6 Amendments of Thomas MANN related to 2009/0099(COD)
Amendment 40 #
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 1
Recital 1
(1) Excessive and imprudent risk-taking in the banking sector has led to the failure of individual financial institutions and systemic problems in Member States and globally. While the causes of such risk- taking are many and complex, there is agreement by supervisors and regulatory bodies, including the G20 and the Committee of European Banking Supervisors, that the inappropriate remuneration structures of some financial institutions have been a contributory factor. Remuneration policies which give incentives to take risks that exceed the general level of risk tolerated by the institution can undermine sound and effective risk management and exacerbate excessive risk-taking behaviour. In this context, particular account should be taken of the internationally agreed and endorsed principles established by the Financial Stability Board (FSB).
Amendment 45 #
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Recital 5
Recital 5
(5) Remuneration policy should aim at aligning the personal objectives of staff members with the long-term interests of the credit institution or investment firm concerned. The assessment of the performance-based components of remuneration should be based on longer- term performance and take into account the outstanding risks associated with the performance. The assessment of performance should be set in a multi-year framework, for example of three to five years, in order to ensure that the assessment process is based on longer-term performance and that the actual payment of performance-based components of remuneration is spread over the business cycle of the firm. Corporate social responsibility and sustainable development targets should be included in the assessment of longer-term performance justifying the payment of deferred variable remuneration.
Amendment 53 #
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Annex I – point 1
Annex I – point 1
Directive 2006/48/EC
Annex V – Section 11 – point 22 – point a
Annex V – Section 11 – point 22 – point a
(a) the remuneration policy is consistent with and promotes sound and effective risk management and, does not encourage risk- taking that exceeds the level of tolerated risk of the credit institution and includes measures to avoid asymmetries of information and conflicts of interest;
Amendment 175 #
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Annex I – point 1
Annex I – point 1
Directive 2006/48/EC
Annex V – section 11 – point 22 – point h a (new)
Annex V – section 11 – point 22 – point h a (new)
(ha) at least 40 % of the variable remuneration component is deferred over a period which is not less than three years, is proportionate with the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the member of staff in question, remuneration payable under deferral arrangements vests no faster than on a pro-rata basis, and, in the event of a variable remuneration component of a particularly high amount, at least 60 % of the amount is deferred;
Amendment 176 #
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Annex I – point 1
Annex I – point 1
Directive 2006/48/EC
Annex V – section 11 – point 22 – point h b (new)
Annex V – section 11 – point 22 – point h b (new)
(hb) at least 50 % of any deferred remuneration component is made in shares or share-linked instruments of the credit institution, subject to the legal structure of the credit institution concerned, or, for non-listed credit institutions, in other non-cash instruments where appropriate and those shares, share-linked instruments and non- cash instruments are subject to an appropriate retention policy designed to align incentives with the longer-term interests of the credit institution;
Amendment 179 #
Proposal for a directive – amending act
Annex I – point 1
Annex I – point 1
Directive 2006/48/EC
Annex V – section 11 – point 22 – point h c (new)
Annex V – section 11 – point 22 – point h c (new)
(hc) the remaining portion of the deferred remuneration component can be paid as cash remuneration vesting gradually and, in the event of negative contributions of the firm or the relevant line of business in any year during the vesting period, any unvested portions are to be clawed back, subject to the realised performance of the credit institution and the business line;