BETA

18 Amendments of Martin SCHIRDEWAN related to 2023/0136(NLE)

Amendment 2 #
Proposal for a directive
The European Parliament rejects the Commission proposal.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 11 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 8
(8) This Directive is part of a package together with Regulation (EU) [XXX]22 of the Parliament and of the Council replacing Regulation (EC) No 1466/9723 (the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact) and Council Regulation [XXX]24 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/9725 (the corrective arm of the Stability and Growth Pact). Together, they establish a reformed Union economic governance framework that incorporates into Union law the substance of Title III ‘Fiscal Compact’ of the inter- governmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) in the Economic and Monetary Union26 , in accordance with Article 16 thereof. Title III is binding on the Member States whose currency is the euro and, on a voluntary basis, on Bulgaria, Denmark and Romania. By building on the experience with the implementation of the TSCG by the Member States, the package retains the Fiscal Compact’s medium- term orientation as a tool to achieve budgetary discipline and growth promotion. The package includes a strengthened country-specific dimension aimed at enhancing national ownership, including by means of a stronger role for independent fiscal institutions, which draws on the Fiscal Compact’s common principles proposed by the Commission27 in accordance with Article 3(2) of the TSCG. The analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures for the overall assessment of compliance required by the Fiscal Compact is set out in Regulation [XXX] replacing Regulation (EC) No 1466/97. As in the Fiscal Compact, temporary deviations from the medium-term plan are allowed only in exceptional circumstances in Regulation [XXX]replacing Regulation (EC) No 1466/97. Similarly, in case of significant deviations from the medium-term plan, measures should be implemented to correct the deviations over a defined period of time. The package strengthens fiscal surveillance and enforcement procedures to deliver on the commitment of promoting sound and sustainable public finances and sustainable growth. The economic governance framework reform, thus, retains the fundamental objectives of budgetary discipline and debt sustainability set out in the TSCG. __________________ 22 Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council of [insert date] [insert full title] (OJ L ..). 23 Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1). 24 Regulation (EU) of the Council of [insert date] [insert full title] (OJ L ..). 25 Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6). 26 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of 2 March 2012. 27 Communication COM(2012) 342 final of 20 June 2012 from the Commission ‘Common principles on national fiscal correction mechanisms’.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 15 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
(11) Biased and unrealistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts for the annual and multiannual budget legislations can considerably hamper the effectiveness of fiscal planning and consequently impair commitment to budgetary discipline. To improve baseline assumptions and provide unbiased assessments of the fiscal impact of various policy measures, the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts of the Member States should be endorsed or produced by an independent fiscal institution when requested by the Member State concerned.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 22 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 14
(14) In order to achieve strengthened responsibility in fiscal policy, fiscal institutions should have a highpluralistic board, where minority views have representation as well as representatives of workers' associations and environmental organizations, the necessary degree of operational independence, the necessary resources to perform their tasks and extensive and timely access to necessary information.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 24 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 14 a (new)
(14 a) In order to promote the ownership of Member States, national parliaments shall be responsible for endorsing the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts and the impact assessments produced by the independent fiscal institutions.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 29 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 18
(18) Similarly, transparency regarding the type and size of tax expenditures, namely tax benefits as well as tax avoidance and evasion practices, and resulting revenue losses is necessary to provide a more profound understanding of the extent to which fiscal policy and budgetary planning are aligned with government priorities.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 39 #
Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 3 – point a Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 4 – paragraph 1
1. Member States shall ensure that annual and multiannual fiscal planning is based on realistic macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts using the most up-to- date information. Budgetary planning shall be based on the most likely macrofiscal scenario or on a more prudent scenario. The macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts shall be either produced or endorsed by independent fiscal institutions established in accordance with Article 8. They shall be compared with the most updated forecasts of the Commission. Significant differences between the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts of the Member State and the Commission’s forecasts shall be explained, including where the level or growth of variables in external assumptions departs significantly from the values contained in the Commission’s forecasts, when requested by the Member State concerned.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 44 #
Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 3 – point a a (new) Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 4 – paragraph 1 a (new)
(aa) the following paragraph 1a is inserted: 1 a. The Commission shall make public the methodologies, assumptions and relevant parameters that underpin its macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts.’
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 46 #
Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 3 – point b Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 4 – paragraph 4
(b) paragraph 4 is deleted.replaced by the following: '4. Within the framework of a sensitivity analysis, the macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts shall examine paths of main fiscal variables under different assumptions as fiscal multipliers and reference interest rates.';
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 48 #
Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 3 – point c Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 4 – paragraph 5
5. Member States shall specify which institution is responsible for producing macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts. At least annually, tThe Member States and the Commission shall engage, when deemed necessary by the Member State concerned, in a technical dialogue concerning the assumptions underpinning the preparation of macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 55 #
Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 5 – point b Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 6 – paragraph 2
If numerical fiscal rules contain escape clauses, such clauses shall set out a limited number ofthe specific circumstances to be used, consistent with the Member States’ obligations deriving from the TFEU in the area of budgetary policy and Regulation [XXX(EU) [on the preventive arm of the SGP], and stringent], and procedures in which temporary non-compliance with the rules is permitted. Escape clauses shall have clear time limitsHowever, the Member States shall be able to apply an escape clause when an economic downturn or stagnation takes place.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 61 #
Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 8 Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 8 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. The Member States shall guarantee that: (i) minority views have representation; (ii) representatives of workers' associations have representation; (iii) environmental organizations have representation.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 68 #
(a) producing the annual and multiannual macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts underlying the government’s medium-term planning or endorsing those used by the budgetary authorities, when requested by the Member State;
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 72 #
Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 8 Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 8 – paragraph 4 – point b
(b) producing debt sustainability assessments underlying the government’s medium-term planning or endorsing those provided by the budgetary authorities;deleted
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 88 #
Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b – point i Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) comprehensive and transparent multiannual budgetary objectives as referred to in Article 2, point (e) in terms of the general governmentprimary deficit, debt and any other summary fiscal indicator such as expenditure, ensuring that they are consistent with any country-specific numerical fiscal rules as provided for in Chapter IV of this Directive and the relevant provisions of Regulation [XXX preventive arm of the SGP]. set of relevant fiscal indicators;
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 89 #
Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 9 – point b – point ii Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 9 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) a description of medium-term policies, including investment and reforms, envisaged with an impact on general government finances, the energy transition and sustainable and inclusive growth, broken down by major revenue and expenditure item, showing how the adjustment towards the national budgetary objectives over the medium term as referred to in Article 2, point (e), is achieved compared to projections under unchanged policies.;
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 98 #
Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 10 Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 10
Annual budget legislation shall be consistent with the national budgetary objectives over the medium term as referred to in Article 2, point (e). Any severe departure shall be duly explained.’;
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON
Amendment 106 #
Proposal for a directive Sole Article – Paragraph 1 – point 13 Directive 2011/85/EU
Article 14 – paragraph 3
3. For all subsectors of general government, Member States shall publish relevant information on contingent liabilities with potentially large impact on public budgets, including government guarantees, non-performing loans, and liabilities stemming from the operation of public corporations, potential expenses and obligations arising from court cases, tax benefits expenditures and potential losses arising from tax avoidance and evasion, including the extent thereof. Member States shall also publish information on disaster and climate-related contingent liabilities to the extent possible. Member States shall publish information on past calls on one-off guarantees and expenditure recorded for standardised guarantees. Published information shall include information on economic losses incurred due to disasters and climate-related shocks, including the fiscal costs borne by the public sector and the instruments used to mitigate or cover them. Member States shall publish information on the participation of general government in the capital of private and public corporations in respect of economically significant amounts.
2023/10/24
Committee: ECON