9 Amendments of Luke Ming FLANAGAN related to 2018/2113(INI)
Amendment 1 #
Draft opinion
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas Parliament is mandated to ensures democratic control over the Commission, which is political in nature but includes different aspects and procedures;
Amendment 2 #
Draft opinion
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas, despite the Commission’s commitment to performance, activity- based budgeting is stillremains - regrettably - the fundamental principle in drafting the Union’s budget;
Amendment 3 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that scrutiny over the EU bodies is the raison d'être of the European Parliament and that the accountability of the Commission to Parliament is an underpinning principle of the functioning of the EU and of internal democratic control;
Amendment 4 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Points out that the discharge procedure has proved to be a powerful tool that has had an impact on the positive evolution of the EU’s budgetary system, financial management, the shaping of the agenda and the way EU policies are defined and implemented, while contributing to increasing Parliament’s political leverage;
Amendment 5 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that Parliament’s decision to grant, postpone or refuse the discharge is primarily, although not exclusively, based on the audit of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) that examines the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions; notes further that question- marks remain over the error-rate correction method employed by the same ECA (when the ECA does its audit and comes across areas that had already been audited by the Commission or relevant Member State, the corrections thus found, though they are known to have occurred exclusively in those previously audited areas, are treated as though those corrections had happened everywhere, as the subsequent error-rate correction is applied to the entire audit);
Amendment 6 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Welcomes, in particular, the fact that owing to its focus on financial performance, the evaluation report provided for in Article 318 TFEU should complements the compliance approach developed by the European Court of Auditors in its annual report and thus offers to the European Parliament the opportunity to assess policy achievements, with the caveat as noted above re the error-rate correction calculation method;
Amendment 8 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Notes with concern that no real legal sanction is available if Parliament decides not to grant discharge to the Commission;
Amendment 9 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 17 – introductory part
Paragraph 17 – introductory part
17. Notes with concern that the reality on the ground is very different:
Amendment 17 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. RecallNotes that the close political links between Parliament and the Commission were recently strengthened by the so-called Spitzenkandidaten system; welcomnotes this attempt to address the democratic deficit of the EU, to strengthen its legitimacy and build trust among EU citizens; recalls, however, the inherent risk related to party financing and calls on the Commission to address the shortcomings of the current political party financing model, in particular for those election candidates who are not members of any political party, in order to prevent fraud and ensure that the financing of electoral campaigns is fair to all candidates, and fully transparent.