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16 Amendments of Íñigo MÉNDEZ DE VIGO related to 2010/0277(NLE)

Amendment 42 #
Proposal for a directive
Citation 1
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular the third subparagraph ofArticle 126, in particular the third subparagraph of paragraph 14 thereof, and Article 126(14)1 thereof,
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 51 #

Recital 1 a (new)
1a. Experience gained during the first decade of functioning of the economic and monetary union shows a need for improved economic governance in the Union, which should be built on a stronger national ownership of commonly agreed rules and policies and on a more robust surveillance framework at the Union level of national economic and budgetary policies.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 53 #

Recital 1 b (new)
1b. The improved economic governance framework should rely on several inter- linked policies for sustainable growth and jobs, which need to be coherent with each other, namely, a Union strategy for growth and jobs, the multilateral surveillance framework (European Semester), an effective procedure for preventing and correcting excessive budgetary positions (the Stability and Growth Pact), a robust framework for preventing and correcting macro- economic imbalances, enhanced financial market regulation and supervision (including macro-prudential supervision by the European Systemic Risk Board), and an European Monetary Fund to pool a percentage of Member States sovereign debts, to help them to resolve financial crisis and to finance investments that can strengthen economic growth.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 54 #

Recital 1 c (new)
1c. A comprehensive and integrated solution to the euro area debt crisis is needed since a piecemeal approach has not worked so far.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #

Recital 1 d (new)
1d. In order to enhance economic growth and support the objectives of Europe 2020 (I), unused payment appropriations shall be reallocated to common programs aimed towards growth, competitiveness and employment, (II) the lending capacities of the EIB as well the creation of a project bonds market should be used to attract funding from other financial institutions and private investors on the capital market such as pension funds and insurers to finance European projects.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 56 #

Recital 1 e (new)
1e. Strengthening economic governance should go hand in hand with reinforcing the democratic legitimacy of economic governance in the Union, which should be achieved through a closer and a more timely involvement of the European Parliament and the national parliaments throughout the economic and budgetary policy coordination procedures.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 57 #

Recital 1 f (new)
1f. The multilateral surveillance framework (European Semester) should play a vital role in implementing the requirement under Article 121(1) TFEU that Member States regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and that they coordinate them in that respect. Transparency and independent oversight are an integral part of enhanced economic governance. The Council and the Commission should make public and set out the reasons for their positions and decisions at the appropriate stages of the economic and budgetary policy coordination procedures.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 59 #

Recital 1 g (new)
1g. The political response of the Member States to the assessments, decisions, recommendations and warnings issued to them by the Commission or Council in the framework of the European Semester shall be taken into account (i) in the enforcement procedures of the preventive and corrective parts of the Stability and Growth Pact (ii) in the enforcement measures to correct macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, (iii) in ensuring that conditions linked to European Monetary Fund allocations are adequately tailored to the Member State fundamentals and to ensure that its economic policies are on the right track, (iv) in ensuring that the European Monetary Fund's financial assistance to Member States will smoothen economic adjustment shocks, help them to avoid sovereign defaults, prevent costs on other countries through contagion and guarantee financial stability of the eurozone as a whole.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 60 #

Recital 1 h (new)
1h. The Commission should have a stronger and more independent role in the enhanced surveillance procedure. This concerns Member-State-specific assessments, monitoring, missions, recommendations and warnings. In addition, the role of the Council needs to be reduced in the steps leading to potential sanctions and the reversed qualified majority voting in the Council needs to be used wherever possible in accordance with the TFEU. The member of the Council representing the Member State concerned and those which are not complying with the Council recommendations to take corrective action under the Stability and Growth Pact or to address excessive macroeconomic imbalances shall not participate in the vote.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 90 #

Recital 12 a (new)
12a. The permanent crisis mechanism should be adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure and inspired by the Union method, in order, on the one hand, to strengthen Parliament’s involvement and improve democratic accountability and, on the other, to draw on the expertise, independence and impartiality of the Commission;
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 91 #

Recital 12 b (new)
12b. The volatility of the markets and the levels of the government bond spreads of certain Member States whose currency is the euro are calling for a resolute action to defend the stability of the euro.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 92 #

Recital 12 c (new)
12c. The EMF should serve three purposes: it should cover a percentage of the sovereign debt from the Member States that can be paid without risking the financial stability of any other Member State or of the eurozone as a whole (Eurosecurities); it should help any Member State with financial difficulties to resolve the crisis in which they might be involved (permanent crisis resolution mechanisms); and, finally, mobilise resources to finance investments that can promote economic growth (project bonds).
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 93 #

Recital 12 d (new)
12d. Member States whose currency is the euro should pool up to {...} percent of the sovereign debt under joint and several liability (Eurosecurities). Whilst the common issuance would increase the liquidity of the bonds on the capital market, the common liability serves to help those states which face increasing difficulties raising capital. Eurosecurities take priority over debt owed by national governments. They could help to promote the euro as a reserve currency.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 94 #

Recital 12 e (new)
12e. To strengthen fiscal discipline those countries with credible economic and fiscal policies should be allowed to borrow up to the full {...} percent of its GDP, while countries with a weaker economic or fiscal position would have to pay a premium/ extra interest rate or only be able to borrow a lower proportion of GDP in Eurosecurities. In the extreme, if a participating country was consistently to pursue unsustainable economic or fiscal policies its participation in the issuance of Eurosecurities will be suspended.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 107 #

Recital 16 a (new)
16a. Prudent and Sustainable fiscal policy-making should effectively achieve and maintain the medium-term budgetary objective. Adherence to the medium-term objective for budgetary positions should allow Member States to have a safety margin with respect to the 3% of GDP reference value for the government deficit, to ensure rapid progress towards sustainability, and at the same time to have room for budgetary manoeuvre, in particular taking into account the needs for public investment.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON
Amendment 108 #

Recital 16 b (new)
16b. In the preventive part of the Stability and Growth Pact, the incentive for prudent and sustainable fiscal policy- making should consist of an obligation to lodge an interest-bearing deposit temporarily imposed on a Member State whose currency is the euro that is making insufficient progress with budgetary consolidation. This should be the case when, following an initial warning from the Commission, a Member State persists in conduct which, while not amounting to a violation of the ban on excessive deficits, is imprudent and potentially detrimental to the smooth functioning of economic and monetary union, and the Council therefore issues a recommendation in accordance with Article 121(4) TFEU.
2011/02/16
Committee: ECON