35 Amendments of Werner LANGEN related to 2013/2277(INI)
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas the economic situation and recent developments in some Member States have compromised the quality of employment, social protection and health and safety standardsincreased unemployment;
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
K. whereas, in its resolution of 20 November 2012, Parliament calls for high standards of democratic accountability at Union level to be applied to the Troika; whereas such accountability notably requires the Troika to be heard in the European Parliament before taking up its duties and to be subject to regular reporting to and democratic scrutiny by the European Parliamentto the European Parliament applies only to the Commission and the activities for which it is responsible;
Amendment 135 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas the programmes were in the short run primarily meant to avoid a disorderly default and stop speculation on sovereign debt; whereas the medium term aim was to ensure that the money that was lent would be reimbursed, thus avoiding a large financial loss that would rest on the shoulders of the taxpayers of the countries which are providing the assistance and guaranteeing the funds; whereas this also requires the programme to deliver sustainable growth and effective debt reduction in the medium and long term; whereas the programmes were not suited to comprehensively correcting macroeconomic imbalances which had accumulated sometimes over decades;
Amendment 198 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Notes that Greece entered recession in Q4 2008; notes that the country experienced six quarters of negative GDP growth rate in the seven leading to the assistance programme being activated; notes that there is a close correlation between a decades-long misguided fiscal policy, a failure to carry out structural reforms and the increase in public debt and the cyclical downturn, with public debt increasing from EUR 254.7 billion at the end of Q3 2008 to EUR 314.1 billion at the end of Q2 2010;
Amendment 208 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme, the Portuguese economy had suffered from low GDP and productivity growth for a number of years whilst public and private wages were rising out of proportion to productivity growth, and that this lack of growth, combined with the impact of the global financial crisis, had resulted in a substantial current account deficit, a large fiscal deficit and a high debt level, driving up Portugal’s refinancing costs in capital markets to unsustainable levels; notes in this context that in 2007 Portugal’s growth rate reached 2.4%, its fiscal deficit 3.1%, its debt level 62.7% and its current account deficit 10.2% of GDP, with the unemployment rate standing at 8.1%;
Amendment 219 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme, the Irish economy had just suffered a banking crisis of unprecedented dimensionswhich was partly of its own making, brought about by inadequate regulation, very low tax rates and an over-sized banking sector, causing Irish GDP to fall by 6.3% in 2009 (1.1% in 2010) from a positive growth level of 5% of GDP in 2007, unemployment to increase from 4.7% in 2007 to 13.7% in 2010 and - its most detrimental impact - the government balance of payments to experience a deficit in 2010 of 30.6%, down from a surplus in 2007 (0.2%); further notes in the decade prior to the assistance programme that the Irish economy experienced a prolonged period of negative real interest rateshigh inflation;
Amendment 228 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. Notes that, at the beginning of the EU- IMF assistance programme in 2013, speculinformations about the systemic instability in the Cypriot economy had been ongoingand the unwillingness of the Cypriot Government to take action had been available for a long time, owing inter alia to the exposure of Cypriot banks to overleveraged local property companies, the Greek debt crisis, capital flight from abroad, in particular from Russia, the downgrading of Cypriot government bonds by international rating agencies, the inability to refund public expenditure from the international markets, and the initial reluctance of the government to restructure the troubled financial sector;
Amendment 274 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Deplores the unpreparedness of the EU and international institutions, including the IMF, for a sovereign debt crisis of a large magnitude inside a monetary unionon the world's financial markets;
Amendment 296 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Acknowledges, however, that the immense challenge the Troika faced leading to the crisis was unique as a result of the poor state ofinadequate regulation of financial services, which was partly the result of the Commission's reluctance to act before 2009, large macroeconomic imbalances, and the fact that a number of instruments such as external devaluation were not available due to the constraints of monetary union; notes, moreover, that time was running out, legal obstacles had to be cleared, fear of a melt-down of the euro area was palpable, political agreements had to be reached, the world economy was in a downturn, and a number of countries which were intended to contribute financial support had seen their own public and private debt increase in alarming ways;
Amendment 304 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
14. Regrets the lack of transparency in the MoU negotiations; notes the necessity to evaluate whether formal documents were clearly communicated in due time to the national parliaments and the European Parliament; further notes the possible negative impact of such practices on citizens’ rights and the political situation within the countries concernedregarding the substance of the MoU prior to the start of the negotiations;
Amendment 327 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Deplores that recommendations contained in MoUs mark a departure from the thinking initiated by the Lisbon strategy and the Europe 2020 strategies); points out however that this can be partly explained, even if not fully justified, by the fact that programmes had to be implemented under considerable time pressure, in an environment characterised by a high degree of uncertainty about the stability of the banking system and the possibility of chain reactions in other Member States, as well as in a difficult political environment;
Amendment 342 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. RegretsWelcomes the fact that the programmes for Greece, Ireland and Portugal comprise a number of detailedinclude prescriptions for health systems reform and public expenditure cuts; regrets that the programmes are not bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Treaties, including Art. 168(7) TFEU;
Amendment 378 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. DeplorNotes that since 2008 the income distribution inequality has grown above average in the four countries and that, owing to years of failure by economic and political elites, cuts in social benefits and rising unemployment are raising poverty levels;
Amendment 393 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 18
Paragraph 18
18. Points to the unacceptable level of youth unemployment in the four Member States under assistance programmes; points especially to the sharp increase in youth unemployment in Greece, Cyprus and Portugal; regrets that these Member States’ governments did not at an early date take measures at national level to counteract this;
Amendment 426 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Welcomes the end of the programme for Ireland and the expected end of the programme for Portugal; regretnotes the lack of progress in Greece so far despite unprecedented reforms having been undertaken;
Amendment 460 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Notes that financial assistance achieved in the short run the avoidance of a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences, as well as spill-over effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; further notes that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run; also notes that the financial assistance and adjustment programme in Greece have not prevented an orderly default nor contagion of the crisis to other Member States; deplores the economic and social downturn which became evident when the fiscal and macroeconomic corrections were put into place;
Amendment 486 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Deplores howeverNotes the sometimes over- optimistic assumptions made by the Troika, especially as far as growth is concerned, but also the insufficient recognition of political resistance to change in some Member States; deplores the fact that this also affected the Troika’s analysis of the interplay between fiscal consolidation and growth; notes that as a result fiscal targets could not be fulfilled;
Amendment 501 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23 a (new)
Paragraph 23 a (new)
23a. reminds that when decisions about the programmes were taken by the Eurogroup it was widely known and accepted that the structural deficits in the programme countries would further increase after the start of the assistance programmes; reminds that the deficit's increase was instrumental to giving the programme countries more time to re- adjust; lauds the Troika for having devised a plan which from the onset left the countries more breathing space rather than forcing cuts in expenditure for the sole aim of quickly reducing deficits;
Amendment 514 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. RegretNotes that the reduction of structural deficits in all programme countries since the start of their respective assistance programmes has not yet led to a reduction in the ratios of public debt to GDP; underlines that the ratio of public debt to GDP has instead sharply increased in all programme countries;
Amendment 523 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Considers that fiscal multipliers are difficult to assess with certainty; recalls in this respect that the IMF admitted to underestimating the fiscal multiplier in its growth forecasts prior to October 2012 but that the Commission stated in November 2012 that forecast errors were not due to the underestimation of fiscal multipliers; points out that this expression of public disagreement between the Commission and the IMF was not followed up;
Amendment 553 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 27
Paragraph 27
27. Considers that the Troika should respond flexibly to new challenges and that too little attention has been given to alleviating the negative impact of adjustment strategies in the programme countries;
Amendment 586 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29
Paragraph 29
29. Notes that the Troika’s mandate has been perceived as being unclear and lacking transparency has acted on the basis of a clear mandate from the Eurogroup and under democratically legitimated agreements with the Member States concerned;
Amendment 604 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 30
Paragraph 30
30. Points out that due to its ad hoc nature there was, without amendment of the EU Treaties, no appropriate legal basis for setting up the Troika on the basis ofcould be found in Union primary law and it was therefore necessary to conclude an intergovernmental agreement;
Amendment 625 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 31
Paragraph 31
31. NotDeplores the admission byfact that the President of the Eurogroup before, addressing the European Parliament that the Eurogroup, endorsed the recommendations of the Troika without consideringhaving studied or allowed for their specific policy implications;
Amendment 635 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 32
Paragraph 32
32. Takes note of the dual role of the Commission in the Troika as both an agent of Member States and an EU institution; warnnotes that conflicts of interests may therefore exist within the Commission between its role in the Troika and its responsibility as a guardian of the Treaties, especially in policies such as competition and state aid;
Amendment 653 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Notes that the ECB’s role is not sufficiently defined, as it is stated in the ESM Treaty that the Commission should work ‘in liaison with the ECB’, thus reducinglaying down the ECB’s role toas that of a provider of expertise; further notes that the ECB mandate is limited by the TFEU to monetary policy and that the involvement of the ECB in any matter related to budgetary, fiscal and structural policies isthe Troika has no Community legal basis, but rather amounts to guidance given voluntarily at the refore on uncertain legal quest of the Eurogroundp;
Amendment 678 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Points to the generally weak democraticlack of accountability of the Troika in programme countries at national level; notes however that this democratic accountability varies between countries, depending on the will of national executives;
Amendment 700 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 37
Paragraph 37
37. Points to the fact that the ESM is an intergovernmental by nature, is boundorganisation which – fortunately – is bound, and must continue to be bound, by the unanimity rule, and hence is subject to the democratically legitimated political influence exerted by finance ministers, heads of state and government as well as national parliaments;
Amendment 721 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 38
Paragraph 38
Amendment 792 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 40
Paragraph 40
40. Urges that in the short run consideration should be given to amending the ESM Treaty in order to allow standard decisions to be taken by a qualified majority rather than by unanimity, and to allow for precautionary assistance to be givenMaintains that it would be desirable to determine, without prejudging the outcome, whether the ESM Treaty can be amended without departing from the unanimity rule;
Amendment 805 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 41
Paragraph 41
41. Calls for the involvement of social partners in the design and implementation ofconsultation of national social partners when adjustment programmes, current and future, are to be implemented;
Amendment 817 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 42
Paragraph 42
42. Demands that the Troika take stock of the current debate on fiscal multipliers and consider the revision of MoUs on the basis of the latest empirical resultIs of the opinion that theoretical models cannot – or cannot properly – represent the need for, and the impact and democratic responsibility of, national institutions; maintains that political players have a responsibility in that process;
Amendment 845 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 43
Paragraph 43
43. Is concerned, in particular, to improve the accountability of the Commission when it acts in its capacity as a member of the Troika; requests that the Commission representative(s) in the Troika should be heard in the European Parliament before taking up their duties and should be subject to regular reportingreport regularly to the European Parliament;
Amendment 860 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 44
Paragraph 44
44. Calls for a reassessment of the decision-making process of the Eurogroup, amending MoUs with the Member States receiving EU-IMF financial assistance to include appropriate democratic accountability at both national and European levels; calls for European guidelines to be established in order to ensure appropriate democratic control on the implementation of measures with a view to providing for appropriate democratic accountability at national level;
Amendment 878 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 45
Paragraph 45
45. Is of the opinion that the option of a Treaty change allowing for the extension of the scope of the present Art. 143 TFEU to all Member States, instead of being restricted to non-euro Member States, should be explored; similarly, takes the view that the option of a Treaty change to create a European Monetary Fund within the Community framework as an alternative to the IMF should also be explored; further considers that other issues to be evaluated include the current institutional framework of the Troika, the involvement of the ECB in the review of the programmes and the mandatory involvement of the IMF in euro area financial assistance programmes, as enshrined in the ESM treaty, have proved to be a success;