Activities of Jan MULDER related to 2014/2005(INI)
Plenary speeches (1)
MFF negotiations 2014-2020: lessons to be learned and the way forward (short presentation)
Shadow opinions (1)
OPINION on negotiations on the MFF 2014-2020: lessons to be learned and the way forward
Amendments (18)
Amendment 1 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Notes that the late communication of the MFF figures and the ceilings available for each policy area did not help individual rapporteurs with the development of a strategic approach to negotiations with the Council; urges the Commission to provide simultaneously to the Council and the Parliament all updated MFF figures in the future.
Amendment 6 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Regrets the fact that, in the area of home affairs, the Council – supported by the Commission – seemed more interested in using the funds to supplement Member States’ national budgets than to promote European added value and European solidarity; regrets not having obtained delegated acts for programming decisions in accordance with article 290 TFEU as these decisions clearly meet the conditions for delegated acts laid down in the Treaty;
Amendment 8 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas, faced with the impossibility of changing the overall MFF figures decided by the European Council, Parliament successfully negotiated the inclusion of several key new provisions that will help to make the new financial framework and the new EU annual budget more operational, consistent, transparent and responsive to the needs of EU citizens and to allow the MFF ceilings to be fully used; whereas these provision concern, in particular, the new arrangements relating to the MFF revision, flexibility, own resources, and the unity and transparency of the EU budget;
Amendment 9 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Further notes, with respect to the home affairs funds, that the ordinary legislative procedure does not provide for the Commission and the Council to negotiate an agreed position between themselves, without involving Parliament, and then to present that position to the Parliament as a fait accompli; points out that if the Commission is unwilling to defend its initial proposal, it should present an amended proposal; insists that the Commission shall take up its role of honest broker in future inter-institutional negotiations;
Amendment 12 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Taking into consideration that the cuts were imposed to the Parliament without any reasoned justification, considers that the Parliament has to put emphasis, when it comes to consider the Mid-term review, on the particular areas where the cuts were the most significant;
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E a (new)
Recital E a (new)
Ea. whereas the outstanding payment claims received after 31 October 2013 and carried-over to 2014 amount to 23 billion EUR for structural and cohesion policy only, which will add significant pressure on an already very low ceiling of payment appropriations;
Amendment 13 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 6 b (new)
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6b. Is of the opinion that, in the framework of the Mid-term review, the Parliament should use all its negotiation capacity through co-decision, without being imposed decisions and figures from the European Council;
Amendment 15 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas the Council failed to make any progress on a much needed reform of the current system for financing the EU budget, despite the ambitious proposals put forward by the Commission aimed not only at overcoming the stalemate caused by the lack of a genuine own resources system but also at making the system of financing of the EU budget simpler, fairer and transparent to the EU citizen;
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Is deeply concerned at the fact that any budgetary debate in the Council has been for many years poisoned by the logic of ‘fair returns’; stresseconsiders that this situation is largely due to the current system of EU financing, whereby some 85 % of revenues stem from national contributions instead of genuine own resources; considers that such a system places disproportionate empdebate already existed before the introduction of an GNI based resources but that this resource hasis on net balances between the Member Stly reinforced the poisoned debates and has led to the progressive introduction of complex and opaque rebates and other correction mechanisms for the financing of the EU budget;
Amendment 35 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Believes that this logic also prevailed in the way the MFF agreement was struck by the European Council on 8 February 2013; considers it regrettable that this was reflected in the fact that the national allocations, especially from agriculture and cohesion policy, were determined at that moment; deplores, in particular, the list of special allocations and ‘gifts’ granted in the course of negotiations between Heads of State and Government, which number culminates in the conclusions of the European Council of 8 February 2013 and which are not based on objective and verifiable criteria, but rather reflect the bargaining power of Member States, trying to secure their national interests and maximise their net returns; denounces the lack of transparencopacity in striking this agreement; highlights that the addition of 27 national individual victories is anything but a success for Europe;
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Strongly rejects this purely accounting vision of the EU budget, which disregards the European added value, contradicts the principle of EU solidarity and underestimates the current and potential role of the EU budget in strengthening economic governance; stresses that the EU budget is predominantly an investment budget with a strong leverage effect and a catalyst for growth and jobs across the Union; considers it regrettabledenounces, therefore, that some Member States seem to regard national contributions to the EU budget purely as a cost to be minimised;
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. NoteStrongly regrets that the European Council took a top-down approach to deciding the overall size of the MFF 2014- 2020, which in turn demonstrates a worrying discrepancy between EU political commitments which the European Council has been making and its reluctance to adequately finance them; believes, on the contrary, that this decision should be based on a bottom-up process, resulting from a thorough assessment of EU financial needs and political objectives as set out in EU multiannual programmes and policies defined by the legislator;
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Is convinced, moreover, that tangible progress can only be achieved following an in-depth reform of the financing of the EU budget that should return to a system of genuine, clear, simple and fair own resources; stresses that this should lead to the introduction of one or several new own resources that will considerably reduce the share ofwith the ultimate objective to put an end to the GNI-based contributions to the EU budget and, accordingly, to the burden onthat the GNI contribution represents for national treasuries; reiterates its strong commitment to any process leading to the reform of the current unfair, non- transparent and complex system of own resources;
Amendment 58 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
9. Recalls that Parliament was the first EU institution to present its vision on the MFF 2014-2020 and the need to reform the financing of the EU budget, with the report of its specialised SURE Committee, in June 2011; considers that this report provided effective guidance for the Commission in drafting its own proposals on the MFF and own resources and appreciates the regular political dialogue that was established between the two institutions at all stages of the preparation of this report; points to the obvious advantages for Parliament of an early preparation for any negotiations on the MFF;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. Recalls that, pursuant to Article 312 TFEU, the Council unanimously adopts the MFF Regulation after obtaining the consent of Parliament, while the three EU institutions ‘shall take any measure necessary to facilitate its adoption’; notes, therefore, that the Treaty does not set out any concrete procedure for the involvement of Parliament in the MFF negotiations and that these modalities were subsequently determined in practice through a number of ad hoc arrangements agreed at political level at Parliament’s initiative; notes that the European Parliament was defining its own role as well and encourages the Parliament to draw on the lessons learnt from this experience; stresses the need for clear and transparent mandates for Parliament's negotiating team;
Amendment 64 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. DeplorRecalls that, according to the Treaty, the European Council has no legislative powers and, therefore, denounces the fact that, despite Parliament’s strong objections, all successive ‘negotiating boxes’ presented by different Council presidencies and, ultimately, the European Council MFF agreement of 8 February 2013 contained a significant number of legislative elements that should have been decided under the ordinary legislative procedure; stresses that the legally required unanimity in the Council on the MFF Regulation could only be achieved by pre- empting certain major policy changes in EU sectoral policies, thereby hindering Parliament’s prerogatives under co- decision, in clear contradiction with the Treaties;
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 a (new)
Paragraph 21 a (new)
21a. Strongly believes a five year MFF cycle would enhance democratic legitimacy, improve the prioritisation of budgetary means and could be considered a precondition for more political debate; urges the Commission, in line with TFUE 312, to opt for a five year budgetary cycle from 2020 onwards;
Amendment 95 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. CReminds its intention to make the compulsory MFF revision a key demand in the investiture of the next Commission; calls, therefore, on the next European Parliament to make the election of the proposed candidate for President of the Commission conditional upon a strong and non-ambiguous commitment to implementing this review/e post-electoral revision clause and engaging in a genuine and deep political dialogue on its content;