Activities of Renato SORU related to 2017/0143(COD)

Renato SORU, Simona BONAFÈ, Andrea COZZOLINO, Pervenche BERÈS, Costas MAVRIDES

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10 a (new)

(10a) Financial education can support the understanding and awareness of households’ saving choices in the area of voluntary personal pension schemes. Savers shall also have a fair chance to fully grasp the risks and the features related to a pan-European product.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Simona BONAFÈ, Andrea COZZOLINO, Costas MAVRIDES

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14

(14) PEPP providers should have access to the whole Union market with one single product authorisation issued by the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (“EIOPA”), on the basis of a single set of rules and in cooperation with national competent authorities.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 16

(16) In order to ensure a high quality of service and effective consumer protection, home and host Member States should closely cooperate in the enforcement of the obligations set out in this Regulation. Where PEPP providers and distributors pursue business in different Member States under the freedom to provide services, the competent authority of the home Member State should be responsible for ensuring compliance with the obligations set out in this Regulation, because of its closer links with the PEPP provider. In order to ensure fair sharing of responsibilities between the competent authorities from the home and the host Member States, if the competent authority of a host Member State becomes aware of any breaches of obligations occurring within its territory, it should inform both EIOPA and the competent authority of the home Member State which should then be obliged to take the appropriate measures. Moreover, the competent authority of the host Member State should be entitled to intervene if the home Member State fails to take appropriate measures or if the measures taken are insufficient.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Simona BONAFÈ, Andrea COZZOLINO, Pervenche BERÈS, Costas MAVRIDES

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17

(17) In the case of the establishment of a branch or a permanent presence in another Member State, it is appropriate to distribute responsibility for enforcement between home and host Member States. While responsibility for compliance with obligations affecting the business as a whole – such as the rules on professional requirements – should remain with the competent authority of the home Member State under the same regime as in the case of provision of services, the competent authority of the host Member State should assume responsibility for enforcing the rules on information requirements and conduct of business with regard to the services provided within its territory. However, where the competent authority of a host Member State becomes aware of any breaches of obligations occurring within its territory with respect to which this ~~Directive~~Regulation does not confer responsibility on the host Member State, a close cooperation demands that that authority informs both EIOPA and the competent authority of the home Member State so that the latter takes the appropriate measures. Such is the case in particular as regards breaches of the rules on good repute, professional knowledge and competence requirements. Moreover, in view of protecting consumers, the competent authority of the host Member State should be entitled to intervene if the home Member State fails to take appropriate measures or if the measures taken are insufficient.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Pervenche BERÈS, Jeppe KOFOD, Costas MAVRIDES

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 19

(19) The pan-European dimension of the PEPP can be developed not only at the level of the provider, through the possibilities for its cross-border activity, but also at the level of the PEPP saver – through the portability of the PEPP, thus contributing to the safeguarding of personal pension rights of persons exercising their right to free movement under Articles 21 and 45 TFEU. Portability involves the PEPP saver changing residence to another Member State without changing PEPP providers, whereas the switching of PEPP providers does not necessarily involve a change of residence. In any case, the place of residence of a PEPP saver shall determine the applicable tax regime for the saver.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Simona BONAFÈ, Costas MAVRIDES

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 21

(21) ~~In order to allow a smooth transition for PEPP providers, the obligation of providing PEPPs comprising compartments for each Member State will apply three years after~~Upon launching a PEPP, the provider should provide information on which national compartments are immediately available in the econtry into force of this Regulation. However, upon launching a PEPP, the provider should provide information on which national compartments are immediately available, in order to avoid a possible misleading of consumersact, in order to avoid a possible misleading of consumers. PEPP savers willing to open a national compartment should be allowed to switch provider free of charge when this national compartment is not made available by the PEPP provider with whom the contract has been initially signed.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Simona BONAFÈ, Andrea COZZOLINO, Paul TANG, Costas MAVRIDES

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22

(22) Taking into account the nature of the pension scheme established and the administrative burden involved, PEPP providers and distributors should provide clear and adequate information to potential PEPP savers and PEPP beneficiaries to support their decision-making about their retirement. For the same reason, PEPP providers and distributors should equally ensure a high level of transparency throughout the various phases of a scheme comprising pre-enrolment, membership (including pre-retirement) and post- retirement. In particular, information concerning accrued pension entitlements, projected levels of retirement benefits, risks (including those related to environmental, social and governance factors) and guarantees, and costs should be given. Where projected levels of retirement benefits are based on economic scenarios, that information should also include an unfavourable scenario, which should be extreme but plausible.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Simona BONAFÈ, Costas MAVRIDES

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 23

(23) Before joining a PEPP scheme, potential PEPP savers should be given all the necessary information to make an informed choice through the provision of advice assessing their saving demands and needs.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Simona BONAFÈ, Costas MAVRIDES

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 32

(32) In order to protect adequately the rights of PEPP savers and PEPP beneficiaries, PEPP providers should be able to opt for an asset allocation that suits the precise nature and duration of their liabilities, including those having a long term horizon. Therefore, efficient supervision is required as well as an approach to investment rules that allows PEPP providers sufficient flexibility to decide on the most secure and efficient investment policy, while obliging them to act prudently. Compliance with the prudent person rule therefore requires an investment policy geared to the customers’ structure of the individual PEPP provider.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Simona BONAFÈ, Andrea COZZOLINO, Pervenche BERÈS, Costas MAVRIDES

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 33

(33) By setting the prudent person rule as the underlying principle for capital investment and making it possible for PEPP providers to operate across borders, the redirection of savings into the sector of personal retirement provision is encouraged, thereby contributing to economic and social progress. The prudent person rule should also take into consideration the role played by environmental, social and governance factors in the investment process.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Simona BONAFÈ, Andrea COZZOLINO, Pervenche BERÈS, Paul TANG, Costas MAVRIDES

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 36

(36) Environmental, social and governance factors, as referred to in the United Nations-supported Principles for Responsible Investment, are important for the investment policy and risk management systems of PEPP providers. PEPP providers should ~~be encouraged to~~ consider such factors in investment decisions and to take into account how they form part of their risk management system. This risk assessment should also be made available to EIOPA and to the competent authorities as well as to PEPP savers. Where relevant, it should also include risks related to climate change, use of resources, the environment, social risks, and risks related to the depreciation of assets due to regulatory change (‘stranded assets’).

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Simona BONAFÈ, Pervenche BERÈS

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 47

(47) In order to find better conditions for their investments, thus also stimulating the competition among PEPP providers, PEPP savers should have the right to switch providers during the accumulation and the decumulation phases, through a clear, quick, low cost and safe procedure.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 54

(54) PEPP providers should be allowed to make available to PEPP savers a wide range of decumulation options. This approach would achieve the goal of enhanced take-up of the PEPP through increased flexibility and choice for PEPP savers. It would allow providers to design their PEPPs in the most cost-effective way. It is coherent with other EU policies and politically feasible, as it preserves enough flexibility for Member States to decide about which decumulation options they wish to encourage. A fixed amount of annuities should be mandatory for the basic PEPP. Furthermore, out-payments in the form of annuities shall be mandatory when a PEPP saver has a total pension income not allowing him to have good life standards.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Pervenche BERÈS, Jeppe KOFOD

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 67

(67) Tax incentives can take different forms and play a~~n important~~ decisive role in encouraging the take-up of personal pension products ((PPPs) in a number of Member States. In many Member States the contributions paid for PPPs qualify for some form of tax relief, be it explicit or implicit.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 67 a (new)

(67a) The tax regime applied to a PEPP shall be the one of the Member State a PEPP saver is resident in order to prevent any abuse due to the different national taxation systems.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 17

(17) “competent authorit~~ies” of the PEPP providers means~~y” means the national authority or the national authorities (if more than one) designated by each Member State tofor the supervis~~e PEPP providers~~ion in the framework of this Regulation;

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ, Simona BONAFÈ, Costas MAVRIDES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 24

(24) “default investment option” means an investment strategy applied when the PEPP saver has not provided instructions on how to invest the funds accumulating in his PEPP account and on how to benefit from the decumulation phase;

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Simona BONAFÈ, Andrea COZZOLINO, Pervenche BERÈS

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point d

(d) information on arrangements regarding portfolio and risk management and administration with regard to the PEPP, including the role played by environmental, social and governance factors in the investment process as well as the long term impact and the externalities of the investment decisions;

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Simona BONAFÈ, Pervenche BERÈS, Paul TANG

Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point e

(e) information about the investment strategies, the risk profile and other characteristics of the PEPP, including the role played by environmental, social and governance factors in the investment process as well as the long term impact and the externalities of the investment decisions;

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Simona BONAFÈ, Andrea COZZOLINO, Pervenche BERÈS, Paul TANG, Costas MAVRIDES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point d a (new)

(da) the proposed PEPP is based on an investment strategy that states to what extent environmental, social and governance factors are included in the proposed providers risk management system.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 2

2. Before taking a decision on the application, EIOPA shall consult the competent authority of the applicant by providing it with a copy of the application and all the relevant information needed for the consultation.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ, Simona BONAFÈ, Pervenche BERÈS

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 4

4. EIOPA shall withdraw the authorisation of a PEPP in the event that the conditions for granting this authorisation are no longer fulfilled. A competent authority may ask EIOPA to consider the withdrawal of a PEPP authorisation upon providing any relevant information motivating this request.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Jonás FERNÁNDEZ, Simona BONAFÈ, Pervenche BERÈS

Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 4 a (new)

4a. When a PEPP authorisation is withdrawn, EIOPA shall coordinate the actions needed to safeguard the PEPP savers holding a contract with the PEPP provider of which the authorisation has been withdrawn.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 1

EIOPA shall keep a central public register identifying each PEPP authorised under this Regulation, the provider of this PEPP ~~and~~, the competent authority of the PEPP provider, the date of authorisation of the PEPP and the number of the available national compartments. The register shall be made publicly available in electronic format and shall be promptly updated if changes occur.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 3

3. Th~~ree years at the latest after the entry into application of this Regulation, each PEPP shall offer national compartments for all Member States upon reques~~e available compartments shall be listed in the contract between the PEPP saver and PEPP provider. The PEPP provider shall be obliged to offer at least the compartments listed in the contract. A PEPP saver willing to change domicile by moving to another Member State may exercise in any case his right of mobility by switching PEPP provider free of charge when the national compartment the saver is willing to open is not mad~~dressed to the PEPP provider.~~ e available neither by from the PEPP provider nor from a registered partner.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 14 – paragraph 1

~~Without prejudice to the deadline under Article 13(3),~~ PEPP providers shall ensure that within each individual PEPP account a new compartment could be opened, corresponding to the legal requirements and conditions for using incentives fixed at national level for the PEPP by the Member State to which the PEPP saver moves.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 1

1. ~~Without prejudice to the deadline under Article 13(3), i~~Immediately after being informed about the PEPP saver’s intention to exercise his right of mobility between Member States, the PEPP provider shall inform the PEPP saver about the possibility to open a new compartment within the PEPP saver’s individual account and about the deadline within which such compartment could be opened.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Pervenche BERÈS

Proposal for a regulation
Chapter 4 – section 3 – title

Advice ~~and standards for sales where no advice is given~~

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 a (new)

Without prejudice to Article 26, advice shall aim at assessing the risk aversion and the financial skills of a PEPP saver as well as at making him able to choose the investment option which better correspond to his risk profile.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Pervenche BERÈS

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 b (new)

Through advice, a PEPP saver shall be informed about the main features of the product.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 25 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2 c (new)

Advice may be provided also through digital channels.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – title

~~Concluding a contract for a PEPP without advice~~Advice for the basic PEPP

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Andrea COZZOLINO

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

~~Without prejudice to Article 25(1), the PEPP saver may waive his right to receive advice in relation to conclud~~In the case of a basic PEPP, a PEPP saver shall be informed whether this investment option is given by the provision of a capital guarantee or other safe risk- mitigation techniques ing a cco~~ntract for the default investment op~~rdance to Article 37 of this Regulation.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

~~Where~~In any case, the PEPP saver waives his right to receive advice, PEPP providers or distributors referred to in Article 19(c) of this Regulation shall, when carrying out PEPP distribution activities, ask the PEPP saver or potential PEPP saver to provide information regarding that person’s knowledge and experience in the investment fshall be informed of the risks arising from the risk-mitigation techniques applield ~~relevant to the PEPP offered or demanded so as to enable the PEPP provider or distributor to assess whether the PEPP envisaged is appropriate for the PEPP saver~~to the basic PEPP in accordance to Article 37 of this Regulation.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3

Where the PEPP provider or distributor referred to in Article 19(c) of this Regulation considers, on the basis of the information received under ~~the first subparagraph~~Article 25(1), that the product is not appropriate for the PEPP saver or potential PEPP saver, the PEPP provider or distributor shall warn the PEPP saver or potential PEPP saver to that effect. That warning may be provided in a standardised format.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 4

Where PEPP savers or potential PEPP savers do not provide the information referred to in ~~the first subparagraph~~Article 25(1), or where they provide insufficient information regarding their knowledge and experience, the PEPP provider or distributor shall warn them that it is not in a position to determine whether the PEPP envisaged is appropriate for them. That warning may be provided in a standardised format.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 26 – paragraph 2

2. Without prejudice to Article 25(1), where the PEPP saver has waived his right to receive advice in relation to the default investment option, the PEPP provider or distributor referred to in Article 19(c) of this Regulation may carry out PEPP distribution activities without the need to obtain the information or make the determination provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article where all the following conditions are met: (a) contracts concerning the default investment option which only provide investment exposure to the financial instruments deemed non-complex under Article 25(4)(a) of Directive 2014/65/EU and do not incorporate a structure which makes it difficult for the PEPP saver to understand the risks involved; (b) the initiative of the PEPP saver or potential PEPP saver; (c) saver has been clearly informed that, in the provision of the PEPP distribution activity, the PEPP provider or distributor is not required to assess the appropriateness of the PEPP or PEPP distribution activity provided or offered and that the PEPP saver or potential PEPP saver does not benefit from the corresponding protection of the relevant conduct of business rules. Such a warning may be provided in a standardised format; (d) complies with its obligations under the rules applicable to it, in accordance with this Chapter, concerning conflicts of interest in relation to PEPP distribution activities.deleted the activities relate to PEPP the distribution of the PEPP is at the PEPP saver or potential PEPP the PEPP provider or distributor

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Simona BONAFÈ, Paul TANG

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 3 – point d

(d) information on how the investment policy takes into account environmental, social and governance factors, including the role they play in the investment process as well as the long term impact and the externalities of the investment decisions.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 28 – paragraph 1 – point e a (new)

(ea) a summary on the PEPP provider’s investment-policy principles that are further described in the supplementary information in accordance with Article 29, point (c) of the present Regulation.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Simona BONAFÈ, Costas MAVRIDES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 1 a (new)

1a. One year prior to the retirement phase, a communication shall be sent to the PEPP saver in order to inform him about the upcoming start of the decumulation phase and the possible forms of out-payments.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Simona BONAFÈ, Pervenche BERÈS, Paul TANG

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point b a (new)

(ba) within the prudent person rule, PEPP providers shall take into consideration the potential long-term impact of investment decisions on environmental, social, and governance factors.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Costas MAVRIDES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 33 – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) the assets shall be predominantly invested on regulated markets. Investment in assets which are not admitted to trading on a regulated financial market ~~must in any event be kept to prudent level~~shall not exceed 20% of the total assets;

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 36 – paragraph 1

1. The terms for modification of the investment option shall be listed in the PEPP contract. In any case, the PEPP saver shall be able to opt for a different investment option once every five years of accumulation in the PEPP.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Costas MAVRIDES

Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 1

1. The ~~default investment option shall ensure capital protection for the PEPP saver, on th~~basic PEPP shall be a simple and safe product that can be beasi~~s of a risk-mitigation technique that results in a safe~~ly acquired, including through digital channels, in each Member State. It represents the default investment ~~strategy~~option.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 37 – paragraph 2

2. Capital protection ~~shall~~for the basic PEPP shall aim at allowing the PEPP saver to recoup the capital invested according to the draft regulatory technical standards established by EIOPA.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 38 – paragraph 2

2. The alternative investment options shall include risk-mitigation techniques to be defined by PEPP providers according to the draft regulatory technical standards established by EIOPA.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 45 – paragraph 2

2. The ~~PEPP saver may~~terms for switching PEPP providers ~~no more frequently than~~shall be listed in the PEPP contract. In any case, the PEPP saver shall be able to switch PEPP provider once every five years ~~after conclus~~of accumulation ofin the PEPP ~~contract~~.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU

Proposal for a regulation
Article 48 – paragraph 3

3. The total fees and charges applied by the transferring PEPP provider to the PEPP saver for the closure of the PEPP account held with it shall be limited to no more than ~~1.5~~ 0.25% of the positive balance to be transferred to the receiving PEPP provider.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Simona BONAFÈ, Pervenche BERÈS

Proposal for a regulation
Article 48 – paragraph 4

4. ~~Fees and charges, if any, applied by the transferring or the receiving PEPP provider to the PEPP saver for any service provided under Article 46, other than~~In the context of the switching process, services given by those re~~ferred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article,~~ceiving PEPP provider shall be fre~~asonable and in line with the actual costs~~e of tcha~~t PEPP provider~~rge.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Mady DELVAUX, Simona BONAFÈ, Pervenche BERÈS

Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 2

2. ~~The choice of the form~~For the basic PEPP a minimum of 50% of out- payments ~~for the decumulation phase shall be exercised by PEPP savers upon conclusion of a PEPP contract and can be changed once every five years thereafter during the accumulation phase, if applicable~~in the form of annuities shall be mandatory.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 52 – paragraph 2 a (new)

2a. Out-payments in the form of annuities shall be mandatory when a PEPP saver has a total pension income which is equal or below the most recent “at-risk-of-poverty threshold” of the Member State where the PEPP saver benefits from the decumulation phase.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Simona BONAFÈ, Pervenche BERÈS, Paul TANG

Proposal for a regulation
Article 55 – paragraph 1

1. EIOPA and the competent authority of the PEPP provider shall co~~operate~~ntribute to the consistent application of this Regulation throughout the Union, by cooperating with each other and by exchangeing information for the purpose of carrying out their duties under thise present Regulation.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 63 – paragraph 1

FEvery five years after the entry into force of this Regulation, the Commission shall carry out an evaluation of this Regulation and, and after consulting EIOPA, present a Report on the main findings to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee. In drafting the Report, the Commission may also consider to consult the national competent authorities.

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 63 – paragraph 2

WThere the evaluation identifies important problems with the functioning of the Regulation, the Report should outline how the Commission is intending to address the identified problems, including steps and timings of the potential revision. Report shall give an overall view on the functioning of the Regulation and shall especially cover the following issues:

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Renato SORU, Simona BONAFÈ, Andrea COZZOLINO, Pervenche BERÈS, Paul TANG

Proposal for a regulation
Article 63 – paragraph 2 – point a (new)

(a) the contribution of the PEPP to the CMU, including sustainable finance;

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 63 – paragraph 2 – point b (new)

(b) the development of the PEPP market both throughout the Union and at national level;

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 63 – paragraph 2 – point c (new)

(c) the uptake of the functioning of the basic PEPP;

2018/04/30
Committee: ECON