Activities of Ernest MARAGALL related to 2015/2344(INI)
Shadow reports (1)
REPORT on budgetary capacity for the Eurozone PDF (616 KB) DOC (93 KB)
Amendments (46)
Amendment 25 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 15 a (new)
Citation 15 a (new)
– having regard to its resolution of 13 March 2014 on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika (ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro area programme countries;
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the Treaty on European Union establishes the creation of the single market, whose currency is the euro; whereas the European Monetary Union currently consists of 19 members, two of whom have opt-out clauses, the remaining seven EU Member States having yet to join; whereas no financial liability willis expected to be incurred by the two countries with opt- outs from EMUnon-euro area Member States in the framework of any fiscal capacity for the euro area;
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas contrary to the budgetary arrangements in all other federations, the EU budget is dependent on contributions from Member State level to EU level and has been maintained relatively constant (in % of the EU Gross National Income) despite the increasing number of objectives assigned to the Union by the Treaties;
Amendment 82 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas, following realative convergence in the run-up to the introduction of the common currency, the euro area witnessed structural divergence between 1999 and 2009, which made the euro area as a whole less resilient to shocks; whereas regulatory adjustments and structural reforms aimed at reducing risks and improving convergence have been introduced since 2009 at both European and national level, but some euro area Member States still require solidarity and sustainable reforms in their catching- up process;only addressed unsustainable high demand in some countries while lacking of demand in other Member States was not corrected leading to a lack of demand and deflation at the aggregate EMU level.
Amendment 90 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws of EMU through legislation such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, as well as through the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such as the ESMthe creation of new instruments such as the ESM, the establishment of a Banking Union and the enlargement of the surveillance scope as regards the economic governance framework; whereas this legislation has however failed to deliver a speedy and sustainable economic and social recovery in the Eurozone;
Amendment 107 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the Community method was abandoundermined in favour of intergovernmental agreements in order to allow for rapid responses in the crisis; whereas this has made the European Councilgroup the leading actor in the crisis, while the European Parliament and its national counterparts have been sidelined;
Amendment 186 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Considers that the EMU exposed its vulnerability in the context of the global financial and economic crisis when unsustainable imbalances, triggered by capital flows from core euro area nations to the periphery and a rising public spendingrivate and public debt ratio in some Member States, aggravated and led to a financial sector crisis across the EU as a whole and subsequently to a sovereign debt crisis, in which government borrowing costs dramatically increased in some Member States, jeopardising, in the absence of a proper fiscal backstop, the mere existence of the euro area;
Amendment 196 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address a lead to economic divergences in the Eurozone and cannot address asymmetric and symmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap,proper and democratic legitimated cooperation at Eurozone level including the absence of credible enforcement mechanisms has not prevented an investment gap and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks, Points out that the European Semester has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;;
Amendment 217 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Observes that the stabilisation efforts of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, while this responsibility should rather lie with democratically elected institutions, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integrated institutions, for a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reform; alerts that monetary policy by its own is unable to reignite the economy and risks to end with speculative bubbles;
Amendment 231 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Acknowledges the resultinstitutional reforms achieved since the crisis broke in terms of risk reduction and better coordination; points in particular to the many measures taken by the EU institutions to address the shortcomings revealed by the crisis by strengthening coordination of national fiscal policies, in particular via the adoption of the Six-Pack and the Two- Pack Regulations;and economic policies, regrets however that strengthened fiscal coordination has failed to deliver on a speedy economic recovery; deplores the asymmetry in the correction of imbalances between surplus and deficit countries welcomes further the fact that the EU institutions have set up frameworks for action in current and future crises, namely by creating the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM), the temporary European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) and its permanent successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); underlines, however, that these mechanisms dramatically lack democratic oversight and parliamentary control, and hence ownership; recalls its resolution on the role and operations of the Troika] and stresses the need to follow up on the recommendations made;
Amendment 246 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls that in 2012 the Commission introduced in its ‘Blueprint for a deep and genuine EMU’ the idea of a Convergence and Competitiveness instrument for euro area Member States, whereby euro area Member States could get financial incentives support for ‘reform packages that are agreed and important both for the Member States and for the good functioning of the euro area’, and that this financial support ‘could be set up in principle as part of the EU budget’ and be established by secondary law on the basis of Article 352 TFEU and financed by either a commitment on the part of the euro area Member States or a legal obligation to that effect enshrined in the EU’s own resources legislation as ‘assigned revenues’; considers the review by the Commission of the European Semester, including the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), as a follow-up to this approach; the fiscal capacity should play a role in providing these financial incentives.
Amendment 253 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Recalls the four pillars set out in the Five Presidents’ Report: completing the economic, financial and fiscal Union and strengthening democratic accountability, legitimacy and the institutional setting; emphasises that this report reiterates the view set out in the Blueprint of the Commission and the Four Presidents’ Report, coordinated by then President of the European Council Mr Herman van Rompuy, that a shock absorption capacity at euro area level is needed to complement automatic stabilisers at national level, whose functioning is limited, as was shownnd was further restricted as a result of the fiscal consolidation measures during the crisis;
Amendment 280 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12 a (new)
Paragraph 12 a (new)
12a. Argues that Member States have to improve their own tax collection capacities and their cooperation, notably in terms of exchanges of information, transparency, and the gradual harmonisation of rates and tax bases; calls upon the Commission to come with proposals and, when appropriate, country-specific recommendations;
Amendment 290 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Stresses the need for a truly symmetric Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure that effectively targets chronic current account surpluses; points out that balanced current accounts of Member States are necessary to mitigate the need for permanent transfers; underlines that Member States may finance government deficits primarily by domestic household savings without need for arbitrary fiscal rules such as the Stability and Growth Pact if external balance is effectively pursued.
Amendment 310 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Recalls the objective of full employment stipulated in Article 3.3 of the Treaty on the European Union; considers that a Eurozone budgetary capacity is an important instrument for achieving this goal, as well as for fostering convergence among EMU members, and for the stabilization and the sustainable development of the Eurozone economy.
Amendment 352 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Considers that three different functions have to be fulfilled; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic timesthe implementation of sustainable structural reforms aimed at achieving the EU2020 targets as well as a genuine fiscal and macroeconomic policy coordination, should be incentivised; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed at both the EMU and national level so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole;
Amendment 372 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Argues in consequence that three pillars of a fiscal capacity should be distinguished, wherein action should be undertaken in the framework of a common toolbox to address the different functions, i.e. incentivising convergence and sustainablepromoting convergence and deeper coordination as regards fiscal, macroeconomic policies and sustainable and outcome-oriented structural reforms, absorbing asymmetric shocks, and absorbing symmetric shocks; takes note of the various proposals regarding designs put forward on this matter by politicians and academia;
Amendment 380 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18a. Calls for the fiscal capacity to be financed by recurrent Member States contributions and a common borrowing capacity, while a roadmap to increase own resources at either the EU or the Euro Area level shall be established;
Amendment 381 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)
Paragraph 18 b (new)
18b. Stresses that a revision of the existing fiscal rules based on the introduction of simpler, countercyclical and transparent rules would complement this framework by enhancing its credibility and its consistency, by increasing national ownership and by reducing moral hazard;
Amendment 407 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should bhave managed by the Commission an independent board held democratically accountable by the European Parliament and whose financial assistance programme should be submitted to a consent vote by this institution; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected; argues that the EMF should include a debt restructuring settlement mechanism consistent with the recently adopted UN principles
Amendment 452 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
Amendment 468 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4
Subheading 4
Pillar 1: A convergence code to promote convergence and incentivise the implementation of outcome oriented structural reforms
Amendment 476 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Stresses that significant progress in convergence and sustainablegenuine fiscal and macroeconomic policy coordination and as regards overall social and economic convergence within the EMU as well as in the implementation of sustainable and democratically scrutinized structural reforms is needed in order to reconcile fiscal consolidation,sustainability, sustainable growth, jobs, productivity, competitiveness and the European social model so as to effectively prevent and tackle asymmetric shock; considers that financial supportincentives from the European level for the implementation of agreed outcome oriented structural reforms in the Member Statand recommendations in the area of fiscal and macroeconomic policies, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, is therefore indispensable;
Amendment 512 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – introductory part
Paragraph 26 – introductory part
26. Suggests that the convergence code define criteriaoutcomes to be reached within five years, building on the merits of the Maastricht criteria and focusing for the first period on convergence requirements regarding:
Amendment 553 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1
– investment, notably in research and development; and in the transition to a sustainable economy
Amendment 556 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
– social progress (the main indicators included in the social progress index)
Amendment 567 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 2
This five-year period should in exchange allow for a phasing-in of the new tasks attributed to the ESM/EMF;a fiscal capacity for the EMU
Amendment 582 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Considers that a financial instrument is needed to work as an incentive-based mechanism for convergence and sustainable structural reforms with clear counder the form of discounts of Member States contributions to a fiscally neutral budgetary capacity in the medium-term could be devised as an incentive-based mechanism for ensuring Member States compliance with the recommendiationality; believes that the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), which is designed to provide technical support to national authorities for measures aimed at reforming institutions, gos on the Euro area aggregate fiscal stance, outcome-based recommendations to reduce EU macroeconomic imbalances and progress towards outcome-based convernagence, administration, and economic and social sectors with a view to enhancing growth and jobs, can be further developed as a contribution to this function of the fiscal capacnd sustainable structural reforms; stresses that these recommendations should be characterised by full democratic accountability;
Amendment 595 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Is convinced that increased convergence and policy coordination within the euro area willmight significantly increase the capacity of its Member States to absorb asymmetric shocks and will reduce the need and the resources needed to cope with these shocks; believes, however, that no matter how great the efforts regarding policy coordination, convergence and sustainable structural reforms, asymmetric shocks with an impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the strong integration of the euro area Member States; stresses, therefore, the need to have an instrument available for this emergency which provides an immediate stabilisation effectackling future shocks with significant spill-over effect which provides a stabilisation effect; underlines that that the high carbon intensity of current economic production and undertakings' balance sheets represents very large systemic risks which will inevitably trigger and intensify shocks of macroeconomic relevance;
Amendment 611 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Notes that the two models for the shock absorption function are featured most prominently in the academic literature: a Rainy Day Fund and a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme; Underlines that according to the IMF an effective shock absorbing budgetary capacity needs to be endowed with annual resources in a range of 1.5%-2.5% of EU GDP as a minimum, in order to ensure meaningful stabilisation. Emphasizes the need to define a roadmap towards a Fiscal and Budgetary Union including inter alia the establishment of an EMU-wide unemployment insurance scheme requiring in the medium to long term a Treaty change as well as a certain harmonisation on national labour market regulations and transfer to the EA level of part of the national resources earmarked for national unemployment benefits; Points out that this scheme would limit moral hazard by providing funds only to countries experiencing large increases in cyclical unemployment and should be balanced over the cycle; emphasizes the role of social partner in this process;
Amendment 629 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Points out that thea Rainy Day Fund should be funded by all could be established within the current Treaty as a first step of the roadmap towards a genuine Fiscal and Budgetary Union and should be funded by Euro Area Member States through national contributions composed of two parts: 1. A contribution aimed at ensuring other Members States on the basis of a cyclically sensitive economic indicator and used forfrom possible spill overs arising from lack of policy coordination and convergence 2. A countercyclical contribution on the basis of a cyclically sensitive economic indicator; Considers that in order to incentivise policy coordination and compliance, Member States should be offered discounts or full exemptions from paying the first contribution referred to above on the basis of their degree of compliance with the convergence code and the fiscal and macroeconomic recommendations; Stresses that these contributions should be used for automatic payments to all Euro Area Member States suffering from economic downturns;
Amendment 661 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Considers that the EMF should provide the financial resources for either of these models, which could require increasing the amount ofStresses that each of these models need a financial backstop which can be ensured either by developing a second arm of the EMF or by making the fiscal capacity able to borrow; considers that both instruments would require additional amount of paid-in and callable capital; points out that the fund should avoid long- term redistribution effects by ensuring that Member States’' contributions are balanced over the cycle; made on the basis of their cyclical position are balanced over the cycle; calls for an additional safeguard clause implying that Member States whose gap between all contributions and all payments received exceeds a pre-determined level over a certain period of time shall provide additional contributions to reduce the gap below the fixed threshold; considers that the parameters of the gap have to be chosen on the basis of a detailed technical analysis;
Amendment 682 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; recalls that the EMF should be used as an appropriate financial resourceEU own resources would be the optimal solution to ensure appropriate financial resources together with common borrowing capacity;
Amendment 695 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Considers that in the case of symmetric shocks brought about by a lack of internal demand, monetary policy alone cannot reignite the economy, particularly in a context of zcharacterized by veroy lower bound nominal interest rates; is therefore convinced that public and private investment must be increased, themutualized fiscal tools and mechanism are in such context instrumental for effectively fostering future oriented and sustainable direct EU investment as well as public and private investments at national level; in combination with a reduced administrative burden reduced and a proper regulatory framework developed, with a view to stimulating potential growthsustainable growth and a swift transition towards a low-carbon economy;
Amendment 711 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Considers that symmetric shocks that are caused by a lack of supply must be diminished by improving thestructural factors affecting the 'supply side' of the economy must be tackled by improving energy and resource efficiency, productivity and overall cost and non-cost competitiveness of the euro area via appropriate financial incentives, including via the financing of professional training or financial incentives for R&D spending;
Amendment 731 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Considers that financial instability in the financial sector could also pose severe challenges for the euro area as a whole; urges the completion of the Banking Union in order to lessen these challenges; calls for the fiscal capacityEMF to operate as a fiscal backstop for the Banking Union, as agreed in the SRM;
Amendment 740 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Points out that this pillar of the fiscal capacity has to be of significant size in order to be able to address these euro- area-wide shocks and to finance its functions the optimal solution would be to rely on additional own resources such as a new carbon tax, the financial transaction tax, a share of the corporate tax based on the CCCTB approach, ECB and ESM profits; insists that in any case in order to providsecure sufficient financial resources, the euro area fiscal capacity, includingor the second arm of the EMF, should be able to increaseallow the issuance of common equities via a rise in guarantees; considers that these common issued equities should have the highest credit rate;
Amendment 749 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37 a (new)
Paragraph 37 a (new)
37a. Stresses that the European Fund for Strategic Investment is in its current form is unable to fully address the structural Investment Gap of the European Economy; calls for additional measures to ensure sufficient levels of investment; underlines that investments to foster energy transition, meeting the COP21 goals and generating new quality jobs should be prioritised;
Amendment 752 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
38. Stresses that the Community method should prevail in the development of economic governance for the euro area; urges that no reinforcement of intergovernmental structures should take place in parallel with existing structurese intergovernmental structures and mechanisms created over the crisis to be integrated in the community acquis as soon as possible; is of the opinion that genuine Fiscal and Budgetary Union requires a comprehensive and convention driven Treaty revision as a necessary condition for ensuring a appropriate level of democratic legitimacy and accountability;
Amendment 759 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 a (new)
Paragraph 38 a (new)
38a. Highlights that in case a budgetary capacity as developed in this report is established, the European Parliament needs to establish a specific committee composed of MEPs from participating Member States – mirrored in form of a specific plenary configuration - to act as budgetary and oversight authority.
Amendment 761 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
Paragraph 39
39. Calls urgently for the European Parliament and national parliaments to be given a strengthened role in the renewed economic governance framework in order to reinforce democratic accountability; calls in this respect to subject the analysis and the recommendations on the Euro Area aggregate fiscal stance to consent in the EMU committee; considers that the Annual Growth Survey should include detailed policy guidelines which should underpin the formulation of outcome- oriented policy recommendations to address macroeconomic imbalances and foster the implementation of sustainable structural reforms, calls for the Commission to be fully accountable to the European Parliament regarding the Annual Growth Survey and for increased national ownership in the European Semester in order to improve compliance withthe democratic accountability of the CSRs;
Amendment 779 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
40. Argues that national ownership could be improved by including national parliaments in the proceduresparliaments should endorse the National reform programme and the Stability Programme; insists, however, that the competences of the EP and the national parliaments conferred upon these institutions by the Treaties should be respected and that mixing of these competences be avoided;
Amendment 795 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Considers that in order to provide for a genuine EMU, a euro area treasury should be created for collective decision- making, supervision and management of the budgetary capacity for the euro area; calls for the inclusion of this treasury within the European Commission with full macroeconomic, fiscal and financial competences; calls for a vice-president of the European Commission to head the treasury and simultaneously to act as president of the Eurogroup; urges full accountability of this treasury to the European Parliament;
Amendment 812 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Considers that those non-euro countries that do not have an opt-out will eventually become part of the EMUeuro area and therefore may join the governance framework on a voluntary basis with a special status;
Amendment 823 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Acknowledges that the current political climate characterised by deep inequality, mistrust and uncertainty is not conducive to proper reforms to achieve and complete EMU; believes, therefore, that a comprehensive roadmap, including clear milestones and a convention driven Treaty revision within an agreed timetable and taking into account the political situation, should be urgently adopted with a clear commitment by euro area Heads of State and Government to achieving a genuine and complete EMU;
Amendment 829 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44
Paragraph 44
44. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Commission, the Council, the Eurogroup and, the ECB, and the national parliaments.