BETA

Activities of Miguel VIEGAS related to 2016/0365(COD)

Shadow reports (1)

2016/11/22
Committee: ECON
Dossiers: 2016/0365(COD)
Documents: PDF(1 MB) DOC(197 KB)

Amendments (38)

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 1

(1) Financial markets are pivotal for the functioning of modern economies. The more integrated they are, the more efficient the allocation of economic resources will be, benefitting economic performance. However, in order to improve the functioning of the single market in financial servihave significantly grown in the past decades due to liberalistation and deregulation. Many actors have become so big that they can be considered as systemically relevant as their failure would massively disrupt economic activities and would destroy wealth on a large scale. Hences, it is important to have procedures in place to ensure that if a financial institution or a financial market infrastructure that is active in this market faces financial distress or is at the point of failure, such an event does not de-stabilise the entire financial market and damage growth across the wider economy.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 3 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

The staff involved in carrying out the functions entrusted to the resolution authority pursuant to this Regulation shall be structurally separated from, and subject to separate reporting lines from, the staff involved in carrying out the other functions of that authority. The staff shall perform their duties and exercise their powers independently from political and other external influence.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – point a – introductory part

(a) that the ~~proportionality~~effectiveness of any decision or action in relation to an individual CCP is ensured, taking into account at least the following factors:

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – point b

(b) that the imperatives of efficacy of decision-making ~~and of keeping costs as low as possible~~while safeguarding financial stability when taking early intervention or resolution action are observed;

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – point f

(f) that due consideration is given to the public interests of the Member States where the CCP provides services and where its clearing members, their clients, and any linked CCPs are established, and in particular the impact of any decision or action or inaction on the financial stability or fiscal resources of those Member States and the Union as a whole;

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Any decision taken pursuant to paragraph 3 and its justification shall be notified toand approved by the competent authority without delay. Where a CCP intends to activate its recovery plan, it shall inform the competent authority of the nature and magnitude of the problems it has identified, setting out all relevant circumstances and indicating the recovery measures or other measures it intends to take to address the situation.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2

Where the competent authority considers that a recovery measure that the CCP intends to take may cause ~~significant~~ adverse effects to the financial system, it may require the CCP to refrain from taking that measure.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 9 – paragraph 7

7. Recovery plans shall be drafted in accordance with Section A of the Annex. Competent authorities may require CCPs to include additional information or measures which it deems necessary in their recovery plans.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 10 – paragraph 9 – subparagraph 2 – point e a (new)

(ea) to request changes to the ownership structure of the CCP.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 2

2. The resolution plan ~~shall~~may provide for the resolution actions that the resolution authority may take where the CCP meets the conditions for resolution referred to in Article 22.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

1. The resolution authority, in cooperation with the resolution college in accordance with Article 17, shall assess the extent to which a CCP is resolvable without ~~assuming~~being able to envisage any of the following:

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

A CCP shall be deemed resolvable where the resolution authority considers it feasible and credible to either liquidate it under normal insolvency proceedings or to resolve it using the resolution tools and exercising the resolution powers while ensuring the continuity of the CCP's critical functions and avoiding ~~to the maximum extent possible any significant~~any adverse effect on the financial system.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

The adverse effects referred to in the first subparagraph shall include broader financial instability or system wide events in ~~any~~the Union as a whole, in any Member State or in a region of a Member State.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

Where, following the assessment in Article 16, the resolution authority and resolution college conclude that there are ~~substantive~~ impediments to the resolvability of a CCP, the resolution authority, in cooperation with the competent authority, shall prepare and submit a report to the CCP and to the resolution college.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

The report referred to in the first subparagraph shall analyse the ~~substantive~~ impediments to the effective use of the resolution tools and the exercise of the resolution powers in relation to the CCP, consider their impact on the business model of the CCP and recommend targeted measures to remove those impediments.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 3

For the purposes of point (b) of the second subparagraph, the resolution authority shall consult the competent authority and the resolution college and, where appropriate, the designated national macroprudential authority and the ESRB.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 7 – point d a (new)

(da) require higher capital requirements pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012;

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 17 – paragraph 7 – point j

(j) require changes to legal or, operational, ownership or management structures of the CCP or any group entity directly or indirectly under its control ~~to ensure that critical functions may be legally and operationally separated from other functions through the application of resolutions tools~~;

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 1 – point g

(g) require changes to the legal or, operational, ownership or management structures of the CCP;

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 3

3. The competent authority may only apply the measures in points (a) to (k) of paragraph 1 after taking account of the impact of those measures in other Member States where the CCP operates or provides services, in particular where the CCP’s operations are critical or important for local financial markets, including the places in which clearing members linked trading venues and FMIs are established.deleted

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – point a

(a) ~~maintain~~ the financial stability of the ~~Union;~~Member States.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – point b

~~(b) maintain the continuity of the critical services of the CCP;~~deleted

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 19 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 – point c

~~(c) maintain and enhance the financial resilience of the CCP.~~deleted

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) to avoid a ~~significant~~n adverse effect on the financial system, in particular by preventing contagion of financial distress between financial institutions and by maintaining market discipline;

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 21 – paragraph 1 – point e

(e) to minimise the cost of resolution on all affected stakeholders ~~and avoid destruction of the CCP's value~~.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

For the purposes of point (a)(ii), the competent authority shall provide without delay and on its own initiative, any information that may suggest that the CCP is failing or likely to fail and, upon request, any relevant information that the resolution authority requests in order to perform its assessment.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – point e

(e) the CCP requires extraordinary ~~public~~ financial support.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2

For the purposes of point (e) extraordinary public financial support shall not include public financial support that meets all of the following conditions: (i) guarantee to back liquidity facilities provided by a central bank according to the central bank's conditions, or the form of a State guarantee of newly issued liabilities; (ii) point (i) are confined to solvent CCPs, conditional on final approval under the Union State aid framework, are precautionary and temporary, proportionate to remedy the consequences of the serious disturbance and are not used to offset losses that the CCP has incurred or is likely to incur in the future; (iii) the State guarantees referred to in point (i) are required to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State and preserve financial stability.deleted it takes the form of a State the State guarantees referred to in

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 3

3. The resolution authority may also take a resolution action where it considers that the CCP applies or intends to apply recovery measures which could prevent the CCP's failure but cause ~~significant~~ adverse effects to the financial system. or the wider economy or when it considers that a CCP has reached a size and level of complexity that its failure would lead to a significant disruption of the economy of the Union as a whole or of a Member State.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 2

2. In the event of a systemic crisis, the resolution authority may also provide extraordinary public financial support by using government stabilisation tools in accordance with Articles 45, 46 and 47 on the condition of prior and final approval under the Union State aid framework.deleted

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 27 – paragraph 9 – point c a (new)

(ca) from the CCP’s clearing members, where any measure resulting in a loss allocation tool affecting the CCP’s clearing members under the CCP’s rules and arrangements, including under its recovery plan, has not been exercised, or has not been exercised in full prior to the entry into resolution.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 42 – paragraph 3

3. When applying the bridge CCP tool, the resolution authority shall ensure that the total value of liabilities and obligations transferred to the bridge CCP does not exceed the total value of the rights and assets transferred from the CCP under resolution. It should also ensure the maintenance of jobs and the respective employment and wage rights.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 43 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

Before selling the bridge CCP or its assets, rights, obligations or liabilities, the resolution authority shall advertise the availability of the elements intended to be sold, and shall ensure that they are marketed openly and transparently, and that they are not materially misrepresented, as well as guarantee the maintenance of jobs and the respective wage and employment rights.

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 45

~~Government financial stabilisation tools 1. The resolution authority may use the government stabilisation tools in accordance with~~ Articles 46 and 47 for the purpose of resolving a CCP where the following conditions are met: (a) the financial support is necessary to meet the resolution objectives; (b) last resort after having assessed and exploited the other resolution tools to the maximum extent practicable whilst maintaining financial stability, as determined by the competent ministry or the government after consulting the resolution authority; (c) the financial support complies with the Union State aid framework; (d) the resolution authority to provide that financial support. 2. financial stabilisation tools, competent ministries or5 deleted the financial support is used as a the competent authority requires To goivernments shall have the relevant resolution powers specified in Articles 48 to 59, and shall ensure that Articles 52, 54 and 70 are complied with. 3. tools shall be deemed to be used as a last resort for the purposes of point (b) of paragraph 1, where, at least, any of the following conditions are met: (a) government and the resolution authority, after consulting the central bank and the competent authority, determine that the use of the resolution tools would not suffice to avoid a significant adverse effect on the financial system; (b) government and the resolution authority determine that the use of the resolution tools would not suffice to protect the public interest, where extraordinary liquidity assistance from the central bank has previously been given to the CCP; (c) ownership tool, the competent ministry or government, after consulting the competent authority and the resolution authority, determines that the use of the resolution tools would not suffice to protect the public interest, where public equity support through the equity support tool has previously been given to the CCP. effect to the government Government financial stabilisation the competent ministry or the competent ministry or in respect of the temporary public

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 46

1. Public financial support may be provided for the recapitalisation of a CCP in exchange for instruments of ownership. 2. CCPs subject to the public equity support tool shall be managed on a commercial and professional basis. 3. referred to in paragraph 1 shall be sold to a private purchaser as soon as commercial and financial circumstances allow.Article 46 deleted Public equity support tool The instruments of ownership

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 47 – title

~~Temporary p~~Public ownership tool

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 60 – paragraph 1 – introductory part

Where the resolution authority uses one or more resolution tools, it shall ensure that ~~shareholders,~~ creditors and clearing participants do not incur:

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON

Proposal for a regulation
Article 61 – paragraph 2 – point a

(a) the treatment that ~~shareholders,~~ creditors and clearing participants would have received had the resolution authority not taken resolution action in relation to the CCP the resolution authority considered that the conditions for resolution pursuant to Article 22(1) were met, and they had instead been subject to possible outstanding obligations pursuant to the CCP's recovery plan or other arrangements in its operating rules or the CCP had been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings;

2017/11/07
Committee: ECON