BETA

32 Amendments of Jakob von WEIZSÄCKER related to 2016/0365(COD)

Amendment 280 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. By ... [date to be inserted: 18 months after the establishment of a single European supervisor for CCPs pursuant to Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 as regards the clearing obligation, the suspension of the clearing obligation, the reporting requirements, the risk-mitigation techniques for OTC derivatives contracts not cleared by a central counterparty, the registration and supervision of trade repositories and the requirements for trade repositories (COM (2017)208) as regards the procedures and authorities involved for the authorisation of CCPs and requirements for the recognition of third country CCPs] a Single Resolution Board for CCPs (‘CCP- SRB’) shall become the designated resolution authority for CCPs which are under direct supervision of the single European supervisor for CCPs.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 286 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 6
6. Where tThe resolution authority in a Member State is not the competent ministry, the resolution authority shall inform the competent ministry in a timely manner of the decisions taken pursuant to this Regulation.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 287 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 7
7. Where the decisions referred to in paragraph 6 have a direct fiscal impact or systemic implications, the resolution authority shall obtain the approval of the competent ministryrelevant executive and legislative decision making bodies before their implementation unless otherwiseas stipulated in nationalby law.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 296 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 4 – paragraph 2 – point a a (new)
(aa) the CCP-SRB, if already established, but not the designated resolution authority of the CCP in question;
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 305 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. ESMA shall assess CCP recovery and resolution arrangements across the Union in terms of their aggregate effect on Union financial stability through regular stress-testing and crisis simulation exercises with respect to potential system-wide stress events. In exercising this role, ESMA shall ensure consistency with the assessments of the resilience of individual CCPs carried out pursuant to Article 21(6) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 with regard to the frequency and design of the tests and shall cooperate closely with the ESRB and competent authorities designated under Article 4 of Directive 2013/36/EU, including the ECB in carrying out its tasks within a single supervisory mechanism under Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, and any national competent authorities tasked with the supervision of CCPs. In areas where these arrangements are found to be wanting as a result of these comprehensive stress tests, the responsible institution or institutions will have to address the shortcomings and resubmit their arrangements for another round of stress tests within 6 months of the previous stress tests.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 338 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 7
7. Recovery plans shall be drafted in accordance with Section A of the Annex. Competent authorities may require CCPs to include additional information in their recovery plans. : (a) not assume any access to or receipt of public financial support, central bank emergency liquidity assistance or central bank emergency liquidity assistance provided under non-standard collateralisation, tenor and interest rate terms; (b) consider the interests of all stakeholders that are likely to be affected by that plan, specifically in relation to clearing members and their clients, both direct and indirect; and (c) ensure that clearing members do not have unlimited exposures toward the CCP.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 374 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Once established, the single European supervisor for CCPs shall take all decisions referred to in paragraph 1 with respect to the CCPs under its direct supervision after consultation with the supervisory college.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 381 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. The resolution plan shall make prudent assumptions, that would therefore still be valid in extreme scenarios including the default of several additional clearing members beyond the largest two compounded by the resulting troubles in other large CCPs, regarding the financial resources that may be required to achieve the resolution objectives and the resources that it expects to be available in accordance with the CCP’s rules and arrangements at the time of entering into resolution.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 393 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 6 – subparagraph 1 – point o a (new)
(oa) a description of the arrangements for exchanging information within the resolution college prior to and during resolution, in line with the written arrangements and procedures set out in the regulatory technical standards referred to in Article 4(6).
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 403 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Once established, the CCP-SRB shall, for all CCPs under its remit, take the decision delegated to the resolution college in this article after consultation with the resolution college.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 426 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 7 – point n a (new)
(na) restrict or suspend interoperability links of the CCP where such a restriction or suspension is necessary to avoid the adverse effects that the use of the resolution tools and the exercise of the resolution powers could have on interoperating CCPs.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 432 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Where a CCP infringes or is likely to infringe in the near future the prudential requirements of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, or poses a risk to the financial stability of the Union financial system or parts thereof, or where the competent authority has determined that there are other indications of an emerging crisis situationdevelopments that could affect the operations of the CCP, in particular its ability to provide clearing services, the competent authorities may:
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 434 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point k a (new)
(ka) exceptionally and on a one-off basis allow clients of clearing members to participate directly in auctions, while waiving prudential requirements pursuant to Chapter 3 of Title IV of Regulation (EU) 648/2012 other than margin requirements as set out in Article 41 of Regulation (EU) 648/2012 for those clients. The clients’ clearing members shall inform clients comprehensively about the auction and facilitate the bidding process for clients. Required margin payments by the clients shall be passed through a non-defaulting clearing member.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 457 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
For the purposes of point (a)(ii), the competent authority shall provide, without delay and on its own initiative, any information that may suggest that the CCP is failing or is likely to fail and, upon request, any relevant information that the resolution authority requests in order to perform its assessment.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 474 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 23 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) all contractual obligations and other arrangements in the CCP's recovery plan are enforced either partially or in full, to the extent that they have not been exhausted before entry into resolution, unless the resolution authority determines that the use of resolution tools or the exercise of resolution powers is more appropriate to achieve the resolution objectives in a timely manner;
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 494 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 9 – introductory part
9. The resolution authority mayshall recover any reasonable expenses, including an appropriate risk premium, incurred in connection with the use of the resolution tools or powers or government financial stabilisation tools in any of the following ways:
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 518 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 2
2. The resolution authority shall calculate any reduction in payment obligations referred to in paragraph 1 using an equitable allocation mechanism determined in the valuation conducted in accordance with Article 24(3) and communicated to the clearing members as soon as the resolution tool is used. The total net gains to be reduced for each clearing member shall be proportional to the amounts due from the CCP. The clearing members should inform their clients about the use of such a mechanism as swiftly as possible.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 523 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 31 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. The resolution authority shall define the amount of the resolution cash call to be included in the operating rules, which shall at the minimum be equivalent to the clearing member’s contribution to the default fund.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 527 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 32 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2
The resolution authority shall also use the write-down and conversion tool in accordance with Article 33 in respect of instruments of ownership and debt instruments issued by the parent of the CCP in resolution where the instruments of ownership issued by the parent undertaking are used to fulfil the CCP's capital requirements in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 or those instruments of ownership or debt instruments are issued for the purpose of funding or enhancing the liquidity of the CCP and they fully absorb losses or constitute subordinate claims in normal insolvency proceedings.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 561 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 60 – paragraph 1
Where the resolution authority uses one or more resolution tools, it shallould aim to ensure that shareholders, creditors and, clearing participants do not incur: (a) clearing member,members and their clients do not incur greater losses than they would have incurred had the resolution authority not taken resolution action in relation to the CCP at the time the resolution authority considered that the conditions for resolution pursuant to Article 22(1) were met and had they instead been subject to all possible outstanding obligations pursuant to the CCP's recovery plan orand all other contractual arrangements in its operating rules; (b) of a clearing member, greater losses than they would have incurred had the CCP been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings including by taking account of its contractu for either a default or a non-default event and had the CCP been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, properly taking into account any plausible adverse effects of systemic instability and market turmoil, including fire sales, replacement costs and the breakdown of entire segments of the financial marrangements in its operating rules.ket on the positions of the stakeholders in question. in the event of the default of a in an event other than the default
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 574 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 61 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) the treatment that shareholders, creditors and clearing participamembers or their clients would have received had the resolution authority not taken resolution action in relation to the CCP the resolution authority considered that the conditions for resolution pursuant to Article 22(1) were met, and they had instead been subject to the enforcement of possible outstanding obligations pursuant to the CCP's recovery plan orand other arrangements in its operating rules orand the CCP had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings, properly taking into account any plausible adverse effects of systemic instability and market turmoil, including fire sales, replacement costs and the breakdown of entire segments of the financial market on the positions of the stakeholders in question;
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 577 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 61 – paragraph 3
3. For the purposes of calculating the treatments referred to in paragraph 2(a), the valuation referred to in paragraph 1 shall disregard any provision of extraordinary public financial support to the CCP under resolution and the CCP’s own pricing methodology shall be disregarded should this methodology fail to reflect the effective market conditions.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 579 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 61 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1
ESMA, taking into account any regulatory technical standards developed in accordance with Article 74(4) of Directive 2014/59/EU, shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the methodology for carrying out the valuation referred to in paragraph 1, including, in particular, the calculation of the losses that would have been realistically incurred if the CCP had been put into liquidation, including fire sales, replacement costs, and the breakdown of entire segments of the financial market on the position of the stakeholders in question.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 585 #
Proposal for a regulation
Title 5 a (new)
The CCP - Single Resolution Fund
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 586 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 73 a (new)
Article 73a General provisions 1. The CCP-Single Resolution Fund (‘CCP-SRF’) is hereby established. 2. Before a Single Resolution Board for CCPs (CCP-SRB) is established, its revenues shall accumulate for up to 10 years to be used by the SRB as an additional financial backstop to the SRF for the activities within its mandate 3. Once the Single Resolution Board for CCPs is established, it shall use the CCP-SRF only for the purpose of ensuring the efficient application of the resolution tools and exercise of the resolution powers referred to in Chapter III and in accordance with the resolution objectives and the principles governing resolution referred to in Articles 21 and 23 of this Regulation. Under no circumstances shall the Union budget or the national budgets be held liable for expenses or losses of the CCP-SRF. 4. The owner of the CCP-SRF shall be the Single Resolution Board. Once established, the CCP-SRB becomes the sole owner of the CCP-SRF. 5. Contributions shall be raised in accordance with articles 73b and 73c.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 587 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 73 b (new)
Article 73b Target level The target level of the CCP-SRF is 0.25 percent of Union GDP. Any capital returns on this fund that accrue beyond the target level are to be used towards the Union Budget.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 588 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 73 c (new)
Article 73c Contributions The contributions shall (a) consist of a levy on average margin requirements posted by clearing members to CCPs in the previous month; (b) always be set at a positive non-zero rate until the target level is reached; and (c) be collected monthly. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 73f defining the contributions to the CCP-SRF and their collection, using as basis any margin posted to any CCPs in the Union and any margin posted by clearing members in the Union to CPPs outside the Union where no comparable levy falls due, allowing for differentiated rates taking into account, among others, competitiveness and cross border effects. This delegated act is to be reviewed every five years at the latest.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 589 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 73 d (new)
Article 73d Administration and investments 1. Until a specific CCP-SRB is established, the Single Resolution Board, and afterwards, the CCP-SRB shall administer the CCP-SRF in application of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/451 on general principles and criteria for the investment strategy and rules for the administration of the Single Resolution Fund. 2. The amounts received from a CCP under resolution or a bridge institution, the interests and other earnings on investments and any other earnings shall only benefit the CCP-SRF. 3. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts further specifying the rules referred to in paragraph 1.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 590 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 73 e (new)
Article 73e Mission and use of the CCP-SRF 1. Within the resolution scheme, when applying the resolution tools to entities referred to in point 1 of Article 2, the Board may use the CCP-SRF only to the extent necessary to ensure the effective application of the resolution tools only where the following conditions are met: (a) the financial support is necessary to meet the resolution objectives; (b) the financial support is used as a last resort after having assessed and exploited all resolution tools other than government financial stabilisation tools according to article 45 of this Regulation to the maximum extent practicable whilst maintaining financial stability, as determined by the CCP-SRB; (c) the financial support complies with the Union State aid framework; and only for the following purposes: (a) to guarantee the liabilities of the CCP under resolution, its subsidiaries, or a bridge institution; (b) to make contributions to a bridge institution; (c) to make contributions to the CCP under resolution in lieu of the write-down or conversion tool; (d) to take any combination of the actions referred to in points (a) to (c).
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 591 #
Proposal for a regulation
Chapter VII a (new) – Article 73 f (new)
VIIa. POWERS OF EXECUTION Article 73f Exercise of the delegation 1. The power to adopt delegated acts is conferred on the Commission subject to the conditions laid down in this Article. 2. The delegation of power referred to in Article 73c shall be conferred for an indeterminate period of time from the relevant dates referred to in Article 83. 3. The delegation of power referred to in Article 73c may be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council. A decision of revocation shall put an end to the delegation of the power specified in that decision. It shall take effect the day following the publication of the decision in the Official Journal of the European Union or at a later date specified therein. It shall not affect the validity of any delegated acts already in force. 4. As soon as it adopts a delegated act, the Commission shall notify it simultaneously to the European Parliament and to the Council. 5. A delegated act adopted pursuant to Article 73c shall enter into force only if no objection has been expressed either by the European Parliament or the Council within a period of three months of notification of that act to the European Parliament and the Council or if, before the expiry of that period, the European Parliament and the Council have both informed the Commission that they will not object. That period shall be extended by three months at the initiative of the European Parliament or the Council. 6. The Commission shall not adopt delegated acts where the scrutiny time of the European Parliament is reduced through recess to less than five months, including any extension.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 616 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 82 – paragraph 1
By […], the Commission shall review the implementation of this Regulation... [date to be inserted: two years after date of entry into force of this Regulation] the Commission shall review this Regulation and its implementation in the light of the shifting European institutional architecture for CCP supervision and resolution and in the light of the progress in international efforts on recovery and resolution of CCPs and shall submit a report thereon to the European Parliament and to the Council. Where appropriate, that report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON
Amendment 619 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 82 – paragraph 1 a (new)
By ... [date to be inserted: two years after date of entry into force of this Regulation], the Commission shall review the effects of the levy on average margin requirements posted by clearing members to the CCP as the sole source of funding for the CCP-SRF, specifically examining potential shifts to a reliance on derivative instruments not subject to central clearing, and shall submit a report thereon to the European Parliament and to the Council. Where appropriate, that report shall be accompanied by a legislative proposal expanding the funding source to parties to derivative contracts which are not centrally cleared.
2017/11/07
Committee: ECON