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Activities of Ernest URTASUN related to 2019/2130(INI)

Shadow reports (1)

REPORT on Banking Union – annual report 2019
2020/02/26
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2019/2130(INI)
Documents: PDF(173 KB) DOC(73 KB)
Authors: [{'name': 'Pedro MARQUES', 'mepid': 197634}]

Amendments (31)

Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 27 a (new)
- having regard to the European Commission’s withdrawal of the proposal on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions COM (2014)0043,
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
B a. whereas a well-functioning market for retail financial services is important for both the economy and citizens of the EU;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B b (new)
B b. whereas the Banking Union still lacks measures to tackle the root causes of the problems consumers are facing: artificial complexity, unfair commercial practices, exclusion of vulnerable groups from using basic services as well as limited involvement of public authorities;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Is of the opinion that while there is an urgent need to limit the damage due to failures within the current structure of the banking system, structural reforms aimed at reducing a priori the systemic risks due to interconnections and complexity, underpinning the “too big to fail problem”, would be much more effective;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 104 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Underlines the crucial role of the banking sector in channelling funding into sustainable investments and enabling the transition to a climate-neutral economy; stresses that a precondition for such an endeavour is a unified classification system for economic activities that needs to be expanded in order to cover activities beyond the ones currently envisaged in the text of the Taxonomy Regulation under negotiation, notably including activities that are considered unsustainable ("brown taxonomy"); further urges the revision of the Non Financial Reporting Directive in order to include ESG-related reporting and disclosure obligations as well as expand its scope to undertakings with less than 500 employees;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Calls on Union and national competent authorities for the banking sector to pay attention to the work and, where possible, implement recommendations from the United Nations Principles for Responsible Banking, the Sustainable Banking Network and the Network of Central Banks and Supervisors for Greening the Financial System;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5 b. Calls for the establishment of an EU-wide binding green bond standard and the definition a favourable framework for the development of such bonds in order to enhance transparency, effectiveness and credibility of sustainable investments;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7 a. Regrets that the Commission and the large majority of EU governments have so far failed in promoting greater gender balance in EU institutions and bodies, particularly with regard to high- level appointments in economic, financial and monetary affairs; calls on the governments of the Member States, the European Council, the Eurogroup and the Commission to actively work towards gender balance in their upcoming proposals for shortlists and appointments, endeavouring to include at least one female and one male candidate per nomination procedure; reiterates the Parliament’s commitment not to take into account lists of candidates where the gender balance principle has not been respected;1a _________________ 1aEuropean Parliament resolution of 14 March 2019 on gender balance in EU economic and monetary affairs nominations (2019/2614(RSP))
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 150 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Notes that the ratio of non- performing loans (NPLs) held by significant institutions has fallen by more than half from the start of ECB banking supervision, in November 2014, to June 2019; underlines the need to protect customers’ rights in the context of NPL transactions; is deeply concerned that in the Commission’s recent proposal the development of secondary markets for non-performing loans does not go hand in hand with strong consumer protection requirements; urges the Commission in the upcoming revision of the Consumer Credit Directive to lay down more ambitious provisions on borrowers protection against abusive practises;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 163 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 a (new)
9 a. Notes with concern that the European Commission referred Croatia, Cyprus, Portugal and Spain to the Court of Justice for failing to fully enact the Mortgage Credit Directive (2014/17/EU), meaning their citizens cannot benefit from the protection guaranteed by the Directive when taking out their mortgage loans or when they experience difficulties repaying it; recalls that only in Spain since the beginning of the crisis 500.000 families have lost their houses and are still paying the debt to the bank due to the foreclosure law;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 165 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9 b. Is alarmed that recent banking crises have revealed that credit institutions have routinely mis-sold bonds and other financial products to retail customers; calls supervisory and resolution authorities to vigorously enforce the newly introduced BRRD provisions on consumer protection with respect to MREL eligible liabilities; urges the Commission to assess the mis-selling of financial products by banking institutions and based on the findings to come up with appropriate legislative proposals;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 c (new)
9 c. Stresses that an effective system of European financial supervision necessitates far-reaching product intervention powers by the European Supervisory Authorities to take action where financial and credit products have resulted in or are likely to result in consumer detriment; regrets that these powers remain currently temporary and exceptional; calls on the co-legislators to enhance the ESAs powers in the upcoming MIFIR/MIFID revision;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 168 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Notes that work on the implementation of the final Basel III standards has already started; is concerned about already existing EU deviations from the multilateral agreement found within the BCBS; recalls its resolution of 23 November 2016 on the finalisation of Basel III and calls on the Commission to act on the recommendations therein when drafting the new legislative proposals; is concerned about statements by Commissioner Dombrovskis that the Commission intends to use the maximum possible phase-in period for the implementation of the final Basel III standards; urges the Commission to transpose the final Basel III standards into European law fully and in timely fashion and warns against offsetting higher Pillar 1 requirements by lowering Pillar 2 requirements as this would go counter the very objective of Basel III to make the riskiest institutions more viable;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10 a. Notes the risk reduction measures achieved in the recent Banking Package; underlines that while some measures have been taken on the liabilities side of the banks’ balance sheets, risks related to the asset side remain largely unaddressed; underlines the absence of robust requirements on large exposures in particular to shadow banks, crossholdings as well as macro-prudential standards such loan to value ratios (LTVs); is convinced that financial stability would be better served by a less complex regulatory system combined with higher requirements, notably a substantially higher leverage ratio;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 175 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 b (new)
10 b. Recalls that national options and discretions (ONDs) set out in EU law concerning banking supervision are meant to be of a transitory nature; calls for harmonising ONDs as far as possible in the strive to achieve a truly single rulebook;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 176 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 c (new)
10 c. Notes that in its report assessing risks and vulnerabilities of the EU banking sector, EBA points to differences in the application and setting of the O-SII buffer among Member States; calls, thus, for further harmonising application of capital buffers across the EU to create a level playing field;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 177 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 d (new)
10 d. Is concerned that the European Banking Authority warned about delivering its proposals for reducing the administrative burden for small institutions not within the deadline set by co-legislators in the banking package; asks for more proportionality in banking regulation;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 186 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Notes that innovative financial technologies are profoundly transforming the financial sector, including banking and payment services; highlights the need to address the challenges posed by these new technologies, such as ensuring sustainable business models, a level playing field in terms of regulation and supervision, and cybersecurity; acknowledges that legal and supervisory action need to be taken to address the money laundering and terrorism financing risks posed by virtual assets;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 194 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Notes that there is considerable interconnectedness between the ‘shadow banking’ sector and the ‘traditional’ banking sector, which raises concerns of systemic risk given the lack of appropriate supervision of the first; calls, in this regard, forunderlines that the 2018 EU Shadow Banking Monitor by the ESRB stresses several risks and vulnerabilities which need to be monitored in the EU shadow banking system including liquidity risk and risks associated with leverage among some types of investment funds, interconnectedness and contagion risk, pro-cyclicality, leverage and liquidity risk created through the use of derivatives and securities financing transactions as well as vulnerabilities in some parts of the financial institutions sector, where significant data gaps prevent a definitive risk assessments; calls, in this regard, for coordinated action to address these risks including the establishment of a macroprudential toolkit to counter threats to financial stability posed by the increasing role of the ‘shadow banking’ system;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 205 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Welcomes the agreement on the exchange of information between the ECB and the AML/CFT supervisors; recalls its serious concern about regulatory and supervisory fragmentation in the AML/CFT area, which is ill-suited to supervise the increasing cross-border activity in the EU; is convinced that the SSM has also a role to play in combatting money laundering; welcomes the set-up of a dedicated anti-money laundering unit; urges the SSM to further step up its efforts; calls on the Commission to start working on the overhaul of the EU AML framework and legislation to effectively address the risks posed by cross-border illegal activity to the integrity of the EU financial system and the security of EU citizens;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Recalls its resolution of 8 June 2011 on credit rating agencies: future perspectives; notes that the creation of a European credit rating agency would contribute to increasing competition, reducing information asymmetries and increasing transparency for markets; notes that sustainability ratings based on environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria arcan gradually become an important complement to the credit risk assessments provided by credit ratings in channelling funds towards investments in sustainable activities; warns, however, that in the absence of a classification system on which activities are sustainable and conversely unsustainable as well as of a robust methodology to translate ESG related factors to risk weights for assets, merely lowering capital requirements for alleged "green investments" can have severe implications for financial stability;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 221 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Notes the need to increase efforts to make financial market activity more consistent with sustainability objectives and ESG criteria, underlining the central role of the ESAs in these objectives; urges in this respect the ESAs, in particular the EBA, in collaboration with the ESRB, to develop a common methodology for “carbon stress tests” measuring the intensity of climate risks to which financial institutions are exposed, including risks related to the depreciation of assets due to changes to the regulatory treatment stemming from climate change mitigation and adaptation; considers that such tests shall identify and assess risk stemming inter alia from the macroeconomic impact of sudden changes in energy use, the revaluation of carbon intensive assets including potential changes related to their regulatory treatment and a rise in the incidence of natural catastrophes;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 231 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 a (new)
18 a. Is deeply alarmed by the fact that 5 years after the establishment of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), institutions in the Banking Union lack fully compliant resolution plans; points out in this respect that for resolution plans to be fully compliant with the legal requirements, the Single Resolution Board needs to provide a comprehensive assessment on each bank’s resolvability, including as to whether substantive impediments to resolvability exist and how those impediments can be removed; is concerned by the acknowledgment by the SRB that "resolution plans adopted so far contain considerations regarding resolvability but not yet contain a fully- fledged resolvability assessment"1b; underlines that gradual phase in of resolution planning and assessment is not foreseen in the current legal framework; urges the SRB to develop fully-fledged plans for all the groups under its direct remit including identification and removal of any significant impediments to resolvability in the course of the2020 resolution planning cycle; _________________ 1b https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/foll owup_reply_to_written_question_z038_20 19_by_mep_sven_giegold.pdf
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 235 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 b (new)
18 b. Is further concerned that the SRB does not regularly disclose the extent to which banks comply with MREL target; urges the SRB to formulate binding MREL target levels for all banks under its remit and to take action if banks do not meet these targets;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 236 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 c (new)
18 c. Notes that in its recent decision the Commission concluded that extensive public support granted to a German Landesbank does not constitute state aid on the basis that the recapitalisation of the bank and the additional provision of state guarantees took place under conditions that a private investor would have accepted (MEOP principle); remains, however, unconvinced whether the newly proposed business plan will enable the bank to return to profitability given that the approval by the Commission of the bank’s restructuring plan in 2012 has proven to be overly optimistic; underlines in this respect that support granted by an Institutional Protection Scheme cannot automatically meet the market economy operator principle as a private investor is only concerned with the expected return on the investment, not the costs associated with the alternative scenario of the bank’s failure; is further of the opinion that exempting from State aid rules investments by IPSs to affiliated failing institutions would undermine the level playing field in the Banking Union;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 237 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 d (new)
18 d. Notes that in two recent Italian cases, albeit the SRB had concluded that the resolution was not warranted in the public interest, the Commission approved State aid on the basis that it mitigates economic disturbance at regional level resulting in the “banks’ senior creditors being better off in insolvency than they would have been in resolution” 1c; is concerned that in the absence of clarity in the 2013 Banking communication on what constitutes a serious impact on the regional economy, the rules on liquidation aid leave room for Member States to effectively re-instate at the local level the public interest that the SRB has denied at national level; urges, therefore, the Commission to revise its long overdue 2013 Banking Communication in consistency with the BRRD principle; underlines respectively that the assessment of the public interest criterion under BRRD shall take due account of the likelihood of public funds being used when resolution is not triggered and national insolvency proceedings applied; _________________ 1c EBA Chair, http://www.lastampa. it/2017/07/19/esteri/lastampa-in- english/enria-eba-we-warned-italy-in- about-risks-for-banks- ZqtCBNa7Yp1d¬PEtxY5CHWI/pagina.ht ml.
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 238 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 e (new)
18 e. Further notes that the current diversity of insolvency regimes is a source of uncertainty about the outcome of liquidation procedures; is of the opinion that in order for the banking union to function effectively, insolvency laws need to be further harmonised towards an EU- wide regime, that would provide the same level of certainty in liquidation as it is expected in resolution; underlines, inter alia, the need for harmonization of triggers for insolvency proceedings in Member States and their alignment with the withdrawal of a bank’s licence in order to prevent “limbo” situations, where a bank is declared as “failing or likely to fail” but there is neither public interest to start a resolution action nor do national laws allow the initiation of liquidation proceedings;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 239 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18 f (new)
18 f. Calls on the Commission to assess whether the banking sector has benefited since the beginning of the crisis from implicit subsidies and State aid by means of the provision of unconventional liquidity support; points out that while the effects on the real economy have been rather limited, ECB’s liquidity operations have enabled banks to access funding at very low cost or even with negative interest rates and against lower quality of collateral; considers that this has directly subsidised their balance sheets in a framework that escapes the established democratic checks and balances for granting public subsidies; deplores the fact that the size of this subsidy, is not monitored and published and that it is free from strict conditionality in terms of whether or how it is invested; insists that any extraordinary measures of this kind should be accompanied by measures to mitigate distortions to markets and the economy;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 262 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21 a. Is deeply concerned that the Banking Union still lacks its third pillar, namely a robust European deposit guarantee scheme that would ensure the protection of deposits across the entire Banking Union, regardless of their geographic location, and significantly reduce the negative link between banks and their home sovereign;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 263 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21 b. Stresses that while EDIS may initially provide repayable liquidity support, this cannot be the end-stage but only a transitional phase to a fully-fledged EDIS;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON
Amendment 268 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Urges the completion of the Banking Union through the creation of a fully mutualised EDIS, to protect depositors against banking disruptions and to ensure confidence among depositors and investors across the Banking Union; is of the opinion that while EDIS must provide full liquidity and loss coverage, it should preserve Institutional Protection Schemes (IPSs) that should be treated as a single entity for EDIS purposes; welcomes the support of the [incoming] President of the Commission and the President of the ECB for the establishment of EDIS;
2019/12/18
Committee: ECON