BETA

11 Amendments of Martin SCHIRDEWAN related to 2023/0112(COD)

Amendment 35 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 a (new)
(1a) The Union resolution framework is not a substitute for structural reforms in the banking sector. The systemic risks to financial stability associated with institutions that are "too big to fail" remain. Therefore, structural measures, including the separation of investment banking from commercial banking, need to be taken over and above the resolution framework.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 36 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1 b (new)
(1b) The Union resolution framework is not a substitute for the establishment of strong safeguards to protect the Union from financial instability. For this reason, not only must the Basel III framework be implemented in full and without derogations, but stronger regulatory capital requirements, going beyond international standards, should be implemented in the Union.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 47 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 9
(9) The resolution framework is meant to be applied to potentially any institution or entity, irrespective of its size and business modelcertain institutions, if the tools available under national law are not adequate to manage its failure. To ensure such outcome, the criteria to apply the public interest assessment to a failing institution or entity should be specified. In particular, it is necessary to clarify that, depending on the specific circumstances, certain functions of the institution or entity can be considered critical even if their discontinuance would impact financial stability or critical services only at regional level.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 145 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 46
(46) Given the possibility to use DGS in resolution, it is necessary to specify further the way in which the DGS contribution can count towards the calculation of the requirements to access resolution financing arrangements. If the contribution made by shareholders and creditors of the institution under resolution through reductions, write- down or conversion of their liabilities, summed with the contribution made by the DGS, amounts to at least 8 % of the institution’s total liabilities including own funds, the institution should be able to access the resolution financing arrangement to receive further funding, where necessary to ensure effective resolution in line with the resolution objectives. If those conditions are met, the contribution of the DGS should be limited to the amount necessary to enable access to the resolution financing arrangement. To ensure that resolution continues to be primarily financed by the institution’s internal resources and to minimise distortions of competition, the possibility to use the DGS contribution to ensure access to resolution financing arrangements should only be possible for institutions for which the resolution plan or the group resolution plan does not provide for their winding up in an orderly manner in case of failure, given that the MREL determined by resolution authorities for those institutions has been set at a level that includes both the loss absorption and the recapitalisation amounts.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 156 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1 – point b
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 2 – paragraph 1 – point 35
(35) ‘critical functions’ means activities, services or operations the discontinuance of which is likely in one or more Member States to lead to the disruption of services that are essential to the real economy or to disrupt financial stability at national or regional level, due to the size, market share, external and internal interconnectedness, complexity or cross- border activities of an institution or group, with particular regard to the substitutability of those activities, services or operations;;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 237 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 15
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 30 a – paragraph 8 – subparagraph 2
Competent authorities and resolution authorities shall ensure that those measures and actions are consistent, coordinated and effective.; The provisions of this Article shall not prejudice the proper functioning of national institutional protection schemes. Member States may decide to exempt national institutional protection schemes from the requirements of this Article.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 260 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 17 – point b – point i
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32 – paragraph 4 – point d
(d) extraordinary public financial support is required except where such support is granted in one of the forms referred to in Article 32c; or in the form of transferring all or part of the institution concerned into public ownership.
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 292 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Before granting public financial support, Member States shall consider transferring all or part of the institution concerned into public ownership. If the Member State decides to grant public financial support instead of transferring all or part of the institution concerned into public ownership, it shall provide for a public statement in writing and before the national parliament explaining the reasons for its decision. Member States shall ensure that extraordinary public financial support outside of resolution action may be granted to an institution or entity as referred to in Article 1(1), points (b), (c) or (d), on an exceptional basis only in one of the following cases and provided that the extraordinary public financial support complies with the conditions and requirements established in the Union State aid framework:
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 314 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 19
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 32c – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 – introductory part
TMember States shall ensure that the support measures for the institution concerned are conditional on behavioural or structural measures that promote the public interest, including the reduction of risks associated with the complexity, interconnectedness and size of institutions in the banking sector. In addition, the support measures referred to in paragraph 1, point (a), shall fulfil all of the following conditions:
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 348 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 – point b
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 44 – paragraph 5 – point a
(a) a contribution to loss absorption and recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8 % of the total liabilities including own funds of the institution under resolution, measured in accordance with the valuation provided for in Article 36, has been made by the shareholders and the holders of other instruments of ownership, the holders of relevant capital instruments and other bail-inable liabilities through reduction, write down or conversion pursuant to Article 48(1) and Article 60(1), and by the deposit guarantee scheme pursuant to Article 109 where relevant;
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON
Amendment 427 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 55 – point a
Directive 2014/59/EU
Article 108 – paragraph 1
(a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: ‘ 1. their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings the following have the same priority ranking, which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors: (a) (b) located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union; (c) subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.; ’deleted Member States shall ensure that in deposits; deposits made through branches deposit guarantee schemes
2023/11/06
Committee: ECON