34 Amendments of Markus FERBER related to 2013/2277(INI)
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the Troika is the basic structure for negotiation between the official lenders and the governments of the recipient countries, as well as for reviewing the implementation of adjustment programmes; whereas for the European side, the final decisions as regards financial assistance and conditionality are taken by the Eurogroup and the respective national parliaments;
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas the total amount of financial assistance in the four programmes is unprecedented, as are the duration and shape of the programmes, leading to an unusual situation where the assistance has almost exclusively replaced the usual financing provided by the markets;
Amendment 98 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas the economic situation and recent developmentresulting from a lack of what are necessary structural reforms in some Member States receiving assistance have compromised the quality of employment, social protection and health and safety standards;
Amendment 115 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas the Task Force for Greece was set up to strengthen the capacity of the Greek administration to design and, implement and enforce structural reforms to improve the functioning of the economy and societyadministration and create the conditions for sustained recovery and job creation, as well as to speed up the absorption of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds in Greece and to provide critical resources to finance investment;
Amendment 124 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
K. whereas, in its resolution of 20 November 2012, Parliament calls for high standards of democratic accountability at Union level to be applied to the Troika; whereas such accountability notably requires the Troika to be heard in the European Parliament before taking up its duties and to be subject to regularand to reporting to and democratic scrutiny by the European Parliamentit as part of a regular dialogue;
Amendment 134 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term; whereas the programmes were not suited to comprehensively correcting macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated sometimes over decades;
Amendment 222 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme, the Irish economy had just suffered a banking crisis of unprecedented dimensions, causing Irish GDP to fall by 6.3% in 2009 (1.1% in 2010) from a positive growth level of 5% of GDP in 2007, unemployment to increase from 4.7% in 2007 to 13.7% in 2010 and - its most detrimental impact - the government balance of payments to experience a deficit in 2010 of 30.6%, down from a surplus in 2007 (0.2%); further notes in the decade prior to the assistance programme that the Irish economy experienced a prolonged period of negative real interest rates;
Amendment 266 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Notes that the IMF is the global institution tasked with providing states experiencing balance of payment problems with conditional financial assistance, where appropriate subject to conditions; points to the fact that all Member States are members of the IMF and have therefore the right to request its assistance;
Amendment 269 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Deplores the unpreparedness ofAcknowledges the efforts made by the EU and international institutions, including the IMF, forto respond quickly and resolutely to a sovereign debt crisis of a large magnitude inside a monetary union;
Amendment 295 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Acknowledges, however, that the immense challenge the Troika faced leading to the crisis was unique as a result of the poor state of regulation of financial services, large macroeconomic imbalances, and the fact that a number of instruments such as external devaluation were obviously not available due to the constraints of monetary union; notes, moreover, that time was running out, legal obstacles had to be cleared, fear of a melt-down of the euro area was palpable, political agreements had to be reached and decisions taken on reforms, the world economy was in a downturn, and a number of countries which were intended to contribute financial support had seen their own public and private debt increase in alarming ways;
Amendment 324 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. DeplorAcknowledges that recommendations contained in MoUs mark a departure from the thinking initiated by the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategies); points out however that this can be partly explained, even if not fully justified, by the fact that programmes had to be implemented under considerable time pressure in a difficult political environment;
Amendment 341 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. RegretNotes that the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal comprise a number of detailed prescriptions for health systems reform and expenditure cuts; regrets that the programmes are not bound bnecessary the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Treaties, including Art. 168(7) TFEUalth systems reform;
Amendment 373 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Deplores that since 2008 the income distribution inequality has grown above average in the four countries and that cuts in social benefits and rising unemployment are raising poverty levelsAcknowledges that the measures implemented have led in the short term to a rise in income distribution inequality in the four countries; notes at the same time that the reform programmes lay the basis for medium- and short-term growth and job creation;
Amendment 403 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Points to the unacceptable level of youth unemployment in the four Member States under assistance programmes; points especially to the sharp increase in youth unemployment in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal which indicates shortcomings in education and training (including dual education);
Amendment 418 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the successful end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal; regrets the lack of progress in Greece despite, which show the effectiveness of the agreed measures; recognises the significant progress and unprecedented reforms having been undertakenin Greece;
Amendment 453 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Underlines that adequate economic models of best practice are necessary in order to produce credible and efficient adjustment programmes; deplores that adequate statistics and information were not always available; points out that in Greece large- scale fraud was happening in this respect in the years preceding the setting up of the programme;
Amendment 462 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; further notes that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run; also notes that the financial assistance and financial assistance and inadequately implemented first adjustment programme in Greece have not prevented an orderly default nor contagion of the crisis to other Member States; deplores the economic and social downturn which became evident when the fiscal and macroeconomic corrections were finally put into place;
Amendment 481 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Deplores however the sometimes over- optimistic assumptions made by the Troika, especially as far as growth is concerned, but also the insufficient recognition of political resistance to change in some Member States; deplores the fact that this also affected the Troika’s analysis of the interplay between fiscal consolidation and growth; notes that as a result; regrets that, partly as a result of the dilatory implementation of the programmes, fiscal targets could not be fulfilled;
Amendment 505 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. RegretNotes that the reduction of structural deficits in all programme countries since the start of their respective assistance programmes has not yet led to a reduction in the ratios of public debt to GDP; underlines thatwill in the medium to long term reduce the ratio of public debt to GDP has instead sharply increased in all programme countries;
Amendment 519 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Considers that fiscal multipliers are difficult to assess with absolute certainty; recalls in this respect that the IMF admitted to underestimating the fiscal multiplier in its growth forecasts prior to October 2012 but that the Commission stated in November 2012 that forecast errors were not due to the underestimation of fiscal multipliers; points out that this expression of public disagreement between the Commission and the IMF was not followed up;
Amendment 529 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
Amendment 543 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
Amendment 585 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Notes that the Troika’s mandate hwas been perceived as being unclear and lacking transparencygiven by the Eurogroup and the programme countries;
Amendment 609 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Points out that due to its ad hoc nature there was no appropriate legal basis available for setting up the Troika on the basis of Union primary law;
Amendment 634 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Takes note of the dual role of the Commission in the Troika as both an agent of Member States and an EU institution; warns that conflicts of interests may therefore exist within the Commissionacknowledges that the Commission has managed to avoid conflicts of interests between its role in the Troika and its responsibility as a guardian of the Treaties, especially in policies such as competition and state aid;
Amendment 647 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 33
Paragraph 33
33. Points equally to a possible conflict of interest between the current role of the ECBout that the ECB is currently playing an important role in the Troika as ‘technical advisor’ andnotwithstanding its position as creditor of the four Member States as well as its mandate under the Treaty;
Amendment 652 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Notes that the ECB’s role is not sufficiently definedcould be defined more precisely, as it is stated in the ESM Treaty that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducimplying that the ECB’s role tois that of a provider of expertise; further notes that the ECB mandate is lidetermitned by the TFEU to monetary policy and that the involvement of the ECB in any matter related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies is therefore on uncertain legal groundhas been handled with great skill and tact;
Amendment 677 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Points to the generally weakvarying democratic accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level; notes however that this democratic accountability varies between countries, depending on the will of national executives;
Amendment 699 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Points to the fact that the ESM is intergovernmental by nature, and is bound by the unanimity rule, and is subject to political influence exerted by finance ministers, heads of state and government as well as national parliaments;
Amendment 790 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
40. UrgNotes that in the short run consideration should be given to amending the ESM Treaty in order to allow standard decisions to be taken by a qualified majority rather than by unanimity, and to allow for precautionary assistance to be givenESM Treaty, based as it is on the unanimity rule, ensures that the measures to be taken will have the broadest possible support;
Amendment 796 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
Amendment 842 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Is concerned, in particular, to improve the accountability of the Commission when it acts in its capacity as a member of the Troika; rRequests that the Commission representative(s) in the Troika should be heard in the European Parliament before taking up their duties and should be subject to regular reporting to the European Parliament;
Amendment 859 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44
Paragraph 44
44. Calls for a reassessment of the decision-making process of the Eurogroup, amending MoUs with the Member States receiving EU-IMF financial assistance to include appropriate democratic accountability at both national and European levels; calls for European guidelines to be established in order to ensure appropriate democratic control on the implementation of measures at national levelgular dialogue to be established between the Troika and the European Parliament, possibly modelled on the format already used for the dialogue between Parliament and the ECB;
Amendment 872 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45
Paragraph 45