44 Amendments of Jonás FERNÁNDEZ related to 2015/2344(INI)
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)
Citation 6 a (new)
– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism;
Amendment 14 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 b (new)
Citation 6 b (new)
– having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism of 2 February 2012;
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 18 a (new)
Citation 18 a (new)
– having regard to articles 33.1.a) and 40.1 of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank Statute, and article 129.3 of the TFEU;
Amendment 55 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 c (new)
Paragraph 3 c (new)
3c. Points out that the ECB profits could feed in to the proposed fiscal capacity of the Eurozone, thereby increasing the resources available for the EUI and to increase investments and to fight poverty;
Amendment 59 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas contrary to the budgetary arrangements in all other federations, the EU budget is mostly dependent on contributions from Member State level to EU level;
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas, following renominal convergence in the run-up to the introduction of the common currency, the euro area witnessed structural divergence between 1999 and 2009, which made the euro area as a whole less resilient to shocks; whereas regulatory adjustments and structural reforms aimed at reducing risks and improving convergence have been introduced since 2009 at both European and national level, but some euro area Member States still require solidarity and sustainable reforms in their catching- upreal convergence process;
Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas progress has been achieved in addressing the flaws of EMU through legislation such as the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack regulations, as well as through the introduction of the European Semester and the creation of new instruments such ascreation of banking union and the ESM;
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas the attempt to strengthen the stability and growth pact with regards to its credibility and macro-economic coherence by means of the Six Pack, the Two Pack and the Fiscal Compact have added more complexity and less credibility than needed, proving to be a poor substitute for a more fundamental overhaul of euro area governance that will be required in order to achieve a sustainable balance between responsibility and solidarity within our common currency;
Amendment 108 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the Community method was largely abandoned in favour of intergovernmental agreements in order to allow for rapid responses inthe context of the crisis; whereas this has made the European Council the leading actor in the crisis, while the European Parliament and its national counterparts have been sidelined;
Amendment 126 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
Recital J a (new)
Ja. whereas article 310 of the TFEU does not prohibit the issuance of bonds by the Commission, as confirmed in particular by article 2 of Council Regulation (EU) No 407/2010 of 11 May 2010 establishing a European financial stabilisation mechanism;
Amendment 209 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Points out that the crisis has proved that a common monetary policy without a common fiscal policy cannot address asymmetric shocks to the euro area; reiterates that mere coordination of national fiscal policies without credible enforcement mechanisminstitutions has not prevented an investment gap, has proved insufficient to trigger growth-enhancing, sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms and has not enhanced the national capacity to absorb economic shocks;
Amendment 223 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. Observes that the stabilisation of the economic cycle since the beginning of the crisis has relied almost exclusively on the ECB, and that the reduced options available for monetary policy in a context of zero lower bound rates have led the ECB to implement unconventional monetary policy measures; recalls that the President of the ECB has called for integrated institutions, for in order to implement a stronger and proactive fiscal policy on the euro area scale and for euro area Member States to deliver on structural reform;
Amendment 224 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7 a (new)
Paragraph 7 a (new)
7a. Emphasises that the division of labour between monetary and fiscal policy for the euro area as currently enshrined in the treaties simply did not anticipate that monetary policy would ever reach the zero lower bound, and shortcoming that urgently needs to be corrected;
Amendment 259 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Makes it clear that rapid actionnd far reaching action, including changes to the Treaties, is needed to ensure the sustainability of the euro; stresses that this requires strong joint efforts on the part of the EU and its Member States to complete the EMU and to restore the trust of citizens and markets;
Amendment 276 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Believes that in order to regain trust from citizens and workers, the euro must deliver on its promise of stability, convergence, growth and jobs; regards a fiscal capacity as a vital element in this enterprise, which can be successful only if solidarity is closely linked to responsibility, meaning that financial support is provided on the basis of clear criteria;
Amendment 291 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance at or close to the zero lower bound, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; emphasises that a mechanism to achieve an aggregate fiscal stance in the future especially at or close to the zero lower bound as well as incentives for symmetric as opposed to asymmetric adjustment for accelerated macro-economic convergence in response to crises are essential for a proper functioning of the euro area; considers that a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;
Amendment 293 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Takes the view that incentives for sound fiscal policymaking and for addressing structural weaknesses at national level, taking into account the aggregate euro area fiscal stance and ensuring, that all Eurozone countries contribute to macroeconomic adjustment towards real convergence, including those who have greater fiscal space to be used to the benefit of the monetary union as a whole, are core elements for the functioning of the euro area; considers that beyond a proper use of the MIP between deficit and surplus countries, a fiscal capacity should, moreover, address specific concerns for the euro area in the case of absorbing shocks;
Amendment 353 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Considers that three different functions have to be fulfilled by the Eurozone fiscal capacity, which requires the setting up of a Euro area treasury ; argues, first, that in order to foster economic and social convergence within the euro area and to improve the economic competitiveness and resilience of the euro area, Member States’ structural reforms should be incentivised in good economic times; argues, secondly, that differences in the business cycles of euro area Member States stemming from structural differences create the need for an instrument to address asymmetric shocks; considers, thirdly, that symmetric shocks should be addressed so as to increase the resilience of the euro area as a whole;
Amendment 375 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Argues in consequence that three pillars of a fiscal capacity should be distinguished, wherein action should be undertaken in the framework of a common toolbox to address the different functions, i.e. incentivising convergence and sustainable structural reforms, absorbing asymmetric shocks, and absorbing symmetric shocks; takes note of the various proposals regarding designs put forward on this matter by politicians and academiacs;
Amendment 390 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Demands that the ESM be integrated into the Union’s legal framework and evolve towards a Community mechanism, as provided for in the ESM Treaty and as constantly requested by the European Parliament and foreseen in the Five Presidents’ report; underlines that the ECJ Pringle case-law and jurisprudence open up the possibility of bringing the ESM within the Union’s framework, within the existing Treaties, on the basis of Article 352 TFEU; calls, therefore, on the Commission to bring forward as a matter of urgency a legislative proposal to that end; demands that the ESM be made fully accountable to the European Parliament; proposes that the Eurozone Treasury within the Commission becomes the shareholder of the ESM in order to ensure that this institution functions in accordance to the Community method;
Amendment 408 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Calls for the ESM, whilst fulfilling its ongoing tasks, to be further developed and turned into a European Monetary Fund (EMF) with adequate lending and borrowing capacities and a clearly defined mandate, including its contribution to a euro area fiscal capacity; stresses that an EMF should be managed and owned by the Commission and held democratically accountable by the European Parliament; emphasises that national parliaments would be involved in the process, given that their constitutional prerogatives regarding financial resources could be affected;
Amendment 419 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20 a (new)
Paragraph 20 a (new)
20a. Suggests that the Commission can take advantage of the zero interest rate to issue bonds in order to finance the purchase of ESM shares back from Member States;
Amendment 437 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Considers that the fiscal capacity for the euro area should be funded by own resources of the EMU, including revenues from a financial transaction tax, and new financing instruments as Eurobonds;
Amendment 441 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21b. Stresses that a euro area fiscal capacity should be complemented by a long term strategy for debt sustainability and reduction of eurozone countries, including partial pooling and common management of sovereign debt, which would bring down overall re-financing costs and debt/GDP ratios to give more margin for growth enhancing policies and investment;
Amendment 442 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 b (new)
Paragraph 21 b (new)
21b. Considers that the ECB profits should feed into the Eurozone fiscal capacity, once discounted the current percentage set for reserves; points out that to this effect, OLP applies to the reform of Article 33.1.a) of the ECB Statute; believes that this is particularly relevant in a period of quantitative easing;
Amendment 447 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Considers that the EFSM and the balance of payment facility should be integrated into the same budgetary chapter as the ESM once the latter is integrated into Community law, thereby providing resources for financial assistance to countries outside the euro area but committed to joining on the basis of the agreed rules; points out that the that the said facilities are under the Commission, thus its integration in the ESM cannot result in its funding and assets becoming intergovernmental as it is the case with the current set-up of the ESM:
Amendment 465 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 4
Subheading 4
Pillar 1: A convergence code to promote convergence and, incentivise the implementation of structural reforms and facilitate the provision of euro area public goods
Amendment 481 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Stresses that significant progress in convergence and sustainable structural reforms is needed in order to reconcile fiscal consolidation, growth, jobs, productivity, competitiveness and the European social model so as to effectively prevent asymmetric shock; considers that financial support from the European level for the implementation of agreed and socially balanced structural reforms in the Member States, while keeping the responsibility for implementation at the national level, is therefore indispensable;
Amendment 488 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24 a (new)
Paragraph 24 a (new)
24a. Considers that structural reforms should be ecologically and socially balanced and aim at strengthening growth potential towards a fully sustainable new growth model, promoting fair and sustainable welfare systems and reducing social inequalities;
Amendment 511 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – introductory part
Paragraph 26 – introductory part
26. Suggests that the convergence and responsibility code define criteria to be reached within five years, building on the merits of the Maastricht criteria and focusing for the first period on convergence and responsibility requirements regarding:
Amendment 555 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1
– investment, notably in research and development;, healthcare and education,
Amendment 557 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
– Social cohesion, including EMU- wide minimum social standards;
Amendment 558 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 26 – indent 3 – paragraph 1 a (new)
– public goods with European relevance
Amendment 584 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Considers that a financial instrument is needed to work as an incentive-based mechanism for convergence and sustainable and socially balanced structural reforms with clear conditionality; believes that the Structural Reform Support Programme (SRSP), which is designed to provide technical support to national authorities for measures aimed at reforming institutions, governance, administration, and economic and social sectors with a view to enhancing growth and jobs, can be further developed as a contribution to this function of the fiscal capacity;
Amendment 601 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. Is convinced that increased convergence within the euro area will significantly increase the capacity of its Member States to absorb asymmetric shocks; believes, however, that no matter how great the efforts regarding convergence and sustainable and socially- balanced structural reforms, asymmetric shocks with an impact on the stability of the euro area as a whole cannot be ruled out completely, given the strong integration of the euro area Member States; stresses, therefore, the need to have an instrument available for this emergency which provides an immediate stabilisation effect;
Amendment 617 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Notes that the two models for the shock absorption function are featured most prominently in the academic literature: a Rainy Day Fund and a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme; and thus proposes its implementation;
Amendment 647 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
31. Acknowledges that the model of a complementary European Unemployment Benefit Scheme would include an anti- cyclical component in the Eurozone economic policy, foster convergence of labour markets in the medium termrun, introduce a social dimension to the EMU, and establish a direct link between the European institutions and citizens;
Amendment 663 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Considers that the EMF should provide the financial resources for eitherboth of these models, which could req should come from genuirne increasing the amount of capital; points out that the fund should avoiown resources, that repeatedly have been called for by the European Parliament; calls for a system of own resources based long-term redistribution effects by ensuring Member States’ contributions are balanced over the cycle taxes, ECB dividends, or common bonds, instead of GNI-based contributions; point out that this would reduce the net-payer debate and would create a clearer link between EU policy objectives and its financing sources;
Amendment 683 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Warns that future symmetric shocks could destabilise the euro area as a whole since the currency area is not endowed with the instruments to cope with another crisis of the extent of the previous one; is convinced that the right instrument to deal with symmetric shocks depends on the nature of the shock; recalls that the EMF should be used as an appropriate financial resource, hence as an instrument of the Eurozone treasury;
Amendment 746 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Points out that the fiscal capacity has to be of significant size in order to be able to address these euro- area- wide shocks and to finance its functions; insists that in order to provide sufficient financial resources, the euro area fiscal capacity, including the EMF, should be able to should be financed by own resources such as taxes, ECB dividends, and the increase thed issuance of equities of the ESM/ESF via a rise in guarantees; considers that these common issued equities should have the highest credit rate;
Amendment 760 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38 a (new)
Paragraph 38 a (new)
38a. Insists that euro area decision making both at the level of the Council and Parliament needs to be organised according to the principles of "no taxation without representation" and "no representation without taxation";
Amendment 796 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Considers that in order to provide for a genuine EMU, a euro area treasury should be created for collective decision- making, supervision and management of the budgetary capacity for the euro area, including over the ESM/EMF ; calls for the inclusion of this treasury within the European Commission with full macroeconomic, fiscal and financial competences; calls for a vice-president of the European Commission to head the treasury and simultaneously to act as president of the Eurogroup; urges full accountability of this treasury to the European Parliament;
Amendment 809 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Considers that those non-euro countries that do not have an opt-out will eventually become part of the EMU and therefore may join the governance framework on a voluntary basis with a special status until their integration in the Monetary Union;
Amendment 827 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43 a (new)
Paragraph 43 a (new)
43a. Calls for all Member States without a derogation that have yet to adopt the Euro to make all necessary efforts to meet the conditions before 2020.