BETA

9 Amendments of Pirkko RUOHONEN-LERNER related to 2016/0339(CNS)

Amendment 40 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 4 a (new)
(4a) Underlying the BEPS initiative is also the declaration of G20 Leaders at their meeting in Saint Petersburg on 5-6 September 2013, expressing their wish to ensure that profits are taxed where economic activities deriving the profits are performed and where value is created. In practice, this would have required the introduction of unitary taxation with formulary apportionment of tax revenues to states. That goal has not been achieved.
2017/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 5 a (new)
(5a) The effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements should also be considered from the viewpoint of developing countries, and the Union and its Member States should aim to support developing countries in tackling such effects.
2017/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 50 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 8
(8) Given that Directive (EU) 2016/1164 includes rules on hybrid mismatches between Member States, it is appropriate to include rules on hybrid mismatches with third countries in that Directive. Consequently, those rules should apply to all taxpayers that are subject to corporate tax in a Member State including permanent establishments of entities resident in third countries. It is necessary to cover all hybrid mismatches or related arrangements where at least one of the parties involved is a corporate taxpayer in a Member State.
2017/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
(9) Rules on hybrid mismatches should address mismatch situations which are the result of conflicting tax rules of two (or more) jurisdictions. However, those rules should not affect the general features of the tax system of a jurisdiction and proportionality should be ensured.
2017/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 65 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 17
(17) Hybrid transfers may give rise to a difference in tax treatment if, as a result of a transfer of a financial instrument under a structured arrangement or without it, the underlying return on that instrument is treated as derived simultaneously by more than one of the parties to the arrangement. The underlying return is the income related to and derived from the transferred instrument. This difference in tax treatment may lead to a deduction without inclusion or to a tax credit in two different jurisdictions for the same tax withheld at source. Such mismatches should therefore be eliminated. In case of a deduction without inclusion the same rules should apply as for neutralising a hybrid financial instrument or hybrid entity mismatch leading to a deduction without inclusion. In case of a double tax credit, the Member State concerned should limit the benefit of the tax credit in proportion to the net taxable income with respect to the underlying return.
2017/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 66 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 19
(19) Imported mismatches shift the effect of a hybrid mismatch between parties in third countries into the jurisdiction of a Member State through the use of a non-hybrid instrument thereby undermining the effectiveness of the rules that neutralise hybrid mismatches. A deductible payment in a Member State can be used to fund expenditure under a structured arrangement involving a hybrid mismatch between third countries. To counter such imported mismatches, it is necessary to include rules that disallow the deduction of a payment if the corresponding income from that payment is set-off, directly or indirectly, against a deduction that arises under a hybrid mismatch or related arrangement giving rise to a double deduction or a deduction without inclusion between third countries.
2017/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 70 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 21
(21) The objective of this Directive is to improve the resilience of the internal market as a whole against hybrid mismatch arrangementes. This cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States acting individually, given that national corporate tax systems are disparate and that independent action by Member States would only replicate the existing fragmentation of the internal market in direct taxation. It would thus allow inefficiencies and distortions to persist in the interaction of distinct national measures. This would thus result in a lack of coordination. That objective can rather, due to the cross-border nature of hybrid mismatches or hybrid mismatch arrangements and the need to adopt solutions that function for the internal market as a whole, be better achieved at Union level. The Union may therefore adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. By setting the required level of protection for the internal market, this Directive only aims to achieve the essential degree of coordination within the Union that is necessary to achieve its objectives.
2017/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 71 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 21 a (new)
(21a) To ensure clear and effective implementation, consistency with the OECD report on Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2 - 2015 should be highlighted.
2017/03/08
Committee: ECON
Amendment 77 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b
Directive (EU) 2016/1164
Article 2 – point 9 – subparagraph 3 – introductory part
A hybrid mismatch also includes the transfer of a financial instrument under a structured arrangement or without one involving a taxpayer where the underlying return on the transferred financial instrument is treated for tax purposes as derived simultaneously by more than one of the parties to the arrangement, who are resident for tax purposes in different jurisdictions, giving rise to any of the following outcomes:
2017/03/08
Committee: ECON