6 Amendments of Sara SKYTTEDAL related to 2022/0212(BUD)
Amendment 4 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Calls on the Council and Commission to make sufficient funding available to reach the objectives of RePowerEU Plan; reminds that these investments should not come at the expense of investments in the broader competitiveness and strategic autonomy of the Unio; considers that the solidarity and cohesion objectives of RePowerEU naturally align its investment needs with instruments like the RRF, ERDF and Cohesion Fund; supports the Commission proposal to use allowances from the Market Stability Reserve to auction up to a value of €20 billion and thereby finance the necessary infrastructure needed to make us less dependent on Russian gas and oil;
Amendment 5 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Calls on the Council and Commission to make sufficient funding available to extend the end of life of nuclear power plants in the Union in order to save European competitiveness and realize the strategic autonomy of the Union; supports the Commission objectives for RePowerEU Plan and the proposal to use allowances from the Market Stability Reserve to auction up to a value of €20 billion to finance the necessary investments in infrastructure; believes, furthermore, that allowances from the Market Stability Reserve should finance investments needed to prolong the life on nuclear power plants in order to make us less dependent on Russian gas and oil;
Amendment 18 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. Considering that the Commission has stated several times that there is no requirement for Horizon Europe projects to comply with the do-no-significant-harm principle and that referencing it is purely voluntary; consdering specifically the text in the Horizon Europe Programme guide: "evaluators will not score applications in relation to their compliance with the DNSH principle"; notes the text in the draft versions of the 2023/2024 Work Programmes for Horizon Europe that refer to the need for projects to comply with the do-no-significant-harm principle; concludes that this text in the 2023/2024 Work Programme is an incorrect reflection of the policy of the Commission with regards to the do-no-significant- harm principle in Horizon Europe. Recognises that this creates uncertainty among applicants about the role of the do- no-significant-harm principle in the evaluation and selection of project; demands, therefore, that the Commission changes the texts in the draft Work Programme to accurately reflect its policy on the do-no-significant-harm principle;
Amendment 24 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Calls for sufficient funding and staffing for all agencies and Union bodies in the policy areas of industry, research and energy, in particular for the European Institute of Innovation and Technology, the EU Agency for the Space Programme and the EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators.
Amendment 29 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 3 a (new)
Paragraph 3 a (new)
3a. Insists that the Commission must guarantee that EU funds are not allocated or linked to any form of terrorism and/or religious and political radicalisation; reiterates its position that all schoolbooks and school materials supported by Union funds must be in line with UNESCO standards of peace, tolerance, coexistence, and non-violence; is concerned about the antisemitism, hate speech and incitement to jihad and violence taught in Palestinian school textbooks, indirectly funded by the EU; stresses that conditionality of EU financial assistance in the educational sector needs to be duly considered;
Amendment 45 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Stresses that the EU and its Member States’ capacities to counter disinformation, hybrid warfare, propaganda and espionage must be strengthened due to, among other reasons, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; calls for further funding for strategic communication to counter malicious interference, and reiterates the need of dedicated StratCom Task Forces, including one focused on interference emanating from the Middle East, in particular from Iran;