38 Amendments of Stefan ECK related to 2016/2215(INI)
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 5 a (new)
Citation 5 a (new)
- having regard to Directive 2008/50/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe,1a _________________ 1a OJ L 152, 11.6.2008, p.1.
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. There are large discrepancies between the NOx emissions of most Euro 3-6 diesel cars measured during the type- approval process with the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC) laboratory test, which meet the legal emission limit, and their NOx emissions measured in real driving conditions, which substantially exceed the limit. Those discrepancies affect most diesel cars and are not limited to Volkswagen vehicles equipped with prohibited defeat devices.
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. The existence of the discrepancies, and their significant negative impact on attaining air quality objectivestandards, in particular with regard to urban areas, had been known to the Commission, to the responsible authorities of the Member States and to many other stakeholders since at least 2004-2005 when the Euro 5/6 Regulation was being prepared. The discrepancies have been confirmed by a large number of studies by the Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) and other researchers since 2010-2011.
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Before September 2015, the discrepancies were generally attributed to the inadequacy of the NEDC laboratory test, which is not representative of real world emissions, and to the optimisation strategies put in place by car manufacturers to pass the laboratory test, not to the use of prohibited. The discrepancies were not recognised to originate from the use of prohibited defeat devices because there were no authorities looking into the illegal use of defeat devices.
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. The excessive length of the process leading to the introduction of regulatory RDE tests can be explained only in part by the complexity of the development of a new test procedure, the time needed for the technological development of PEMS, and the length of the decision-making and administrative processes at the EU level. The delays were also due to choices of political priorities, such as the focus ofmainly the result of lobby influence, and of the political priority given by the Commission and the Member States ton avoiding burdens on industry in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.
Amendment 30 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. The car industry put considerable pressure on the European Commission and Member States and that is why they delayed action on reducing toxic emissions by passenger vehicles.
Amendment 33 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6 b. It is justified to propose a lower NOx emission limit for diesel cars since there are standards in the world that are much more demanding than the current European standards and because the technology already exists to reduce the NOx emissions since EU car manufacturers are placing diesel cars on the US market that have to comply with much lower NOx emission limits.
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 c (new)
Paragraph 6 c (new)
6 c. The Commission in its initial draft for the second RDE package had proposed to the TCMV conformity factors towards the lower end of the 1.6-2.2 range for the first phase and of the 1.2-1.6 range for the second phase. The initial proposal was based on conformity factors identified at the lower end of identified ranges and thus corresponded to the strongest environmental objectives.
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 d (new)
Paragraph 6 d (new)
6 d. Notwithstanding the reasons mentioned the Commission lacked the political will and decisiveness to act upon the seriousness of the high NOx emissions and to give priority to the protection of public health of citizens that was at stake;
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. The Member States’ failure to take an active part in the “Real Driving Emissions - Light Duty Vehicles” (RDE- LDV) working group constitutes maladministration. With the exception of a few Member States, such as the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Denmark and Spain, the vast majority did not participate in the RDE-LDV working group, despite voicing criticisms of the Commission’s proposals. Given the lead role played by the Member States in the enforcement of the Regulation, and given the known discrepancies in the NOx emissions of diesel vehicles and their significant negative impact on air quality objectives, Member States should have participated in the group’s proceedings. This would also have helped to achieve a better balance within the other participants in the working groupworking group instead of having a central role played by the overrepresented industry.
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8 a. The Member States contravened their legal obligation to monitor that the manufacturers equip vehicles so that the components likely to affect emissions are designed, constructed and assembled so as to enable the vehicle, in normal use, to comply with Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 and its implementing measures.
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. The Commission did not use all possiblfailed to use the means at its disposal, at the level of the TCMV and of the RDE-LDV working group, to advance the decision making process and ensure a timely adaptation of the type-approval tests to reflect real world conditions, as required by Article 14(3) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007.
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Better coordinCoordination and cooperation between the different Commission departments involvedservices, including the JRC, was unstructured and neglectful. Better coordination could have been instrumental in accelerating the process of adapting the tests.
Amendment 63 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Over half of the RDE-LDV working group participants consisted of experts from car manufacturers and other automotive industries. This can inter alia be attributed to the lack of sufficient technical expertise in the Commission departments. While the Commission consulted a wide range of stakeholders and ensured open access to the RDE-LDV group, it leading to imbalanced composition of the working group where research institutes, civil society and NGO's were heavily underrepresented. The Commission should have taken further steps to “as far as possible, ensure a balanced representation of relevant stakeholders, taking into account the specific tasks of the expert group and the type of expertise required”, as required by the horizontal rules for Commission expert groups of 10 November 2010.
Amendment 72 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Defeat devices were generally not considered among the possible reasons behind the discrepancies between laboratory and on-road NOx emissions and it was not generally suspected that they could be in actual use in any passenger car produced in the EU before the Volkswagen revelations in September 2015. However, the Commission and the Member States were informed about the possibility of the use of defeat strategies under normal conditions of use ever since the conclusions of the JRC's 2013 report titled "A complementary emissions test for light-duty vehicles" were presented to them.
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21 a. After the warnings of the JRC in 2013 regarding the possibility of the use of defeat strategies under normal conditions of use, the Commission should have taken additional measures to monitor and ensure that Member States carry out all necessary checks and that there is no infringement of EU legislation.
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. The Commission had no legal basis to search for defeat devices itself, but had the legal obligation to oversee the Member States’ enforcement of the ban on defeat devices. However, in spite of the awareness of, and communication between the relevant Commission services on, possible illegal practices by manufacturers, the Commission neither undertook any further technical or legal research or investigation on its own nor requested any information or further action from the Member States to verify whether the law may have been infringed. This constitutes maladministration.
Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22 a. Even if there was no concrete evidence that indicated cheating in emissions tests, the Commission should have launched an investigation to check if the car manufactures were using defeat devices in contravention with Article 5(2) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 and should have taken measures to prevent the fraud.
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 b (new)
Paragraph 22 b (new)
22 b. The Commission failed to monitor the development of national policies and the enforcement of the EU legislation by national authorities ensuring that there is no infringement of EU legislation. This constitutes maladministration.
Amendment 118 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 c (new)
Paragraph 22 c (new)
22 c. The Commission failed to give a mandate to the JRC to investigate the possible illegal use of defeat devices as a possible explanation for the discrepancies between the laboratory and road emissions.
Amendment 125 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. The Commission should have ensured that the JRC’s research findings and concerns discussed among the Commission services with regard to possible illegal practices by manufacturers reach the level of the hierarchy and lead to actions needed to correct the situation. Altogether, the Commission's lack of action constitutes maladministration.
Amendment 129 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. The level of technical expertise and human and financial resources may vary substantially between type-approval authorities and technical services, and the fact that car manufacturers are free to choose any of the existing type-approval authorities combined with a lack of a harmonised interpretation of the rules can leads to competition among them, especially since the authorities act in this respect as commercial parties and not as bodies serving only the public interest. Car manufacturers are, in principle, free to address the type-approval authority and technical service with the most flexible and least stringent interpretation of the rules, as well as the lowest fees.
Amendment 132 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. There is an evident lack of control after type-approval, which is partly due to the current rules and partly due to uncertainty as to which authority is in charge of market surveillance. Effective conformity of production, in-service and end-of- lifecycle conformity checks to uncover cases where production vehicles and vehicles in use do not conform to the type- approved vehicle are often not in place or verified only through documents instead of physical tests carried out in the presence of the authorities.
Amendment 138 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
31. The Member States should have ensured that their type-approval authorities have sufficient human and financial resources to either perform in-house testing or purchase reliable testing services. They should have not relied on tests performed in the car manufacturers’ certified laboratories under the supervision of technical services. The potential conflicts of interest arising from the contracting of technical services by car manufacturers for carrying out tests is a direct result of the current system set out in the EU type- approval framework directive and cannot therefore be considered maladministration. The Commission proposal for a new market surveillance and type-approval regulation addresses this weakness by proposing a fee structure for the financing of type-approval tests, although under the system proposed by the Commission it remains possible for car manufacturers to choose the testing service and type approval authority of their preference in any of the Member States. It is regrettable that the Commission did not consider a complete overhaul of the system by eliminating competition among testing services and among type approval authorities by making it obligatory for car manufacturers to use the national testing services and national type approval authorities.
Amendment 142 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. However, wWhere technical services also offer consultancy services to car manufacturers on obtaining type-approval, as is the case in certain Member States, a potential conflict of interest arises due to the existence of an additional financial link between technical services and car manufacturers related to the provision of advice on how to successfully acquire type-approval. Member States should have investigated such potential conflicts of interests. This constitutes maladministration.
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. The Member States should have ensured that type-approval authorities adequately audit technical services. This constitutes maladministration. TUnfortunately, the choice of the technical service is primarily the choice of the car manufacturer, and the role of the type- approval authority is often just to validate the procedure at the end. The possibility available to type-approval authorities to audit technical services and to challenge the choice of technical service is very rarely used.
Amendment 150 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. The Member States’ failure to organise an efficient and reliable market surveillance system constitutes a contravention of EU law. The verification of the conformity of production and in- service conformity of light-duty vehicles is often based only on laboratory tests performed on the car manufacturers’ premises.
Amendment 156 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 a (new)
Paragraph 37 a (new)
37 a. In particular, the Commission should have examined how competition among type approval authorities and among testing services worked out in practice and should have submitted alternatives for this type of unnecessary and harmful competition.
Amendment 157 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 b (new)
Paragraph 37 b (new)
37 b. The Commission failed to make use of the provision of Regulation (EC) No 692/2008, to request Member States type approval authorities for information on the functioning of emission technology at low temperatures.
Amendment 158 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
Amendment 161 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 a (new)
Paragraph 38 a (new)
38 a. The initial test results performed by the national authorities in the framework of the diesel emissions screening campaign give credence to suspicions that Volkswagen case is not the only violation but the emissions scandal is more widespread and prevents the efficient enforcement of EU legislation.
Amendment 167 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
40. The majority of the Member States did not launch or participate to any investigations. Some Member States were very reluctant to share the results of their investigations and the technical test data with the Commission and this committee of inquiry. or they published only parts of their findings.
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 46 a (new)
Paragraph 46 a (new)
46 a. Furthermore, the Member States have not taken up their role to actively inform and support consumers to claim their rights in respect of the Volkswagen emissions case and possible involvement of other car-brands.
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 47
Paragraph 47
47. Following a strict interpretation of Regulation (EC) No 715/2007, the Commission considered that it is the sole duty of the Member States, and not part of its responsibility as guardian of the Treaties, to investigate the possible illegal use of defeat devices. On this basis, the Commission did notThe Commission failed to undertake furtherany technical research, did not request additional information from the Member States and did not askor request the responsible national type-approval authorities to undertake further investigative and corrective actions regarding the possible illegal use of the defeat devices.
Amendment 187 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 48 a (new)
Paragraph 48 a (new)
48 a. The Commission should have asked for the emissions tests to be done in real driving conditions as set in the Regulation (EC) No 715/2007 since it was known that there was a difference between the results of the emissions in the laboratory and in the real driving conditions.
Amendment 192 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 53
Paragraph 53
53. The participation of sSome former Commissioners was further complicated byrefused to cooperate and contribute to the research of this committee of inquiry using as an excuse the lack of a clear obligation in the current Code of Conduct for Commissioners that former Commissioners must cooperate with ongoing inquiries and in general remain accountable for actions undertaken during their term in office.
Amendment 202 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 60
Paragraph 60
Amendment 204 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 61
Paragraph 61
61. Given the temporary nature of committees of inquiry, collecting evidence in an efficient and timely manner is essential. The approach taken by the committee to devote the first months of its mandate to hearing technical experts before moving on the political level proved successful. Ideally, the hearings should start only once the first phase of evidence collection, including receiving all the relevant documents from the parties under inquiry, is concluded.