BETA

79 Amendments of Ernest URTASUN related to 2023/0112(COD)

Proposal for a directive
Recital 9

(9) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business model, if the tools available under national law are not adequate to manage its failure. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In particular, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical even if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services only at regional or sectoral level.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

René REPASI, Ernest URTASUN, Andreas SCHWAB

Proposal for a directive
Recital 33 a (new)

(33a) Notwithstanding current secrecy rules applicable, information exchange between resolution authorities and tax authorities should be improved. Such exchanges should be in line with national law, and, where the information originates in another Member State, it should only be disclosed with the express agreement of the relevant authority which has disclosed it.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Recital 37

(37) Directive 2014/59/EU partially harmonised the ranking of deposits under national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings. Those rules provided for a three-tier ranking of deposits, whereby covered deposits had the highest priority ranking, followed by eligible deposits of natural persons and micro, smaller and medium-sized enterprises above the coverage level. The remaining deposits, i.e. deposits of large corporates exceeding the coverage level and deposits that are not eligible for repayment by the DGS, were required to have a lower priority ranking, but their position was not otherwise harmonised. Finally, the claims of DGSs benefitted from the same higher priority ranking as covered deposits. Nevertheless, this has not proved to be the optimal solution for depositor protection. Partial harmonisation created differences in the treatment of those remaining depositors across Member States, in particular as an increasing number of Member States have decided to also grant a legal preference to the remaining deposits. Those differences also created difficulties when determining the insolvency counterfactual for cross- border groups during the resolution valuations. Furthermore, the lack of general depositor preference along with the three-tiered ranking of depositors’ claims had the potential to create problems regarding compliance with the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle, particularly when the deposits the priority of which had not been harmonised by Directive 2014/59/EU ranked at the same level as senior claims. Lastly, the high priority ranking given to the claims of DGSs had not made it possible for the available financing means of those schemes to be used in a more efficient and effective way in interventions other than the payout of covered deposits in insolvency, namely in the context of resolution, alternative measures in insolvency or preventive measures. The protection of covered deposits does not rely on the priority ranking of the claims of the DGS but is instead ensured through the mandatory exclusions from bail-in in resolution and the prompt repayment from the DGS in case of unavailability of deposits. Therefore, the ranking of deposits in the current hierarchy of claims should be amended.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Recital 38

(38) The ranking of all deposits should be fully harmonised through the implementation of a ~~general depositor preference with a single~~two-tiered approach, whereby ~~all~~eligible deposits ~~benefit from a higher priority ranking over ordinary unsecured claims, without any differentiation between different types of deposits~~, DGS and corporate deposits held for payment and settlement purposes rank above non- eligible deposits and large corporates deposits held for investment purposes. . At the same time, the use of the deposit guarantee schemes in resolution, insolvency and in preventive measures should always remain subject to compliance with the relevant conditionality, in particular the so-called ‘least cost test’.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Recital 39

(39) A ~~general depositor preference~~two-tiered approach will contribute to reinforcing depositors’ confidence and to further prevent the risk of bank runs. Enhanced depositor protection is also aligned with the central role deposits play in the real economy, being the primary tool for savings and for payments, as well as in the banking activity, where the deposits represent an important source of funding and are a key driver of confidence in the banking system, which becomes of particular relevance in times of market stress. Moreover, a ~~general depositor preference~~two- tiered approach improves the resolvability of institutions and entities by increasing their ability to comply with the requirements to access the resolution financing arrangements and decreasing the amount of funding required from those arrangements, due to the lower risk of breaching the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle where bailing-in ordinary unsecured debt. In particular, the removal of deposits from the insolvency class of ordinary unsecured claims would increase the bail-inability of remaining ordinary unsecured claims by minimising the risk of breaches of the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle. By reducing the likelihood of deposits being written down or converted to ensure access to the resolution financing arrangements, the general depositor preference would contribute to making the bail-in tool more effective and credible and would lead to an increase of the transparency and legal certainty of the resolution framework. The general depositor preference would also contribute to the credibility of transfer strategies in resolution, as it would facilitate the inclusion of the entire deposit contract in the perimeter of liabilities to be transferred to a private purchaser or to a bridge institution, to the benefit of the customer relationship and the franchise value of the institution under resolution. Lastly, a full harmonisation of the insolvency ranking of depositors would be beneficial from the cross-border and level playing field perspective.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Recital 40

(40) A single-tiered approach for the priority ranking of deposits under national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings contributes to a more efficient and less costly protection of all deposits. For covered deposits, that approach facilitates the financing by the DGS of measures other than the payout of covered deposits, which can be more effective and less disruptive in protecting access to the deposited funds as they do not lead to an interruption of access to bank accounts and payment services. For the deposits that are not covered, that approach facilitates their protection where necessary for the protection of financial stability and depositor confidence. Finally, by introducing flexibility in the use of those potentially less costly mechanisms for depositor protection, that approach minimises the immediate disbursement needs of the DGSs, thereby ensuring a better preservation of their available financing means in case other crises occur and decreasing the burden on the banking sector, who are called to replenish those funds.deleted

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Recital 41

(41) The changes to the priority ranking of deposits, in particular the elimination of the higher ranking of covered deposits and the claims of the DGSs relative to all other deposits, would not negatively affect the protection afforded to covered deposits in the event of failure, as that protection would continue to be guaranteed through the mandatory exclusion of covered deposits from loss absorption in case of resolution and, ultimately, by the payout provided by the DGS in event of unavailability of deposits.deleted

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Recital 46

(46) Given the possibility to use DGS in resolution, it is necessary to specify further the way in which the DGS contribution can count towards the calculation of the requirements to access resolution financing arrangements. If the contribution made by shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution through reductions, write-down or conversion of their liabilities, summed with the contribution made by the DGS, amounts to at least 8 % of the institution’s total liabilities including own funds, the institution should be able to access the resolution financing arrangement to receive further funding, where necessary to ensure effective resolution in line with the resolution objectives. If those conditions are met, the contribution of the DGS should be limited to the amount necessary to enable access to the resolution financing arrangement. To ensure that resolution continues to be primarily financed by the institution’s internal resources and to minimise distortions of competition, the possibility to use the DGS contribution to ensure access to resolution financing arrangements should only be possible for institutions for which the resolution plan or the group resolution plan does not provide for their winding up in an orderly manner in case of failure, given that the MREL determined by resolution authorities for those institutions has been set at a level that includes both the loss absorption and the recapitalisation amounts.deleted

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 35

(35) ‘critical functions’ means activities, services or operations the discontinuance of which is likely in one or more Member States to lead to the disruption of services that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt financial stability at national or regional level, due to the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity, relative importance in a specific economic sector or cross- border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations;;

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point d a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 90 a (new)

(da) the following point is inserted: (90a) ‘significant branches’ means a branch of a credit institution that has been considered significant in accordance with Article 51 of Directive 2013/36/EU

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 97 a (new)

(ea) the following point is inserted: (97a) ‘retail deposits’ means a deposit that is held by a natural person or a small and medium enterprise as defined in Article 3(2) and 3(3) of Directive 2013/34/EU

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 97 b (new)

(eb) the following point is inserted: (97b) ‘corporate deposit for payment and settlement purposes’ means a deposit held by a legal person which have all the following features: (a) it is payable at par on demand; (b) it is able to provide payment and settlement services; (c) it does not bear interest; (d) it is not a financial instrument as defined in Article 4(1)(15) of Directive 2014/65/EU;

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point e c (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 97 c (new)

(ec) the following point is inserted: (97c) ‘Other corporate deposit’ means a deposit held by a legal person which is not a corporate deposit for payment and settlement purposes;

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

In the absence of changes referred to in the first subparagraph in 12 months following the latest annual update of the recovery plan, the competent authorities may exceptionally waive, until the subsequent 12-month period, the obligation to update the recovery plan.deleted

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 5 – paragraph 4

4. Recovery plans shall include, where applicable, an analysis of how and when an institution may apply, in the conditions addressed by the plan, for the use of central bank facilities not excluded from the scope of the recovery plan pursuant to paragraph 3 and identify on a regular and at least on a quarterly basis those assets which would be expected to qualify as collateral.;

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 5 – paragraph 8

(2a) in Article 5, paragraph 8 is replaced by the following: "Member States ~~may~~shall provide that competent authorities have the power to require an institution to maintain detailed records of financial contracts to which the institution concerned is a party. " Or. en (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 5 – paragraph 10 a (new)

(2b) in Article 5, the following paragraph 10a is added: "10a. EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards specifying the methodology for determining a significant deterioration of the financial situation referred to in paragraph 1 and the changes to the legal or organizational structure of the institution, its business or its financial situation referred to in paragraph 2.EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 6 months [ please insert 12 after entry into force of this Directive]. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 c (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 6 – paragraph 2 – point a

(2c) in Article 6(2), point (a) is replaced by the following: "(a) the implementation of the arrangements proposed in the plan is reasonably likely to maintain or restore ~~the viabil~~within a reasonable timeframe the viability, liquidity and financial position of the institution or of the group, taking into account the preparatory measures that the institution has taken or has planned to take; " Or. en (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2 d (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 6 – paragraph 4

(2d) in Article 6, paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: "4. The competent authority shall provide the recovery plan to the resolution authority. The resolution authority ~~may~~shall examine the recovery plan with a view to identifying any actions in the recovery plan which may adversely impact the resolvability of the institution and make recommendations to the competent authority with regard to those matters. " Or. en (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0059)

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 6 – paragraph 5 – subparagraph 1

5. Where the competent authority assesses that there are material deficiencies in the recovery plan, or material impediments to its implementation, or where the resolution authority makes recommendations referred to in paragraph 4, the competent authority shall notify the institution or the parent undertaking of the group of its assessment and shall require the institution to submit, within 31 months, extendable with the authorities’ approval by 1 month, a revised plan demonstrating how those deficiencies or impediments are addressed.;

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)

(3a) in Article 6, paragraph 6 is replaced by the following: "6. If the institution fails to submit a revised recovery plan, or if the competent authority determines that the revised recovery plan does not adequately remedy the deficiencies or potential impediments identified in its original assessment, and it is not possible to adequately remedy the deficiencies or impediments through a direction to make specific changes to the plan, the competent authority shall require the institution to identify within a ~~reasonable~~specified timeframe changes it can make to its business in order to address the deficiencies in or impediments to the implementation of the recovery plan. If the institution fails to identify such changes within the timeframe set by the competent authority, or if the competent authority assesses that the actions proposed by the institution would not adequately address the deficiencies or impediments, the competent authority may or direct the institution to take any measures it considers to be ~~necessary and proportion~~appropriate, taking into account the seriousness of the deficiencies and impediments and the effect of the measures on the institution’s business. The competent authority may, without prejudice to Article 104 of Directive 2013/36/EU, direct the institution to: (a)reduce the risk profile of the institution, including liquidity risk; and restore within a specified timeframe the liquidity coverage ratio to a certain threshold above the minimum requirement established in Regulation (EU) N° 575/2013; (b)enable timely recapitalisation measures; (c)review the institution’s strategy and structure; (d)make changes to the funding strategy so as to improve the resilience of the core business lines and critical functions; (e)make changes to the governance structure of the institution. The list of measures referred to in this paragraph does not preclude Member States from authorising competent authorities to take additional measures under national law. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 9 – paragraph 1 – first subparagraph

(4a) In Article 9(1), the first subparagraph is replaced by the following: "1. For the purpose of Articles 5 to 8, competent authorities shall require that each recovery plan includes a framework of indicators established by the institution which identifies the points at which appropriate actions referred to in the plan may be taken. The indicators shall at least include a minimum set of triggers developed under Article 27. Such indicators shall be agreed by competent authorities when making the assessment of recovery plans in accordance with Articles 6 and 8. The indicators may be of a qualitative or quantitative nature relating to the institution’s financial position and shall be capable of being monitored easily. Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions put in place appropriate arrangements for the regular monitoring of the indicators. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 2

(4b) in Article 10, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: "2. When drawing up the resolution plan, the resolution authority shall identify any material impediments to resolvability and, where ~~necessary and proportion~~appropriate, outline relevant actions for how those impediments could be addressed, according to Chapter II of this Title. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 c (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 4

(4c) in Article 10, paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: "4. The resolution plan shall include an analysis of how and when an institution may apply, in the conditions addressed by the plan, for the use of central bank facilities and shall identify those assets which would be expected to qualify as collateral. while providing a prudent estimation of its average yearly value in aggregate for central bank liquidity purposes taking due account of relevant haircuts. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 d (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 7

(4d) in Article 10, paragraph 7 is replaced by the following: "7. Without prejudice to Article 4, the resolution plan shall set out options for applying the resolution tools and resolution powers referred to in Title IV to the institution. It shall include, quantified whenever appropriate and possible: (a)a summary of the key elements of the plan; (aa) where applicable, a detailed description of the reasons for determining that an institution is to be qualified as a liquidation entity; (b)a summary of the material changes to the institution that have occurred after the latest resolution information was filed; (c)a demonstration of how critical functions and core business lines could be legally and economically separated, to the extent necessary, from other functions so as to ensure continuity upon the failure of the institution; (d)an estimation of the timeframe for executing each material aspect of the plan; (e)a detailed description of the assessment of resolvability carried out in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article and with Article 15; (f)a description of any measures required pursuant to Article 17 to address or remove impediments to resolvability identified as a result of the assessment carried out in accordance with Article 15; (g)a description of the processes for determining the value and marketability of the critical functions, core business lines and assets of the institution; (h)a detailed description of the arrangements for ensuring that the information required pursuant to Article 11 is up to date and at the disposal of the resolution authorities at all times;(i)an explanation by the resolution authority as to how the resolution options could be financed without the assumption of any of the following: (i)any extraordinary public financial support besides to the entity under resolution or entities acquiring parts of its business the use of the financing arrangements established in accordance with Article 100; (ii)any central bank emergency liquidity assistance;or (iii)any central bank liquidity assistance provided under non-standard collateralisation, tenor and interest rate terms; (j)a detailed description of the different resolution strategies that could be applied according to the different possible scenarios and the applicable timescales;(k)a description of critical interdependencies; (l)a description of options for preserving access to payments and clearing services and other infrastructures and, an assessment of the portability of client positions; (m)an analysis of the impact of the plan on the employees of the institution, including an assessment of any associated costs, and a description of envisaged procedures to consult staff during the resolution process, taking into account national systems for dialogue with social partners where applicable; (n)a plan for communicating with the media and the public; (o)the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities required pursuant to Article 45(1) and a deadline to reach that level, where applicable; (p)where applicable, the minimum requirement for own funds and contractual bail-in instruments pursuant to Article 45(1), and a deadline to reach that level, where applicable; (pa) a detailed and comprehensive list of eligible liabilities instruments including whether their holders qualify as retail or professional investors pursuant to Directive 2014/65/EU. (pb) a detailed and quantified list of covered deposits, retail deposits, corporate deposits for payment and settlement purposes and other corporate deposits as defined respectively in Article 2(1) points (95), (97), (98) and (98a) (q)a description of essential operations and systems for maintaining the continuous functioning of the institution’s operational processes; (r)where applicable, any opinion expressed by the institution in relation to the resolution plan. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4 e (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 8

(4e) in Article 10, paragraph 8 is replaced by the following: "8. Member States shall ensure that resolution authorities have the power to require an institution and an entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) to maintain detailed records of financial contracts to which it is a party. The resolution authority ~~may~~shall specify a time- limit within which the institution or entity referred to in point (b), (c) or (d) of Article 1(1) is to be capable of producing those records. The same time-limit shall apply to all institutions and all entities referred to in point (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) under its jurisdiction. The resolution authority may decide to set different time-limits for different types of financial contracts as referred to in Article 2(100). This paragraph shall not affect the information gathering powers of the competent authority. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 8 a

8a. Resolution authorities shall not adopt resolution plans where an institution is being wound up in accordance with the applicable national law pursuant to Article 32b or where Article 37(6) applies.;deleted

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 10 – paragraph 8 a a (new)

8aa. The resolution authority shall disclose on its website the resolution plans of institutions under its remit on an annual basis. Commercially sensitive information or information that is protected by statutory confidentiality provisions, shall be redacted from such disclosures.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 5 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 11 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

(5a) in Article 11(1), the second subparagraph is replaced by the following: "In particular the resolution authorities shall have the power to require within 24 hours, among other information, the information and analysis specified in Section B of the Annex. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3

The identification of the measures to be taken in respect of the subsidiaries referred to in the first subparagraph, point (b), that are not resolution entities may be subject to a simplified approach by resolution authorities if such approach does not negatively affect the resolvability of the group, taking into account the size of the subsidiary, its risk profile, the absence of critical functions and the group resolution strategy.;deleted

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3

(a) in paragraph 1, the following third and fourth subparagraph iss are added: ‘The identification of the measures to be taken in respect of the subsidiaries referred to in the first subparagraph, point (b), that are not resolution entities may be subject to a simplified approach by resolution authorities if such approach does not negatively affect the resolvability of the group, taking into account the size of the subsidiary, its risk profile, the absence of critical functions and the group resolution strategy.~~’ (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014L0059-20221114)~~ The group resolution plan shall also determine whether entities within a resolution group other than the resolution entity, qualify as liquidation entities. Without prejudice to other factors that may be deemed relevant by resolution authorities, entities that provide critical functions or critical services or are material subsidiaries pursuant Article 4(1) point 135 of Regulation (EU) 575/2013 shall not qualify as liquidation entities. " Or. en

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point a a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 12 – paragraph 2

(aa) in Article 12, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following: "2. The group resolution plan shall be drawn up on the basis of the requirements under Article 10 and the information provided pursuant to Article 11. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point a a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 12 – paragraph 3 – points a b and a c (new)

(aa) in paragraph 3, the following points (ab) and (ac) are inserted: "(ab) where a group comprises more than one resolution group, set out the resolution actions that are to be taken for the resolution entities of each resolution group and the implications of those actions on both of the following: (i) other group entities that belong to the same resolution group; (ii) other resolution groups; (ac) a detailed description of the reasons for determining that a group entity referred to in points (a) to (d) of paragraph 1 is to be qualified as a liquidation entity; " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 6 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 12 – paragraph 5 a

~~5a. Resolution authorities shall not adopt resolution plans where an entity is being wound up in accordance with the applicable national law pursuant to Article 32b or where Article 37(6) applies.;~~deleted

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 17 – paragraph 1

(9a) in Article 17, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: "1. Member States shall ensure that when, pursuant to an assessment of resolvability for an institution carried out in accordance with Articles 15 and 16, a resolution authority after consulting the competent authority determines that there are substantive impediments to the resolvability of that institution, the resolution authority shall notify in writing that determination to the institution concerned, to the competent authority and to the resolution authorities of the jurisdictions in which significant branches are located. The inability to provide any of the information required for the contents of the resolution plans under Article 10(7) to the satisfaction of the resolution authority shall be considered a substantive impediment to resolvability. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 8 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 16 a – paragraph 1 – introductory part

(9a) In Article 16a(1), the introductory part is replaced by the following: "Article 16a Power to prohibit certain distributions 1. Where an entity is in a situation where it meets the combined buffer requirement when considered in addition to each of the requirements referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 141a(1) of Directive 2013/36/EU, but it fails to meet the combined buffer requirement when considered in addition to the requirements referred to in Articles 45c and 45d of this Directive, when calculated in accordance with point (a) of Article 45(2) of this Directive, or where an entity fails to meet the requirements referred to in Articles 45c and 45d of this Directive, when calculated in accordance with point (b) of Article 45(2) of this Directive the resolution authority of that entity shall ~~have the power~~, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, to prohibit an entity from distributing more than the Maximum Distributable Amount related to the minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (‘M- MDA’), calculated in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article, through any of the following actions: ~~(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014L0059-20221114)~~" Or. en

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 9 b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 17 – paragraph 4

In identifying alternative measures, the resolution authority shall demonstrate how the measures proposed by the institution would not be able to remove the impediments to resolvability and how the alternative measures proposed are proportionate in removing them. (9b) in Article 17(4), the second subparagraph is replaced by the following: "The resolution authority shall take into account the threat to financial stability of those impediments to resolvability and the effect of the measures on the business of the institution, its stability and its ability to contribute to the economy. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 17 – paragraph 4 – subparagraphs 2 a (new) and 3

in Article 17(4), the following third and fourth subparagraph ~~is added:~~s are added: The institution shall have the right to demonstrate how the measures it proposed would be able to remove the impediments to resolvability and how the alternative measures proposed by the authority are unnecessarily burdensome in removing them. If the measures proposed by the entity concerned effectively reduce or remove the impediments to resolvability, the resolution authority shall take a decision, after consulting the competent authority. That decision shall indicate that the measures proposed effectively reduce or remove the impediments to resolvability and require the entity to implement the measures proposed.;

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 17 – paragraph 5 – introductory part

(10a) in Article 17, the introductory part of paragraph 5 is replaced by the following: "5. For the purposes of paragraph 4, resolution authorities shall ~~have the power to~~require the institution take any of the following measures: within a specified timeframe: " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 17 – paragraphs 8 a and 8 b (new)

(10b) in Article 17, paragraphs (8a) and (8b) are inserted: "8a. Taking into account, where appropriate, experience acquired in the application of the guidelines referred to in paragraph 8, EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify further details on the measures provided for in paragraph 5 and the circumstances in which each measure may be applied. EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by [please insert 1 year after entry into force of the amended Directive. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. 8b. The resolution authority shall publish at the end of each resolution planning cycle an anonymised list with identified impediments including substantive impediments to resolvability and relevant actions to address them. " Or. en (Directive 2014/59/EU)

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 – point -a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 18 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

(-a) In Article 18 (2), the first sub- paragraph is replaced by the following: "2. The group-level resolution authority, in cooperation with the consolidating supervisor and EBA in accordance with Article 25(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, shall prepare and submit a report to the Union parent undertaking, to the resolution authorities of subsidiaries, which shall provide it to the subsidiaries within their remit, and to the resolution authorities of jurisdictions in which significant branches are located. The report shall be prepared after consulting the competent authorities, and shall analyse the substantive impediments to the effective application of the resolution tools and the exercising of the resolution powers in relation to the group, and also in relation to resolution groups where a group is composed of more than one resolution group. The report shall consider the impact on the group's business model and recommend any proportionate and targeted measures that, in the view of the group- level resolution authority, are ~~necessary or~~ appropriate to remove those impediments. ~~(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014L0059-20221114)~~" Or. en

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11 – point a a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 18 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

~~Within four~~(aa) in paragraph 3, the first sub- paragraph is replaced by the following: "Within three months of the date of receipt of the report, the Union parent undertaking may submit observations and propose to the group-level resolution authority alternative measures to remedy the impediments identified in the report. ~~(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014L0059-20221114)~~" Or. en

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Member States shall ensure that competent authorities ~~may~~ apply early intervention measures where an institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d) meets any of the following conditions:

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 12

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 27 – paragraph 4

4. EBA shall, by … [PO please insert the date = 12 months from the date of entry into force of this amending Directive], issue ~~guidelines in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 to promote the consistent application of the triggers referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article~~draft regulatory technical standards in order to specify a minimum set of triggers for the use of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. Such triggers shall in particular take into account a rapidly deteriorating financial condition of an institution, including deteriorating liquidity situation, increasing level of leverage, non- performing loans or concentration of exposures, and include the institution’s own funds requirement plus at least 1,5 percentage points. Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 16

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 31 – paragraph 2 – point c

(c) to protect public funds by minimising reliance on extraordinary public financial support~~, in particular when provided from the budget of a Member State~~;

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point b – point -i (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – points a, b, c

(-i) in the first subparagraph, points (a), (b) and (c) are replaced by the following: (a) the institution infringes or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will, in the ~~near future~~following 12 months, infringe the requirements for continuing authorisation in a way that would justify the withdrawal of the authorisation by the competent authority including but not limited to because the institution has incurred or is likely to incur losses that will deplete part or all or a significant amount of its own funds; (b) the assets of the institution are or there are objective elements to support a determination that the assets of the institution will, in the ~~near future~~following 12 months, be less than its liabilities; (c) the institution is or there are objective elements to support a determination that the institution will, in the ~~near future~~following 12 months, be unable to pay its debts or other liabilities as they fall due

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32b – paragraph 3

3. Member States shall ensure that when a resolution authority determines that an institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), meets the conditions in Article 32(1), points (a) and (b), but not the condition in Article 32(1), point (c), the determination that the institution or entity is failing or likely to fail pursuant to Article 32(1), point (a) is a sufficient condition for the ~~withdrawal of the authorisation by the competent~~competent authority to withdraw the authoritysation pursuant to Article 18 of Directive 2013/36/EU.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 18

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32b – paragraph 4

4. Member States shall ensure that the withdrawal of the authorisation of the institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d) is a sufficient condition for a relevant national administrative or judicial authority to ~~be able to~~ initiate without delay the procedure to wind up the institution or entity in an orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national law.’:

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – title

Extraordinary ~~public~~ financial support

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Member States shall ensure that extraordinary ~~public~~ financial support outside of resolution action may be granted to an institution or entity as referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), on an exceptional basis only in one of the following cases and provided that the extraordinary public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework:

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point a

~~(a) where, to rem~~deletedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State or to preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial support takes any of the following forms: (i) facilities provided by central banks in accordance with the central banks’ conditions; (ii) liabilities; (iii) instruments other than Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, or of other capital instruments or a use of impaired assets measures, at prices, duration and other terms that do not confer an undue advantage upon the institution or entity concerned, where neither the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4), points (a), (b) or (c), nor the circumstances referred to in Article 59(3) are present at the time the public support is granted;State guarantee to back liquidity a State guarantee of newly issued an acquisition of own funds

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – point d

(d) where the extraordinary public financial support takes the form of State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU granted in the context of the winding up of the institution or entity pursuant to Article 32b of this Directive, other than the support granted by a deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 11(5) of Directive 2014/49/EU.deleted

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

The support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (~~a),~~b) shall fulfil all of the following conditions:

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point d

(d) the measures are not used to offset losses that the institution or entity has incurred or is likely to incur in the ~~near future~~following 12 months.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 4

~~The s~~Support meausures ~~referred to in paragraph 1~~may involve an acquisition of own funds instruments other than Common Equity Tier 1 instruments, or of other capital instruments or a use of impaired assets measures, at prices, duration and other terms that do not confer an undue advantage upon the institution or entity concerned, where neither the circumstances referred to in Article 32(4), points (a)~~(iii),~~, (b) or (c), nor the circumstances referred to in Article 59(3) are present at the time the public support is granted; The support shall be limited to measures that have been assessed by the competent authority as necessary to maintain the solvency of the institution or entity by addressing its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario of national, Union or SSM-wide stress tests or equivalent exercises conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities, where applicable, confirmed by the competent authority. Such support shall not be used to address a capital shortfall established in the baseline scenario of national, Union or SSM-wide stress tests or equivalent exercises conducted by the European Central Bank, EBA or national authorities.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 5

By way of derogation from ~~paragraph 1, point (a)(iii)~~the fourth subparagraph, acquisition of Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall be exceptionally permitted where the nature of the shortfall identified is such that the acquisition of any other own funds instruments or other capital instruments would not make it possible for the institution or entity concerned to address its capital shortfall established in the adverse scenario in the relevant stress test or equivalent exercise. The amount of acquired Common Equity Tier 1 instruments shall not exceed 2% of the total risk exposure amount of the institution or entity concerned calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 6

In case any of the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, ~~point (a),~~ is not redeemed, repaid or otherwise terminated in accordance with the terms of the exit strategy established at the time of granting such measure, the competent authority shall conclude that the condition laid down in Article 32(1), point (a), is met in relation to the institution or entity which has received those support measures, and shall communicate that assessment to the resolution authority concerned.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 23 – point b a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 36 – paragraph 13a (new)

(b a) The following paragraph 13a is inserted: '13a. The independent valuer shall have no duty or responsibility to shareholders or creditors of the institution under resolution and shall have no liability to such shareholders or creditors for acts and omissions when carrying out the valuation, unless the act or omission implies gross negligence or wilful misconduct in accordance with national law which directly affects rights of such shareholders or creditors.'

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 44 – paragraph 5 – point a

(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1)~~, and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 109~~ where relevant;

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 28 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 44a

Article 44a Selling of subordinated eligible liabilities to retail clients 1. Member States shall ensure that a seller of eligible liabilities which meet all conditions referred to in Article 72a of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 except for point (b) of Article 72a(1) and paragraphs 3 to 5 of Article 72b of that Regulation sells such liabilities to a retail client, as defined in point 11 of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU, only where all of the following conditions are fulfilled: (a) the seller has performed a suitability test in accordance with Article 25(2) of Directive 2014/65/EU; (b) the seller is satisfied, on the basis of the test referred to in point (a), that such eligible liabilities are suitable for that retail client; (c) the seller documents the suitability in accordance with Article 25(6) of Directive 2014/65/EU.Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, Member States may provide that the conditions laid down in points (a) to (c) of that subparagraph shall apply to sellers of other instruments qualifying as own funds or bail-inable liabilities. 2. Where the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are fulfilled and the financial instrument portfolio of that retail client does not, at the time of the purchase, exceed EUR 500 000 the seller shall ensure, on the basis of the information provided by the retail client in accordance with paragraph 3, that both of the following conditions are met at the time of the purchase: (a) the retail client does not invest an aggregate amount exceeding 10 % of that client's financial instrument portfolio in liabilities referred to in paragraph 1; (b) that initial investment amount invested in one or more liabilities instruments referred to in paragraph 1 is at least EUR 10 000 . 3. The retail client shall provide the seller with accurate information on the retail client's financial instrument portfolio, including any investments in liabilities referred to in paragraph 1. 4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the retail client's financial instrument portfolio shall include cash deposits and financial instruments, but shall exclude any financial instruments that have been given as collateral. 5. Without prejudice to Article 25 of Directive 2014/65/EU, and by way of derogation from the requirements set out in paragraphs 1 to 4 of this Article, Member States may set a minimum denomination amount of at least EUR 50 000 for liabilities referred to in paragraph 1, taking into account the market conditions and practices of that Member State as well as existing consumer protection measures within the jurisdiction of that Member State. 6. Where the value of total assets of entities referred to in Article 1(1) that are established in a Member State and are subject to the requirement referred to in Article 45e does not exceed EUR 50 billion, that Member State may, by way of derogation from the requirements set out in paragraphs 1 to 5 of this Article, apply only the requirement set out in paragraph 2(b) of this Article. 7. Member States shall not be required to apply this Article to liabilities referred to in paragraph 1 issued before 28 December 2020. (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014L0059-20221114)(28 a) Article 44a is replaced by the following: "Article 44a Selling of MREL eligible instruments to retail clients 1. Member States shall ensure that a seller of MREL eligible instruments qualifying as own funds or eligible liabilities sells such instruments to a retail client, as defined in point 11 of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU, only where all of the following conditions are fulfilled: (a) the seller has performed a suitability test in accordance with Article 25(2) of Directive 2014/65/EU; (b) the seller is satisfied, on the basis of the test referred to in point (a), that such instruments are suitable for that retail client; (c) the seller documents the suitability in accordance with Article 25(6) of Directive 2014/65/EU. Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, Member States may provide that the conditions laid down in points (a) to (c) of that subparagraph shall apply to sellers of other instruments qualifying as bail-inable liabilities. Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, Member States may provide that the conditions laid down in points (a) to (c) of that subparagraph shall apply to sellers of other instruments qualifying as bail-inable liabilities. 2. Where the conditions set out in paragraph 1 are fulfilled and the financial instrument portfolio of that retail client does not, at the time of the purchase, exceed EUR 500 000 the seller shall ensure, on the basis of the information provided by the retail client in accordance with paragraph 3, that the initial investment amount invested in one or more instruments referred to in paragraph 1 is at least EUR 50 000. 3. The retail client shall provide the seller with accurate information on the retail client's financial instrument portfolio, including any investments in instruments referred to in paragraph 1. 4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the retail client's financial instrument portfolio shall include cash deposits and financial instruments, but shall exclude any financial instruments that have been given as collateral. 7. Member States shall not be required to apply this Article to liabilities referred to in paragraph 1 issued before 28 December 2020. 7a. MREL eligible instruments sold without fulfilling the conditions under paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not count towards the requirements under Articles 45 to 45f of this Directive. 7b. Resolution authorities shall, as part of the assessment of resolvability in accordance with Articles 15 to 18 monitor the extent to which MREL eligible instruments are held by retail investors and report the results to EBA at least once per year. 7c. EBA shall disclose annually on a group or, where relevant, institution specific basis the amounts of MREL eligible instruments held by retail investors. Where, on the basis of this information, EBA deems it necessary, it shall issue warnings or recommendations for remedial action. 7d. By … [PO please insert the date = 18 months after the date of entry into force of this Directive], EBA shall report to the Commission on the application of this Article. That report shall compare the measures adopted by the Member States to comply with this Article, analyse their effectiveness in protecting retail investors and assess their impact on cross-border operations. On the basis of that report, the Commission may submit a legislative proposal to amend this Directive " Or. en

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point -a (new)

Directive 2014/59 EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part

(-a) in paragraph 3, the introductory part to the first subparagraph is replaced by the following: "For resolution entities, the amount referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 shall be at least the following: ~~(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014L0059-20221114)~~" Or. en

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point -a (new)

Directive 2014/59 EU
Article 45c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 2a (new)

~~(https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014L0059-20221114)~~(-a) In paragraph 3, the following subparagraph is inserted after the second subparagraph: "The resolution authority shall be able to adjust the requirement provided for in point (a)(i) of the first subparagraph, taking into account the information requested from the competent authority relating to the institution’s business model, funding model, and risk profile, and in order to reduce or remove an impediment to resolvability or absorb losses on holdings of MREL instruments issued by other group entities as well as whenever the combined buffer requirement is deemed irrelevant to ensure that losses can be absorbed in resolution. " Or. en

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. When applying Article 45c to a resolution entity whose preferred resolution strategy envisages ~~primarily the~~the exclusively use of the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool and its exit from the market, the resolution authority shall set the recapitalisation amount provided in Article 45c(3) in a proportionate way on the basis of the following criteria, as relevant:

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 32

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 45ca – paragraph 3

3. The application of paragraph 1 shall not result in an amount that is ~~high~~lower than 90% of the amount resulting from application of Article 45c(3).;

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 33

Directive 2014/59 EU
Article 45d – paragraph 1 – introductory part

The requirement referred to in Article 45(1) for a resolution entity that is a G-SII entity shall at least consist of the following:;

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point b a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 55 – paragraph 2a (new)

(b a) The following paragraph 2a is added: 2a. Institutions and entities referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), shall report to the resolution authority on an annual basis the following: (a) the total outstanding amounts of all liabilities governed by the law of a third country; (b) for the items referred in point (a): (i) their composition, including their maturity profile; (ii) their ranking in normal insolvency proceedings; (iii) whether the liability is excluded under Article 44(2); (iv) whether they include in the contractual provisions the term required by paragraph 1; (v) where a determination has been made that it is legally or otherwise impracticable to include the contractual recognition of bail-in clause in accordance with paragraph 2, the category of the liability pursuant to paragraph 7. Where institutions and entities are part of a resolution group, the report shall be done by the resolution entity concerning the resolution group, to the extent required by paragraph 1, second and third subparagraphs.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 41 – point b b (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 55 – paragraph 8a (new)

(b b) The following paragraph 8a is added: EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify procedures and uniform formats and templates for the reporting to resolution authorities referred to in paragraph 2a. EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by [PO please insert the date = 1 year after the date of entry into force of this Directive]. Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

René REPASI, Ernest URTASUN, Andreas SCHWAB

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 45 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 84 – paragraph 6 a (new)

(45 a) In Article 84, the following paragraph 6a is inserted: This Article shall not preclude the exchange of information between resolution authorities and tax authorities in the same Member State to the extent that such exchange is stipulated by national laws of Member States. Where this information originates in another Member State, it shall only be disclosed with the express agreement of the relevant authority which has disclosed it.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

René REPASI, Ernest URTASUN, Andreas SCHWAB

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 46 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 90 – paragraph 4a (new)

(46 a) In Article 90, the following paragraph is added: 4a. Article 84 shall not preclude the exchange of information between resolution authorities and tax authorities in the same Member State to the extent that such exchange is stipulated by national laws of Member States. Where this information originates in another Member State, it shall only be disclosed with the express agreement of the relevant authority which has disclosed it.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 52

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 102 – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

If, after the initial period of time referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, the available financial means diminish below the target level specified in that paragraph, the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 shall resume until the target level is reached. Resolution authorities may defer the collection of the regular contributions raised in accordance with Article 103 for 1 ~~or more~~ years where the amount to be collected reaches an amount that is proportionate to the costs of the collection process, provided that such deferral does not materially affect the capacity of the resolution authority to use the resolution financing arrangements pursuant to Article 101. After the target level has been reached for the first time and where the available financial means have subsequently been reduced to less than two thirds of the target level, those contributions shall be set at a level allowing for reaching the target level within 6 years.;

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 53 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 103 – paragraph 3

3. The available financial means to be taken into account in order to reach the target level specified in Article 102 may include irrevocable payment commitments which are fully backed by collateral of low risk assets unencumbered by any third party rights, at the free disposal and earmarked for the exclusive use by the resolution authorities for the purposes specified in Article 101(1). The share of irrevocable payment commitments shall not exceed 520 % of the total amount of contributions raised in accordance with this Article. Within that limit, the resolution authority shall determine annually the share of irrevocable payment commitments in the total amount of contributions to be raised in accordance with this Article.;

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 54 a (new)

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 104 – paragraph 3

(54 a) Article 104 (3) is replaced by the following: "3. The resolution authority may defer, in whole or in part, an institution’s payment of extraordinary ex-post contributions to the resolution financing arrangement if the payment of those contributions would jeopardise the liquidity or solvency of the institution. Such a deferral shall not be granted for a period of longer than six months but may be renewed once upon the request of the institution. The contributions deferred pursuant to this paragraph shall be paid when such a payment no longer jeopardises the institution’s liquidity or solvency. " Or. en (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0059)

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. Member States shall ensure that in their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have ~~the same~~a higher priority ranking~~, which is higher~~ than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors:

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point a

(a) ~~deposits~~the following claims that have a ranking priority higher than the ranking of claims referred to in point b): deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency, eligible deposits, corporate deposit held for payment and settlement purposes, deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union ;

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) ~~deposits made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union;~~other corporate deposits than those referred to in point a) and non-eligible deposits

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1 – point c

~~(c) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.;~~deleted

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 8

8. Where the resolution tools referred to in Article 37(3), point (a) or (b), are used to transfer only part of the assets, rights or liabilities of the institution under resolution, the resolution financing arrangement shall have a claim against the residual institution or entity referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), for any expense and loss incurred by the resolution financing arrangement as a result of any contributions made to resolution pursuant to Article 101(1) ~~in connection to losses which creditors would have otherwise borne~~.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

The contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, shall count towards the thresholds laid down in Article ~~44(5), point (a), and in Article~~ 44(8), point (a).

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 56 – point b

Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 109 – paragraph 2b – subparagraph 2

Where the use of the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to paragraph 1, second subparagraph, together with the contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities, allows for the use of the resolution financing arrangement, the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme shall be limited to the amount necessary to meet the thresholds laid down in Article ~~44(5), point (a), and in Article~~ 44(8), point (a). Following the contribution of the deposit guarantee scheme, the resolution financing arrangement shall be used in accordance with the principles governing the use of the resolution financing arrangement set out in Articles 44 and 101.

2023/11/06
Committee: ECON