4 Amendments of Paul TANG related to 2015/0270(COD)
Amendment 197 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20
Recital 20
(20) As the Deposit Insurance Fund, in the re-insurance stage, would only provide an additional source of funding and would only weaken the link between banks and their national sovereign, without however ensuring that all depositors in the Banking Union enjoy an equal level of protection, the reinsurance stage should, after three years, gradually progress into a co- insurance scheme and ultimately into a fully mutualised deposit insurance scheme. Additionally, a credit line from the European Stability Mechanism is needed to act as a common fiscal backstop.
Amendment 210 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22
Recital 22
(22) Safeguards should be built into EDIS so as to limit moral hazard risk and to ensure that the coverage by EDIS is only provided where nationals DGSs act in a prudent manner. Firstly, national DGSs should comply with their obligations under this Regulation, the Directive 2014/49/EU and other relevant EU law, in particular their obligation to build up their funds in accordance with Article 10 of Directive 2014/49/EU as further specified in this Regulation. In order to benefit from coverage by EDIS, participating DGSs need to raise ex-ante contributions in accordance with a precise funding path. This also implies that the possibility of a target level reduction in accordance with Article 10(6) of Directive 2014/49/EU is no longer available if the DGS wants to benefit from EDIS. Secondly, in case of a pay-out event or where its funds are used in resolution, a national DGS should bear a fair share of the loss themselves. It should therefore be required to collect ex-post contributions from its members to replenish its fund and to repay EDIS to the extent that the initially received funding exceeds the share of loss to be borne by EDIS. Thirdly, following a pay-out event, the national DGS should maximise the proceeds from the insolvency estate and repay the Board and the Board should have sufficient powers to safeguards its rights. Fourthly, the Board should have the powers to recover all or part of funding in case of a participating DGS did not comply with key obligations. Fifthly, in parallel with evolving into a fully mutualised co- insurance scheme over a number of years, further risk reducing measures should be taken and adhered to, including the harmonisation of the single rule book, the application of TLAC and MREL standards, a limitation to sovereign exposure, the transposition of measures from the Basel committee and the application of an effective European insolvency framework.
Amendment 216 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 22 a (new)
Recital 22 a (new)
(22a) The current reform of the financial services regulatory framework should lead to a strengthening of the overall financial position of European banks, and requires banks to prioritize bolstering capital requirement over their banks' revenue distribution, including employee bonuses and shareholder dividends. This can be attained, inter alia, via retained earnings.
Amendment 402 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 10 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014
Article 41c a (new)
Article 41c a Application The application of chapter 2 and 3 shall require that the banks affiliated to the participating DGS are subject to the principle that strengthening their financial position has priority above the banks' revenue distribution including employee bonuses and shareholder dividends, which shall be laid down in the following proposals: (a) Directive 2013/36/EU (the Capital Requirements Directive) concerning exemptions, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, supervisory measures and powers and capital conservation measures and clarifying the requirements for additional capital; (b) Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (the Capital Requirements Regulation), stipulating rules on a mandatory leverage ratio.