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23 Amendments of Caroline NAGTEGAAL related to 2023/0138(COD)

Amendment 204 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 11
(11) The presentation of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan should be accompanied by an opinion of the independent fiscal institutions of the Member State and should be preceded by a technical dialogue with the Commission to ensure compliance with the provisions of this Regulation. On the basis of a recommendation from the Commission, accompanied by a report from the European Fiscal Board, the Council should set the net expenditure path and endorse the reform and investment commitments, including those taken for the possible extension of the adjustment period, as appropriate.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 245 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 17
(17) When Member States use assumptions in their medium-term fiscal- structural plan that differ from the Commission’s standard medium-term debt projection framework, they should explain and duly justify the differences in a transparent manner and based on sound economic arguments. The independent fiscal institutions of the Member State should also opine on the justifications for deviating from the technical trajectory.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 252 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 20
(20) The Commission’s assessment of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plans should examine in particular the plausibility of the macroeconomic and fiscal assumptions, to the extent that they depart from those underlying the technical trajectory. In particular, the debt projections at unchanged policy to be included in the plan should be consistent and comparable with the Commission projections. The opinions of the independent fiscal institutions and EFB should be duly taken into account. In case the EFB’s assessment is that the plan does not fulfil the criteria of this Regulation, the Council can only recommend the proposed net expenditure path with a 4/5th majority of Member States in favour, excluding the Member State in question.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 269 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 25
(25) Where the verifiable and time- bound set of reform and investment commitments underpinning the more gradual net expenditure path is not met within the specified deadline, the Council, on a recommendation from the Commission, can recommend that adjustment be steepened, that is to say by shortening the extension of the net expenditure path. Both net expenditure significantly exceeding the net expenditure path and a significant cumulated debit balance should be considered as not in compliance with the net expenditure path. Such a measure should ensure that Member States undertake necessary consolidation even in times of economic growth.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 277 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 27
(27) Independent fiscal institutions have proven their capacity to foster fiscal discipline and strengthen the credibility of Member States’ public finances. In order to enhance national ownership and the accountability of the national governments, the role of independent fiscal institutions, traditionally mandated to monitor compliance with the national framework, should be expanded to the economic governance framework of the Union.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 289 #
Proposal for a regulation
Recital 31
(31) There should also be a country- specific escape clause to allow a deviation from the net expenditure path provided that it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term in the case of exceptional circumstances, such as unpredictable exogenous events that could not have been prevented and that require counter-cyclical fiscal measures, outside the control of the Member State which have a major impact on the public finances of the Member State. Such major impact should result in an overall size of the shock that exceeds a ‘normal’ range: for example costs of natural disasters should be factored in in budgetary planning within a certain range. Exceptional circumstances should be qualified as a significant negative GDP shock. The triggering and extension of general and country-specific escape clauses are subject to a Council recommendation and an EFB opinion. In case the EFB opinion on the country-specific escape clause is negative, the Council can only recommend a positive decision with a 4/5th majority of Member States in favour, excluding the Member State in question. The Council should specify a time limit and maximum size as measured through the control account for such a deviation.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 423 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 5 – paragraph 1
For each Member State having a public debt above the 60% of GDP reference value or a government deficit above the 3% of GDP reference value, the Commission shall put forward, in a report to the Economic and Financial Committee, a technical trajectory for net expenditure covering a minimum adjustment period of 43 years of the national medium-term fiscal- structural plan, and its possible extension by a maximum of 32 years pursuant to Article 13. The Commission shall make the report public. (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.)
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 441 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the public debt ratio is put or remains on a plausibly downward path towards 60% of GDP, or stays at prudent levels, i.e. below 60% of GDP;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 461 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point c
(c) the fiscal adjustment effort is linear over the period of the national medium- term fiscal- structural plan isand at least proportional to the total effort over the entire adjustment period;. (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.)
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 475 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 6 – paragraph 1 – point d
(d) the public debt ratio at the end of the planning horizon is below the public debt ratio in the year before the start of the technical trajectory; and is reduced by at least 1% of GDP per year on average over the adjustment period until below 60% of GDP; for Member States with debt ratios above 60 % of GDP, the public debt ratio must decline by at least [x] percentage points per year of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan for Member States with high debt challenge, and by at least [x] percentage points per year for Member States with medium debt challenge. The influence of the cycle on the pace of debt reduction shall be taken into account; (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.)
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 519 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 1 – point a
(a) the underlying medium-term public debt projection framework and results; based on a specific methodology and results; it shall make all data, calculations and assumptions public that are necessary for a replication of the results;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 539 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 7 – paragraph 2
2. For Member States having a government deficit below the 3% of GDP reference value and public debt below the 60% of GDP reference value, the Commission shall provide technical information regarding the structural primary balance necessary to ensure that the headline deficit is maintained below the 3% of GDP reference value and the public debt ratio remains below the 60% of GDP reference value, both without any additional policy measures over a 10-year period after the end of the national medium-term fiscal-structural plan.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 623 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 11 – paragraph 2
2. Where the national-medium-term fiscal-structural plan includes a higher net expenditure trajectory than in the technical trajectory issued by the Commission pursuant to Article 5, the Member State shall provide in its plan sound and verifiable economic arguments explaining the difference. The explanation shall be accompanied by an assessment by the Independent Fiscal Institutions of the Member State of the economic arguments put forward by the Member State.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 639 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point a a (new)
(a a) adhere to the requirements for the technical trajectory pursuant to Article 6 and Annex I;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 653 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 12 – paragraph 1 – point b
(b) explain how it will ensure the delivery of investment and reforms responding to the main challenges identified within the European Semester, in the country-specific recommendations, correct the identified macroeconomic imbalances under the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure if applicable, and address the common priorities of the Union referred to in Annex VI of this Regulation, including the European Green Deal, European Pillar of Social Rights and the Digital Decade while being consistent with the updated National Energy and Climate Plans and the National Digital Decade Roadmaps;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 761 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 13 – paragraph 5
5. The assessment of whether the set of reforms and investment commitments fulfil the criteria set out in paragraph 2 and of whether each of the reform and investment commitment fulfil the conditions set out in paragraph 3 shall be carried out in accordance with the assessment framework set out in Annex VII. The assessment should be accompanied by an independent evaluation of the respective national IFI and the EFB.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 840 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – point e
(e) whether for the years that the Member State concerned is expected to have a deficit above the 3% of GDP reference value, and the excess is not close and temporary, the fiscal adjustment is consistent with the benchmark adjustment of at least 0.5% of GDP in the structural primary balance referred to under Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure as amended by Regulation [X]; and (This amendment applies throughout the text. Adopting it will necessitate corresponding changes throughout.)
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 865 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 15 – paragraph 2 – point f a (new)
(f a) whether the projected debt reduction ten years after the adjustment period is at least X% of the excess of public debt ratio over the 60% reference value, compared to the year before the start of the technical trajectory;
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 951 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 22 – paragraph 1
Each national independent fiscal institution referred to in Article 8 of Council Directive […]32 [on the national budgetary frameworks] shall provide an assessment of compliance of the budgetary outturns data reported in the progress report referred to in Article 20 with the net expenditure path. Where applicable, each national independent fiscal institution shall also analyse the factors underlying a deviation from the net expenditure path. The assessment shall be made public and shall be submitted to the Member State and to the Commission. _________________ 32 Council Directive […] of […] [amending Council Directive 2011/85/EU on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States] (OJ …., …, p,…)
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 982 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 24 – paragraph 1
On a recommendation from the Commission, the Council may adopt a recommendation, accompanied by an opinion from the European Fiscal Board, allowing Member States to deviate from their net expenditure path, in the event of a severe economic downturn in the euro area or the Union as a whole, provided it does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the medium term. The Council shall specify a time-limit for such deviation.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1036 #
Proposal for a regulation
Article 30 – paragraph 2 a (new)
2 a. Where the Council decides against opening an excessive imbalance procedure under Article 7 (2) of Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 in cases where the Commission considers that the Member State concerned is affected by excessive imbalances on the basis of the in-depth review referred to in Article 5 of that Regulation, it shall publicly explain its position.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1159 #
Proposal for a regulation
Annex IV – paragraph 3
The cumulated balance of the control account in a given period is the sum of the yearly debits and credits registered during that period. A Member State will be deemed not to be in compliance with its net expenditure path when: (a) net expenditure exceeds the net expenditure path by more than [xxx] % of GDP in one single year of the plan horizon;or, (b) the cumulated balance of the control account exceeds a debit of more than [xxx]% of GDP.
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON
Amendment 1163 #
Proposal for a regulation
Annex V – paragraph 1 – introductory part
The methodology for the assessment of plausibility pursuant to Article 8 is replicable, predictable and transparent and based on the following conditions:
2023/10/26
Committee: ECON