – point -1 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
(-1) In Section I, the following point (da) is added: (da) a trade repository infringes Article 78(4a) by not identifying and implementing effective information security controls, to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of its processes and data;
Amendment 276 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Annex 1 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Annex 1 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Annex II – Section I – point b
Annex II – Section I – point b
Annex II, section I, point b is amended as follows: "(b) if the infringement has been committed for more than sixone months, a coefficient of 1,5 shall apply; " Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32012R0648&qid=1519747597556&from=DE)
Amendment 277 #
2017/0090(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Annex 1 – paragraph 2 b (new)
Annex 1 – paragraph 2 b (new)
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012
Annex II – Section II – point (a)
Annex II – Section II – point (a)
Annex II, section II, point a is amended as follows: "(a) if the infringement has been committed for less than 10 working day24 hours, a coefficient of 0,9 shall apply; content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32012R0648&qid=1519747597556&from=DE)" Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
Amendment 42 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
D a. whereas minimum income schemes are generally defined as guaranteed income levels for those who cannot work or whose employment income is below the poverty line of 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income; whereas a more comprehensive framework for minimum income schemes should also include non- monetary benefits such as education, healthcare, childcare, housing and mobility3a; _________________ 3aEuropean Commission (2015) Towards adequate and accessible Minimum Income Schemes in Europe: Analysis of Minimum Income Schemes and roadmaps in 30 countries participating in the EMIN project (p. 15). European Commission (2016) Minimum Income Schemes in Europe: A study of national policies (p. 9).
Amendment 53 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Recital D b (new)
Recital D b (new)
D b. whereas a number of studies show poverty negatively affecting economic growth4a; _________________ 4aWorld Bank (2006) Poverty Reduction and Growth: The Virtuous and Vicious Circle. OECD (2014) Trends in Income Inequality and its Impact on Economic Growth.
Amendment 57 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Recital D c (new)
Recital D c (new)
D c. whereas minimum income schemes can act as macroeconomic automatic stabilizers in response to economic shocks;
Amendment 58 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Recital D d (new)
Recital D d (new)
D d. whereas the effectiveness of minimum income schemes to alleviate poverty, foster labour market integration especially for the young, and act as automatic stabilisers varies significantly between member states;
Amendment 61 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Recital D e (new)
Recital D e (new)
D e. whereas every fourth child under 16 years is affected by poverty in Europe5a; whereas the socio-economic background is determining too often the opportunities of children; _________________ 5a Eurostat.
Amendment 141 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Calls on the Commission to propose a framework directive establishing comprehensive and accessible minimum income schemes set at above 60% of national median equivalised disposable income, taking due account of each country’s specific characteristics.;
Amendment 146 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Reiterates the importance of equal access to minimum income schemes without discrimination by ethnicity, gender, education, nationality, sexual- orientation, religion, disability, age, political or socio-economic background;
Amendment 152 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5 b. Notes that minimum income schemes ought to be implemented and evaluated in context of the overall national systems of social services, i.e. education, health care, childcare, housing and mobility;
Amendment 153 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 c (new)
Paragraph 5 c (new)
5 c. Stresses the advantages of a European unemployment insurance or re- insurance scheme that would stand to enhance the resilience of national welfare states faced with asymmetric shocks and resilience of monetary union overall;
Amendment 154 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 d (new)
Paragraph 5 d (new)
5 d. Underlines the need for adapting existing minimum income schemes to better address the challenge of youth unemployment;
Amendment 155 #
2016/2270(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 e (new)
Paragraph 5 e (new)
5 e. Draws attention to the problem of child poverty and calls for minimum income schemes to take the needs of children into special consideration;
Amendment 41 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital A a (new)
Recital A a (new)
Aa. whereas, however, the Banking Union is not complete without the introduction of a common deposit insurance and a Bank Structural Reform in the spirit of the Liikanen Report to effectively address the too-big-to-fail problem and to safeguard taxpayers and depositors;
Amendment 49 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas overall the capital and liquidity ratios of EU banks have steadily improved over the last years; whereas risks to financial stability nevertheless remain; whereas the current situation calls for caution when introducing regulatory changesile many banks, including several large banks, remain significantly undercapitalised; whereas risks to financial stability nevertheless remain;
Amendment 59 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas a proper clean-up of bank balance sheets after the crisis has been delayed, still hampering economic growth;
Amendment 140 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers it essential to ensure the compaddress the excessive variability in risk-weights applied tof risk-weighted assets of the same class across institutions in order to allow for effective supervision; welcomes the work done internationally to streamline the resort to internal models including the consideration of input and output floors, as well as the introduction of a leverage ratio to act as a backstop; recalls that the current rules governing the use of internal models provide a significant level of flexibility for banks and add a layer of modelling risk from the supervisory perspective; recalls, however, that the regulatory changes planned should not result in significant increases in capital requirements across the board, nor harm the ability of banks with a sustainable business model to finance the real economy, in particular SMEs;
Amendment 150 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Stresses that reliable access to finance and the sound allocation of capital in Europe's bank-based financing model depends heavily on robust balance sheets and proper capitalisation, the restoration of which after the financial crises was not and is not uniformly assured across the Union, thus hampering economic growth;
Amendment 161 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Points out that guidance provided by international fora should be used in order to avoid the risk of regulatory fragmentation; recalls the importance of committing to the conclusions of the work of those international fora;
Amendment 169 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Underlines the need to introduce a Bank Structural Reform, including the reversal of the burden of proof, to end the problem of very large institutions being too big to fail;
Amendment 317 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Stresses that it is crucial to harmonise the hierarchy of claims in bank insolvency across Member States and to make sure banks hold sufficient subordinated and bail-inable debt to allow for a bail-in of debt instruments without causing general market panic in order to make the implementation of the BRRD morefeasible, consistent and effective;
Amendment 354 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Regrets that the Commission did not allow for more time to assess the implementation of the DGSD before proposing the EDIS and did not conduct a proper impact assessment of the proposalWelcomes the Commission's proposal for EDIS; stands ready, however, to seize the opportunity generated by the proposal to discuss the DGSD and address some of the options and discretions it includes;
Amendment 376 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Is aware of the potential benefits of an EDIS; is nevertheless of the opinion that risk reduction measures are an indispensable counterparty to its establishment in order to prevent moral hazard, and that such measures should preferably precede risk sharing;
Amendment 379 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Stresses the necessity of addressing the sovereign bank link and suggests commencing a careful and staged phasing in of large exposure rules for sovereign debt in lock-step with the introduction of EDIS;
Amendment 401 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
Amendment 410 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22a. Stresses that a credible EDIS needs to be supported by a backstop mechanism;
Amendment 429 #
2016/2247(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Welcomes the establishment of loan facility agreements between the SRF and the Banking Union Member States; is of the opinion, nevertheless, that this solution is not sufficient to do away with the bank-sovereign vicious circle and that the work on a common fiscal backstop for the SRF, which should be fiscally neutral over the medium term, should continue step by stepfor the SRF and EDIS is required;
Amendment 31 #
2016/2243(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas FinTech developments should contribute to thepositively to citizen's welfare and the development and competitiveness of the European financial system and economy, without hampering financial stability and while maintaining the highest possible level of consumer protection;
Amendment 45 #
2016/2243(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas FinTech can lead to considerable benefits, such as faster, cheaper, more inclusive, resilient and transparent and better financial services for consumers and businesses, and open up many new business opportunities for European entrepreneurs;
Amendment 65 #
2016/2243(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas FinTech can serve as an effective tool for financial inclusion, opening up tailor-made financial services to those who could not access them before and increasing access to finance for individuals, thereby contributing to the G20 and G8 '5x5 objectives';
Amendment 76 #
2016/2243(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
Recital J a (new)
Ja. whereas FinTech applications have the potential rapidly to become systemic, similar to how digital innovations have fundamentally changed services in other sectors, such as telecommunication;
Amendment 114 #
2016/2243(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Stresses that legislation in the financial domain must provide for financial stability, sound investor protection and should be proportionate, frequently revised and in accordance with the ‘Innovation Principle’, so that potential effects on innovation will be part of the impact assessment; underlines that regulators must be able to step in forcefully and quickly when FinTech applications become systemic; recalls that precautionary monitoring from a very early stage can inform sound decision- making by the regulator on the appropriate moment for legislative action, without unduly impeding on innovation.
Amendment 144 #
2016/2243(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Recommends that the competent authorities allow controlled experimentation with new technologies both for new entrants and existing market participants; highlights that a pro-active dialogue with market participants can help supervisors and regulators to develop technological expertise; recommends that competent authorities develop stress- testing tools for potentially systemic FinTech applications;
Amendment 165 #
2016/2243(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Emphasises the importance of supervisors having sufficient technical expertise to adequately scrutinise increasingly complex FinTech services; welcomes measures aimed at enhancing regulatory capacity with regard to FinTech at the level of the European Commission such as the European Commission's horizontal taskforces on FinTech and Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLT); invites the Commission to build on those measures with the objective to create world-leading expertise on FinTech regulation; invites European and national regulatory authorities to contribute to those efforts and take appropriate measures to enhance regulatory capacity internally;
Amendment 179 #
2016/2243(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls that innovative financial services should be available throughout the EU; calls on the Commission and Member States to apply, where applicable, passporting regimes for new financial services offered across the Union; calls on the Commission and Member States to foster convergence and harmonisation of regulatory approaches and prevent regulatory arbitrage;
Amendment 243 #
2016/2243(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Highlights the need for the exchange of information and best practices between supervisors and market participants and between market participants themselves; calls on the Commission, the Member States, market participants and the EU Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) to set standards for major incident reporting and to remove barriers to information sharing; suggests exploring the potential benefits of a single point of contact for market participants in this regard; recommends that supervisors actively explore with market participants the potential of transparency and information sharing rather than purely relying on data protection and concealment as prevalent tools against cyber-attacks;
Amendment 251 #
2016/2243(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Underlines that regulation on the provision of financial services infrastructure needs to provide for appropriate incentive structures for providers to invest adequately in cyber security;
Amendment 253 #
2016/2243(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Is aware of the advantages and risks of blockchain applications; invites the Commission to organise an annual technical multi-stakeholder conference on this subject, building on the technical expertise developed in the framework of the Taskforce DLT; is concerned by the increased use of unpermissioned blockchain applications, in particular Bitcoin, for criminal activities, tax evasion, tax avoidance and money laundering; invites the Commission to organise an annual multi-stakeholder conference on this subject; and insists that these issues are closely monitored and addressed;
Amendment 238 #
2016/2100(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Stresses that – as the Commission has stated for the sixth time in its annual competition report – the temporary state aid granted in the financial sector was necessary for the stabilisation of the global financial system, but must quickly be reduced, or totally removed and scrutinised, once the Banking Union is completed; recommends a closer scrutiny of the problem of implicit state aid afforded to too-big-to-fail financial institutions during normal times;
Amendment 3 #
2016/2056(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Citation 17 a (new)
Citation 17 a (new)
- having regard to the Resolution of the European Parliament on virtual currencies (T8-0228/2016),
Amendment 26 #
2016/2056(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the rapid transformation brought about by digitisation and fintech innovation not only creates new and often better financial products for consumers, including by means of lowering transaction costs and easing the access to finance, but also involves key challenges in terms of security, data protection, consumer protection and taxation which ought to be monitored closely in order to maximize citizens' benefits;
Amendment 100 #
2016/2056(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Notes the increasing complexity of retail financial products; insists on the need to develop initiatives and instruments that allow consumers to identify safe and simple products within the range of products available to them; supports initiatives such as the Key Investment Information Document for undertakings for collective investments in transferrable securities (UCITS) and the Key Information Document for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs); calls on the Commission to require Key Information Documents for all retail investment products;
Amendment 113 #
2016/2056(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Recalls the recent developments in the legislative framework for the banking sector, in particular the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive; insists on the need to inform consumers fully about the impact of the new rules; points out that the sale of certain bailinable instruments to retail investors is highly problematic in terms of both, adequate consumer protection and ensuring the practical feasibility of a bailin and calls on the Commission to explore options to restrict such practice;
Amendment 189 #
2016/2056(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Calls for the European Supervisory Authorities to be tasked as single regulators for retail financial services, including a responsibility for ESMA to approve prospectuses and to control market abuse;
Amendment 230 #
2016/2056(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17 a (new)
Paragraph 17 a (new)
17a. Points out that the potentially transformative impact of distributed ledger technology necessitates the build- up of regulatory capacity so as early to identify potential systemic risks and challenges to consumer protection; therefore calls on the Commission to create a horizontal task force closely to monitor risks and to help address them in a timely manner;
Amendment 31 #
Amendment 47 #
2016/2047(BUD)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Emphasises that the ESAs must carefully stick to the tasks assigned to them by the Union legislator and must not seek to de facto broaden their mandate beyond those assignmentsshould not be limited by their budget when fulfilling their mandate;
Amendment 49 #
2016/2047(BUD)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Stresses that in the field of digitalisation of financial services, particularly with regards to Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), a build-up of technical expertise and regulatory capacity is urgently needed in order to be better able to react rapidly to potential challenges; therefore specifically supports the funding of a horizontal Task Force on DLT;
Amendment 10 #
2016/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas the current VAT system is vulnerable to fraud and, the estimated 'VAT gap' amounts to around EUR 170 billion annually, and better digital technologies are becoming available to help reduce this shortfall;
Amendment 18 #
2016/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the high administrative costs incurred under the present VAT system, especially with regard to cross- border transactions, could be significantly reduced for small and medium-sized enterprises in particular through the necessary, including by means of employing digital refpormting tools and common databases;
Amendment 63 #
2016/2033(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Encourages the Commission and government agencies to explore and test new technologies, such as distributed ledger technology and real time supervision as part of a RegTech agenda with a view significantly to reduce the existing and significant 'VAT gap' in the Union;
Amendment 53 #
2016/2007(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 – point d a (new)
Paragraph 2 – point d a (new)
(da) the lack of sufficiently transparent and easily accessible technical documentation of the functioning of specific VCs and other DLT schemes;
Amendment 63 #
2016/2007(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Points out that clearing, settlement and other post trade management processes currently cost the global financial industry well in excess of EUR 50 billion per year25, and that this iand bank reconciliation processes anre areas where the use of DLT might turn out to be transformational in terms of efficiency, speed, and resilience, but would also raise new regulatory challenges; __________________ 25 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/s ystem/uploads/attachment_data/file/49297 2/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger- technology.pdf
Amendment 124 #
2016/2007(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 – point 1
Paragraph 14 – point 1
1. if it is used on a large scale, is designed so as to avoid harming consumers and users and provides easily accessible technical documentation of its functioning to the public as well as more detailed technical information of its specific architecture to the supervisory authorities and namely to the TF DLT;
Amendment 128 #
2016/2007(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Calls on the Commission with the support of the TF DLT to develop stress tests containing adverse scenarios for VCs and other DLT schemes and apply them to schemes which are being used on large scale or even have become systemic; suggests discouraging users from employing VCs and other DLT schemes which have failed such tests;
Amendment 280 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Amendment 286 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 6
Article 3 – paragraph 6
6. Where tThe resolution authority in a Member State is not the competent ministry, the resolution authority shall inform the competent ministry in a timely manner of the decisions taken pursuant to this Regulation.
Amendment 287 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 7
Article 3 – paragraph 7
7. Where the decisions referred to in paragraph 6 have a direct fiscal impact or systemic implications, the resolution authority shall obtain the approval of the competent ministryrelevant executive and legislative decision making bodies before their implementation unless otherwiseas stipulated in nationalby law.
Amendment 296 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point a a (new)
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point a a (new)
(aa) the CCP-SRB, if already established, but not the designated resolution authority of the CCP in question;
Amendment 305 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. ESMA shall assess CCP recovery and resolution arrangements across the Union in terms of their aggregate effect on Union financial stability through regular stress-testing and crisis simulation exercises with respect to potential system-wide stress events. In exercising this role, ESMA shall ensure consistency with the assessments of the resilience of individual CCPs carried out pursuant to Article 21(6) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 with regard to the frequency and design of the tests and shall cooperate closely with the ESRB and competent authorities designated under Article 4 of Directive 2013/36/EU, including the ECB in carrying out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism under Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, and any national competent authorities tasked with the supervision of CCPs. In areas where these arrangements are found to be wanting as a result of these comprehensive stress tests, the responsible institution or institutions will have to address the shortcomings and resubmit their arrangements for another round of stress tests within 6 months of the previous stress tests.
Amendment 338 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 7
Article 9 – paragraph 7
7. Recovery plans shall be drafted in accordance with Section A of the Annex. Competent authorities may require CCPs to include additional information in their recovery plans. : (a) not assume any access to or receipt of public financial support, central bank emergency liquidity assistance or central bank emergency liquidity assistance provided under non-standard collateralisation, tenor and interest rate terms; (b) consider the interests of all stakeholders that are likely to be affected by that plan, specifically in relation to clearing members and their clients, both direct and indirect; and (c) ensure that clearing members do not have unlimited exposures toward the CCP.
Amendment 374 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 5 a (new)
Article 12 – paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Once established, the single European supervisor for CCPs shall take all decisions referred to in paragraph 1 with respect to the CCPs under its direct supervision after consultation with the supervisory college.
Amendment 381 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 4 a (new)
Article 13 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. The resolution plan shall make prudent assumptions, that would therefore still be valid in extreme scenarios including the default of several additional clearing members beyond the largest two compounded by the resulting troubles in other large CCPs, regarding the financial resources that may be required to achieve the resolution objectives and the resources that it expects to be available in accordance with the CCP’s rules and arrangements at the time of entering into resolution.
Amendment 393 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 – point o a (new)
Article 13 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 – point o a (new)
(oa) a description of the arrangements for exchanging information within the resolution college prior to and during resolution, in line with the written arrangements and procedures set out in the regulatory technical standards referred to in Article 4(6).
Amendment 403 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 7 a (new)
Article 15 – paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Once established, the CCP-SRB shall, for all CCPs under its remit, take the decision delegated to the resolution college in this article after consultation with the resolution college.
Amendment 426 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 7 – point n a (new)
Article 17 – paragraph 7 – point n a (new)
(na) restrict or suspend interoperability links of the CCP where such a restriction or suspension is necessary to avoid the adverse effects that the use of the resolution tools and the exercise of the resolution powers could have on interoperating CCPs.
Amendment 432 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Where a CCP infringes or is likely to infringe in the near future the prudential requirements of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, or poses a risk to the financial stability of the Union financial system or parts thereof, or where the competent authority has determined that there are other indications of an emerging crisis situationdevelopments that could affect the operations of the CCP, in particular its ability to provide clearing services, the competent authorities may:
Amendment 434 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point k a (new)
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point k a (new)
(ka) exceptionally and on a one-off basis allow clients of clearing members to participate directly in auctions, while waiving prudential requirements pursuant to Chapter 3 of Title IV of Regulation (EU) 648/2012 other than margin requirements as set out in Article 41 of Regulation (EU) 648/2012 for those clients. The clients’ clearing members shall inform clients comprehensively about the auction and facilitate the bidding process for clients. Required margin payments by the clients shall be passed through a non-defaulting clearing member.
Amendment 457 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
For the purposes of point (a)(ii), the competent authority shall provide, without delay and on its own initiative, any information that may suggest that the CCP is failing or is likely to fail and, upon request, any relevant information that the resolution authority requests in order to perform its assessment.
Amendment 474 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) all contractual obligations and other arrangements in the CCP's recovery plan are enforced either partially or in full, to the extent that they have not been exhausted before entry into resolution, unless the resolution authority determines that the use of resolution tools or the exercise of resolution powers is more appropriate to achieve the resolution objectives in a timely manner;
Amendment 494 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 9 – introductory part
Article 27 – paragraph 9 – introductory part
9. The resolution authority mayshall recover any reasonable expenses, including an appropriate risk premium, incurred in connection with the use of the resolution tools or powers or government financial stabilisation tools in any of the following ways:
Amendment 518 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 2
Article 30 – paragraph 2
2. The resolution authority shall calculate any reduction in payment obligations referred to in paragraph 1 using an equitable allocation mechanism determined in the valuation conducted in accordance with Article 24(3) and communicated to the clearing members as soon as the resolution tool is used. The total net gains to be reduced for each clearing member shall be proportional to the amounts due from the CCP. The clearing members should inform their clients about the use of such a mechanism as swiftly as possible.
Amendment 523 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 31 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. The resolution authority shall define the amount of the resolution cash call to be included in the operating rules, which shall at the minimum be equivalent to the clearing member’s contribution to the default fund.
Amendment 527 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Article 32 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
The resolution authority shall also use the write-down and conversion tool in accordance with Article 33 in respect of instruments of ownership and debt instruments issued by the parent of the CCP in resolution where the instruments of ownership issued by the parent undertaking are used to fulfil the CCP's capital requirements in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 or those instruments of ownership or debt instruments are issued for the purpose of funding or enhancing the liquidity of the CCP and they fully absorb losses or constitute subordinate claims in normal insolvency proceedings.
Amendment 561 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 60 – paragraph 1
Article 60 – paragraph 1
Where the resolution authority uses one or more resolution tools, it shallould aim to ensure that shareholders, creditors and, clearing participants do not incur: (a) clearing member,members and their clients do not incur greater losses than they would have incurred had the resolution authority not taken resolution action in relation to the CCP at the time the resolution authority considered that the conditions for resolution pursuant to Article 22(1) were met and had they instead been subject to all possible outstanding obligations pursuant to the CCP's recovery plan orand all other contractual arrangements in its operating rules; (b) of a clearing member, greater losses than they would have incurred had the CCP been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings including by taking account of its contractu for either a default or a non-default event and had the CCP been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, properly taking into account any plausible adverse effects of systemic instability and market turmoil, including fire sales, replacement costs and the breakdown of entire segments of the financial marrangements in its operating rules.ket on the positions of the stakeholders in question. in the event of the default of a in an event other than the default
Amendment 574 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 61 – paragraph 2 – point a
Article 61 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the treatment that shareholders, creditors and clearing participamembers or their clients would have received had the resolution authority not taken resolution action in relation to the CCP the resolution authority considered that the conditions for resolution pursuant to Article 22(1) were met, and they had instead been subject to the enforcement of possible outstanding obligations pursuant to the CCP's recovery plan orand other arrangements in its operating rules orand the CCP had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, properly taking into account any plausible adverse effects of systemic instability and market turmoil, including fire sales, replacement costs and the breakdown of entire segments of the financial market on the positions of the stakeholders in question;
Amendment 577 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 61 – paragraph 3
Article 61 – paragraph 3
3. For the purposes of calculating the treatments referred to in paragraph 2(a), the valuation referred to in paragraph 1 shall disregard any provision of extraordinary public financial support to the CCP under resolution and the CCP’s own pricing methodology shall be disregarded should this methodology fail to reflect the effective market conditions.
Amendment 579 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 61 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
Article 61 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
ESMA, taking into account any regulatory technical standards developed in accordance with Article 74(4) of Directive 2014/59/EU, shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the methodology for carrying out the valuation referred to in paragraph 1, including, in particular, the calculation of the losses that would have been realistically incurred if the CCP had been put into liquidation, including fire sales, replacement costs, and the breakdown of entire segments of the financial market on the position of the stakeholders in question.
Amendment 585 #
Amendment 586 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 73 a (new)
Article 73 a (new)
Article 73a General provisions 1. The CCP-Single Resolution Fund (‘CCP-SRF’) is hereby established. 2. Before a Single Resolution Board for CCPs (CCP-SRB) is established, its revenues shall accumulate for up to 10 years to be used by the SRB as an additional financial backstop to the SRF for the activities within its mandate 3. Once the Single Resolution Board for CCPs is established, it shall use the CCP-SRF only for the purpose of ensuring the efficient application of the resolution tools and exercise of the resolution powers referred to in Chapter III and in accordance with the resolution objectives and the principles governing resolution referred to in Articles 21 and 23 of this Regulation. Under no circumstances shall the Union budget or the national budgets be held liable for expenses or losses of the CCP-SRF. 4. The owner of the CCP-SRF shall be the Single Resolution Board. Once established, the CCP-SRB becomes the sole owner of the CCP-SRF. 5. Contributions shall be raised in accordance with articles 73b and 73c.
Amendment 587 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 73 b (new)
Article 73 b (new)
Article 73b Target level The target level of the CCP-SRF is 0.25 percent of Union GDP. Any capital returns on this fund that accrue beyond the target level are to be used towards the Union Budget.
Amendment 588 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 73 c (new)
Article 73 c (new)
Article 73c Contributions The contributions shall (a) consist of a levy on average margin requirements posted by clearing members to CCPs in the previous month; (b) always be set at a positive non-zero rate until the target level is reached; and (c) be collected monthly. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 73f defining the contributions to the CCP-SRF and their collection, using as basis any margin posted to any CCPs in the Union and any margin posted by clearing members in the Union to CPPs outside the Union where no comparable levy falls due, allowing for differentiated rates taking into account, among others, competitiveness and cross border effects. This delegated act is to be reviewed every five years at the latest.
Amendment 589 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 73 d (new)
Article 73 d (new)
Article 73d Administration and investments 1. Until a specific CCP-SRB is established, the Single Resolution Board, and afterwards, the CCP-SRB shall administer the CCP-SRF in application of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/451 on general principles and criteria for the investment strategy and rules for the administration of the Single Resolution Fund. 2. The amounts received from a CCP under resolution or a bridge institution, the interests and other earnings on investments and any other earnings shall only benefit the CCP-SRF. 3. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts further specifying the rules referred to in paragraph 1.
Amendment 590 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 73 e (new)
Article 73 e (new)
Article 73e Mission and use of the CCP-SRF 1. Within the resolution scheme, when applying the resolution tools to entities referred to in point 1 of Article 2, the Board may use the CCP-SRF only to the extent necessary to ensure the effective application of the resolution tools only where the following conditions are met: (a) the financial support is necessary to meet the resolution objectives; (b) the financial support is used as a last resort after having assessed and exploited all resolution tools other than government financial stabilisation tools according to article 45 of this Regulation to the maximum extent practicable whilst maintaining financial stability, as determined by the CCP-SRB; (c) the financial support complies with the Union State aid framework; and only for the following purposes: (a) to guarantee the liabilities of the CCP under resolution, its subsidiaries, or a bridge institution; (b) to make contributions to a bridge institution; (c) to make contributions to the CCP under resolution in lieu of the write-down or conversion tool; (d) to take any combination of the actions referred to in points (a) to (c).
Amendment 591 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Chapter VII a (new) – Article 73 f (new)
Chapter VII a (new) – Article 73 f (new)
VIIa. POWERS OF EXECUTION Article 73f Exercise of the delegation 1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article. 2. The delegation of power referred to in Article 73c shall be conferred for an indeterminate period of time from the relevant dates referred to in Article 83. 3. The delegation of power referred to in Article 73c may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision of revocation shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force. 4. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council. 5. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 73c shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or the Council within a period of three months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by three months at the initiative of the European Parliament or the Council. 6. The Commission shall not adopt delegated acts where the scrutiny time of the European Parliament is reduced through recess to less than five months, including any extension.
Amendment 616 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 82 – paragraph 1
Article 82 – paragraph 1
By […], the Commission shall review the implementation of this Regulation... [date to be inserted: two years after date of entry into force of this Regulation] the Commission shall review this Regulation and its implementation in the light of the shifting European institutional architecture for CCP supervision and resolution and in the light of the progress in international efforts on recovery and resolution of CCPs and shall submit a report thereon to the European Parliament and to the Council. Where appropriate, that report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal.
Amendment 619 #
2016/0365(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 82 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 82 – paragraph 1 a (new)
By ... [date to be inserted: two years after date of entry into force of this Regulation], the Commission shall review the effects of the levy on average margin requirements posted by clearing members to the CCP as the sole source of funding for the CCP-SRF, specifically examining potential shifts to a reliance on derivative instruments not subject to central clearing, and shall submit a report thereon to the European Parliament and to the Council. Where appropriate, that report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal expanding the funding source to parties to derivative contracts which are not centrally cleared.
Amendment 185 #
2016/0364(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 13 a (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 84 a (new)
Article 84 a (new)
Amendment 338 #
2016/0364(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 29 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 29 a (new)
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 129 – paragraph 1
Article 129 – paragraph 1
(29 a) Article 129, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 1. Member States shall require institutions to maintain in addition to the Common Equity Tier 1 capital maintained to meet the own funds requirement imposed by Article 92 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, a capital conservation buffer of Common Equity Tier 1 capital equal to the higher of: (a) 2,5 % of their total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of that Regulation on an individual and consolidated basis,; or (b) 1.0% of their leverage exposure measure calculated in accordance with Article 429(4) of that Regulation on an individual and consolidated basis; as applicable in accordance with Part One, Title II of that Regulation. "
Amendment 385 #
2016/0364(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31
Directive 2013/36/EU
Article 141 – paragraph 1
Article 141 – paragraph 1
1. An institution that meets the combined buffer requirement shall not make a distribution in connection with Common Equity Tier 1 capital or make payments on Additional Tier 1 instruments to an extent that would decrease its Common Equity Tier 1 capital to a level where the combined buffer requirement is no longer met.
Amendment 176 #
2016/0362(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 21 b (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 21 b (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 34 – paragraph 1 – point g
Article 34 – paragraph 1 – point g
21 b. In Article 34(1), point (g) is replaced by the following: "(g) no creditor shall incur greater losses than would have been incurred if the institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings in accordance with the safeguards in Articles 73 to 75; , properly taking into account any plausible adverse effects of systemic instability and market turmoil;" Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=DE)
Amendment 237 #
2016/0362(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45b – paragraph 3– subparagraph 2 a (new)
Article 45b – paragraph 3– subparagraph 2 a (new)
The amount of own funds and eligible liabilities required by a decision under this paragraph to be met with instruments that meet all of the conditions referred to in Article 72a of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 shall be equal to at least the level that arises or would arise from the application of Article 92a(1) of that Regulation.
Amendment 412 #
2016/0362(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Article 1 – paragraph 23
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45e – paragraph 4
Article 45e – paragraph 4
4. An entity that fails to have additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance referred to in the first paragraph shall not be subject to the restrictions referred to in Article 141 of Directive 2013/36/EU.
Amendment 574 #
2016/0362(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 36 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 36 a (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 73 – paragraph 1
Article 73 – paragraph 1
36 a. In Article 73, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: Member States shall ensure that, where one or more resolution tools have been applied and, in particular for the purposes of Article 75: "(a) except where point (b) applies, where resolution authorities transfer only parts of the rights, assets and liabilities of the institution under resolution, the shareholders and those creditors whose claims have not been transferred, receive in satisfaction of their claims at least as much as what they would have received if the institution under resolution had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings at the time when the decision referred to in Article 82 was taken, properly taking into account any plausible adverse effects on systemic instability and market turmoil; (b) where resolution authorities apply the bail-in tool, the shareholders and creditors whose claims have been written down or converted to equity do not incur greater losses than they would have incurred if the institution under resolution had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings immediately at the time when the decision referred to in Article 82 was taken. , properly taking into account any plausible adverse effects on systemic instability and market turmoil." Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=DE)
Amendment 575 #
2016/0362(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 36 b (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 36 b (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 74 – paragraph 2 – point a
Article 74 – paragraph 2 – point a
36 c. In Article 74(2), point (a) is replaced by the following: "(a) the treatment that shareholders and creditors, or the relevant deposit guarantee schemes, would have received if the institution under resolution with respect to which the resolution action or actions have been effected had entered normal insolvency proceedings at the time when the decision referred to in Article 82 was taken; , properly taking into account any plausible adverse effects of systemic instability and market turmoil;" Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=DE)
Amendment 576 #
2016/0362(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 36 c (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 36 c (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 74 – paragraph 4
Article 74 – paragraph 4
36 c. In Article 74, paragraph (4) is replaced by the following: "4. EBA may develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the methodology for carrying out the valuation in this Article, in particular the methodology for assessing the treatment that shareholders and creditors would have received if the institution under resolution had entered insolvency proceedings at the time when the decision referred to in Article 82 was taken. , properly taking into account any plausible adverse effects of systemic instability and market turmoil." Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=DE)
Amendment 577 #
2016/0362(COD)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 36 d (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 36 d (new)
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 75 – paragraph 1
Article 75 – paragraph 1
36 d. In Article 75, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: "Member States shall ensure that if the valuation carried out under Article 74 determines that any shareholder or creditor referred to in Article 73, or the deposit guarantee scheme in accordance with Article 109(1), has incurred greater losses than it would have incurred in a winding up under normal insolvency proceedings, it is entitled to the payment of the difference from the resolution financing arrangements. properly taking into account any plausible adverse effects of systemic instability and market turmoil, it is entitled to the payment of the difference from the resolution financing arrangements." Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014L0059&from=DE)
Amendment 58 #
2016/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 – point c
Article 12 c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2 – point c
(c) the amount of subordinated liabilities shall not exceed the amount necessary to ensure that creditors referred to in point (b) shall not incur losses above the level of losses that they would otherwise have incurred in a winding up under normal insolvency proceedings, properly taking into account any plausible adverse effects of systemic instability and market turmoil.
Amendment 74 #
2016/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Article 12 d – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Without prejudice to the last subparagraph, for resolution entities, the amount referred to in paragraph 2 shall not exceedfall below the greater of the following:
Amendment 90 #
2016/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 d – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Article 12 d – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Without prejudice to the last subparagraph, for entities that are not themselves resolution entities, the amount referred to in paragraph 2 shall not exceedfall below any of the following:
Amendment 138 #
2016/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Article 1 – paragraph 5
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 12 f – paragraph 4
Article 12 f – paragraph 4
4. An entity that fails to have additional own funds and eligible liabilities as expected under the guidance referred to in the first paragraph shall not be subject to the restrictions referred to in Article 141 of Directive 2013/36/EU.
Amendment 170 #
2016/0361(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 5 g (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 5 g (new)
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point g
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point g
5g. in Article 15(1), point g is replaced by the following : "(g) no creditor shall incur greater losses than would have been incurred if an entity referred to in Article 2 had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings in accordance with the safeguards provided for in Article 29; , properly taking into account any plausible adverse effects of systemic instability and market turmoil;" Or. en (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32014R0806&from=DE)
Amendment 192 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
Recital 13
(13) The Basel Committee is currently considering the introduction of a leverage ratio surcharge for globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs). The final outcome of the Basel Committee's calibration workFor institutions that are designated globally systemically important institutions (G-SIIs) because of their size, interconnectedness, complexity, irreplaceable nature or global relevance, a leverage ratio surcharge should be introduced, on account of the too-big-to- fail problem. European legislation should take into account the strict leverage ratios which already exist in other jurisdictions in order to effectively counteract these negative externalities. Furthermore, a surcharge of this kind for G-SIIs is readily implementable since G-SIIs in the Union already significantly exceed a leverage ratio of 3%1a. The leverage ratio for G-SIIs should givbe raised to a discussion on the appropriate calibration of the leverage ratio for stotal of 5%. __________________ 1a Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III Monitoring Report, February 2017: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d397.pdf (p.49). Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV) of the European Parliament, Briefing: Global Systemically iImportant EU institutions. Banks in Europe (PE 574.406): http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/e tudes/BRIE/2016/574406/IPOL_BRI(201 6)574406_EN.pdf (p.7).
Amendment 196 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13 a (new)
Recital 13 a (new)
(13a) To prevent an institution from paying out own funds, even though its capital position is weak, a buffer on top of the prescribed leverage ratio should be met. Should the institution fail to meet this buffer, the institution is prohibited from distributing its own capital to shareholders and management, until the capital position meets the minimum leverage ratio plus the leverage ratio buffer requirement (LRBR).
Amendment 241 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point j
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 – point j
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 144 a (new)
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – point 144 a (new)
(144a) ‘small and non-complex institution’ means an institution which fulfils all of the following criteria: (a) the total value of the assets at the consolidated level, or, in the case of institutions controlled by a parent undertaking, a financial holding company or a mixed financial holding company, the total value of assets of the parent entity at the consolidated level is less than or equal to EUR 1,5 billion; (b) the resolution assessment in accordance with Articles 15 and 16 of Directive 2014/59/EU concludes that the liquidation of the institution in normal insolvency proceedings is feasible and credible; (c) the institution is not a large institution within the meaning of Article 4(1) point 144b; (d) its trading activities are classified as low within the meaning of Article 94; (e) the total value of its derivative exposures is less than or equal to 2% of its total on- and off-balance sheet assets, where only derivatives which qualify as positions held with trading intent are included in calculating the derivative exposures; (f) the institution does not use internal models for calculating own funds requirements; (g) the institution has not communicated to the competent authority an objection to being classified as a small and non- complex institution; (h) the competent authority has not decided that the institute is not to be considered a small and non-complex institution based on an analysis of its size, connectivity, complexity or risk profile. Within the Single Supervisory Mechanism the threshold in point (a) can be adjusted upward or downward for an institution, taking into consideration the total value of assets of the parent entity at the consolidated level in relation to the GDP of the member state of the institution.
Amendment 480 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 39 – point a
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 39 – point a
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 92 – paragraph 1 – point d
Article 92 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) a leverage ratio of 35%..
Amendment 483 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 39 – point a a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 39 – point a a (new)
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 92 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)
Article 92 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)
(aa) in paragraph 1, the following point (d a) is added: "(da) By way of derogation from point d, a leverage ratio of 5% for institutions which are G-SIIs or part of a G-SII;"
Amendment 486 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 40
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 92 -a (new)
Article 92 -a (new)
(40) The following Article 92 -a is inserted: Article 92 -a 1. An institution that fails to keep a leverage ratio of at least 5%, the leverage ratio buffer requirement (LRBR), shall be prohibited from making a distribution in connection with its own funds to an extent that would decrease its leverage ratio. 2. Institutions that fail to meet the leverage ratio buffer requirement (LRBR) shall notify the competent authority and any such institution is prohibited from undertaking any of the following actions before it has fulfilled the requirement of paragraph 1: (a) make a distribution of its own funds that would decrease its leverage ratio; (b) pay variable remuneration or discretionary pension benefits; (c) make payments on own funds instruments. 3. The restrictions imposed by this Article shall only apply to payments that result in a reduction of own funds or in a reduction of profits, and where a suspension of payment or failure to pay does not constitute an event of default or a condition for the commencement of proceedings under the insolvency regime applicable to the institution. 4. Where an institution fails to meet the leverage ratio buffer requirement (LRBR) and still intends to distribute any of its distributable profits or undertake an action referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of the second subparagraph of paragraph 2, it shall first obtain permission from the competent authority and provide the following information: (a) the amount of capital maintained by the institution, subdivided as follows: (i) Common Equity Tier 1 capital, (ii) Additional Tier 1 capital, (iii) Tier 2 capital; (b) the amount of its interim and year- end profits; (c) the amount of distributable profits it intends to allocate between the following: (i) dividend payments, (ii) share buy backs, (iii) payments on Additional Tier 1 instruments, (iv) the payment of variable remuneration or discretionary pension benefits. 5. Institutions shall maintain arrangements to ensure that the leverage ratio buffer is calculated accurately, and shall be able to demonstrate that accuracy to the competent authority on request. 6. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, a distribution in connection with its own funds shall include the following: (a) a payment of cash dividends; (b) a distribution of fully or partly paid bonus shares or other capital instruments referred to in Article 26(1)(a) of this Regulation; (c) a redemption or purchase by an institution of its own shares or other capital instruments referred to in Article 26(1)(a) of this Regulation; (d) a repayment of amounts paid up in connection with capital instruments referred to in Article26(1)(a) of this Regulation; (e) a distribution of items referred to in points (b) to (e) of Article 26(1) of this Regulation.
Amendment 527 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 42
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 42
(e) recommend amendments of Implementing Regulation (EU) No 680/2014 to reduce the reporting burden on institutions or specified categories of institutions where appropriate having regard to the objectives of this Regulation and Directive 2013/36/EU. The report shall, at a minimum, make recommendations on how technical standards and guidelines can create uniform reporting formats to reduce the level of granularity of reporting requirements for small and non-complex institutions as defined in Article 430a.
Amendment 984 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 116
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 116
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 449 a (new)
Article 449 a (new)
Amendment 1064 #
2016/0360A(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 127
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 127
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
Article 501 d a (new)
Article 501 d a (new)
Amendment 36 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
Recital 1
(1) Businesses must pay their fair share of tax where they make their profits, but double taxation and double non- taxation must be avoided. Situations, in which different Member States tax the same income or capital twice can create serious tax obstacles for businesses operating cross border. They create an excessive tax burden for businesses and are one of the big obstacles to the internal market as they are likely to cause economic distortions and inefficiencies, as well as to have a negative impact on cross border investment and growth.
Amendment 41 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 a (new)
Recital 1 a (new)
(1 a) On 16 December 2015, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on bringing transparency, coordination and convergence to corporate tax policies in the Union, where it called on the Commission to propose legislation to improve cross-border taxation disputes in the Union, focussing not only on cases of double taxation but also double non-taxation. It also called for clearer rules, more stringent timelines and transparency.
Amendment 45 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) Current dispute resolution procedures are too long, costly and often do not result in an agreement, with some cases receiving no acknowledgement at all. Some businesses currently accept double taxation rather than spending money and time on burdensome procedures to eliminate double taxation. For this reason, it is necessary that mechanisms available in the Union ensure the enforceable resolution of double taxation disputes and the effective and timely elimination of the double taxation at stake, with regular and effective communication to the taxpayer.
Amendment 66 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 5 a (new)
Recital 5 a (new)
(5 a) The Union has the potential to become a model and a global leader in tax transparency and coordination. The double taxation dispute resolution mechanisms should therefore also create a harmonised and transparent framework for solving double taxation issues and as such provide benefits to all taxpayers. All final decisions should be published in their entirety and be made available by the Commission in a common data format also on a centrally managed webpage.
Amendment 81 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) The Commission should review the application of this Directive after a period of five years and Member States should provide the Commission with appropriate input to support this review, including a determination of whether the Directive should continue to be applied or amended. Member States should provide the Commission with appropriate input to support this review. At the end of its review, the Commission should present a report to the European Parliament and the Council, including an assessment on extension of the scope of this Directive to cover all cross-border double taxation situations and double non-taxation, and if appropriate, an amending legislative proposal,
Amendment 88 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1
Article 3 – paragraph 1
1. Any taxpayer subject to double taxation shall be entitled to submit a complaint requesting the resolution of the double taxation to each of the competent authorities of the Member States concerned within three years from the receipt of the first notification of the action resulting in double taxation, whether or not it uses the remedies available in the national law of any of the Member States concerned. The taxpayer shall indicate in its complaint to each respective competent authority which other Member States are concerned. The Commission shall host a central contact point in all languages of the Union, which is easily accessible to the public with the following updated information:
Amendment 90 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a (new)
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point a (new)
(a) contact information for each competent authority;
Amendment 91 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b (new)
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b (new)
(b) full overview of applicable Union legislation and tax treaties;
Amendment 92 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 2
Article 3 – paragraph 2
2. The competent authorities shall acknowledge receipt of the complaint within one month from the receipt of the complaint. They shall also inform the competent authorities of the other Member States concerned on the receipt of the complaint within two weeks from the receipt of the complaint.
Amendment 100 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 3 – point a
Article 3 – paragraph 3 – point a
(a) name, address, tax identification number and other information necessary for identification of the taxpayer(s) who presented the complaint to the competent authorities and of any other taxpayer directly affected to the best of the complainant's knowledge;
Amendment 101 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 3 – point d
Article 3 – paragraph 3 – point d
Amendment 102 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 3 – point e – point iii
Article 3 – paragraph 3 – point e – point iii
(iii) a commitment by the taxpayer to respond as completely and quickly as possible to all appropriate requests made by a competent authority and provide any documentation at the request of the competent authorities with due consideration by the competent authorites for contraints of access to requested documents and external time delays;
Amendment 103 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 3 – point f
Article 3 – paragraph 3 – point f
(f) any specific additional information requested by the competent authorities relevant to the taxation dispute.
Amendment 106 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 3 – paragraph 5
Article 3 – paragraph 5
5. The competent authorities of the Member States concerned shall take a decision on the acceptance and admissibility of the complaint of a taxpayer within sixthree months of the receipt thereof. The competent authorities shall inform the taxpayers and the competent authorities of the other Member States of their decision within two weeks.
Amendment 110 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Where the competent authorities of the Member States concerned decide to accept the complaint according to Article 3(5), they shall endeavour to eliminate the double taxation by mutual agreement procedure within two years starting from12 months of the last notification of one of the Member States’' decision on the acceptance of the complaint.
Amendment 113 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
The period of two year12 months referred to in the first subparagraph may be extended by up to sixthree months at the request of a competent authority of a Member State concerned, if the requesting competent authority provides justification it in writing. That extension shall be subject to the acceptance by taxpayers and the other competent authorities.
Amendment 116 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point b
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) the tax chargeable on this income in one Member State is reduced by an amount equal to the tax chargeable on it in any other Member State concerned.; and
Amendment 117 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point b a (new)
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point b a (new)
(b a) any overpaid tax is reimbursed to the taxpayer;
Amendment 119 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 3
Article 4 – paragraph 3
3. Once the competent authorities of the Member States have reached an agreement to eliminate the double taxation within the period provided for in paragraph 1, each competent authority of the Member States concerned shall transmit this agreement to the taxpayer immediately, as a decision which is binding on the authority and enforceable by the taxpayer, subject to the taxpayer renouncing the right to any domestic remedy. That decision shall be implemented irrespective of any time limits prescribed by the national law of the Member States concerned.
Amendment 120 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 4 – paragraph 4
Article 4 – paragraph 4
4. Where the competent authorities of the Member States concerned have not reached an agreement to eliminate the double taxation within the period provided for in paragraph 1, each competent authority of the Member States concerned shall inform the taxpayers within two weeks indicating the reasons for the failure to reach agreement and informing the taxpayer of their options for appeal, with relevant contact information for the appeal bodies.
Amendment 123 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 2
Article 5 – paragraph 2
2. Where the competent authorities of the Member States concerned have not taken a decision on the complaint within sixthree months following receipt of a complaint by a taxpayer, the complaint shall be deemed to be rejected and the taxpayer shall be notified within one month of that decision.
Amendment 126 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 3
Article 5 – paragraph 3
3. In case of rejection of the complaint, the taxpayer shall be entitled to appeal against the decision of the competent authorities of the Member States concerned in accordance with national rules. The taxpayer is entitled to make the complaint to either competent authority. The competent authority to whom the appeal is made shall inform the other competent authority of the existence of the appeal and the two competent authorities shall coordinate when processing the appeal. In the case of SMEs, the financial burden shall be borne by the initially rejecting competent authority when the appeal case is successful .
Amendment 130 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
The Advisory Commission shall adopt a decision on the admissibility and acceptance of the complaint within sixthree months from the date of notification of the last decision rejecting the complaint under Article 5(1) by the competent authorities of the Member States concerned. By default of any decision notified in the sixthree month period, the complaint is deemed to be rejected and the taxpayer shall be notified within two weeks of that decision.
Amendment 132 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Where the Advisory Commission confirms the existence of double taxation and the admissibility of the complaint, the mutual agreement procedure provided for in Article 4 shall be initiated at the request of one of the competent authorities. The competent authority concerned shall notify the Advisory Commission, the other competent authorities concerned and the taxpayers of that request. The period of two year12 months provided for in Article 4(1) shall start from the date of the decision taken by the Advisory Commission on the acceptance and admissibility of the complaint.
Amendment 142 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
If the competent authorities of all Member States concerned have failed to do so, the taxpayer may request the competent courts of each Member State to appoint the two independent persons of standing in accordance with the second and third subparagraphs. The Commission shall make contact information for the competent courts of each Member State clearly available in a central information point on its website in all official languages of the Union. The thus appointed independent persons of standing shall appoint the chair by drawing lots from the list of the independent persons who qualify as chair according to Article 8(4).
Amendment 143 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 7 – paragraph 3
Article 7 – paragraph 3
3. The competent court shall adopt a decision according to paragraph 1 and notify it to the applicant within one month. The applicable procedure for the competent court to appoint the independent persons when the Member States fail to appoint them shall be the same as the one applicable under national rules in matters of civil and commercial arbitration when courts appoint arbitrators in cases where parties fail to agree in this respect. The competent court shall also inform the competent authorities having initially failed to set up the Advisory Commission. This Member State shall be entitled to appeal a decision of the court, provided they have the right to do so under their national law. In case of rejection, the applicant shall be entitled to appeal against the decision of the court in accordance with the national procedural rules.
Amendment 163 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 9 – paragraph 2
Article 9 – paragraph 2
2. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Commission may differ regarding its composition and form from the Advisory Commission and apply conciliation, mediation, expertise, adjudication or any other effective and recognised dispute resolution processes or techniques to solve the dispute.
Amendment 170 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 10 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Article 10 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
If the Advisory Commission is set up to deliver an opinion on the disputed rejection or admissibility of the complaint as provided for in Article 6(1), only the information referred to points (a), (d), (e) and (f) of the second subparagraph shall be set out in the Rules of Functioning.
Amendment 176 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) information concerns trade, business, industrial or professional secret or trade processannot be disclosed as in accordance with Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure, and Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, and all other applicable legislation;
Amendment 178 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point d
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point d
Amendment 189 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 15 – paragraph 3 – point b
Article 15 – paragraph 3 – point b
(b) two year12 months referred to in Article 4(1).
Amendment 194 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 2
Article 16 – paragraph 2
2. The competent authorities shall publish the full and final decision referred to in Article 14, subject to consent of each of the taxpayers concerned.
Amendment 196 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
Article 16 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
Amendment 199 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
Article 16 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
Amendment 202 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 16 – paragraph 4
Article 16 – paragraph 4
Amendment 207 #
2016/0338(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 21 a (new)
Article 21 a (new)
Article 21 a Review After a period of five years, the Commission shall, on the basis of public consultation and in the light of the discussions with competent authorities, carry out a review on the application and the scope of this Directive, including a determination of whether the Directive should continue to be applied or amended. The Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council, including, if appropriate, an amending legislative proposal.
Amendment 117 #
2016/0336(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 13 a (new)
Recital 13 a (new)
(13a) The Commission should create a new department in DG TAXUD to monitor Member States’ tax revenues after the implementation of the CCCTB. In this view, the Commission should increase the means of this DG. This new department should be mandated to give guidance to companies and Member States’ tax administrations.
Amendment 119 #
2016/0336(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 13 b (new)
Recital 13 b (new)
(13b) As the High Level Group on Own Resources suggests, a part of the fiscal revenues gained from the common consolidated tax base can be used as an own resource for the Union budget, in order to proportionally reduce Member States’ contributions to the same budget. This should lead to a more effective way to levy taxes on exporting and multinational corporations, who benefit most from globalisation and the Single Market, and thus introduce a user-pays principle.
Amendment 121 #
2016/0336(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 14 a (new)
Recital 14 a (new)
(14a) In order to create a level playing field and to eliminate tax competition conditions having a negative impact on the economic performance of the internal market and leading to a race to the bottom, minimum effective corporate tax rates should be introduced so as to optimise tax efficiency. Such a minimum effective tax rate would furthermore lead to the benefit of better comparing economic performance of Member States across the EU. The average EU top statutory corporate income tax rate is 22.5%, and in some Member States as low as 10%. The declining tendency of this rate should be reversed so as to avoid a race to the bottom. This directive therefore asks the Commission to come up with a legislative proposal for a minimum effective corporate tax rate at 18% in each Member State. Until such a legislation is in place, the Commission should publish statistics of the effective tax rates in Member States, distinguishing between the effective tax rates of SMEs and MNEs.
Amendment 246 #
2016/0336(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 44 – paragraph -1 (new)
Article 44 – paragraph -1 (new)
-1. No deductions shall be allowed to the extent that they would lead to an effective corporate tax rate lower than 18% on revenues, excluding exempt revenues.
Amendment 247 #
2016/0336(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 45 – paragraph 1
Article 45 – paragraph 1
The tax liability of each group member shall be the outcome of the application of the national tax rate to the apportioned share, adjusted in accordance with Article 44, and further reduced with the deductions provided for in Article 25. A minimum effective corporate tax rate shall be set at 18%.
Amendment 248 #
2016/0336(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 45 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 45 – paragraph 1 a (new)
The Commission shall put forward by 1 January 2019 a legislative proposal for a minimum effective corporate tax rate at 18% in each Member State, for the purpose of maximisation of tax efficiency, so as to make it possible to compare rates across the Union and which feeds into the Union own resources. This rate shall be applied after a phasing-in of five years in line with the convergence code.
Amendment 91 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws of EMU through legislation such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, as well as through the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such ascreation of banking union and the ESM;
Amendment 99 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas the attempt to strengthen the stability and growth pact with regards to its credibility and macro-economic coherence by means of the Six Pack, the Two Pack and the Fiscal Compact have added more complexity and less credibility than needed, proving to be a poor substitute for a more fundamental overhaul of euro area governance that will be required in order to achieve a sustainable balance between responsibility and solidarity within our common currency;
Amendment 109 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Recital H a (new)
Ha. whereas the Council internally has organised itself to reflect the reality of the existence of a Eurozone, while the European Parliament will eventually also need to reflect the reality that not all EU Member States will adopt the euro in the foreseeable future and are prepared to accept responsibilities that come with such membership;
Amendment 152 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers, against this background, that shortcomings have existed in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since its inception under the Maastricht Treaty with the attribution of monetary policy to the European level, while budgetary policy remains within the competencies of the Member States and is only framed by provisions on light coordination of national policies, supplemented by a no-bailout clause that is not fully operational in practice for as long as no permanent and democratically legitimate procedure to enforce a good debt equilibrium for Member States confronted with a liquidity problem and no credible procedure for the orderly bankruptcy of an insolvent member are in place that would allow for a fresh start;
Amendment 177 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Points out that the introduction of permanent and democratically legitimate procedure to enforce a good debt equilibrium for Member States confronted with a liquidity problem and a credible bankruptcy procedure for the euro area will need to be preceded by a transition regime in order to avoid a destabilisation of Member States under pressure from the financial markets;
Amendment 180 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Considers that EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spending ratio in some Member States, aggravated by the entanglement of banks, financial markets and governments and led to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstopwithout a proper crisis mechanism such as a European Monetary Fund to deal with illiquidity and without an orderly insolvency procedure for a Member State with unsustainable debt levels, the mere existence of the euro area;
Amendment 198 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy that organises risk sharing and clearly attributes the responsibility between Member States and the euro area as whole so as to address problems of moral hazard cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;
Amendment 224 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Emphasises that the division of labour between monetary and fiscal policy for the euro area as currently enshrined in the treaties simply did not anticipate that monetary policy would ever reach the zero lower bound, and shortcoming that urgently needs to be corrected;
Amendment 232 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Acknowledges the results achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adop, and in particular the creation of banking union and the ESM; recalls that the well-intentioned creation of the Six-Pack and, the Two- Pack Regulations; welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor,and the Fiscal Compact have created more complexity, less credibility and less macro-economic cohesion than needed, stresses that further steps are required to create a credible and sustainable architecture of the Eeuropean Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership, including a euro area budgetary capacity, a euro treasury and a democratic decision making body specific to the euro area;
Amendment 259 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Makes it clear that rapid actionnd far reaching action, including changes to the Treaties, is needed to ensure the sustainability of the euro; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets;
Amendment 291 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance at or close to the zero lower bound, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; emphasises that a mechanism to achieve an aggregate fiscal stance in the future especially at or close to the zero lower bound as well as incentives for symmetric as opposed to asymmetric adjustment for accelerated macro-economic convergence in response to crises are essential for a proper functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;
Amendment 324 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15 a (new)
Paragraph 15 a (new)
15a. Upholds that this instrument should be used to invest in public goods, with an Eurozone added value and taking into account national contexts; underlines that the access to a fiscal capacity involves an agreement that incentivizes the investment in these domains; asks the Commission to explore the potential fields where a fiscal capacity can have such an Eurozone added value and how synergy with the Eurozone budget can be brought about; underlines that the access to a fiscal capacity involves an agreement that incentivizes the investment in these domains;
Amendment 335 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Points out that effective stabilisation of large euro area Member States or a group of closely economically intertwined countries requires sufficient resources; stresses that the stabilization function of the fiscal capacity should not be undermined by fiscal rules;
Amendment 341 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16 a (new)
Paragraph 16 a (new)
16a. Notes the complexity and lack of credibility of the EU economic governance; urges the Commission to work towards EU fiscal framework with a better economic and social rationale;
Amendment 355 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Considers that three different functions have to be fulfilled; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’' structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic timeswhen resorting to a fiscal capacity and public goods should be commonly financed and provided; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole;
Amendment 370 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Argues in consequence that three pillars of a fiscal capacity – each clearly identifying and attributing European and national responsibilities – should be distinguished, wherein action should be undertaken in the framework of a common toolbox to address the different functions, i.e. incentivising convergence and sustainable structural reforms, absorbing asymmetric shocks, and absorbing symmetric shocks; takes note of the various proposals regarding designs put forward on this matter by politicians and academia;
Amendment 405 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity and its responsibility for ensuring that, after the necessary transition period all necessary conditions are in place for – if and when needed - an orderly restructuring of national sovereign debt to restore fiscal sustainability and allow an overly indebted member state a fresh start; stresses that an EMF should be managed by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected; underscores the own responsibility Member States have in managing their national budgets;
Amendment 430 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Insists that once it is integrated into Community law, the fiscal capacity for the euro area should be integrated into the EU budget in the form of a fund, but over and above the ceilings of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF);
Amendment 438 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Considers that the fiscal capacity for the euro area should be funded not only by contributions, but also by own resources of the EMU, including revenues from a financial transaction tax and ECB profits;
Amendment 440 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21b. Stresses that current expenditures from the euro area capacity should routinely be met by current revenues but also highlights the need for a euro area borrowing capacity in order to deal with large symmetric shocks not least as a fiscal backstop to the banking union and in order to facilitate the transition to sustainable public finances in crisis countries in the context of operations of the European Monetary Fund;
Amendment 465 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4
Subheading 4
Pillar 1: A convergence code to promote convergence and, incentivise the implementation of structural reforms and facilitate the provision of euro area public goods
Amendment 477 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Stresses that significant progress in convergence and, sustainable structural reforms is needed in orderand the provision of euro area public goods can contribute to reconcile fiscal consolidation, growth, jobs, productivity, competitiveness and the European social model so as to effectively prevent asymmetric shock; considers that financial support from the European level for the implementation of agreed structural reforms in the Member States, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, is therefore indispensable; stresses this support is conditional to the agreement and must be linked to technical support to national authorities aimed at reforming institutions, governance, administration, economic and social sectors;
Amendment 488 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24a. Considers that structural reforms should be ecologically and socially balanced and aim at strengthening growth potential towards a fully sustainable new growth model, promoting fair and sustainable welfare systems and reducing social inequalities;
Amendment 495 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Reiterates its call for the adoption of a ‘'convergence and responsibility code’', as a legal act resulting from the ordinary legislative procedure, as a first step to streamline the existing coordination of economic policies into a more effective convergence of economic policies within the European Semester points out that in order to create a credible and sustainable architecture of the euro area based on solidarity and responsibility changes to the Treaties will be required;
Amendment 511 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – introductory part
Paragraph 26 – introductory part
26. Suggests that the convergence and responsibility code define criteria to be reached within five years, building on the merits of the Maastricht criteria and focusing for the first period on convergence and responsibility requirements regarding:
Amendment 555 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1
– investment, notably in research and development;, healthcare and education,
Amendment 557 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
– Social cohesion, including EMU- wide minimum social standards;
Amendment 558 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
– public goods with European relevance
Amendment 613 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Notes that the twomultiple models for the shock absorption function are featured most prominently in the academic literature: a Rainy Day Fund and, a European Unemployment Benefit SchemeInsurance or Reinsurance Scheme, a full-fledged capital market union and national budgets; stresses however that Member States remain responsible for the sustainability of their national budget;
Amendment 655 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
31. Acknowledges that the model of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme wouldInsurance or Reinsurance Scheme might be used to foster convergence of labour markets in the medium term;
Amendment 666 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Considers that the EMF should provide the financial resources for either of these models, which could require increasing the amount of capital; points out that the fundeither of these models should avoid long-term redistribution effects by ensuring Member States’' contributions are balanced over the cycle;
Amendment 688 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; recalls that the EMF shcould be used as a first step towards an appropriate financial resource;
Amendment 703 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Considers that in the case of symmetric shocks brought about by a lack of internal demand, monetary policy alone cannot reignitbe relied upon to stabilise the economy, particularespecially in a context of the zero lower bounds; is therefore convinced that public and private investment must be increased, the administrative burden reduced and a proper regulatory framework developed, with a view to stimulating potential growth;
Amendment 717 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Considers that symmetric shocks that are caused by a lack of supply must be diminished by improvalso need to be tackled by means of fostering the competitiveness of the euro area via appropriate financial incentives, including via the financing of professional training or financial incentives for R&D spending;
Amendment 719 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Considers that a renewed instability inand fragmentation of the financial sector could alsogain pose severe challenges for the euro area as a whole; urges completion of the Banking Union, including a meaningful BSR, in order to lessen these challenges; calls for the and recalls that the shock absorption capacity of financial institutions remains low and fragile; calls, thus, for accelerated balance sheet repair and significantly higher levels of capital and bailinable instruments as well as a sufficient fiscal capacity to operate as a fiscal backstop for the Banking Union, as agreed in the SRM;
Amendment 745 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Points out that the fiscal capacity has to be of significant size in order to be able to address these euro-area-wide shocks and to finance its functions; insists that in order to provide sufficient financial resources, the euro area fiscal capacity, including the EMF, should be able to increase the issuance of equities via a rise in guarantees; considers that these common issued equities should have the highest credit rateacknowledges that such increases need to go hand in hand with the creation of a dependable governance structure at the euro area level, including a dedicated parliamentary decision making body;
Amendment 760 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 a (new)
Paragraph 38 a (new)
38a. Insists that euro area decision making both at the level of the Council and Parliament needs to be organised according to the principles of "no taxation without representation" and "no representation without taxation";
Amendment 770 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Calls urgently for the European Parliament and national parliaments to be given a strengthened role in the renewed economic governance framework in order to reinforce democratic accountability; calls for increased national ownership inUrges that a democratic decision making body in the form of a Eurozone Parliament (EZP) specific to the euro area is created on which the democratic accountability for the new institutional architecture of the Eeuropean Semester in order to improve compliance with the CSRs would be based; the decision making should involve Parliamentarians at the European and national level;
Amendment 771 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
Amendment 794 #
2015/2344(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Considers that in order to provide for a genuine EMU, a euro area treasury should be created for collective decision- making, supervision and management of the budgetary capacity for the euro area; calls for the inclusion of this treasury within the European Commission with full macroeconomic, fiscal and financial competences; calls for a vice-president of the European Commission to head the treasury and simultaneously to act as president of the Eurogroup; urges full accountability of this treasury to the European Parliamentfuture decision making body specific to the euro area;
Amendment 8 #
2015/2233(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 – point a
Paragraph 1 – point a
(a) to make financial services one of the EU’s priorities in the TiSA negotiations, as the EU’s own market for those services is already comparatively open; to ensure that, in the area of financial services, no new commitments will be taken on that would jeopardise EU financial regulation, and that EU regulators retain the ability to authorise or deny any new financial product; to introduce significantly higher capital requirements on a harmonised basis;
Amendment 55 #
2015/2221(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas Banking Structural Reform (BSR) in the spirit of the Liikanen Report as an additional fourth pillar of Banking Union is necessary effectively to address the too-big-to-fail problem and to safeguard taxpayers and depositors;
Amendment 114 #
2015/2221(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Considers the comprehensive assessment performed ahead of the launch of the SSM to be a fundamental first step towards restoring the confidence lost through the crisis years and enhancing the resilience of the euro area banking system by improving its capitalisation and increasing transparency;
Amendment 130 #
2015/2221(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Is concerned that capital requirements as well as actual capital levels in the EU continue to fall somewhat short of what has been achieved in other important jurisdictions, thereby hampering the resilience of banks, systemic stability and sustainable economic recovery;
Amendment 135 #
2015/2221(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Believes that the worldwide drive towards more and better quality bank capital is a necessary condition for a sound banking system capable of supporting the economy and for avoiding any repeat of the enormous bailouts witnessed during the crisis; points out that despite the regulatory actions since the financial crisis capital levels especially of some of the largest banks remained surprisingly low;
Amendment 147 #
2015/2221(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Notes that an increase in capital requirements, beyond a certain threshold, may in the short term induce bneeds to be achieved by reducing dividend payments and raising fresh equity instead of a shrinking of balance sheets by meanks tof curtail the supplying of credit, and therefore looks forward to an overall stabilisation of the level of capital smooth and steady phasing in of higher capital requirements by means of retained earnings at the minimum;
Amendment 154 #
2015/2221(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Stresses the necessity of addressing the sovereign bank loop and suggests commencing a careful and staged phasing in of large exposure rules for sovereign debt in lock-step with the introduction of EDIS;
Amendment 157 #
2015/2221(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Considers the stabilisupward convergence and harmonization of the supervisory and regulatory frameworks an important element to restore investors’' confidence, to avoid uncertainty about regulatory and supervisory action, and to support growth and financial stability;
Amendment 161 #
2015/2221(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Welcomes the development of a common methodology for the 2015 round of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP); takes note that, partly as a consequence of the swift start of the SSM, many aspects of this methodology were finalised while the SREP cycle was already underway, and considers that in order to improve robustness of results and consistency between banks’' risk profiles and capital levels, the process leading to the approval of the common risk assessment may benefit from further refinement; points out that stress tests must include potential second round effects in order to be effective and reliable;
Amendment 184 #
2015/2221(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Underlines that the SSM should look beyond credit risk to all forms of bank risk, and that further steps are necessary to reinforce the supervisory scrutiny of banks’' financial portfolios, especially level 3 assets; stresses the need for a reduction of the interlinkages between the regulated and the shadow banking sector, not least via limiting the respective credit risk exposure;
Amendment 195 #
2015/2221(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Believes that the ECB’'s supervisory strategy, while avoiding any differentiation along national lines, should reflect and safeguard pluralism of banking models across the EU without undermining the effectiveness of the SSM;
Amendment 118 #
2015/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Welcomes the entry into force of the regulation on the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), aimed at boosting private investment in the EU, as a first step in the right direction and calls on all relevant stakeholders to ensure its swift and effective implementation; points out that in the present low interest rate environment at the zero lower bound, a significant increase of the fund would be needed to provide the necessary macro- economic stimulus;
Amendment 142 #
2015/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Is concerned at the persisting macroeconomic imbalances in some Member States, in particular the high public debt levels and large current account gaps, as well as the excessive risks in the banking systemsfinancial sector not least stemming from institutions that are too big to fail; calls for an elimination of the debt-equity bias to avoid misguided incentives leading to above optimal debt levels in the private sector;
Amendment 148 #
2015/2210(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Highlights that the sovereign-bank- loop has not been resolved yet and continues to pose threats to financial and fiscal stability; urges the Commission and the Council to phase out zero risk weighting of sovereign debt;
Amendment 5 #
2015/2190(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Points out that ESMA when carrying out its activities needs to pay particular attention to the issue of proportionalitysafety and soundness of the financial sector and must strive to achieve outcomes that are unambiguous, coherent and free of superfluous complexitystandardized;
Amendment 16 #
2015/2190(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Stresses that given its limited resources, ESMA must stick strictly to the tasks assigned to it by the Union legislator and must not seek to broaden its mandate beyond those assignmethe practical limits of effective supervision by ESMA must not be set by budgetary constraints; stresses that while carrying out its work and in particular when drafting implementing legislation, ESMA needs to regularly and comprehensively inform the Union legislator about its activities; regrets that ESMA has in the past not always met that standard;
Amendment 5 #
2015/2189(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Points out that EIOPA when carrying out its activities needs to pay particular attention to the issue of proportionalitysafety, soundness and risk taking of the pension sector and must strive to achieve outcomes that are unambiguous, coherent and free of superfluous complexitystandardized;
Amendment 16 #
2015/2189(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Stresses that given its limited resources, EIOPA must stick strictly to the tasks assigned to it by the Union legislator and must not seek to broaden its mandate beyond those assignmethe practical limits of effective supervision by EIOPA must not be set by budgetary constraints; stresses that while carrying out its work and in particular when drafting implementing legislation, EIOPA needs to regularly and comprehensively inform the Union legislator about its activities; regrets that EIOPA has in the past not always met that standard;
Amendment 6 #
2015/2188(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Points out that EBA, when carrying out its activities, needs to pay particular attention to the issue of proportionalitysafety and soundness of the financial sector and must strive to achieve outcomes that are unambiguous, coherent and free of superfluous complexitystandardized;
Amendment 17 #
2015/2188(DEC)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Stresses that, given its limited resources, EBA must stick strictly to the tasks assigned to it by the Union legislator and must not seek to broaden its mandate beyond those assignme the practical limits of effective supervision by EBA must not be set by budgetary constraints; stresses that, while carrying out its work and in particular when drafting implementing legislation, EBA needs to regularly and comprehensively inform the Union legislator about its activities; regrets that EBA has in the past not always met that standard;
Amendment 198 #
2015/2140(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Stresses that the temporary State aid in the financial sector for the stabilisation of the global financial system was necessary but on completion of the Banking Union must be quickly reduced or totally removed and scrutinised; emphasises the persisting urgency to eliminate subsidies from implicit guarantees for financial institutions which are still too big to fail both in order to level the playing field in the financial sector and in order to protect taxpayers;
Amendment 218 #
2015/2140(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Welcomes the investigations initiated by the Commission in 2014 into unlawful State aid through unfair tax competition and calls on Member States in futurepublically to present the Commission with information about their past, present and future taxation practice in good time and ultimately to comply with the obligation to declare special arrangements to the detriment of other Member Statesto disclose all special arrangements to the Commission and the European Parliament;
Amendment 234 #
2015/2140(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Stresses that State aid proceedings alone cannot put a permanent stop to the unfair tax competition in a number of Member States of the European Union; further tangible results are required, such as a consolidated basis of calculation for capital gains and, in conjunction, a minimum tax rate, a review of the VAT Directive in order to prevent fraud, the obligation on large international companies to report their turnover and profits on a ‘country by country’ basis and calling on Member States to introduce greater transparency in their tax practices and mutual reporting requirements;
Amendment 239 #
2015/2140(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Considers that healthy tax competition is one of the constitutive elements of the internal market of the Union but unfair tax competition must be prevented through minimum rates of taxation and harmonised tax basesnot all forms of tax competition need be harmful but stresses that unfair and harmful tax competition are dominant in the way that the EU has organised itself and therefore calls for minimum rates of taxation, harmonised tax bases and a legally explicit possibility to restrict mobility of capital if needed for the orderly function of tax systems within in the Union, thereby neutralising the damaging effects of Cadbury-Schweppes and similar rulings which have led to the perverse situation that in important respects it is more difficult to fight frivolous profit shifting to countries within the Union than to countries outside the Union;
Amendment 13 #
2015/2132(BUD)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Highlights the crucial role to be played by the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) in closing gaps not covered by the market and in attracting private investments; welcomes the agreement reached by the co-legislators on the increase in contributions to the EFSI to EUR 3 billion, to be found from the overall budgetary margins in the period 2016 to 2020 as a first step in the right direction; points out that in the present low interest rate environment at the zero lower bound, a significant increase of the fund would be needed effectively to provide the necessary macro-economic stimulus; reaffirms its determination to further reduce the budgetary impact on Horizon 2020 and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF);
Amendment 29 #
2015/2132(BUD)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Draws attention to the present and future crucial role of the three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) in relation to EU-level financial supervision and the banking union; emphasises that the 2016 draft budget must provide for a sufficient increase in budgetary resources for the ESAs to address the ever-increasing range of tasks being assigned to them, as well as external factors such as exchange rate fluctuations and general increases in levels of pay; points out that the practical limits of effective supervision must not be set by budgetary constraints; encourages a comparison of ESAs’ funding with US agencies in the field of financial sector supervision, including the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau;
Amendment 5 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Takes note of the 2014 EIB Annualctivity Report and the increase by 6.92% to EUR 80.3 billion in the EIB Group’s lending; is very concerned at the increasingbout still very high unemployment, inequality and poverty levels, as well as weak investment in Europe and the continuous uncertainty in the financial markets, also in view of a worsening global economic outlook;
Amendment 18 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Regrets that overall EU investment in 2013 decreased by 13% compared with the pre- crisis period with investment in some countries decreasing 25% and even by as much as 60% in others, creating a dangerous investment imbalance in the EU; is of the opinion that this constitutes a major challenge for the EIB Group and will require extraordinary efforts from its side for the years to come, as part of an overall EU effort to implement a renewed long-term strategy for sustainable, convergent and inclusive growth;
Amendment 27 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes the urgent need for an increase in EIB lending activityGroup investment activity, including innovative financial instruments with greater additional risk-bearing capacity, and for the improvement of its activity in line with Protocol (No 28) on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion;
Amendment 43 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Calls on the EIB Group to re-examine its strategic planning programme, given the high degree of concentration of funding for the four biggest economies in the EU accounting for more than 45%, and the disproportionate rise in unemployment levels and investment gaps in some other countries which remains at alarming levels, and which could hamper economic convergence in the EU and further damage growth prospects and social cohesion in specific countries and regions in the EU;
Amendment 87 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Calls on the EIB to refrain from cooperating with financial partners with a negative track record and to enforce prevention measures against tax havens, fraud and evasion as well as aggressive tax avoidance; calls for these prevention measures to include ensuring that no EIB funding can go to ultimate beneficiaries or financial intermediaries which make use of tax havens or harmful tax practices;
Amendment 88 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Calls on the EIB Group to refrain from cooperating with financial partners with a negative track record, particularly in the field of corporate taxation, and to enforce prevention measures against tax havens, tax fraud and tax evasion as well as aggressive tax avoidance; requests a list of outstanding EIB Group transactions involving counterparts established in jurisdictions featuring on the Commission's list of "top 30" tax havens around the world;
Amendment 91 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Calls on the EIB to adopt an effective and up-to-date Responsible Taxation Policy, to be overseen by a Tax Unit and detailed within an Annual Tax Report; calls for this policy to include regular country tax assessments in order to identify problematic jurisdictions; calls for this policy to involve the EIB actively using its relocation clause and systematically publishing the domicile of funds which benefit from EIB support, as well as the domicile of the ultimate beneficiaries of the funds if they are supported by financial intermediaries;
Amendment 98 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Calls on the EIB Group to re-evaluate the private-public partnerships in terms of their pgrofitabilitywth, jobs and productivity impact for the relevant economies and societies and to examine alternative methods of funding, possiblyincluding through increasing public investments, notably given the present outlook of low long-term interest rates;
Amendment 112 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Calls on the EIB Group to further enhance transparency and access to information both internafor the Parliament and other EU institutions as welly ands for the public, especially regarding the selection, monitoring and evaluation of activities and programmes;
Amendment 127 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Requests the EIB to increase its reporting to Parliament regarding its decisions, progress achieved and the impact of its lending activities within and outside the EU; requests that this include regular reports to the European Parliament and other stakeholders on the implementation of its Non-Compliant Jurisdiction Policy, including the number of applications which have been turned down for failing to comply with this policy, as well as the number of relocations which have been requested and implemented.
Amendment 128 #
2015/2127(INI)
Draft opinion
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Requests the EIB Group to increase its reporting to Parliament regarding its decisions, progress achieved and the impact of its lending activities within and outside the EU; calls on the EIB Group to engage in deeper dialogue with the Parliament on all its activities within the same scheme for reporting and accountability as set out in the EFSI regulation and to fully comply with the spirit and letter of the EFSI regulation, notably concerning inter-institutional cooperation with the Parliament.
Amendment 74 #
2015/2115(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Points out that the sovereign bank loop has not yet been fully addressed and urges the ECB to reflect upon possibilities to address this directly or indirectly via strengthening large exposure limits.
Amendment 56 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Is concerned about the increased complexity, reflected in the greater amount, detail and number of layers of regulation and supervision with requirements at international, European and national level of regulation with requirements at international, European and national level and therefore calls for strengthening of the Banking Union, streamlining national exemptions;
Amendment 69 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Notes that a sound and robust CMU has to acknowledge the interdependencies with other financiexplore additional market based sources of funding for the real sectors and has to be based ononomy complementing well-established existing structures; stresses the need for a holistic view of EU financial services regulationthe risks in the financial sector and their potential fiscal and macro- economic consequences;
Amendment 79 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Believes that an effective and efficient EU financial services regulation should be coherent, consistent (also on a cross- sectoral basis), proportionate, and free of superfluous complexity; believes that it should enable intermediarieseffectively address threats to financial stability and to the taxpayer, not least owing to systemic risks and too-big-to-fail institutions; believes that it should specifically enable capital market based capital allocation effectively to fulfil theirits role in funding the real economy and serve savers and investors, enhance the risk sharing capacity of the financial markets with the common currency and serve savers and investors without endangering financial and fiscal stability; considers that it should contribute to the single market and focus on goals better achievable at European level;
Amendment 89 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Calls for a dramatic reduction of the debt-equity bias to enhance economic resilience and capital allocation;
Amendment 92 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Underlines the need to take stock of the financial services framework not least in order to identify any remaining threats to financial stability and loopholes in the regulatory framework; notes that similar exercises are being undertaken in other jurisdictions, notably in the US;
Amendment 101 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Suggests a gradual further increase in capital requirements in order to reduce exposure to far from perfect risk models while improving capital allocation, financial stability and the protection of taxpayers;
Amendment 108 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Believes that a single market for financial services serves businesses, but ultimately has to benefit customers and investors; insists that barriers to cross- border access, marketing and investment have to be analysed and addressed; underscores the fact that a more efficient allocation of capital within the EU need not always lead to higher cross-border capital flows; reminds that the build-up of real-estate bubbles in some Member States before the crisis was to some extent fuelled by too much capital flowing in;
Amendment 112 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Recalls that reduced barriers to capital flows can only be safely predicted to enhance long-term growth prospects if the overall incentives for companies are set right; highlights that this is at present not the case in a number of areas - not least with regards to corporate taxation - and that the rectification of such destructive incentives therefore must be treated as an integral part of the capital market union agenda;
Amendment 119 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Believes that consumer protection does not necessarily entail large volumes of information, but precise information clearly disclosing the entire risk a consumer is exposed to; is concerned that the multiplicity of customer information might not ultimately serve real customer needs; points to the necessity of a European initiative for more and better financial education; encourages further digitalization of information;
Amendment 137 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Highlights the benefits of asset diversification; emphasises that the purpose of prudential regulation is not to favour certain asset classes; calls for a risk- based approach to regulation, with the same rules being applied to the same risks; believes that a more granular categorisation of asset classes is appropriate, in particular by establishing categories such as infrastructure employing robust and standardised risk measures and complementing them with regulation that does not rely on risk measures such as a the leverage ratio;
Amendment 157 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Notes the possible unintended consequences of multipleat capital, liquidity and leverage requirements on maturity transformatineed to complement one and othe provision of long- term financing;r and asks the Commission, in cooperation with the supervisors, to analyse these conseque extent to which the complementarity of such thresholds might be further enhancesd for banking and insurance as a matter of priority;
Amendment 179 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Welcomes the diversity of business models; calls for a differentiation incomprehensive regulationory and supervisionory regardingime fully taking into account the nature, size, riskiness and complexity of the entities in question;
Amendment 189 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Calls for an appropriate division of competences between EU and national level, bearing in mind that national supervisors have more knowledge of local market characteristicsreduced regulatory fragmentation, ensuring a seamless and streamlined division of labour between EU and national level; is concerned about the effeimpact of a one-size-fits-all supervisory approach on smaller and primarily nationally active entities within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)supervisory fragmentation on the effectiveness of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the level playing field for financial institutions;
Amendment 198 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Notes the achievements in establishing a banking union; stresses that the next step has to be its full implementation, including full capitalisation of national Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) and the Single Resolution Fund (SRF); emphasises the aim of avoiding moral hazard and ensuring that risk-takers bear the costs when their risks materialise; calls for the completion of banking union including a common mechanism for deposit insurance and effective bank structural reform regulation based on the Liikanen report;
Amendment 282 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Demands a stronger focus on the global competitiveness of the EU financial sectors when making policyEmphasises that an effective financial sector is a necessary condition for efficient capital allocation on dynamic growth while observing that there can be too much finance which has been empirically shown to tend to reduce growth prospects;
Amendment 297 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. Supports attempts to harmonise accounting standards, including the definition of non-performing loans in the Union; stresses the need for a harmonised insolvency regime; points out that fragmentation in the area of accounting and insolvency laws is associated with enormous costs, inefficiencies and regulatory arbitrage which have the potential to hamper growth and distort the internal market;
Amendment 372 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Reminds the ESAs that technical standards, guidelines and recommendations are bound by the principle of proportionality; calls on the ESAs to adopt a restrictive approach to the extent and number of guidelines, particularly where they are not explicitly empowered in the basic act; notes that such a restrictive approach is also required in view of the ESAs’ resources and the need to prioritise their taskspoints out that the practical limits of effective supervision must not be set by budgetary constraints; encourages a comparison of ESAs’ funding with US agencies in the field, including the US Consumer Financial Protection Bureau;
Amendment 385 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Calls on the Commission and ESAs to conduct regular (at least annual) proportionalityeffectiveness checks, particularly with regard to the requirements applicable for small and medium-sized market participants and on every draft legislative actintended to address threats to financial stability stemming from large financial intermediaries, and to dedicate resources to this activity;
Amendment 394 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Stresses that the impact of individual legislative measures differs from their cumulative impact; calls on the Commission services, in corporation with the ESAs, SSM and ESRB, to conduct a comprehensive quantitative and qualitative assessment every five years of the cumulative impact of the EU financial services regulation at EU and Member State level in order to identify shortcomings and loopholes;
Amendment 410 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43 – indent 2 a (new)
Paragraph 43 – indent 2 a (new)
– the actual common equity tier 1 to total asset ratios in financial institutions and their development over time,
Amendment 419 #
2015/2106(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43 – indent 4 a (new)
Paragraph 43 – indent 4 a (new)
– the actual amount of subsidies to financial institutions stemming from explicit or implicit government guarantees,
Amendment 113 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 5
Recital 5
(5) In June 2015, the Five Presidents Report on Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union pointed out that a single banking system can only be truly single if confidence in the safety of bank deposits is the same irrespective of the Member State in which a bank operates. This requires single bank supervision, single bank resolution and single deposit insurance. The Five Presidents report therefore proposed tocalled for completeion of the Banking Union by establishing a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), the third pillar of a fully-fledged Banking Union alongside bank supervision and resolution, that should be completed by a common fiscal backstop based in the European Stability Mechanism. Concrete steps in that direction should already be taken as a priority, with a re-insurance system at the European level for the national deposit guarantee schemes as a first step towards a fully mutualised approach. The scope of this reinsurance system should coincide with that of the SSM.
Amendment 150 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14
Recital 14
(14) In order to ensure parallelismcoherence with the SSM and the SRM, EDIS should apply to participating Member States. Banks established in the Member States not participating in the SSM should not be subject to EDIS. As long as supervision in a Member State remains outside the SSM, that Member State should remain responsible for ensuring the protection of depositors against the consequences of the insolvency of a credit institution. As Member States adopt the Euro and join the SSM, or join the SSM, they should also automatically become subject to the EDIS. Ultimately, the EDIS cshould potentially extend to the entire internal market.
Amendment 211 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22
Recital 22
(22) Safeguards should be built into EDIS so as to limit moral hazard risk and to ensure that the coverage by EDIS is only provided where nationals DGSs act in a prudent manner. Firstly, national DGSs should comply with their obligations under this Regulation, the Directive 2014/49/EU and other relevant EU law, in particular their obligation to build up their funds in accordance with Article 10 of Directive 2014/49/EU as further specified in this Regulation. In order to benefit from coverage by EDIS, participating DGSs need to raise ex-ante contributions in accordance with a precise funding path. This also implies that the possibility of a target level reduction in accordance with Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU is no longer available if the DGS wants to benefit from EDIS. Secondly, coverage under EDIS is only provided where the banks affiliated to a DGS adhere on an aggregate basis to sovereign exposure limits as set out in this Regulation. Thirdly, in case of a pay-out event or where its funds are used in resolution, a national DGS should bear a fair share of the loss themselves. It should therefore be required to collect ex-post contributions from its members to replenish its fund and to repay EDIS to the extent that the initially received funding exceeds the share of loss to be borne by EDIS. ThirdFourthly, following a pay-out event, the national DGS should maximise the proceeds from the insolvency estate and repay the Board and the Board should have sufficient powers to safeguards its rights. Fourifthly, the Board should have the powers to recover all or part of funding in case of a participating DGS did not comply with key obligations.
Amendment 220 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23
Recital 23
(23) The Deposit Insurance Fund is an essential element without which the progressive establishment of EDIS could not be achieved. Different national systems of funding would not provide for homogenous deposit insurance across the Banking Union. Throughout the three stages, the Deposit Insurance Fund should help ensuring the stabilising role of DGSs, a uniform high level of protection to all depositors in a harmonised framework throughout the Union and avoiding the creation of obstacles for the exercise of fundamental freedoms or the distortion of competition in the internal market due to different levels of protection at national level, since savers have the right to open a bank account in any Member State irrespective of their legal domicile.
Amendment 244 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
Recital 27
(27) In principle, contributions should be collected from the industry prior to, and independently of, any deposit insurance action. When prior funding is insufficient to cover the losses or costs incurred by the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, additional contributions should be collected to bear the additional cost or loss. Moreover, the Deposit Insurance Fund should be able to contract borrowings or other forms of support from credit institutions, financial institutions or other third partiesrequest funding from the European Stability Mechanism in the event that the ex-ante and ex post contributions are not immediately accessible or do not cover the expenses incurred by the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund in relation to deposit insurance actions.
Amendment 246 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
Recital 27
(27) In principle, contributions should be collected from the industrybanks prior to, and independently of, any deposit insurance action. When prior funding is insufficient to cover the losses or costs incurred by the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, additional contributions should be collected to bear the additional cost or loss. Moreover, the Deposit Insurance Fund should be able to contract borrowings or other forms of support from credit institutions, financial institutions or other third parties in the event that the ex-ante and ex post contributions are not immediately accessible or do not cover the expenses incurred by the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund in relation to deposit insurance actions.
Amendment 248 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27 a (new)
Recital 27 a (new)
(27a) The Board of EDIS should be able to make a request to borrow for the DIF from the European Stability Mechanism. A credit line from the European Stability Mechanism should be pre-approved by Member States and approved by the Board of Governors when EDIS has issued a request.
Amendment 258 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30
Recital 30
Amendment 263 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30
Recital 30
(30) Ensuring effective and sufficient financing of the Deposit Insurance Fund is of paramount importance to the credibility and efficiency of EDIS. The capacity of the Board to contract alternative funding means for the Deposit Insurance Fund should be enhanced in a manner that optimises the cost of funding and preserves the creditworthiness of the Deposit Insurance Fund. Immediately after the entry into force of this Regulation, the necessary steps should be taken by the Board in cooperation with the participating Member States to develop the appropriate methods and modalities permitting the enhancement of the borrowing capacity of the Deposit Insurance Fund that should be in place by the date of application of this Regulation. It is essential also to create a mutualised credit line via the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as an effective common fiscal backstop for the Banking Union to be used as a last resort.
Amendment 273 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36
Recital 36
(36) The Board should operate in joint- plenary, plenary and executive sessions. The Board, in its executive session, should prepare all decisions concerning pay-out procedures and, to the fullest extent possible, adopt those decisions. Regarding the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, it is important that there is no first-mover advantage and that the outflows of the Deposit Insurance Fund are monitored. Once the net accumulated use of the Deposit Insurance Fund in the previous consecutive 12 months reaches the threshold of 25% of the final target level, the plenary session should evaluate the application of the deposit insurance actions or the participations in resolution actions and the use of the Deposit Insurance Fund, and should provide guidance which the executive session should follow in subsequent decisions. Guidance to the executive session should, in particular, focus on ensuring the non- discriminatory application of deposit insurance actions or participation in resolution actions, on measures to be taken to avoid a depletion of the Deposit Insurance Fund.
Amendment 337 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new)
9a. in Article 34, paragraph 5 is replaced by the following: ‘5. The Board, the ECB, the national competent authorities and, the national resolution authorities and the national designated authorities may draw up memoranda of understanding with a procedure concerning the exchange of information. The exchange of information between the Board, the ECB, the national competent authorities, and the national resolution authorities and the national designated authorities shall not be deemed to infringe the requirements of professional secrecy.’
Amendment 340 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 b (new)Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 b (new)Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 38 – paragraph 2 – point c a (new)
9b. In Article 38(2), the following point (ca) is added: ‘(ca) where they intentionally or negligently fail to comply with decisions of the DGS to which they are affiliated, including a failure associated with the invoices on contributions, in accordance with Article 74e.’;'
Amendment 416 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41d - paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 41d - paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Chapter 2 of this Regulation shall only apply if the banks affiliated to the participating DGS on the aggregate level comply with large exposure limits at most of 150 % of total own funds for all types of exposures. This requirement shall not apply to future "European risk free assets".
Amendment 439 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41h - paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 41h - paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Chapter 3 of this Regulation shall only apply if the banks affiliated to the participating DGS on the aggregate level comply with large exposure limits at most of 75 % of total own funds for all types of exposures. This requirement shall not apply to future ‘European risk free assets’.
Amendment 475 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 4li a (new)
Article 4li a (new)
Article 41i a Conditions for coverage 1. Without prejudice to the obligations to fund the DIF, a participating DGS shall not be covered by EDIS in the reinsurance, co-insurance or full insurance phase, if the Member State in question has not pre-approved a credit line for the DIF from the ESM of at least 0,4 % of covered deposits to cover shortfalls exceeding the capacities of the DIF. 2. This condition does not apply to DGSs in Member States which are not part of the ESM. 3. DGSs in Member States which are not part of the ESM may not benefit from the ESM's credit line.
Amendment 515 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 m – paragraph 2
Article 41 m – paragraph 2
Amendment 521 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41 m – paragraph 3
Article 41 m – paragraph 3
3. The Board shall immediately inform the participating DGS about its decision under paragraphs 1 and 2. The participating DGS may request a review of the Board’s decision within 24 hours after it has been informed. It shall state the reasons why it considers an amendment to the Board’s decision necessary, in particular with respect to the extent of coverage by EDIS. The Board shall take a decision on the request within another 24 hours.
Amendment 555 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 50 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 50 – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 556 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 50 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)
Article 50 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)
(da) decide on the necessity to make a request to the European Stability Mechanism for extraordinary funding contributions in accordance with Article 74h.
Amendment 557 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 20
Amendment 563 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 22
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 52 – paragraph 3
Article 52 – paragraph 3
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 1 of this Article, decisions referred to in Article 50(1) or Article 50a(1), which involve the raising of ex- post contributions in accordance with Article 71 or Article 74d, on voluntary borrowing between financing arrangements in accordance with Article 72 or Article 74f, on alternative financing means in accordance with Article 73, Article 74 or Article 74g, as well as on the mutualisation of national financing arrangements in accordance with Article 78, exceeding the use of the financial means available in the SRF or in the DIF, as well as on requesting funding from the ESM in accordance with Article 75a, shall be taken by a majority of two thirds of the Board members, representing at least 50 % of contributions during the transitional period until the SRF is fully mutualised and respectively the DIF has reached its final target level and by a majority of two thirds of the Board members, representing at least 30 % of contributions from then on. Each voting member shall have one vote. In the event of a tie, the Chair shall have a casting vote.
Amendment 566 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 28
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 28
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 60 a – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 60 a – paragraph 1 – point c
Amendment 568 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 28
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 28
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 61 a – paragraph 2 – point d
Article 61 a – paragraph 2 – point d
Amendment 720 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 a (new)
Article 74 c – paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. The result of the calculation formula of both delegated acts shall be multiplied by a factor: (a) increasing with the variance of a financial institution's EU sovereign bond holdings as compared to a fully diversified portfolio in proportions of GDP. (b) increasing with the variance of a financial institution's EU sovereign bond holdings as compared to a fully diversified portfolio in proportions of debt outstanding. (c) decreasing in the leverage ratio up to a leverage ratio of 5 percent
Amendment 735 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 f – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 74 f – paragraph 1 – point c
Amendment 738 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 g - title
Article 74 g - title
Amendment 755 #
2015/0270(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 34
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 74 g a (new)
Article 74 g a (new)
Article 74ga Borrowing from the ESM as a lender of last resort 1. The Board shall decide to make a request to borrow for the DIF from the European Stability Mechanism in accordance with Article 50d in the event that: (a) the means available to the DIF are not sufficient to cover the losses, costs or other expenses incurred by the use of the DIF in relation to payout events or resolution actions; (b) the amounts raised under Article 74c are not immediately accessible or insufficient to cover the losses, costs or other expenses incurred by the use of the DIF in relation to payout events or resolution actions; 2. The proceeds of such borrowings shall be used exclusively to meet payment obligations towards participating DGSs. 3. The Board of Governors of the ESM shall approve the lending to the DIF by mutual agreement in accordance with Article 4 and Article 5 of the Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism. 4. The funding from the ESM shall be fully recouped in accordance with Articles 74c and 74d.
Amendment 230 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 60
Recital 60
(60) The competent authority of theESMA should act as the single competent administrative authority responsible for carrying out the duties resulting from this Regulation. The national competent authorities referred to in Article 22 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the home and host Member State should be entitled to receive a certificate from the competent authority of the home Member State which states that the prospectus has been drawn up in accordance with this Regulation. The competent authority of the home Member State should also notify the issuer or the person responsible for drawing up the prospectus of the certificate of approval of the prospectus that is addressed to the authority of the host Member State in order to provide the issuer or the person responsible for drawing up the prospectus with certainty as to whether and when a notification has actually been made.
Amendment 234 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 62
Recital 62
(62) A variety of competent authorities in Member States, with different responsibilities, maywould create unnecessary costs and overlapping of responsibilities without providing any additional benefit. In each Member State,Therefore, ESMA as a single competent authority ishould be designated to approve prospectuses and to assume responsibility for supervising compliance with this Regulation. That competent authority should be established as an administrative authority andESMA should act in such a form that their independence from economic actors is guaranteed and conflicts of interest are avoided. The designation of aESMA as a single competent authority for prospectus approval should not exclude cooperation between that competent authority and other entities, such as banking and insurance regulators or listing authorities, with a view to guaranteeing efficient scrutiny and approval of prospectuses in the interest of issuers, investors, markets participants and markets alike. Delegation of tasks by athe competent authority to another entity should only be permitted where it relates to the publication of approved prospectuses.
Amendment 235 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 63
Recital 63
(63) A set of effective tools and powers and resources for the competent authorities of Member Statesy guarantees supervisory effectiveness. This Regulation therefore should in particular provide for a minimum set of supervisory and investigative powers with which the competent authorities of Member Statesy should be entrusted in accordance with national law. Those powers should be exercised, where the national law so requires, by application to the competent judicial authorities. When exercising theirits powers under this Regulation the competent authorities and ESMAy should act objectively and impartially and remain autonomous in their decision making.
Amendment 556 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 24 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
The competent authority of the home Member State shall, at the request of the issuer or the person responsible for drawing up the prospectus and within three working days following receipt of that request or, where the request is submitted together with the draft prospectus, within one working day after the approval of the prospectus, notify the national competent authority ofies referred to in Art 22 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the home and the host Member State with a certificate of approval attesting that the prospectus has been drawn up in accordance with this Regulation and with an electronic copy of that prospectus.
Amendment 559 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
Article 24 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3
The issuer or the person responsible for drawing up the prospectus shall be notified of the certificate of approval at the same time as the national competent authorityies referred to in Article 22 of Regulation 596/2014 of the host Member State.
Amendment 561 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 3
Article 24 – paragraph 3
Amendment 562 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 4
Article 24 – paragraph 4
4. Where the final terms of a base prospectus which has been previously notified are neither included in the base prospectus, nor in a supplement, the competent authority of the home Member State shall communicate them electronically to the national competent authorityies referred to in Article 22 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the home and of the host Member State(s) and to ESMA as s soon as practicable after they are filed.
Amendment 597 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 29 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Each Member State shall designate aSMA is the single competent administrative authority responsible for carrying out the duties resulting from this Regulation and for ensuring that the provisions adopted pursuant to this Regulation are applied. Member States shall inform the Commission, ESMA and the other competent authorities of other Member States accordingly.(References to the CA and the national authorities in question in the rest of the text are to be adapted.)
Amendment 599 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Article 29 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Amendment 600 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Article 29 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
The final responsibility for supervising compliance with this Regulation and for approving the prospectus shall lie with the competent authority designated in accordance with paragraph 1.
Amendment 601 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 29 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 4
Article 29 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 4
Amendment 602 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
1. In order to fulfil their duties under this Regulation, the competent authoritiesy shall have, in accordance with national law, at least the following supervisory and investigatory powers:
Amendment 605 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Article 30 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Where necessary under national law, the competent authority may ask the relevant judicial authority to decide on the use of the powers referred to in the first subparagraph. In accordance with Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, ESMAThe competent authority shall be entitled to participate inconduct on-site inspections referred to in point (n) where they are carried out jointly by two or more competent authorities.
Amendment 607 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
Article 30 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. CThe competent authoritiesy shall exercise theirits functions and powers, referred to in paragraph 1, in any of the following ways:
Amendment 608 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 3
Article 30 – paragraph 3
3. Member States shall ensure that appropriate measures are in place so that the competent authoritiesy haves all the supervisory and investigatory powers that are necessary to fulfil theirits duties.
Amendment 609 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 5
Article 30 – paragraph 5
Amendment 610 #
Amendment 613 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – title
Article 32 – title
Cooperation with ESMAnational market abuse authorities
Amendment 614 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 1
Article 32 – paragraph 1
1. The national competent authorities referred to in Article 22 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 shall cooperate with ESMA for the purposes of this Regulation, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Amendment 615 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 2
Article 32 – paragraph 2
2. The national competent authorities referred to in Article 22 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 shall without delay provide ESMA with all information necessary to carry out its duties, in accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Amendment 616 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1
Article 33 – paragraph 1
1. All the information exchanged between the competent authoritiesy and the national competent authorities referred to in Article 22 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 under this Regulation that concerns business or operational conditions and other economic or personal affairs shall be considered to be confidential and shall be subject to the requirements of professional secrecy, except where the competent authority states at the time of communication that such information may be disclosed or such disclosure is necessary for legal proceedings.
Amendment 617 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 2
Article 33 – paragraph 2
2. The obligation of professional secrecy shall apply to all persons who work or who have worked for the competent authority or for any entity to whom the competent authority has delegated its powers or for the national competent authorities referred to in Article 22 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014. Information covered by professional secrecy may not be disclosed to any other person or authority except by virtue of provisions laid down by Union or national law.
Amendment 618 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 34 – paragraph 1
Article 34 – paragraph 1
With regard to the processing of personal data within the framework of this Regulation, the national competent authorities referred to in Article 22 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 shall carry out their tasks for the purposes of this Regulation in accordance with the national laws, regulations or administrative provisions transposing Directive 95/46/EC.
Amendment 619 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 34 – paragraph 2
Article 34 – paragraph 2
With regard to the processing of personal data by ESMAthe competent authority within the framework of this Regulation, ESMAthe competent authority shall comply with the provisions of Regulation (EC) No 45/2001.
Amendment 620 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 35 – paragraph 1
Article 35 – paragraph 1
1. Where thea national competent authority of the host Member Statereferred to in Article 22 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 finds that irregularities have been committed by the issuer, the offeror or the person asking for admission to trading or by the financial institutions in charge of the offer to the public or that those persons have infringed their obligations under this Regulation, it shall refer those findings to the competent authority of the home Member State and to ESMA.
Amendment 621 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 35 – paragraph 2
Article 35 – paragraph 2
Amendment 622 #
2015/0268(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 35 – paragraph 3
Article 35 – paragraph 3
Amendment 238 #
2015/0226(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 4 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
The originator, sponsor or the original lender of a securitisation shall retain on an ongoing basis a material net economic interest in the securitisation of not less than 520 %. Where the originator, sponsor or the original lender have not agreed between them who will retain the material net economic interest, the originator shall retain the material net economic interest. There shall be no multiple applications of the retention requirements for any given securitisation. The material net economic interest shall be measured at the origination and shall be determined by the notional value for off-balance sheet items. The material net economic interest shall not be split amongst different types of retainers and not be subject to any credit risk mitigation or hedging.
Amendment 246 #
2015/0226(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. Only the following shall qualify as a retention of a material net economic interest of not less than 520 % within the meaning of paragraph 1:
Amendment 250 #
2015/0226(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point a
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the retention of no less than 520 % of the nominal value of each of the tranches sold or transferred to investors;
Amendment 254 #
2015/0226(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point b
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) in the case of revolving securitisations or securitisations of revolving exposures, the retention of the originator's interest of no less than 520% of the nominal value of each of the securitised exposures;
Amendment 258 #
2015/0226(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point c
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) the retention of randomly selected exposures, equivalent to no less than 520 % of the nominal value of the securitised exposures, where such non-securitised exposures would otherwise have been securitised in the securitisation, provided that the number of potentially securitised exposures is no less than 100 at origination;
Amendment 262 #
2015/0226(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point d
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point d
(d) the retention of the first loss tranche and, where such retention does not amount to 520 % of the nominal value of the securitised exposures, if necessary, other tranches having the same or a more severe risk profile than those transferred or sold to investors and not maturing any earlier than those transferred or sold to investors, so that the retention equals in total no less than 5% of the nominal value of the securitised exposures;
Amendment 267 #
2015/0226(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point e
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point e
(e) the retention of a first loss exposure of not less than 520 % of every securitised exposure in the securitisation.
Amendment 309 #
2015/0226(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 a (new)
Article 5 a (new)
Article 5 a Ban on re-securitisation The underlying exposures used in a securitisation shall not include securitisations.
Amendment 351 #
2015/0226(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 9 a (new)
Article 8 – paragraph 9 a (new)
9a. Synthetic securitisation shall not be considered to be 'STS'.
Amendment 415 #
2015/0226(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 14 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Originators, sponsors and SSPE's shall not transfer the 'STS' certification of securitisations to third parties. Advice from a third party on the certification of a securitisation as 'STS' is permissible, but shall not alter in any way the liability of the issuer, nor that of the investor or the SSPE for the legal obligations following from this Regulation.
Amendment 42 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 5
Recital 5
(5) The possibility that the provision of information may be refused where it would lead to the disclosure of a commercial, industrial or professional secret or of a commercial process, or of information whose disclosure would be contrary to public policy should not apply to provisions of mandatory automatic exchange of information on advance cross- border rulings and advance pricing arrangements in order not to reduce the effectiveness of these exchanges. The limited nature of the information that is required to be shared with all Member States should ensure sufficient protection of those commercial interests.
Amendment 48 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 6
Recital 6
(6) In order to reap the benefits of the mandatory automatic exchange of advance cross-border rulings and advance pricing arrangements, the information should be communicated promptlyimmediately after and at the latest one month after the end of the quarter during which after they are issued and therefore regular intervals for the communication of the information should be established (at least twice a year).
Amendment 51 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 7
Recital 7
(7) The mandatory automatic exchange of advance cross-border rulings and advance pricing arrangements should in each case include communication of a defined set of basic information to all Member States. The Commission should adopt any measures necessary to standardise the communication of such information under the procedure laid down in Directive 2011/16/EC for establishing a standard form to be used for the exchange of information. That procedure should also be used in the adoption of any necessary measures and practical arrangements for the implementation of the information exchange.
Amendment 54 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 8
Recital 8
(8) Member States should exchange the basic information to be communicated also with the Commission. This would enable the Commission at any point in time to monitor and evaluate the effective application of the automatic exchange of information on advance cross-border rulings and advance pricing arrangements. Such communication will not discharge a Member State from its obligations to notify any state aid to the Commission.
Amendment 64 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) A Member State should be able to rely on Article 5 of Directive 2011/16/EU as regards the exchange of information on request to obtain additional information, including the full text of advance cross- border rulings or advance pricing arrangements, from the Member State having issued such rulings or arrangements.
Amendment 65 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) Member States should take all measures necessary to remove any obstacle that might hinder the effective and widest possible mandatory automatic exchange of information on advance cross-border rulings and advance pricing arrangements.
Amendment 75 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Recital 15
Recital 15
(15) The existing provisions regarding confidentiality should be amended to reflect the extension of mandatory automatic exchange of information to advance cross-border rulings and advance pricing arrangements.
Amendment 85 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 3 – point 14 – introductory part
Article 3 – point 14 – introductory part
14. 'advance cross-border ruling' means any agreement, communication, or any other instrument or action with similar effects, including one issued in the context of a tax audit, which:
Amendment 87 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 3 – point 14 – point c
Article 3 – point 14 – point c
(c) relates to a cross-border transaction or to the question of whether or not activities carried on by a legal person in the other Member State create a permanent establishment, and;
Amendment 88 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 3 – point 14 – subparagraph 2
Article 3 – point 14 – subparagraph 2
The cross-border transaction may involve, but is not restricted to, the making of investments, the provision of goods, services, finance or the use of tangible or intangible assets and does not have to directly involve the person receiving the advance cross-border ruling;
Amendment 89 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 3 – point 15 – subparagraph 1
Article 3 – point 15 – subparagraph 1
'advance pricing arrangement' means any agreement, communication or any other instrument or action with similar effects, including one issued in the context of a tax audit, given by, or on behalf of, the government or the tax authority of one or more Member States, including any territorial or administrative subdivision thereof, to any person that determines in advance of cross-border transactions between associated enterprises, an appropriate set of criteria for the determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions or determines the attribution of profits to a permanent establishment.
Amendment 104 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 8a – paragraph 1
Article 8a – paragraph 1
1. The competent authority of a Member State issuing or amending an advance cross-border ruling or an advance pricing arrangement after the date of entry into force of this Directive shall, by automatic exchange, communicate information thereon to the competent authorities of all other Member States as well as to the European Commission.
Amendment 110 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 8a – paragraph 2
Article 8a – paragraph 2
2. The competent authority of a Member State shall also communicate information to the competent authorities of all other Member States as well as to the European Commission on advance cross-border rulings and advance pricing arrangements issued within a period beginning ten years before the entry into force but still valid on the date of entry into force of this Directive;
Amendment 120 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 8a – paragraph 3
Article 8a – paragraph 3
3. Paragraph 1 shall notalso apply in a case where an advance cross-border ruling exclusively concerns and involves the tax affairs of one where the request for an advance ruling relates to a legal structure without legal personality. In that instance, the competent authority of the Member State issuing the advance ruling shall forward the information it has to the competent authorities of all other Member States and shall arrange for the memorandum of incorporation to be transferred to the Member State or States where the incorporator more natural persons incorporators and the beneficiary or beneficiaries are resident.
Amendment 127 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 8a – paragraph 5 – point b
Article 8a – paragraph 5 – point b
(b) the content of the advance cross-border ruling or advance pricing arrangement, including a description of the relevant business activities or transactions or series of transactions;
Amendment 129 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 8a – paragraph 5 – point d
Article 8a – paragraph 5 – point d
(d) the identification of the other Member States likely to be directly or indirectly concerned by the advance cross-border ruling or advance pricing arrangement;
Amendment 130 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 8a – paragraph 5 – point e
Article 8a – paragraph 5 – point e
(e) the identification of any person, other than a natural person, in the other Member States likely to be directly or indirectly affected by the advance cross-border ruling or advance pricing arrangement (indicating to which Member State the affected persons are linked).
Amendment 131 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 8a – paragraph 5 – point e a (new)
Article 8a – paragraph 5 – point e a (new)
(ea) as soon as it is available, the European Tax identification Number (TIN) as outlined in the Commission's Action Plan on the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion of 2012.
Amendment 135 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 8a – paragraph 5 a (new)
Article 8a – paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Member States shall require each issuer to annually publicly disclose, specifying by Member State and by third country in which it has a subsidiary, the following information on a consolidated basis for the financial year : (a) name(s), nature of activities and geographical location, (b) turnover, (c) number of employees on a full-time equivalent basis, (d) profit or loss before tax, (e) tax on profit or loss, (f) public subsidies received.
Amendment 138 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 8a – paragraph 8
Article 8a – paragraph 8
8. Member States – or their territorial or administrative bodies including local authorities if applicable – may, in accordance with Article 5, request additional information, including the full text of an advance cross- border ruling or an advance pricing arrangement, from the Member State which issued it.
Amendment 139 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 8a – paragraph 8 a (new)
Article 8a – paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. A minimum tax rate shall be established.
Amendment 157 #
2015/0068(CNS)
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5
Directive 2011/16/EU
Article 20 – paragraph 5
Article 20 – paragraph 5
5. The automatic exchange of information on advance cross-border rulings and advance pricing arrangements pursuant to Article 8a shall be carried out using a standard form once that form has been adopted by the Commission in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 26(2).
Amendment 116 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2 a (new)
Recital 2 a (new)
(2a) Inflation and inflation expectations are significantly below the ECB’s target of just below two percent while the ECB already hit the zero lower bound in September 2014. Tolerating excessively low inflation is unacceptable in the current environment in the euro area since adjustment processes for improved competitiveness and much lower unemployment rates in such an environment would take longer than would be economically, socially and politically bearable. While unconventional monetary policy in the form of quantitative easing – in which the ECB has started to engage – is justified and welcome in the current situation, it would be undesirable to rely on it exclusively due to the side effects that come with it, including the risk of future bubbles building up. Hence, the quantitative easing of the ECB urgently needs to be complemented by member states with reforms which enhance growth prospects and a macro-relevant investment drive, not least via a macro- relevant European investment fund. To achieve this, the EU’s own funds and the EIB’s funds already committed urgently need to be complemented by significant contributions from member states directly to the planned fund as well as national efforts alongside the fund.
Amendment 122 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
Recital 4
(4) Throughout the economic and financial crisis, the Union has made efforts to promote growth, in particular through initiatives set out in the Europe 2020 strategy that put in place an approach for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. The European Investment Bank ('EIB') has also strengthened its role in instigating and promoting investment within the Union, partly by way of an increase in capital in January 2013. Further action iss, including significant contributions of Member States, are required to ensure that the investment and macro-economic needs of the Union are addressed adequately and that the liquidity available on the market is used efficiently and channelled towards the funding of viable investment projects.
Amendment 190 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) The EFSI should supportinclude Member State contributions providing for sufficient size effectively to support necessary strategic investments with high economic value added contributing to achieving Union policy objectives.
Amendment 350 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 18
Recital 18
(18) In order to enable the EFSI to support investments, the Union should grant a guarantee of an amount equal to EUR 16 000 000 000. When provided on a portfolio basis, the guarantee coverage should be capped depending upon the type of instrument, such as debt, equity or guarantees, as a percentage of the volume of the portfolio of outstanding commitments. It is expected that when the guarantee is combined with EUR 5 000 000 000 to be provided by the EIB, that the EFSI support should generate EUR 60 800 000 000 additional investment by the EIB and EIF. This EUR 60 800 000 000 supported by the EFSI is expected to generate a total of EUR 315 000 000 000 in investment in the Union within the period 2015 to 2017. Additional significant Member State contributions to the EFSI's capital are necessary to bring the Fund's capacity closer to actual needs and essential to ensure an impact of macro-economic relevance. Guarantees that are attached to projects which are completed without a call on a guarantee are available for supporting new operations.
Amendment 368 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
Recital 19
(19) In order to allow for the much needed further increase in its resources, participation in the EFSI should be open to third parties, including Member States, national promotional banks or public agencies owned or controlled by Member States, private sector entities and entities outside the Union subject to the consent of existing contributors. Third parties may contribute directly to the EFSI and take part in the EFSI governance structure.
Amendment 1149 #
2015/0009(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 a (new)
Article 8 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 2 a (new)
An assessment of the effects of the different funds within the EU budget in its relation to the EU 2020 priorities shall be presented ahead of the review/revision of the EU multi-annual financial framework, as to foster a balanced debate on the funding of the EFSI Guarantee Fund, taking in account all means available under the EU budget.
Amendment 202 #
2014/2158(INI)
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Notes the considerable advanceprogress that haves been made in EU banking regulation since 2008, and particularly in 2013; believes that a comprehensive analysis of the competitive aspects of this large amount of new EU financial regulation is iafter the financial crisis in better regulating the financial sector to protect taxpayers from massively subsidizing the financial sector, implicitly in good times and explicitly in crisis times; stresses the need further to address the problem of financial institutions which are too big to fail and as a result continue to benefit from implicit subsidies; welcomes the proposed regulation on banking structural reform in that context; concludes that financial markets less distorted by implicit subsidies will be able to deliver a more effective capital allocation forder sustainable growth;
Amendment 104 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4
Recital 4
(4) The on-going banking regulatory reform agenda will significantly increase the resilience of both individual banks and the banking sector as a whole. However, a limited subset of the largest and most complex Union banking groups still remain too-big- to-fail, too-big-to-save and too- complex to manage, supervise and resolve. Structural reform is therefore an important complement to other regulatory initiatives and measures, as it would offer one way of more directly addressing intra-group complexity, intra-group and government subsidies, and excessive risk-taking incentives, mispricing of capital, distorted conditions of competition within the financial sector and threats arising from institutions operating under the jurisdiction of multiple regulatory regimes and supervisors. A number of Member States have adopted or are considering adopting measures to introduce structural reform in their respective banking systems. Structural reform is a unique opportunity to strengthen the Banking Union.
Amendment 106 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 7
Recital 7
(7) Inconsistent national legislation that does not pursue the same policy goals in a manner that is compatible and equivalent with the mechanisms envisaged in this Regulation increases chances that capital movements decisions of market participants are negatively affected because different and inconsistent rules and practices may significantly raise operational costs for credit institutions that are operating across borders and hence lead to a less efficient allocation of resources and capital compared to a situation where capital movement is subject to similar and consistent rules. For the same reasons, different and inconsistent rules will also negatively affect decisions of market participants relating to where and how to provide cross-border financial services. Different and inconsistent rules may also unintentionally encourage geographic arbitrage. The movement of capital and the provision of cross-border services are essential elements for the proper functioning of the Union internal market. Without a Union-wide approach credit institutions will be forced to adapt their structurA harmonised approach is especially important within the Band operations along national boundaries, thereby making them eveking Union in more complex and leading to increased fragmentation of the internal marketder to avoid supervisory fragmentation.
Amendment 113 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) Consistent with the goals of contributing to the functioning of the internal market, it should be possible to grant a derogation for a credit institution froma credit institution can be deemed compliant with the provisions on separation of trading activities or certain trading activities where a Member State has adoptedif this credit institution based on national primary legislation adopted by a Member State prior to 29 January 2014 (including secondary legislation subsequently adopted) is structured to prohibiting credit institutions, which take deposits from individuals and Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs) from dealing in investments as a principal and from holding trading assets. The Member State should therefore be entitled to makeis would allow credit institutions which a lrequest to the Commission to grant a derogation from the provisions on separation of certain trading activities for a credit institution that is subject to ady comply with primary legislation in place and which are structured in a way that the effects are in line with this Regulation, to avoid incurring additional compliance costs. Limiting the exemption to credit institutions compliant withe national legislation compatible with those provisions. This would allow Member States that already have primary legislation in place, the effects of which are equivalent to and consistent with this Regulation, to avoid alignadopted by a Member State prior to 29 January 2014 ensures that only such credit institutions will be covered which could not have foreseen additional requirements of existing, effective provisions. To ensure that the impact of that national legislation, as well as of subsequent implementing measures, doesn a European level while already in the process of conforming with national legislation. In order for this exemption not to jeopardise the aim or functioning of the internal market, the aim of that national legislation and related supervisory and enforcement arrangements must be able to ensure that credit institutions that take eligible deposits from individuals and from SMEs comply with legally binding requirements that are equivalent and compatible with the provisions provided in this Regulation. T or unduly to discriminate, the credit institution's structure must be compatible with the aim of the provisions in this Regulation. To increase legal certainty and its planning ability, the credit institution may request a binding affirmation that it complies with the provisions on separation. Such request shall be accompanied by a supporting opinion of the competent authority supervising the credit institution subject, making reference to the national legislation in question should be responsible for providing an opinion that should accompany the request for the derogationalready place.
Amendment 115 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 a (new)
Recital 10 a (new)
(10 a) With respect to ensuring the effectiveness of separation this Regulation sets minimum standards. Member States, either collectively within Banking Union or individually outside Banking Union, may further empower the competent authority, including, but not limited to imposing additional capital and liquidity requirements, requiring lower thresholds for maximum extra or intra group exposures and restricting transactions between the trading entity and the core credit institution.
Amendment 116 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 12
Recital 12
(12) This Regulation intends to reduce excessive risk taking and rapid balance sheet growth, difficult resolution, difficult monitoring, conflicts of interest, competition distortions, and misallocation of capital. It also intends to shield institutions carrying out activities that deserve a public safety net from losses incurred as a result of other activities. Necessary rules should therefore contribute to refocusing banks on their core relationship-oriented role of serving the real economy, and avoid that bank capital be excessively allocated to trading at the expense of lending to the non-financial economy. This regulation also intends to reduce risks arising from financial conglomerates operating across the supervisory boundaries. To achieve these objectives, this Regulation does not limit the powers conferred to the relevant authorities by other legislation including, among others, Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, Directive 2014/59/EU and Directive 2013/36/EU.
Amendment 122 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 13
Recital 13
(13) This Regulation will apply only to credit institutions and groups with trading activities that meet thresholds set out in the Regulation. This is in line with the explicit focus on the limited subset of the largest and most complex credit institutions and groups that in spite of other legislative acts remain too-big-to-fail, too-big-to-save and too complex to manage, supervise and resolve. The provisions of this Regulation should accordingly only apply to those Union credit institutions and groups that either are deemed of global systemic importance or exceed certain relative and absolute accounting-based thresholds in terms of trading activity or absolute size. Subsidiaries of foreign institutions which, measured on an aggregated basis within the Union, meet the thresholds shall be covered accordingly. To level the playing field, this Regulation with the exception of Chapter III shall also apply to subsidiaries of foreign G-SIIs and of foreign entities which meet the thresholds referred to above. Member States or the competent authorities may decide to impose similar measures also on smaller credit institutions.
Amendment 132 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16
Recital 16
(16) It is difficult to distinguish proprietary trading from market making. To overcome this difficulty, the prohibition of proprietary trading should be limited to desks, units, divisions or individual traders specifically dedicated to proprietary trading. Banks should not be able to circumvent the prohibition by running or benefiting from investments in, or lending, issuing guarantees or bonds, to non-bank entities engaging in proprietary trading.
Amendment 136 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
Recital 17
(17) To ensure that the entities subject to the prohibition of proprietary trading can continue to contribute toward the financing of the economy, they should be allowed to invest in a closed list of funds. This exhaustive list should comprise closed-ended and unleveraged alternative investment funds (AIFs), European Venture Capital Funds, European Social Entrepreneurship Funds and European Long Term Investment Funds. To ensure that these funds do not endanger the viability and financial soundness of the credit institutions that invest in them, it is essential that closed- ended and unleveraged AIFs in which credit institutions can still invest are managed by AIF managers that are authorised and supervised in accordance with the relevant provisions of Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council26, and that those AIFs are established in the Union or, if they are not established in the Union, they are marketed in the Union according to the rules of that Directive. __________________ 26Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010
Amendment 143 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19
Recital 19
(19) Cash equivalent assets are instruments that are not linked to units or shares of AIFs, and that are normally dealt on the money market, such as treasury and local authority bills, certificates of deposit, commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, short-term notes or units or shares of regulated money market funds. In order to prohibit short selling, a credit institution should hold cash equivalent assets before being able to sell these assets.
Amendment 146 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21
Recital 21
(21) The management body of the entities subject to the prohibition of proprietary trading and all members thereof should ensure compliance with this prohibition.
Amendment 168 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25 a (new)
Recital 25 a (new)
(25 a) Notwithstanding separation decisions, the competent authority may impose additional capital and liquidity requirements that it deems necessary to counter a threat to the financial stability of the core credit institution or to the whole or part of the Union financial system.
Amendment 169 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25 b (new)
Recital 25 b (new)
Amendment 170 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 26
Recital 26
(26) To ensure an effective separation in legal, economic, governance and operational terms, core credit institutions and trading entities should meet capital, liquidity, and large exposure rules also on a functional sub-group basis. They should have strong independent governance and separate management bodies. Trading entities within the group are to remain subject to prudential banking supervision, including but not limited to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU.
Amendment 176 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29
Recital 29
(29) Irrespective of separation, the core credit institution should still be able to manage its own risk. Certain trading activities should therefore be allowed to the extent that they are aimed at the prudent management of the core credit institution's capital, liquidity and funding and do not pose concerns to its financial stability. Similarly, the core credit institutions needs to be able to provide, as an agent, certain necessary risk management services to its clients. However, that shouldThat must be done without exposing the core credit institution to unnecessary risk and without posing concerns to its financial stability. Hedging activities eligible for the purpose of prudently managing own risk and for the provision of risk management services to clients can, but does not have to, qualify as hedge accounting under the International Financial Reporting Standards.
Amendment 179 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 29 a (new)
Recital 29 a (new)
(29 a) Irrespective of a decision to separate or impose other measures according to this Regulation, the competent authority shall have all the powers conferred to it by other legislation. This includes, but is not limited to the power conferred by Article 104 of Directive 2013/36/EU.
Amendment 180 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 30
Recital 30
(30) To enhance the effectiveness of the decision making procedure envisaged by this Regulation as well as to ensure to greatest extent possible that there is consistency between measures imposed under this Regulation, Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directive [BRRD] and Directive 2013/36/EU27 of the European Parliament and of the Council are consistent with this Regulation, competent authorities and relevant resolution authorities should closely cooperate in all circumstances having all powers conferred upon them in relevant Union law. The duty to cooperate should cover all stages of the procedure leading up to a competent authority's final decision to impose structural measures. __________________ 27Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p.338).
Amendment 181 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31
Recital 31
(31) Separation has a significant impact on banking groups’' legal, organisational and operational structure. To insure an effective and efficient application of separation and to prevent separation of groups along geographic lines, separation decisions should be taken at group level by the consolidating supervisor, having consulted the competent authorities of a banking group’'s significant subsidiaries as appropriate.
Amendment 183 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31 a (new)
Recital 31 a (new)
Amendment 186 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 34
Recital 34
Amendment 190 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 37 a (new)
Recital 37 a (new)
(37 a) For the purpose of carrying out the duties specified in this Regulation, the competent authority is to use the full set of its executive powers. This includes, but is not limited to the powers to impose penalties specified in Articles 64 to 72 of Directive 2013/36/EU and Article 18 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
Amendment 192 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 38
Recital 38
(38) In order to specify the requirements set out in this Regulation, the power to adopt acts in accordance with Article 290 of the TFEU should be delegated to the Commission in respect of the following non-essential elements: expanding the type of government bonds that should not prohibited under Article 6 and which competent authorities do not have to review or consider for separation; setting the relevant limits and conditions for when a competent authority shall presume that certain trading activities must be separated; expanding the list of instruments that are allowed for the management of a credit institution's own risk; expanding the list of instruments that a credit institution may transact in to manage clients' risks; calculating the limit above which derivatives may not be sold nor recorded on the balance sheet of a core credit institution; large exposures and the extent of recognition of credit risk mitigation techniques; amending the components of the concept of ‘"trading activities’" used for establishing the conditions of application of Chapter II and Chapter III of this Regulation; specifying the types of securitisations that do not pose a threat to the financial stability of a core credit institution or to the Union financial system; the criteria for assessing the equivalence of third country legal and supervisory frameworks. It is of particular importance that the Commission carries out appropriate consultations during its preparatory work, including at expert level. The Commission, when preparing and drawing up delegated acts, should ensure a simultaneous, timely and appropriate transmission of relevant documents to the European Parliament and to the Council.
Amendment 209 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(a a) to prevent credit institutions from engaging in proprietary trading;
Amendment 211 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point a b (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point a b (new)
(a b) to reduce credit institutions' exposure to AIFs;
Amendment 214 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) to avoid misallocation of resources and to encourage lending to the remispricing of capital, economyspecially for trading activities;
Amendment 215 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point c a (new)
(c a) to encourage lending to the real economy and to safeguard deposits;
Amendment 218 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)
(d a) to level the playing field in the financial sector;
Amendment 219 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point d b (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point d b (new)
(d b) to reduce subsidies by explicit or implicit government guarantees for deposits or institutions;
Amendment 225 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point g a (new)
(g a) to reduce risks arising from financial institutions operating under multiple regulatory regimes or multiple supervisors;
Amendment 232 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the prohibition of proprietary trading and related activities;
Amendment 234 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) the separation of certain trading activities and other measures.
Amendment 252 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b – introductory part
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b – introductory part
(b) any of the following entities that for a period of three consecutive yearhas or within any period of the last three years, but not retroactively covering any period before this regulation entered into force, has hasd total assets amounting at least to EUR 30 billion and has trading activities calculated on a non-risk weighted basis according to Articles 22 and 23 amounting at least to EUR 70 billion or 10 per cent of its total assets:
Amendment 257 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)
(iii a) EU subsidiaries of credit institutions established in third countries or of parent undertakings of credit institutions established in third countries.
Amendment 262 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Article 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Irrespective of paragraph 1, this Regulation, with the exception of Chapter III, shall also apply to: (a) any subsidiary or branch operating in the Union of a credit institution established in a third country or of a parent undertaking thereof established in a third country, when this credit institution or parent undertaking thereof is identified as a global systemically important institution (G-SIIs) by EBA according to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph; (b) any subsidiary or branch operating in the Union of a credit institution established in a third country or of a parent undertaking thereof established in a third country when this credit institution or parent undertaking thereof has total assets amounting at least to EUR 30 billion and has trading activities calculated on a non-risk weighted basis according to Articles 22 and 23 amounting at least to EUR 70 billion or 10 per cent of its total assets.
Amendment 263 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 b (new)
Article 3 – paragraph 1 b (new)
1 b. EBA shall identify credit institutions or parent undertakings thereof that are Globally Systemically Important Institutions (G-SIIs) irrespective of where they are located applying the material standards of Article 131 of Directive 2013/36/EU.
Amendment 264 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 c (new)
Article 3 – paragraph 1 c (new)
1 c. Any entity referred in points a) and b) of paragraph 1a will be considered as being within the scope of this Regulation unless it demonstrates to the satisfaction of the competent authority and EBA that its parent undertaking is not a G-SII or it does not meet the thresholds referred to in point b) of paragraph 1a.
Amendment 270 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point b
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) the resolution strategy for the subsidiary of an EU parent established in a third country has no adverse effect on the whole or part of the Union financial system or on the financial stability of the Member State(s) where the EU parent and other group entities are established or operating.
Amendment 278 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point 4
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point 4
4. ‘proprietary trading’ means using own capital or borrowed money to take positions in any type of transaction to purchase, sell or otherwise acquire or dispose of any financial instrument or commodities for the soleprimary purpose of making a profit for own account, and without any connection to actual or anticipated client activity or for the purpose of hedging the entity’s risk as result of actual or anticipated client activity, through the use of desks, units, divisions or individual traders specifically dedicated to such position taking and profit making, including through dedicated web-based. This definition includes any such transaction undertaken with the aim of making profit, irrespective of whether such profit would be realised in the short term or in the longer term, or is in fact realised. Unless an institution demonstrates and proves to the satisfaction of the competent authority that an activity is not covered by this definition it shall be deemed to be proprietary trading platforms; ;
Amendment 285 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point 12
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point 12
12. ‘market making’ means a financial institution's commitment to provide market liquidity on a regular and on-going basis, by posting two-way quotes with regard to a certain financial instrument, or as part of its usual business, by fulfilling orders initiated by clients or in response to clients’ requests to trade, but in both cases. Both activities shall be carried out by the financial institution without being exposed to material market risk;
Amendment 300 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – title
Article 6 – title
Prohibition of certain trading and related activities
Amendment 306 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point b – introductory part
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point b – introductory part
(b) with its own capital or borrowed money and for the soleprimary purpose of making a profit for own account:
Amendment 323 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point b – point iii a (new)
(iii a) engage in lending to, grant guarantees to, or hold any financial instrument other than those listed in point (ii) of this paragraph issued by an AIF.
Amendment 332 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point b – point ii
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point b – point ii
(ii) it exclusively holds, purchases, sells or otherwise acquires or disposes of cash or cash equivalent assets, without engaging in short-selling. Cash equivalent assets must be highly liquid investments held in the base currency of the own capital, be readily convertible to a known amount of cash, be subject to an insignificant risk of a change in value, have maturity which does not exceed 397 days and, provide a return no greater than the rate of return of a three- month high quality government bond and not be linked to shares or units of AIFs.
Amendment 348 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 3 a (new)
Article 6 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. Each entity referred to in this Article shall include in its annual report an explanation of how it complies with the requirements in paragraph 1.
Amendment 351 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 4
Article 6 – paragraph 4
4. The management body of each entity referred to in Article 3 shalland all members thereof individually shall permanently ensure that the requirements set out in paragraph 1 are complied with.
Amendment 358 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Chapter 3 – title
Chapter 3 – title
Separation of certain trading activities and other measures
Amendment 366 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. For the purposes of this Chapter, trading activities shall include activitiesmarket making, investments in and acting as a sponsor for securitisation, trading in derivatives irrespective of whether it is part of the prudent management of its capital, liquidity and funding and any activity other than:
Amendment 384 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
Article 8 – paragraph 1 – point i a (new)
(i a) advising clients on financial instruments referred to in Article 12 and providing such instruments originated by third parties as an agent.
Amendment 412 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. The competent authority shall assess trading activities including in particular: market making, investments in and acting as a sponsor for securitisation, and trading in derivatives of ther than those deriva entitives permitted under Articles 11 and 12 of the following entities:within the scope of this Regulation according to Article 3 and 4.
Amendment 416 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point a
Amendment 418 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point b
Amendment 420 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – point c
Amendment 465 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point h a (new)
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point h a (new)
(h a) the exposure to derivatives as measured by notional outstanding divided by total assets;
Amendment 466 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point h b (new)
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point h b (new)
(h b) the exposure to derivatives as measured by the sum of derivatives assets and derivatives liabilities divided by total assets;
Amendment 471 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point h c (new)
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point h c (new)
(h c) the non-bank loan to total asset ratio.
Amendment 474 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point h d (new)
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point h d (new)
(h d) the ratio of corporate and investment banking revenues to total revenues
Amendment 475 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point h e (new)
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point h e (new)
(h e) the ratio of derivatives assets to total assets, where derivatives assets are derivatives with positive replacement values not identified as hedging or embedded derivatives.
Amendment 480 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 9 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. The competent authority may require all quantitative and qualitative information it deems relevant for the assessment of trading activities under paragraph 1.
Amendment 486 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
Article 9 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify how the metrics referred to in paragraph 2 shall be measured and, where appropriate, specify the details of the metrics referred to in paragraph 2 and their measurement using supervisory data. The draft regulatory technical standards shall also provide the competent authority with a methodology for the consistent measurement and application of the metrics.
Amendment 488 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – title
Article 10 – title
Power of competent authority to require that a core credit institution does not carry out certain activities and to impose other measures
Amendment 499 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1
Article 10 – paragraph 1
1. Where the competent authority concludes that, following the assessment referred to in Article 9(1), the limits and conditions linked to the metrics referred to in points (a) to (h b) of Article 9(2) and specified in the delegated act referred to in paragraph 5 are met, and it therefore deems that there is a threat to the financial stability of the core credit institution or to the whole or part of the Union financial system as a whole, taking into account the objectives referred to in Article 1, it shall, no later than two months after the finalisation of that assessment, start the procedure leading to a decision as referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 3.
Amendment 508 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 2
Article 10 – paragraph 2
2. Where the limits and conditions referred to in paragraph 1 are not met, the competent authority may still start the procedure leading to a decision as referred to in the third subparagraph of paragraph 3 where it concludes, following the assessment referred to in Article 9(1), that any trading activity, with the exception of trading in derivatives other than those permitted under Article 11 and 12, carried out by the core credit institution, poses a threat to the financial stability of the core credit institution or to the whole or part of the Union financial system as a whole taking into account the objectives referred to in Article 1.
Amendment 521 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
Article 10 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2
Unless the core credit institution demonstrates, within the time limit referred to in the first subparagraph, to the satisfaction of the competent authority, that the reasons leading to the conclusions are not justifiedactivities referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article do not pose a threat to financial stability of the core credit institution or to the whole or part of the Union financial system, the competent authority shall adopt a decision addressing the core credit institution and requiring it not to carry out the trading activities specified in those conclusions. The competent authority shall state the reasons for its decision and publicly disclose it.
Amendment 530 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3
Article 10 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 3
For purpose of paragraph 1, where the competent authority decides exceptionally to allow the core credit institution to carry out those trading activities it shall also state the reasons for that decision and publicly disclose it.
Amendment 542 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 6
Article 10 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 6
The competent authority shall adopt its final decision within two months from having received the written comments referred to in the first subparagraph. or four months after the notification referred to in the first subparagraph, whichever is earlier.
Amendment 547 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 4 a (new)
Article 10 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. Notwithstanding separation decisions, the competent authority may impose additional capital and liquidity requirements that it deems necessary to counter a threat to the financial stability of the core credit institution or to the whole or part of the Union financial system.
Amendment 548 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 4 b (new)
Article 10 – paragraph 4 b (new)
4 b. Where the competent authority concludes that, following the assessment referred to in Article 9(1), the metric referred to in point h c) of Article 9(2) falls below 40 percent or the metric referred to in point h d) of Article 9(2) exceeds 30 percent or the metric referred to in point h e) of Article 9(2) exceeds 15 percent, it shall no later than two months after the finalisation of that assessment adopt a final decision addressing the core credit institution and requiring it not to carry out certain trading activities and publicly disclose it.
Amendment 554 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 5 – point a – point ii
Article 10 – paragraph 5 – point a – point ii
(ii) the conditions, including how many of the metrics provided in points (a) to (hb) of Article 9(1) need to exceed the relevant limit, and in what combination, in order for the competent authority to start the procedure referred to in Article 10(1).
Amendment 555 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 5 – point a – point iii
Article 10 – paragraph 5 – point a – point iii
(iii) Tthe specification of the conditions in point (ii) shall include an indication of the level of the aggregate significant risk of the trading activity concerned that results from several metrics provided in points (a) to (h b) of Article 9(1) having exceeded the relevant limits referred to in point (i);
Amendment 557 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 5 – point b – introductory part
Article 10 – paragraph 5 – point b – introductory part
(b) specify which type of securitisation is not considered to pose a threat to the financial stability of the core credit institution or to the whole or part of the Union financial system as a whole with regard to each of the following aspects:
Amendment 564 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
A core credit institution that has been subject to a decision referred to in Article 10(3) may carry out trading activities to the extent that the purpose is limited to only prudently managing its capital, liquidity and funding and that the trading is carried out on a trading venue as defined in Directive 2014/65/EU.
Amendment 576 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Article 11 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
The management body shall ensureand all members thereof individually shall continually ensure and include in the annual report that the remuneration policy of the core credit institution is in line with the provisions set out in the first subparagraph, acting on the advice of the risk committee, where such a committee is established in accordance with Article 76(3) of Directive 2013/36/EU.
Amendment 578 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 3
Article 11 – paragraph 3
Amendment 586 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
A core credit institution that has been subject to a decision referred to in Article 10(3) may sell, as an agent, offer interest rate derivatives, foreign exchange derivatives, credit derivatives, emission allowances derivatives and commodity derivatives eligible for central counterparty clearing and emission allowances to its non- financial clients, to financial entities referred to in the second and third indents of point (19) of Article 5, to insurance undertakings and to institutions providing for occupational retirement benefits, all of the above as third party products, when the following conditions haves been satisfied:
Amendment 598 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Amendment 602 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
Amendment 605 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 2
Article 12 – paragraph 2
Amendment 614 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 4
Article 13 – paragraph 4
4. The EU parent of the core credit institution shall ensure to the extent necessary that the core credit institution can carry on its activities in the event of the insolvency of the trading entity. This includes, but is not limited to, ensuring that shared service, including IT services, offices and any other facilities used by the core credit institution are not to be owned or operated by the trading entity or any parent undertaking thereof.
Amendment 617 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
Article 13 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
The core credit institution and any parent undertaking thereof within the same sub- group shall not hold capital instruments or voting rights in a trading entity. or any parent undertaking thereof within the same sub-group or, by any means, exert influence on the activities of the core credit institution. The trading entity and any parent undertaking thereof within the same sub-group shall not hold capital instruments or voting rights in the core credit institution or, by any means, exert influence on the activities of the core credit institution.
Amendment 627 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 6
Article 13 – paragraph 6
6. The core credit institution and the trading entity shall issue their own debt on an individual or sub-consolidated basis provided that this is not inconsistent with th. The following entities shall not engage in any activity other than acquiring holdings: a) a parent undertaking that holds capital instruments or voting rights in a trading entity and a core cresolution plan agreed by the relevant resolution authorities in accordance with Directive [BRRD]dit institution; b) a parent undertaking that holds, directly or indirectly, capital instruments or voting rights in any two entities that are part of two different distinct sub- groups referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article.
Amendment 631 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 7
Article 13 – paragraph 7
7. All contracts and other transactions entered into between the core credit institution and the trading entity or, with the exception of the payment of dividends and other distributions, any of its parents shall be as favourable to the core credit institution as are comparable contracts and transactions with or involving entities not belonging to the same sub-group.
Amendment 632 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 7 a (new)
Article 13 – paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. The trading entity shall operate as a credit institution or an investment firm as defined in Article 4(1) and 4(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
Amendment 633 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 8
Article 13 – paragraph 8
8. A majority of tThe members of the management body of the core credit institution and of the trading entityor any entity within the same sub-group and of the trading entity or any entity within the same sub-group respectively shall consist of persons who are not members of the management body of the other entity or other sub-group. No member of the management body of eitherany entity shall perform an executive function in both entities with the exception for the risk management officer of the parent undertakingor both sub-groups.
Amendment 637 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 9
Article 13 – paragraph 9
9. The management body of the core credit institution, of the trading entity and of their parents as well as the individual members thereof shall have a duty to uphold the objectives of the separation and ensure continuously and affirm annually that the requirements set out in this Chapter are complied with.
Amendment 638 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 12
Article 13 – paragraph 12
12. By way of derogation from Article 6(1) andIf the competent authority excercises the options provided for in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the obligations laid down in Parts Two to Four and Eight of that Regulation shall apply on sub-consolidated basis in conformity with paragraph 3 of this Article.
Amendment 639 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 13
Article 13 – paragraph 13
13. By way of derogation from Article 6(4) andIf the competent authority excercises the options provided for in Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the requirements of Part Six of that Regulation shall apply on sub- consolidated basis in conformity with paragraph 3 of this Article.
Amendment 644 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 2
Article 14 – paragraph 2
2. When measures have been imposed in accordance with this Chapter the core credit institution shall not incur an intra- group exposure that exceeds 250 per cent of the core credit institution's eligible capital to an entity that does not belong to the same sub-group as the core credit institution. The intra-group exposure limit shall apply on a sub-consolidated basis, and after taking into account the effect of the credit risk mitigation and exemptions in accordance with Articles 399 to 403 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 16 of this Regulation.
Amendment 647 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) a large exposure that exceeds 250 per cent of the core credit institution's eligible capital to a financial entity. That exposure limit shall apply on an individual and on a sub-consolidated basis, and after taking into account the effect of the credit risk mitigation and exemptions in accordance with Articles 399 to 403 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 16 of this Regulation;
Amendment 649 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 15 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) large exposures that in total exceed 20150 per cent of the core credit institution's eligible capital to financial entities. That exposure limit shall apply on an individual and on a sub-consolidated basis, and after taking into account the effect of the credit risk mitigation and exemptions in accordance with Articles 399 to 403 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 16 of this Regulation.
Amendment 668 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 18 – paragraph 9
Article 18 – paragraph 9
9. The management body of a credit institution or an EU parent and all members thereof shall ensure that the separation plan has been implemented in accordance with the approval of the competent authority.
Amendment 679 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3
Article 19 – paragraph 3
3. The competent authority shall cooperate with the relevant resolution authority and exchange relevant information that is deemed necessary in carrying out its duties including the list of institutions that fall within the scope of this regulation.
Amendment 681 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3 a (new)
Article 19 – paragraph 3 a (new)
3 a. If the competent authority takes the decision referred to in article 10(3) or 10(4b), the resolution plan should be reviewed and where appropriate updated in accordance with Article 10 and 13 of Directive 2014/59/EU.
Amendment 682 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 4
Article 19 – paragraph 4
Amendment 701 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – title
Article 21 – title
Amendment 706 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. At the request of a Member State, the Commission may grant a derogation from the requirements of this Chapter to a credit institution taking deposits from individuals and SMEs that areis subject to national primary legislation adopted before 29 January 2014 when the national legislation complies withrequiring structural separation of deposits and adopted before 29 January 2014 shall be deemed compliant with the requirements in this Chapter as regards to the requirement not to carry out trading activities or certain trading activities when the institution meets the following requirements:
Amendment 710 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point a
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) its structure aims at preventing financial stress or failure and systemic risk referred to in Article 1;
Amendment 714 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point b
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) its structure prevents credit institutions taking eligible deposits from individuals and SMEs from engaging in the regulated activity of dealing in investments as principal and holding trading assets; however, the national legislation may provide forits structure may foresee limited exceptions to allow the credit institution taking deposits from individuals and SMEs to undertake risk- mitigating activities for the purpose of prudently managing its capital, liquidity and funding and to provide limited risk management services to customers;
Amendment 717 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point c – introductory part
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point c – introductory part
(c) if the credit institution taking eligible deposits from individuals and SMEs belongs to a group, ithe group's structure ensures that the credit institution is legally separated from group entities that engage in the regulated activity of dealing in investments as a principal or hold trading assets, and the national legislation specifiguarantees the following:
Amendment 720 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1
Amendment 725 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2
Once the Commission has all the information it considers necessary for appraisal of the request for derogat decision, it shall within one month notify the requesting Member Statecredit institution that it is satisfied with the information.
Amendment 729 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 3
Within five months of issuing the notification referred to in the second subparagraph, the Commission shall, after having consulted the EBA on the reasons underlying its envisaged decision and on the potential impact of such a decision on the financial stability of the Union and the functioning of the internal market, adopt an implementingthe decision declaring the national legislation not incompatible with this Chapter and granting the derogation to the credit institutions specified in the request referred to in paragraph 1. Where the Commission intends to declare the national legislacompliance of the credit institution with this Chapter. Where the Commission intends not to affirm the credit institution in's compatible and to not grant the derogationliance referred to in paragraph 1, it shall set out its objections in detail and provide the requesting Member Statecredit institution with the opportunity to submit written comments within one month from the date of notification of the Commission objections. The Commission shall within three months from the end of the time limit for submission adopt an implementing further decision granting or rejecting the derogationrequest for an affirmation of compliance referred to in subparagraph 1.
Amendment 734 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 4
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 4
Where the national legislation is amended, the Member Staterelevant structure of the credit institution is changed or is foreseen to be changed, the credit institution shall notify the amendmentchanges to the Commission. TAs a consequence, the Commission may review the implementingany decision referred to in the third subparagraphis paragraph and withdraw it.
Amendment 738 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5
Where the national legislation not declared incompatiblecredit institution that was declared to be compliant with this Chapter is no longer applies to a credit institution that has been granted derogation from the requirements of this Chaptersubject to the national legislation referred to in paragraph 1, thate derogation shall be withdrawn with regard to that credit institutiocision of compliance shall be withdrawn.
Amendment 742 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6
Article 21 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6
The Commission shall notify the EBA of its decisions to the EBA. The EBA shall publish a list of the credit institutions that have been granted a derogationreceived a decision concerning their compliance in accordance with this Articleparagraph. The list shall be continuously kept up-to-date.
Amendment 744 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Chapter 3 a (new)
Chapter 3 a (new)
Amendment 748 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 2 a (new)
Article 22 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. For the purpose of Article 3(b)(iii a), the calculation shall be based on the accumulated activities of all subsidiaries within the Union.
Amendment 750 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
Article 22 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
By [OP insert the correct date by 12 months of publication of this Regulation], and thereafter annually, the competent authority shall identify credit institutions and groups that are subject to this Regulation in accordance with Article 3 and notify them immediately to the EBA.
Amendment 755 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1
For the purposes of Article 3, trading activities shall be calculated on a non-risk weighted basis as follows in accordance with the applicable accounting regime.
Amendment 765 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 2
Article 23 – paragraph 2
2. Assets and liabilities of insurance and reinsurance undertakings and other non- financial undertakings shall not be included in the calculation of trading activities.
Amendment 773 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
Article 26 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1
For the purposes of this Regulation, with the exception of Article 21a, the consolidating supervisor shall be deemed to be the competent authority with regard to all group entities that belong to the same group as the EU parent and that are subject to this Regulation.
Amendment 789 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) any holding back or manipulation of information to be submitted in accordance with Article 24(1).
Amendment 791 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new)
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point b a (new)
(b a) breach of the duty to uphold the objectives of separation referred to in Article 13(9).
Amendment 793 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
Article 28 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1
Where Member States have chosen to lay down criminal sanctions for the breaches of the provisions referred to in paragraph 1, they shall ensure that appropriate measures are in place so that a competent authority has all the necessary powers to liaise with judicial authorities within their jurisdiction to receive specific information related to criminal investigations or proceedings commenced for possible violations of Article 6 and f, for holding back or manipulating information to be submitted in accordance with 24(1) and breaching the duty to uphold the objectives of separation referred to in Article 13(9), and to provide the same to other competent authorities and EBA to fulfil their obligation to cooperate with each other and, where relevant with EBA for the purposes of paragraph 1.
Amendment 795 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – point b
Article 28 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – point b
(b) the disgorgement of the profits gained or losses avoided due to the breach in so far asas estimated by they can be determinedompetent authority;
Amendment 803 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – point h
Article 28 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – point h
(h) in respect of a natural person, a maximum administrative pecuniary sanction of at least EUR 510 000 000 or in the Member States whose currency is not the euro, the corresponding value in the national currency on the date of entry to force of this Regulation;
Amendment 806 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 5 a (new)
Article 28 – paragraph 5 a (new)
Amendment 817 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 2 – point b
Article 30 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) appropriate protection for persons working under a contract of employment, who report breaches or who are accused of breaches, against retaliation, discrimination or other types of unfair treatment. This includes prohibiting an institution from trying to investigate the source of the information;
Amendment 819 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 4
Article 30 – paragraph 4
4. Member States mayshall provide for financial incentives to persons who offer relevant information about potential breaches of this Regulation to be granted in accordance with national law where such persons do not have other pre-existing legal or contractual duties to report such information, and provided that the information is new, and it results in the imposition of an administrative sanction or other measure taken for a breach of this Regulation or a criminal sanction. Should the information reported result in a pecuniary penalty, the financial incentive shall be calculated as a proportion of this pecuniary penalty of no less than 15 % of the penalty imposed. Should the information reported result in a non- pecuniary penalty, the financial incentive shall reflect the gravity and duration of the breach, and it will be paid by the natural or legal person that committed the breach.
Amendment 821 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4 a (new)
Article 32 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4 a (new)
Where the competent authority did not publish a decision immediately according to subparagraph 4, it shall in any case publish it two years after the person subject to the decision has been informed.
Amendment 825 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point c
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) a report on whether other financial instruments for hedging purposes other than those listed in Article 12(1) could be permitted to be sold to clients and the proportion of own funds requirements above which derivatives may not be sold as referred to in point (b) of Article 12(2).
Amendment 827 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 34 – paragraph 1
Article 34 – paragraph 1
The Commission shall, on a regular basis, monitor the effect of rules laid down in this Regulation in respect of the achievement of the objectives referred to in Article 1 and on the stability of the whole or part of the Union financial system as a whole, taking into account market structure developments as well as the development and activities of the entities regulated by this Regulation, and make any appropriate proposals. The review shall in particular focus on the application of the thresholds referred to in Article 3, the application and effectiveness of the prohibition foreseen in Article 6, including the exemptions to the prohibition provided in the same Article, the scope of activities referred to in Article 8 and the suitability of the metrics set out in Article 9. By 1 January 2020 and on a regular basis thereafter, the Commission shall, after taking into account the views of the competent authorities and of the European Parliament, submit to the European Parliament and to the Council a report, including the issues mentioned above, if appropriate accompanied by a legislative proposal. EBA shall, on a regular basis, but no less than every five years, review the metrics set out in Article 9 and, if needed, suggest modifications of the metrics set out in Article 9 to the European Commission and to the European Parliament.
Amendment 832 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 35 – paragraph 2
Article 35 – paragraph 2
2. The delegation of power referred to in Articles 6(6), 8(3), 10(5), 11(3), 12(2), 15(2), second sub-paragraph of Article 16, Articles 23(4) and 27(3) shall be conferred on the Commission for an indeterminate period of time from the date referred to in Article 38.
Amendment 833 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 35 – paragraph 3
Article 35 – paragraph 3
3. The delegation of power referred to in Articles 6(6), 8(3), 10(5), 11(3), 12(2), 15(2), second sub-paragraph of Article 16, Article 23(4) and 27(3) may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision of revocation shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force.
Amendment 834 #
2014/0020(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 35 – paragraph 5
Article 35 – paragraph 5
5. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Articles 6(6), 8(3), 10(5), 11(3), 12(2), 15(2), second sub-paragraph of Article 16, Article 23(4) and 27(3) shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or the Council within a period of 2 months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by 2 months at the initiative of the European Parliament or the Council.
Amendment 101 #
2013/0306(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 2 a (new)
Recital 2 a (new)
(2a) MMFs accept funding with deposit- like characteristics, perform maturity and liquidity transformation and engage in credit risk transfer. Hence, they are shadow banks in the strict sense of the word.
Amendment 110 #
2013/0306(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6 a (new)
Recital 6 a (new)
(6a) In view of the many bank-like characteristics of MMFs and the systemic interconnections to bank stability, MMFs should be subject to the supervision of the banking supervisors.
Amendment 111 #
2013/0306(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 6 b (new)
Recital 6 b (new)
(6b) As MMFs do not contribute to the SRF they are not to benefit from direct support by the SRF.
Amendment 250 #
2013/0306(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 16 – point c a (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 16 – point c a (new)
(ca) with respect to Article 15a of this Regulation the authority designated by a Member State in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and Directive 2013/36/EU for credit institutions in the MMF's home Member State;
Amendment 251 #
2013/0306(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 16 – point c b (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 16 – point c b (new)
(cb) With respect to Article 15a and if the authority referred to in point c a is located in a participating Member State and any of the following conditions is met: (i) the total value of the MMF's assets exceeds EUR 10 billion or (ii) following a notification by any competent authority that it considers such a fund of significant relevance with regard to the domestic financial stability or economy, the ECB takes a decision confirming such significance following a comprehensive assessment by the ECB of that fund, the SSM and within the SSM the ECB as described in Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 may, on behalf of its own assessment of necessity, act as the competent authority as regards to this Regulation and, thereby, contribute to undistorted conditions of competition within the financial sector.
Amendment 255 #
2013/0306(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 22 a (new)
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 22 a (new)
(22a) 'participating Member State' means a Member State whose currency is the euro or a Member State whose currency is not the euro which has established a close cooperation in accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013.
Amendment 397 #
2013/0306(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 a (new)
Article 15 a (new)
Article 15 a Harmonisation of capital buffers and liquidity requirements in the financial sector 1. The competent authority shall impose capital buffers and liquidity requirements according to the standards laid out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU. 2. If the authority referred to in Article 2 paragraph 1 point 16 point c a acts as the competent authority, it shall submit its decisions and the related information regarding its regulatory activities according to paragraph 1 to the SSM. 3. Article 1 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 is hereby amended as follows: "This Regulation lays down uniform rules concerning general prudential requirements that institutions supervised under Directive 2013/36/EU as amended shall comply with in relation to the following items: (a) own funds requirements relating to entirely quantifiable, uniform and standardised elements of credit risk, market risk, operational risk and settlement risk; (b) requirements limiting large exposures; (c) after the delegated act referred to in Article 460 has entered into force, liquidity requirements relating to entirely quantifiable, uniform and standardised elements of liquidity risk; (d) reporting requirements related to points (a), (b) and (c) and to leverage; (e) public disclosure requirements. This Regulation does not govern publication requirements for competent authorities in the field of prudential regulation and supervision of institutions as set out in Directive 2013/36/EU as amended." 4. Article 2 of Directive 2013/36/EU is hereby amended as follows: Paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: "This directive shall apply to institutions. As regards to capital buffers and liquidity requirements it also shall apply to money market funds." 5. Article 3 of Directive 2013/36/EU is hereby amended as follows: Point 2a shall be added to paragraph 1 after point 2 and read as follows: "'money market fund' means a fund within the scope of Regulation XXX (MMF Regulation);".
Amendment 398 #
2013/0306(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 b (new)
Article 15 b (new)
Article 15 b Prohibition of direct support for MMFs As MMFs do not contribute to the SRF they are not to benefit from direct support by the SRF.
Amendment 752 #
2013/0306(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 2
Article 42 – paragraph 2
2. Competent authorities, including authorities designated by a Member State in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and Directive 2013/36/EU for credit institutions in the MMF's home Member State, SSM and ECB, and ESMA shall cooperate with each other for the purpose of carrying out their respective duties under this Regulation in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Amendment 754 #
2013/0306(COD)
Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 3
Article 42 – paragraph 3
3. Competent authorities, including authorities designated by a Member State in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and Directive 2013/36/EU for credit institutions in the MMF's home Member State, SSM and ECB, and ESMA shall exchange all information and documentation necessary to carry out their respective duties under this Regulation in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, in particular to identify and remedy breaches of this Regulation.