31 Amendments of Gunnar BECK related to 2019/2130(INI)
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 27 a (new)
Citation 27 a (new)
- having regard to the ECB's financial stability review of November 2019,
Amendment 17 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 27 b (new)
Citation 27 b (new)
- having regard to the Bank of International Settlements Annual Economic Report for 2018,
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas the process of deepening the Economic and Monetary Union requires a solid Banking Union as an indispensable building block to the euro area’s financial stability, as well as the creation of a mechanism of fiscal stabilisation for the euro area as a wholesound monetary policy which adheres strictly to its mandate of price stability as enshrined in article 127 (1) TFEU is an indispensable building block to the euro area’s financial stability;
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas the Banking Union remains incomplete as long as it lacks a backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS); will further disintegrate due to moral hazard and lead to a permanent Transfer Union if mechanisms such as the backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) are implemented; regrets that insufficient progress in risk reduction in some member states serves as an argument for mutualisation of deposit insurance schemes, creating incentives for some member states not to reduce risk, or even engage in even more excessive risk-taking; points out that the absence of a proper impact assessment of the EDIS proposal is fundamentally at odds with the principles of sound governance;
Amendment 34 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas entrusting the ECB with the supervision of systemically important financial institutions has proven to be unsuccessful, according to the EBA's risk dashboards, which clearly show that the 50% weakest banks in the euro area did not increase their solvency ratios since 2016, and that the biggest banks are substantially worse of than smaller banks;
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
C a. whereas in carrying out its supervisory activities, the European Central Bank has so far failed to sufficiently take into account the proportionality principle;
Amendment 38 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C b (new)
Recital C b (new)
C b. emphasises, however, that efficient and effective supervision will not be achieved by making all institutions subject to the same rules because smaller institutions face proportionately higher compliance costs than larger ones; stresses, therefore, the urgent need for further efforts to make banking supervision arrangements more proportionate for small, low-risk institutions; emphasises that improving proportionality means that the administrative burden, in terms of compliance and disclosure requirements, should be considerably lessened;
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas the development of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) whas efficientto be terminated;
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls the progress made regarding the implementation of the Banking Union, namely on risk reduction; stresses, however, that further progressrisk has tonly been made, particularly on risk sharingrginally reduced, despite the favorable interest rate climate;
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. WelcomDeplores the support of the [incoming] President of the European Commission and the President of the ECB for the completransformation of the Banking Union into a Transfer Union and, more globally, the Economic and Monetary Union, through the creation of a fiscal capacity designed to provide the euro area with an adequate stabilisation functionestablish a permanent transfer mechanism from member states with sound economic policies to highly indebted member states with inefficient and outdated governance structures;
Amendment 78 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Welcomes the overall increased resilience of the European banking system, as attested by the EBA’s 2018 Risk Assessment of the European Banking System; recalls however the warnings issued by the ECB in its Stability Review of November 2019 regarding lower bank profitability and asset and bond bubbles;
Amendment 83 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Notes that bank profitability has increased steadily since 2012, with return on equity surpassing 6 % since 2017; underlines that the low risk and low interest rate environment has resulted in lower costs for provisions and losses; recalls the need to continuously evaluate the levels of financing to the economy and particularly to SMEsUnderlines that the low risk and low interest rate environment has resulted in lower costs for provisions and losses; regrets that the biggest banks and highly indebted Member States have not made use of this favorable environment to reduce debt and increase productivity; recalls the need to continuously evaluate the levels of financing to the economy and particularly to SMEs, taking into account the "zombifications" of at least 10% of European companies due to this accommodative monetary policy, according to the BIS Annual Economic Report 2018;
Amendment 94 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Underlines the crucial role of the banking sector in channelling funding into sustainable investments and enabling the transition to a climate-neutral economyWarns the banking sector of green asset bubbles following the mediatic and political hype around sustainable investments and the so-called climate- neutral economy; stresses that fostering such bubbles is detrimental to the financial resilience and stability of the banking sector;
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Restatejects the importestablishment and issuance of a safe asset in the euro area as a way to help stabilise financial markets and allow banks to reduce the exposure of their balance sheets to national sovereign debt; calls on the Commission to submit a legislative proposal for the creation of a true European sa, which remains untested and politically controversial, since it would distract the euro area from the real problem, namely the unsafe nature of certain euro area sovereign bonds, due to a lack of budgetary discipline at national level; recalls therefore the urgent need for ambitious structural reforms; recalls that during the financial panic of 2007, runs out of asset-backed securities were indiscriminate, and depended neither on their complexity nor on their intrinsic performance, which made new issuances impossible even for simple products, while secondary markets froze; warns that the same could happen to the market of the safe asset; recalls the conclusion of the ESRB that the safe asset does not entail any built-in promise to offer asset; stable source of finance for governments during a crisis;
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6 a. Recalls that there are risks associated with sovereign debt; notes that in some Member States financial institutions have overly invested in bonds issued by their own governments, constituting excessive ‘home bias’;
Amendment 125 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6 b. Calls for measures to address concentration risk, including a large- exposure limit, possibly combined with the introduction of non-zero risk weights, to be introduced; debt and sovereign bonds should therefore be covered by equity capital;
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Welcomes theTakes note of the limited progress made in the banking sector in reducing risk and increasing f, but warns about the effects of monetary policy such as lower bank profitability and zombification of banks and corporates, as shown by the ECB´s Financial sStability Review;
Amendment 147 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Notes that the ratio of non- performing loans (NPLs) held by significant institutions has fallen by more than half from the start of ECB banking supervision, in November 2014, to June 2019, declining to 3.3% in the third quarter of 2018 and down by 1.1 percentage points year-on-year; is concerned about persistent high ratios of NPLs in some Member States, but remains at unacceptably high level across the Banking Union as a whole; underlines the need to protect customers’ rights in the context of NPL transactions;
Amendment 170 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Notes that work on the implementation of the final Basel III standards has already started; recalls its resolution of 23 November 2016 on the finalisation of Basel III and calls on the Commission to act on the recommendations therein when drafting the new legislative proposals; Stresses that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) standards in particular should not be enacted wholesale into European law without taking proper account of the specific characteristics of the European banking system and of the proportionality principle;
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Requests increased transparency in banking supervision and resolution authorities in order to reinforce trust from capital and financial markets, companies and citizens;
Amendment 184 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. NotWelcomes that innovative financial technologies, such as cryptocurrencies, which could become a viable alternative to the euro, are profoundly transforming the financial sector, including banking and payment services; highlights the need to address the challenges posed by these new technologies, such as ensuring sustainable business models, a level playing field in terms of regulation and supervision, and cybersecurity;
Amendment 196 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Notes that there is considerable interconnectedness between the ‘shadow banking’ sector and the ‘traditional’ banking sector, which raises concerns of systemic risk given the lack of appropriate supervision of the first; calls, in this regard, for the establishment of a macroprudential toolkit to counter threats to financial stability posed by the increasing role of the ‘shadow banking’ system;
Amendment 206 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Welcomes the agreement on the exchange of information between the ECB and the AML/CFT supervisors; recalls its serious concern about regulatory and supervisory fragmentation in the AML/CFT area, which is ill-suited to supervise the increasing cross-border activity in the EU; calls on the Commission to start working on the overhaul of the EU AML framework and legislation to effectively address the risks posed by cross-border illegal activity to the integrity of the EU financial system and the security of EU citizens;
Amendment 216 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Recalls its resolution of 8 June 2011 on credit rating agencies: future perspectives; notes thatquestions whether the creation of a European credit rating agency would contribute to increasing competition, reducing information asymmetries and increasing transparency for markets; note, since the credit rating market would still remain an oligopoly using dubious methods of assessing creditworthiness; warns that sustainability ratings based on environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria are an importantwould create more layers of complementxity to the credit risk assessments provided by credit ratings in channelling funds towards investments in; warns that such qualitative assessments could lead to channelling funds towards investments in politically mandated activities, rather than economically viable and sustainable activities;
Amendment 219 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
Amendment 225 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. WelcomNotes the fact that the Single Resolution Board has not been required to take resolution action in 2019; urges the Commission to review whether the legislation is adequate to ensure that all banks could, if needed, be resolved without the need for taxpayers’ money, including resorting to the various taxpayer funded rescue schemes including the Single Resolution Fund; invites the Commission to follow up on the Financial Stability Board review of the ‘too big to fail’ legislation and consider if legislation to separate deposit-taking and investment banking should once again be considered; regrets in this sense the comments made by Pentti Hakkarainen, Member of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, on 15 June 2019, stating that European banking needs to enter a period of consolidation, with less profitable banks exiting the market or being taken over by their more profitable competitors;
Amendment 242 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Is concerned by the lack of mechanisms in the Banking Union to ensure that emergency liquidity that can be provided in the event of a resolution and; calls on the Commission to attempt to address this gapmoral hazard without further delay; rejects the idea that the ECB could provide such liquidity;
Amendment 250 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Urges the operationalisation of the backstop todissolution of the SRF;
Amendment 254 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Stresses that some banks need to be able to operate across borders while managing their capital and liquidity at a consolidated level, in order to diversify their risks and address any lack of profitability; highlights that rules should allow for greater flexibility for the parent company in this regard, while specifying that, in the event of a crisis, the parent company should provide capital and liquidity to the subsidiary located in the host country;
Amendment 264 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Urges the compleRejects the transformation of the Banking Union into a Transfer Union through the creation of a fully mutualised EDIS, to protectforce depositors against banking disruptions and to ensure confidence among depositors and investors across the Banking Union; welcomes the support of the [incoming] President of the Commission and the President of the ECBin one Member States to pay for banking disruptions in other Member States and to disrupt confidence among depositors and investors across the Banking Union; recalls that the moral hazard of deposit protection spurs deposit banks to engage in overly risky behaviour; recalls that deposit protection discourages deposit holders to scrutinise their bank and its investment and management decisions; rejects the support of the President of the Commission and the President of the ECB for the establishment of EDIS; points out that the absence of a proper impact assessment of the EDIS proposal is fundamentally at odds with the principles of sound governance; points out that there are still significant doubts regarding the appropriate legal basis for the establishment of EDIS;
Amendment 276 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22 a (new)
Paragraph 22 a (new)
22 a. Recalls that gold is money and fiat is debt; welcomes that the German Bundesbank, for the first time since the introduction of the euro, has started to buy gold, thereby taking the necessary precautions for the inevitable; welcomes that the Polish central bank has repatriated its gold reserves; welcomes the recent statement of the Dutch Central Bank that if there were to be a major monetary reset, gold stock can serve as a basis to rebuild the global monetary system; underlines that gold bolsters confidence in the stability of the central bank's balance sheet and creates a sense of security; therefore calls on all national central banks, especially those in the euro area, to hold on to sufficient amounts of physical gold, and repatriate any gold reserves currently kept outside the national borders;