6 Amendments of Gunnar BECK related to 2022/2143(INI)
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 b (new)
Paragraph 1 b (new)
1b. Recalls that the principle of primacy asserts a hierarchy between EU and national law, which is not expressly mentioned in the texts of the EU Treaties and does not have a basis in general public international law;
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Recalls in this regard that, in accordance with consistent case-law and on the basis of Article 4(2) TEU, although the Member States have a certain degree of discretion in implementing the principles of EU law, their obligations as to the result to be achieved do not vary from one Member State to another and the executive force of EU law may not vary from one Member State to another; emphasises that the same logic applies within the Member States, as compliance with EU law and its principles may not vary over time asthe principle of primacy precludes autochthonous national legislation in areas of exclusive EU competence, applies to areas of shared EU/national competence but does not extend to areas of subordinate or complementary EU competence nor to a result of national legal, political or social changesas of ongoing national competence;
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Recalls that there have only been very few instances of conflicts between EU and national constitutional law, which have resulted in national constitutional courts asserting their jurisdiction of the last resort: in the PSPP case where the German Constitutional Court eventually submitted like a lamb once the ECB, the German government and the German parliament all ignored the constitutional limits on the ECB’s bond-buying programmes;
Amendment 209 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Encourages the Commission to initiate infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU in response to judgments of national constitutional courts that challenge the principle of primacy; underlines that such procedures provide the opportunity for supreme courts to engage in a judicial dialogue; stresses also the need to make clear to other national constitutional courts that there are consequences for failing to respect the principle of primacyConsiders that it might be extremely useful for the cause of the ‘ever close union’ if judges of Supreme Courts engaged on a regular basis in an open and transparent dialogue by using possible means, such as conferences, networks or exchange visits; suggests that in the interests of democratic accountability and transparency, however, such meetings should neither be informal nor be tarnished by secrecy, and a full transcript should be published of any encounter or any meeting or any conversation in writing or otherwise between national and EU judges;
Amendment 243 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12