24 Amendments of Hilde VAUTMANS related to 2021/2232(INI)
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the recently adopted EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo- Pacific, which is based on a principled engagement with a long-term perspective, reflects a deep evolution in the way the EU looks at its intereststhe ambition of the EU to play a greater role in theis region and the potential role it can play; whereasof growing geopolitical and economic importance; whereas promoting an open and rules- based regional security architecture and building strong relations and security cooperation with Indo-Pacific regional organisations and countries is central to the strategy;
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the recently adopted EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo- Pacific, which is based on a principled engagement with a long-term perspective, reflects a deep evolution in the way the EU looks at its interests, the opportunities, and challenges in the region and the potential role it can play; whereas building strong relations and security cooperation with Indo-Pacific regional organisations and countries is central to the strategy;
Amendment 36 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas in recent years the dynamics in the region have given rise toregion has become a hotspot of intense geopolitical competition, mirrored inby an increase in military spending and a more aggressive rhetoric, thereby calling into question the rules-based international order; whereas a new centre of global competition has therefore evolved in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas there is no overarching regional security order to mitigate the associated challenges; whereas such dynamics represent serious threats to stability and security in the region and beyond, impacting directly the EU’s strategic interests as a key political and economic partner of the countries in the region; whereas the EU is committed to security, peace and international law;
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the EU is the number one foreign investor and development assistance provider in the Indo-Pacific; whereas the EU has already concluded and is in the process of negotiating free trade agreements with countries in the region; whereas the EU can already rely on a broad network of partnerships and agreements with a number of countries, such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, India, New Zealand and Singapore, and with regional organisations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS); whereas the EU is present in the region through its Member State France, notably through the French overseas departments of La Réunion and Mayotte in the Indian Ocean, and in the Pacific Ocean through New Caledonia, as well as through the French overseas collectivities of French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna; whereas these French regions are home to roughly 1.56 million EU citizens, including over 7000 military personnel; whereas, consequently, the EU is a resident actor in the Indo-Pacific;
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas China’s rapid military build-up, coupled with its increasingly assertive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region and its military activities in the East and South China Seas, as well as its deliberate and repetitive violations of Taiwan’s air defence identification zone and its increasingly aggressive rhetoric and media campaigns, are leading to rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific, which calls for a scenario-based ready-to-act plan;
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas China’s rapid military build-up, coupled with its increasingly assertive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region and its military activities in the East and South China Seas, as well as its deliberate and repetitive violations of Taiwan’s air defence identification zone, trampling of Hong Kong’s freedoms, and its increasingly aggressive rhetoric and media campaigns, are leading to drisving up tensions in the Indo-Pacific;
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the recently adopted EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo- Pacific; recognises the added value of the strategy as the first foundation stone of the EU’s united approach to the region, and praises the inclusive and multifaceted nature of the strategy and the inclusion of security and defence as one of its seven priority areas; calls for the EU to use the strategy as a tool to effectively assert its presence and influence in the region through furthering strategic ties and deepening cooperation on security- and defence-related matters with regional like- minded countries and organisations; believes that increased value-based EU engagement in the region would contribute to regional security, and help overcome regional tensions and create more balanced relations among regional players; recalls that the strategy is a Team Europe project and that bilateral arrangements between Member States and Indo-Pacific countries that go against the Team Europe approach can harm the objectives of the shared strategy;
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Highlights the need to safeguard EU unity as a pre-condition to achieve the EU’s ambition of open strategic sovereigntautonomy amid the increasing competition between the United States and China; recalls that the EU’s unified approach must be underpinned by a pragmatic and principled foreign and security policy and more effective foreign-policy decision-making at the EU-level, specifically through a transition to qualified majority voting;
Amendment 92 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. Highlights the need to work closer together with like-minded countries in the region and to coordinate closer with other liberal democracies on common regional strategies, especially in the context of an increasingly assertive and aggressive China; argues that the EU’s strategy in the region needs to constantly adapt to the rapidly changing power balance and should be firmly anchored in European values;
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Calls onUrges the EU to make use of its reputation as a credible and reliable actor amid the growing geopolitical competition between global and regional powers in the Indo-Pacific; recalls that the added value of EU engagement in the Indo-Pacific lies in its comprehensive range of civilian and military assistance measures, including well developed non-military contributions; recalls that the EU has a vast network of diplomatic assets to facilitate dialogue on conflict-resolution, legal solutions and expertise in setting up confidence-building measures; calls on the EU to closer link its contributions to countries in the region and its diplomacy efforts to its values and interests;
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Expresses deep concerns aboutCondemns China’s rapid military build-up, including its test of a hypersonic missile, and its increasingly assertive behaviour, which aims, among other things, to advance its territorial claims in the East and South China Seas; equally condemns China’s diplomacy of intimidation towards the EU and EU Member States; highlights that security hotspots and unresolved issues, such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programme, the recent China-India border standoffs, the crackdown on democracy in Hong Kong, and threats posed by China to the territorial integrity of Taiwan, exert further strain on regional security and stability; highlights that the EU’s approach towards China must be unified, pragmatic, multifaceted and principled, including cooperating on issues of shared interesglobal impact, such as climate change, on the one hand, and competing when it comes to providing economic, political and strategic alternatives to third countries, and confronting and sanctioning China on matters where our respective views diverge substantially, on the other hand;
Amendment 160 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Believes that the ongoing process of drafting the EU’s Strategic Compass should identify the Indo-Pacific as a region of key strategic interest for the EU, while also identifying a concrete set of objectives to achieve in the region and the required capabilities to attain them;
Amendment 161 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Believes that the ongoing process of drafting the EU’s Strategic Compass should identify the Indo-Pacific as a region of key strategic interest for the EU, while also identifying the required capabilities and evaluating conflict potentials;
Amendment 168 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Stresses that enhancing existing partnerships with regional actors and building new ones is a key feature of the strategy; highlights that priority areas for cooperation should include capacity- building, hybrid threats, maritime security, cyber-security, counter-terrorism, non- proliferation, disarmament and crisis response;
Amendment 187 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Calls for the EU to strengthen its dialogue with NATO’s four Asia-Pacific partners, namely Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand, with a view to enhancing mutualcommon situational awareness on security developments in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions; invites NATO to use its 2030 reflection process to enhance cooperation with its partners in order to defend shared values, bolster resilience and uphold the international rules-based order, while ensuring greater consistency between policies on China;
Amendment 193 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Welcomes the well established cooperation between the EU and Japan in the area of security and defence, and urges both partners to further advance the strategic partnership; calls for both partners to enhance cooperation in the area of maritime security and to further develop cooperation within the framework of the common security and defence policy (CSDP) in areas such as intelligence and, capacity-building, and cybersecurity;
Amendment 218 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the positive role Taiwan plays in fostering peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region; urges the EU and the Member states to strengthen their partnership with Taiwan in support of its democratic system and to deter China’s aggressive posture towards Taiwan;
Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the positive role Taiwan plays in fostering peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region and strongly supports its democratic path;
Amendment 238 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Highlights that maritime security and freedom of navigation, which must be ensured in accordance with international law and, in particular, the UNCLOS, are among the key challenges in the Indo- Pacific; underlines that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is of strategic interest to the EU, as 40% of the exports of the EU pass by these waters; calls for the EU to enhance maritime cooperation with countries in the Indo- Pacific by establishing systematic and coordinated frameworks, including joint exercises and port calls that would advance naval diplomacy and contribute to regional maritime security;
Amendment 252 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Calls for the EU and its Members States to step-up their own maritime capacities in the region in a coordinated way, including by exploring ways to ensure a permanent European naval presence in the Indian Ocean; stresses the need to increase the EU’s capacity as an effective maritime security provider; highlights the fact that France is the only Member State with a permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean; welcomes the fact that the Netherlands and Germany have sent frigates to the region; underlines that more suchjoint EU-level naval missions will be needed in the future; welcomes the joint naval exercises that EUNAFOR Atalanta has thus far undertaken with partner countries, and calls for the EU to consider expanding its geographical scope deeper into the Indian Ocean; invites the EU to establish a maritime area of interest in the Indo- Pacific with a view to extending its Coordinated Maritime Presences concept, building on the Member States’ individual assets;
Amendment 260 #
Motion for a resolution
Subheading 6
Subheading 6
Amendment 270 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27 a (new)
Paragraph 27 a (new)
27 a. Highlights that the digital transformation has an increasing impact on the structure of the international system and that digital competitiveness will increasingly become a prerequisite for influence on the international scene; cautions that international standard- setting and breakthrough innovations in frontier technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 5G and 6G are increasingly part of a global competition for technological supremacy in which China is significantly invested; urges the European Union to deepen its coordination with technologically- advanced democracies in the region for setting global technological standards and influencing the development of a future global Alliance of Tech Democracies; argues furthermore that this alliance should be underpinned by democratic values, the rule of law, individual rights and freedoms, and the preservation of the rules-based international system;
Amendment 281 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Underlines the growing importance of the space dimension of international cooperation and security; underlines the need to ensure the security of the global internet infrastructure, including undersea cables;
Amendment 282 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30 a (new)
Paragraph 30 a (new)
30 a. Stresses that critical technologies such as 5G and 6G components, microchips, semiconductors, and rare earth metals are of strategic importance to the EU and its digital future; argues for strict requirements, both political and technical, for purchasing such technologies from non-democratic states in the region such as China; calls for closer cooperation with democratic producers of such technologies in the region and for a coordinated, European- wide strategic approach to the region with a view to secure supplies of critical technology and materials and strengthen democratic partners’ ability to produce them;