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12 Amendments of Eva KAILI related to 2016/2063(INI)

Amendment 26 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas the normalization of the monetary policy of the FED in the USA is expected to impact in both positive and negative ways the macroeconomic conditions of the euro area as well as in the competitive position of the EU products and services in the international economy; whereas the coordination of the ECB and FED monetary policies has a potential stabilizing effect;
2016/07/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 40 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G a (new)
Ga. whereas the effect of the quantitative easing (QE) program of the ECB has achieved only limited success as it is indicated by the expected inflation rate in the Eurozone, which remains far below from the stated target of "close to but below 2%";
2016/07/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
J. whereas the ECB further eased its monetary stance by lowering its key intervention rates to unprecedented levels, with the main refinancing operations (MRO) and the deposit facility deposit down to 0 and – 0.40 % respectively by March 2016;
2016/07/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
Ja. whereas, according to the ECB, the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) aimed at consistent application of microprudential supervision and enforcement across the euro area to ensure a level-playing field for bank operations and impose a common assessment methodology (SREP);
2016/07/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J b (new)
Jb. whereas public and corporate governance risk events in relation to the macroeconomic adjustment programmes of certain Member States in 2015, which impinged on financial volatility and financing conditions, highlighted the existence of tail risks and the fragility of the euro area, and thus the need to complete the Banking Union;
2016/07/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 56 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J c (new)
Jc. whereas, contrary to the market and credit risk, which are comparatively better addressed, the problem of operational risk in banking activities is essential for both systemic stability and the consumer protection, but unfortunately is not well addressed by the current regulatory framework;
2016/07/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J d (new)
Jd. whereas the ECB is supportive of the Simple, Transparent and Standardized Securitization framework and the resultant reduced capital requirements that will revitalize both securitization markets and the financing of the real sector economy;
2016/07/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 60 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J e (new)
Je. whereas the ECB contributed to a regulatory initiative to weaken the sovereign-bank nexus by supporting sovereign debt risk weights and limits on sovereign exposures consistent with prudential regulation;
2016/07/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 207 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 a (new)
14a. Notes that bank supervision and SREP application in SSM Member States are uneven and failing in the periphery where they matter most, since weak public governance has impacted local regulatory governance and development of competencies, which in turn has affected banks' and, thus financial firms' corporate governance and internal controls;
2016/07/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 211 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 b (new)
14b. Stresses that a wide range of bank activities are left unsupervised and, in the absence of a conduct authority, misconduct risk reigns supreme and tail risk remain intact, as the behaviour of M3 components for over a decade clearly attests; underlines that the operational risk in such economic environment is dominant and highly correlated with both market and credit risk and in fact, a significant materialization component of the latter is a manifestation of the first;
2016/07/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 213 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 c (new)
14c. Notes that confidence and trust to the banking system is affected and non- performing loans resolution, lending capacity, as well as economic recovery is hampered; points to the implications for the staffing and expertise needs of Joint Supervisory Teams, and to side effects for the completion of the third pillar of the EBU (EDIS) and CMU related simple securitization process;
2016/07/27
Committee: ECON
Amendment 215 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14 d (new)
14d. Underscores that regulatory treatment of sovereign debt exposures must be completed in order to take advantage in the implementation transition period of ECB's APP;
2016/07/27
Committee: ECON