BETA

Activities of Eleftherios SYNADINOS related to 2017/2068(INI)

Plenary speeches (1)

The fight against cybercrime (short presentation) EL
2016/11/22
Dossiers: 2017/2068(INI)

Amendments (59)

Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Α
A. whereas cybercrime is causing increasingly significant social and economic damage affecting the fundamental rights of individuals, and posing threats to the rule of law in cyberspace and endangering the stability of democratic societies;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Α a (new)
Aa. whereas, although technological innovation in cyberspace can be used to benefit society as a whole, it also offers opportunities for illegal and criminal practices; recalling that cybercrime is by definition more pronounced in those countries with well developed internet infrastructures and functioning online payment systems;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Β
B. whereas the lines betweenattacks against information security systems can take different forms, such as cybercrime, cyber espionage, cyber warfare, cyber sabotage and cyber terrorism are becoming increasingly blurred, etc; whereas cybercrimes can target individuals, public or private entities and cover a wide range of offences, including privacy breaches, copyright infringement, child pornography, online incitement to hate, the dissemination of fake news with malicious intent, financial crime andcriminal and civil offences; whereas, to fall under the definition of cybercrime, however, they must arise from, and be essentially caused by, the existence and use of digital media and be inherently linked to the digital domain; whereas they include infringements of internet privacy, unauthorised data dissemination using digital technology, copyright infringement, the dissemination of child pornography, industrial espionage and digital fraud, as well as illegal system interference;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 43 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Γ
C. whereas the 2016 IOCTA reveals that, over time and with the expansion of digital applications and capabilities, cybercrime is increasing in intensity, aggressiveness, complexity and magnitude, that reported cybercrime quite possibly exceeds traditional crime in some EU countries, there being no tangible or comparable data, while the definition is very broad and encompasses economic fraud and misuse of digital technology, that it extends to and encourages other areas of crime, such as human trafficking, that there has been a growing misuse of encryption, and anonymisation and pseudonymisation tools and that ransomware attacks outnumber traditional malware threats for the misappropriation and exploitation of personal and sensitive banking data, such as Trojans;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Δ
D. whereas the key focus of cyber- attacks remains on sensitive personal information such as health or financial records, but attacks and on industrial control systems and networks aimed at destroying, the aim of such attacks differing in accordance with the source thereof, with motivations ranging from personal satisfaction and/or enrichment to the destruction of economic structures and the destabilisingation of societies are growing in number; whereas the majority; whereas the an exceptionally high number of international requests for data are related to fraud and financial crime, followed by violent and serious crime in the digital domain;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Ε
E. whereas a considerable number of cybercrimes remain unprosecuted and unpunished, due in part to significant underreporting , long detection periods allowthe legal procedures that must be followed at the detection stage, inevitably giving cybercriminals time to develop multiple entries/exits or backdoors, difficult access to e-evidence, probinstitutional and procedural obstaclems into obtaining it and with its admissibility in court, as well as complex procedures and jurisdictional challengequestions related to the cross-border nature of cybercrimes;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 61 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital ΣΤ
F. whereas the TELE2 judgment of the CJEU imposes stringent limits on police and judicial access to the data of cybercrime suspects, given that Member States are not entitled to require the general and indiscriminate storage by service providers of electronic messaging data, since this would be in breach of Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; the admissibility of data retention must be assessed in the light of the principles of necessity and proportionality, as well as the rules governing data access, protection and security and the length of time for which data may be stored;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 69 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Ζ
G. whereas children are particularly vulnerable to online groomingwhen exposed to certain risks arising from unsupervised use of the Internet, including online sexual advances and other forms of sexual exploitation onlin the digital domaine, and therefore require special protection;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Η
H. whereas awareness about the risks posed by cybercrime has increased, but adequate precautionary measures backed- up by deterrents, both on the part of individual users and of business, remain absent; whereas, despite the action taken in response to this by individuals, companies or other legal persons using the net, this is does not provide sufficient protection or deterrence against the new methods being used by cybercriminals, particularly given the technical resources already available and the exponential development of technology in this field;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital Θ
I. whereas the constantly growing interconnectedness of people, places and things makessymbiosis between people, devices and other objects, including the resulting data output on the Internet of Things within the shared global system of interconnected networks and even more so on private or more limited Interanet of Things (IoT) devices an ideal target for cybercriminals; networks, using frequently classified online technologies and providing comparatively more valuable data, make the system a target for cybercriminals, particularly where weak or vulnerable areas can be identified, and all the more so where security systems are inadequate, have not been upgraded or updated or are not being properly deployed by users;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 97 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
1. Stresses that the sharp increase in ransomware, botnets and using malicious bots or, more frequently, various types of automated network (botnets) , which may be used to launch a coordinated digital attack or for the unauthorised impairment of, or interference with, computer systems has an impact on the availability and integrity of personal data, as well as on the protection of privacy and fundamental freedoms; that varies widely depending on the specific circumstances; stresses that such incidents may temporarily or permanently affect the availability and integrity of personal data or other sensitive data, including data relating to industrial property, security, the protection of privacy and fundamental freedoms, the economic and logistical sustainability of companies and businesses because of the expected direct and indirect damage sustained and related costs incurred, possibly harming the reputation and prestige of victims, the availability of digital and online services, confidence in private and public security efforts, innovation and creativity in sectors coming under attack and public receptiveness to both specific services and digital innovation in general;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 103 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
2. Reiterates the importance of the legall measures taken at European level to harmonise the definition of offences linked to attacks against information systems as well as to child sexual exploitation online and to oblige the Member States to set up as related to cybercrime in general and, more specifically, offences linked to attacks against information systems, under the supervision of the of the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) of the European Police Office (Europol) and with the effective participation and assistance of users, more particularly professionals and researchers in the digital and technological sectors concerned, with particular emphasis on security; calls on all the Member State authorities and their European institutional counterparts, including the judiciary, police, prosecution authorities and intelligence services, to examine whether the setting up of system for the recording, production and provision of statistical data on these offences; would be appropriate or fit for purpose and in what form;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 109 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Calls on the Member State and EU authorities, under the guidance of ENISA and Europol's EC3, acting as a hub of information and expertise, to identify shortcomings in cooperation between the security services of the Union, highlighting those areas where duplication of effort is proving detrimental to rapid, smooth and trouble- free cooperation and to come up with joint proposals regarding the legal aspects of cybersecurity that are in need of clarification;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
3. DeploresExpresses its concern that cyber- attacks against businesses often remain undetected or unreported; believes that the obligation to disclose security breaches introduced by the GDPR will help to address this problem; strongly regrets the fact that companies providing digital services or managing electronic data often do not immediately notify users directly involved or concerned that the security of their network and, quite possibly, their data security have been compromised, thereby enabling them to take remedial action and decide on a course of action in full knowledge of the facts; considers that companies have an obligation to notify users of security breaches affecting them and to facilitate law enforcement while ensuring the protection of data, including confidential corporate or industrial data, insofar as such cooperation does not adversely affect the company, does not create disproportionate costs or administrative burdens in relation to the size of the company and is in proportion to the extent, gravity and impact of cyber- attack;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
4. Stresses that the constantly changing nature of the cyber-threat landscape presents all stakeholders with serious legal and technological challenges; points, in particular, to the increasing misuse of privacy-enhancing technologies such as onion-routing and the Darknet, as well as to the growing threats posed by hackers sponsored by non-friendly foreign states or extremist political or religious organisationschallenges in different areas, including, but not limited to, questions of a moral, ethical, legal, technical, technological, institutional and political nature;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 128 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Notes that enhanced privacy applications may be misused for criminal purposes and it is therefore essential to develop appropriate methods and devices to counter this; calls for necessary investments in security to be continued so as to ensure that these applications are fit for purpose, up to date and more widely utilised;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 130 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 b (new)
4b. Points out that we are now in a rapidly changing environment in which the networks used by cybercriminals immediately seek to take advantage of new technological and non-technological loopholes to evade traditional law enforcement procedures; stresses that new challenges require innovative and flexible responses on the part of the institutions and regulatory bodies involved;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 133 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that the recourse of, despite the a number of indications relating to isolated incidents, systematic recourse by terrorist extremists to cybercrime tools and services is still limited; highlights, however, that this is likely to change in light of theoffered by other cybercriminal networks has not been flagged in reports or suggested by evidence to date; notes, however the existing and growing direct links between terrorism and organised crime and the wide availability of firearms and explosive precursors on the Darknet, making it probable that instruments suitable for this purpose that are available in cyberspace or on the Dark Net are being used mainly by isolated terrorists operating independently under an indirect chain of command; stresses that the use of cyberspace, and especially the Dark Net by terrorist and other organised criminal networks is focused primarily on cash- flow management, including money laundering and measures to generate revenue;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 135 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5a. Acknowledges the increased risks posed by cybercriminals and hackers serving or protected by hostile foreign powers or extremist organisations; observes that criminals can cause disproportionate harm to key infrastructures, as well as financial losses and other damage, with a comparatively small logistical and cash outlay, in return for benefits or financial gain, depending on the resources deployed and objectives sought;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 139 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
6. Acknowledgesstresses that, despite their excellent, desirable and judicious applications, privacy protection devices using various enhanced encryption, anonymisation and pseudonymisation technologies, which are not by definition unlawful, could, given their potential, be widely misused in order to conceal or disguise a wide range of illegal or criminal activities; accepts that, for many individuals, the use of privacy enhancing technologies in cyberspace is one of the few sufficiently powerful and effective tools at their disposal in order to ensure, for example, the confidentiality of their communications and the safety of their banking or financial transactions; acknowledges in any case that technological advances in encryption allow legitimate users to better protect their data, butwhile pointsing out that malicious users deploy the same techniques to conceal their criminal activities and identities;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 151 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
7. Calls on the Member States to step upcontinue their efforts in relation to victim identification and victim-centred assistance and support services;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 163 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
8. Calls on the Commission, in the context of the review of the European cybersecurity strategy, to assess the situation regarding the fight against cybercrime in the European Union and the Member States and the risks it poses, in order to achieve a better understanding of the trends and developments in relation to offences in cyberspace; cybercrime, establish a vulnerability and security index for critical information and digital systems in the Union, draw up an in-depth and strictly confidential internal report on priorities for the enhancement of vulnerable systems and identify weaknesses in the light of current technological possibilities and requirements;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 166 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8 a (new)
8a. Calls on the Commission not to seek the concentration of power or the conferral and exercise of competences belonging to the Member States by adducing the undeniable need for European and international cooperation in response to cybercrime; urges the national parliaments to ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, under which, in areas outside its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can be better achieved at Union level by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 168 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
9. Stresses that cyber-resilience is a key inelement of cyber-security when it comes to preventing cybercrime and should therefore be given the highest priority by the Member States and the Union the security sector ; calls for a comprehensive Eupropean approach on the fight against cybercrime that is compatible with fundamental rights, data protection, cybersecurity, consumer protection and e-commeosal regarding appropriate and available options at Union level for the fight against cybercrime, given the current challenges and any foreseeable future needs or requirements that are compatible with the provisions of the Treaties, the legislation applicable, the constitutional requirements of the Member States and the Union and modern case-law in the field of fundamental rights, freedoms, security, law and order, the protection of personal and other sensitive data, consumer protection, the digital market and researceh;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
10. Welcomes, in this regard, the investment of EU funds in research projects such as the public-Member State and EU funds in cybersecurity research projects to foster, where approprivate partnership (PPP) on cybersecur, national and European cyber-resilience and the ability, to foster Europewithstand cyber-resilienceattacks through innovation and digital capacity building and skills enhancement; urges Member States to continue to invest available EU funding also, so as to enhance the security of critical infrastructures and protect data contained therein;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 179 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
11. Urges the Member States to step up information exchanges on the challenges they face in the fight against cybercrime, as well as on solutions to address themexchanges of information and expertise regarding the challenges they are facing in their efforts to combat cybercrime, as well as related innovative approaches and solutions;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 189 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
12. Is concerned byStresses the Europol finding that the majority of successful attacks are attributable to a lack of user- awareness, as well as insufficient security; strongly supports effective, agreed and coordinated efforts to raise user awareness;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 200 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
13. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to launchto launch pan-European public awareness- raising campaigns to ensure that citizens, in particular children and other vulnerable users, and the private sector are awareinitiatives, targeted at individuals and undertakings, regarding cybercrime and associated risks, with a particular focus ofn the risks posed by cybercrime, and to promote the use of security measures such as encryptionesources being deployed by them and ways of countering digital threats;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 204 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13a. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that members of the public, in particular children and other vulnerable users and private sector users, have guided and unhindered access to adequate security measures such as encryption;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 210 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
14. Stresses that businesses should conduct regular vulnerability assessments, fix existing vulnerabilities in their products or services and consistently reportwhere these are identified and, where necessary, notify affected users and the authorities of any cyber- attacks and provide any information necessitated and dictated by the circumstances;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 219 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
15. Urges the Member States to invest in making their critical infrastructure and associated data more secure in order to withstand cyber-attacks;deleted
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 232 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
16. Considers enhanced and closer cooperation with service providers to be a key factor inmeans of prevention and a key pillar for accelerating and streamrationalinsing mutual legal assistance and mutual recognition procedurescompany assistance procedures through the provision of data to law enforcement and judicial authorities and the corresponding use of digital evidence;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 244 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
17. Believes that innovation should not be hampered by unnecessary red tape for, chiefly in the case of software developers and hardware producers; encourages the private sector, through a cooperative approach, to implement voluntaryessential measures aimed at bolstering trust in the security of software and devices, such as the IoT trust label in cooperation with institutional bodies;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 254 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
18. Calls on the Commission to put forward legislative measures setting out clear definitions and minimumappropriate penalties for the dissemination of fake news and online incitement to hate,of a fraudulent and criminal nature, the online incitement to criminal activities, as well as the related obligations of internet service providers and penalties in the event of non- compliance, with due respect for fundamental rights and freedoms and to a degree that is proportionate with the goal of preserving these rights and freedoms;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 266 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
19. Calls on the Commission to investigateclarify the legal scope for improving the accountability of service providers and forto investigate the need to imposinge an obligation to respond to foreign EU law- enforcement requests, with due respect for the principle of reciprocity;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 280 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
20. Calls on the Member States to impose the sameestablish encryption obligations onfor online service providers as those, which apply to; considers that basic rules and requirements regarding encryption must exist for every providers of traditional telecommunications services, whether 'traditional' or on-line;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 286 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
21. Underlines that illegal online content should be removed immediately; welcomes, in this context, the progress achieved concerning the blocking and removal of illegal content online, but stresses the need for a stronger commitment on the part of platform service providers to respond quickly and effectivelyndered inaccessible and, wherever possible, deleted; welcomes, in this context, the progress achieved, but stresses the need for a stronger commitment on the part of platform service providers to respond quickly and effectively, without prejudice to the rights of the creators to compensation for injury or damage or the possible imposition of administrative fines by the supervisory bodies if the response is not in accordance with objective requirements and without ignoring possible technical challenges;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 301 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
22. Is concerned that a considerable number of cybercrimes remain unpunished; emphasises the need to continue to allow lawful access to relevant information, even if it has been encrypted, if such access is imperative for reasons of security and justice and in so far as the existing legal pathways and procedures permit, and for the regulatory authorities to clarify the procedural manner and access framework where necessary;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 309 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
23. Urges the Member States to exchange best practices regarding the circumvention of encryption and to cooperate, in consultation with the judiciary, in aligning the conditions for the lawful use of investigative tools online;deleted
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 319 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
24. Stresses that lawful hacking must be a measure of last resort,n available instrument and tool which has to be necessary, proportionate, and in full compliance with fundamental rights and EU data protection and case law; calls on all Member States to establish clear rules regarding the authorisation process for lawful hacking activities, including restrictions on the use and duration of lawful hacking tools, to set up anwith internal oversight mechanisms, and to provide effective legal remedies for the targets of these hacking activities if this is deemed appropriate by an independent judicial body;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 327 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
25. Calls on the Member States to notify each other about breaches of their territori digital sovphereignty as part of investigations conducted due to lack of information about the location of the hacked device within their national territory and to exchange data relating to intra-Community cybercrime of a cross- border nature within the framework of ongoing investigations;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 331 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
26. Stresses the need to minimise the risks posed tofor the privacy and security of internet users by leaks of exploits or other tools used by law- enforcement authorities as part of their legitimate investigations;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 332 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
27. Emphasises that judicial and law enforcement authorities have to be equipped with sufficient capabilities in terms of specialised personnel and logistical digital infrastructure and funding to respond effectively toinvestigate cybercrime;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 334 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
28. Underlines that the patchwork of separate, territorially defined national jurisdictionsfragmented judicial framework, if not correctly regulated or defined, will causes difficultieelays in determining the applicable law in transnational interactions and may gives rise to related legal uncertainty, thereby preventing the unrestricted and the maximum possible and most effective cooperation across borders, which is necessary to deal efficiently with misuses onlinrapidly with possible criminal abuses in cyberspace;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 347 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
29. Underlines that a commonordinated European approach by the Member States to criminal justice in cyberspace is a matter of priority, as it willprecondition for improveing the enforcement of the rule of law in cyberspace and facilitateing the obtaining of e-evidence that can be used in court in criminal proceedings;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 353 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
30. Underlines the importancvalue of close cooperation between law enforcement authorities and the private sector on the issue of access to e-evidence; recalls the value of mutual cooperation between national law enforcement authorities; urges the Member States concerned to eliminate criminal law provisions prohibiting domestic service providers from responding to foreign law enforcement requests, in so far as the ban is not adequately justified;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 364 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
31. Calls on the Commission to put forward a Europeaclarify the common legal framework for e- evidence, including harmonised rules to determine the status of a provider as domestic or foreign, and to impose an specific obligation on service providers to respond to requests from third countriesStates only in accordance with the principle of reciprocity, with a view to ensuring legal certainty for stakeholders and removing obstacles to cooperation;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 372 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
32. Calls on the Member States to implement fully the EIO Directive for the purposes ofensure the effective securing and obtaining of e-evidence in the EU, as well as to include specific provisions relating to cyberspace in their national penal codes in order to facilitate the admissibility of e- evidence in court and to issue clearer guidance to judges regarding the penalisation of cybercrime by determining the corresponding national legal framework, which the judicial and prosecution body will be called upon to interpret and implement;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 376 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
33. Recognises the important contribution of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies, especially the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) of Europol and Eurojust, as well as the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), to the fight against cybercrime of the European Union;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 378 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33 a (new)
33a. Recognises that one of the nine thematic areas of Europol's EMPACT Multi-Annual Strategic Plan 2013-2017 prioritises the fight against cybercrime, which is committed by organised crime groups and is a particularly lucrative activity for the members of these gangs, causes serious harm to its victims and affects critical infrastructure and information systems in the Union; calls on Europol to regularly review and update or re-adjust its strategic plan on the basis of the latest data;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 383 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
34. Calls on Europol to continue to support national law enforcement authorities in setting up secure and adequate transmission channels within the limits of the agency's mandate;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 388 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
35. Calls on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) and the European Judicial Training Network to extend their offer of training courses dedicated to cybercrime- related topics to competent law enforcement bodies and judicial athe judges and prosecuthorities across the Unions of the Member States dealing with cases of this kind;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 389 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 a (new)
5a. Calls on the competent bodies of the Member States and the Union, under the guidance of staff of the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) of Europol and Eurojust, and of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), as information and expertise centres, to make costed proposals to be carried out under their own executive supervision and within the limits of the mandate given to them which, at European level, will have as their object the practical training of appropriately specialised staff of police prosecution services in key principles of identifying and handling digital evidence, in tried-and-tested and legitimate ways of harnessing the social media, in the best ways and procedures for reporting cyberattacks and in understanding practical aspects of protecting the privacy of communications and personal data on the Internet;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 394 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
36. Calls for sufficient funding and postsconsideration of whether it would be necessary, appropriate and efficient to be madke available further funding and posts to the European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit (Eurojust) to allow the agency to cope with its increasing workload, as well as to develop and strengthen further its support to national cybercrime prosecutors in cross-border cases, including viathe potential increase in its workload related to the recently established European Judicial Cybercrime Network;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 397 #
37. Highlights the importance of close cooperation with third countries in the global fight against cybercrime, including through the exchange of best practices, joint investigations, capacity-building, and mutual legal assistancethe adoption of common definitions, the convergence of efforts to tackle common cross-border threats and crimes relating to the cyberspace and the digital sphere, possibly through joint investigations, capacity-building and the development of skills and mutual assistance in providing adequate and secure data to facilitate the task of, and be used by, law enforcement and judicial authorities;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 409 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
38. Underlines that strategic and operational cooperation agreements between Europol and third countries facilitate bothallow the exchange of information and practical cooperation, but there are still administrative and institutional barriers to the rapid response of all parties despite the facilitation provided by the Agency as an interface; invites Europol to conclude realistic agreements of practical value with all countries listed in the annex to the Europol regulation in due course; and subject them to approval, consideration and ratification by the European Parliament in consultation with the national parliaments of Member States before they are put into effect;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 419 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 39
39. Takes note of the fact that the highest numberStresses that the overwhelming majority of law enforcement requests is sent to the United States and Canada; is concernednotes that the voluntary disclosure rate of big US digital service providers in response to requests from European criminal justice authorities falls short of 60 %;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 424 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
40. Calls on the Commission to put forward concrete measures to address impediments to the exchange of information between European law enforcement authorities and third countries, in particular Canada and the USA notably the quick obtaining, upon a court decision, of relevant evidence, subscriber- related information as well as detailed meta- and content data (if not encrypted)which have been recorded or are otherwise available from law- enforcement authorities and/or service providers with a view to improving mutual legal assistance, with due respect for the principle of subsidiarity;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE
Amendment 430 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
41. Supports the capacity-building assistance provided by the EU to Eastern Neighbourhood countries, given that manywhatever assistance is needed to develop the cyber resilience of the Member States and the Union as a whole and the Union's ability to respond to cyber-attacks originate in them attacks against information or digital systems of whatever origin;
2017/06/09
Committee: LIBE