4 Amendments of David MARTIN related to 2017/2028(INI)
Amendment 15 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Emphasises that trade agreements should be seen as a key mechanism for promoting anti-corruption measures and good governance; calls for such agreements to include commitments to multilateral anti-corruption conventions in all trade deal, such as the UNCAC and the OECD Anti- bribery Convention; calls on the Commission to consider developing assistance projects to help states overcome constraints complying with these international conventions;
Amendment 20 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2 a (new)
Paragraph 2 a (new)
2a. Recognises the major role of the Trade Facilitation Agreement in fighting corruption at ports of entry which was adopted in Bali in 2013 and entered into force in February 2017;
Amendment 27 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Calls for whistle-blower protection to be addressed in EU trade deals; therefore recalls that proper European legislation is needed and urges the Commission to propose legislative instruments ensuring effective measures to protect whistle-blowers acting in the public interest when disclosing confidential information of companies and public bodies; stresses that signatory parties of trade agreements should take measures to promote the active participation of the private sector, civil society organisations and domestic advisory groups in the implementation of anti-corruption programmes and clauses in international trade and investment deals;
Amendment 45 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Insists that EU trade partners lose benefits granted by trade agreements where they fail to comply with anti-corruption commitments or with international standards in the field of anti-corruption such as the Common Reporting Standard of the OECD, the Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting of the OECD, the central register of beneficial ownership and FATF recommendations; calls on the Commission to set clear and relevant conditions and performance indicators allowing better assessment and demonstration of results; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to respond firmly, proportionally and quickly where the beneficiary government shows insufficient commitment to comply with what has been agreed.