43 Amendments of Jessica STEGRUD related to 2019/2129(INI)
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas according to the Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections of September 2019, annual inflation for the euro area in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) looks set to reach 1.2 %, 1.0 % and 1.5 % in 2019, 2020 and 2021, thus still falling short of the medium-term objective of 2 %; whereas inflation projections show substantial variance across the euro area;
Amendment 24 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas at the end of 2018 the size of the Eurosystem balance sheet had reached an all-time high of EUR 4.7 trillion, thus exceeding 40% of the euro area GDP, an increase of 0.2 trillion compared with the end of 2017;
Amendment 31 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas a stronger role of the euro, and its increased use as a reserve currency, wcould in the long term increase the EU’s ability to frame its policy stance independently vis-à-vis othe US and the Federal Reserver global powers and would ultimately provide protection from the risk of an uncooperative US approach by other global powers;
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F a (new)
Recital F a (new)
Fa. whereas, in order for the Euro to achieve a stronger global role, the Eurozone must first prove itself able to withstand a recession without any of its Member States resorting to write downs (voluntary or not) of government debt;
Amendment 39 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas despite this positive trend, green bonds still account for only 1 % of the overall supply of euro-denominated bonds;
Amendment 41 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas despite this positive trend, green bonds still account for only 1 % of the overall supply of euro-denominated bonds;
Amendment 44 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Recital H a (new)
Ha. whereas there is still uncertainty and scepticism whether the APP falls within the scope of the mandate of the ECB and constitutes de facto fiscal financing policy1a; _________________ 1aDG IPOL "Policy options and risks of an extension of the ECB’s quantitative easing programme: An analysis", PE 569.994.
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H a (new)
Recital H a (new)
Ha. whereas Article 123 TFEU and Article 21 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank prohibit the monetary financing of governments;
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H b (new)
Recital H b (new)
Amendment 51 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H c (new)
Recital H c (new)
Hc. whereas the ECB has taken significant risks into its balance sheet through the bond purchase program;
Amendment 52 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H d (new)
Recital H d (new)
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Welcomes the role of the ECB in safeguarding euro stability and stresses that the ECB’s independence is a requisite for fulfilling its mandate; notes that such independence requires that the ECB shall not seek or take instructions from Union institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body; considers that the independence of the ECB cannot in any way be reconciled with political campaigning;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Is concerned that after a short economic recovery, euro area growth momentum has slowed markedly to 1.2 % of GDP in the euro area and to 1.4 % of GDP for the EU-27; underlines, therefore, the need for monetary policy to remain accommodative for the foreseeable futurebelieves that the structural contribution that monetary policy makes to sustainable growth is limited; underlines, therefore, the need for policy makers to undertake productivity- enhancing structural reforms and pursue sound fiscal policies;
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Stresses that fiscal policy is a necessary component for enhancing the impact of monetary policy and reducing possible side effects; it is not the role of fiscal policy is to enhance the impact of monetary policy or to reduce its possible side effects; considers instead that fiscal policy and monetary policy need to compensate for each other: an expansive monetary policy should go hand in hand with a restrictive fiscal policy and the other way around, only in crisis situations they should strengthen each other; emphasises that the euro area is currently not in a situation which requires such policy convergence;
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. UnderlinesTakes note of the findings of the ESCB expert group on low wage growth1 , which analysed the disconnect between wage growth and labour market recovery, namely that low wage growth over recent years can be explained mainly by technology and wage bargaining shocks, the latter being impacted by changes in wage bargaining structure – reducing the bargaining power of employees – and labour market regulations – mainly in countries most affected by the global economic and financial crisis and the combination of labour underutilisation, low inflation readings and subduednamely that a combination of slack in the labour market, low inflation readings and subdued productivity growth has been holding back wage growth in the euro area; emphasises that innovation and flexibility are prerequisites for competitive labour markets; considers moreover that the ECB's very accommodative monetary policy itself is an important determinant of the subdued productivity growth, as highly indebted corporations survive thanks to low interest rates, thus compressing productivity growth; _________________ 1ECB Occasional Paper Series No 232 / September 2019: Understanding low wage growth in the euro area and European countries. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ ecb.op232~4b89088255.en.pdf
Amendment 96 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 – introductory part
Paragraph 5 – introductory part
5. Underlines that strengthening the role of the euro requires the right structural conditions, among which:, especially in light of Brexit, focus ought to be on consolidation and reflection rather than expansion and deepening of the European Monetary Union;
Amendment 99 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 – indent 1
Paragraph 5 – indent 1
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 – indent 2
Paragraph 5 – indent 2
Amendment 117 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 – indent 3
Paragraph 5 – indent 3
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 – indent 4
Paragraph 5 – indent 4
Amendment 134 #
6. Underlines that while the asset purchase programme (APP) has provided a substantialhort-term contribution to economic recovery and the formation of households’ inflation expectations, has led to a substantial improvement in financing conditions via several transmission channels, and has compressed yields across a wide range of asset classes; stresses, in particular, that the APP has directly improved credit conditions for the private non-financial sector with the asset-backed securities purchase programme (ABSPP) and the third covered bond purchase programme (CBPP3), quantitative easing cannot be considered a permanent source of growth nor should it ever be part of any long- term strategy to create growth;
Amendment 138 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Remains extremely concerned about the real shortcomings and negative side effects in the long term of a prolonged extraordinarily expansionary monetary policy which risks jeopardising a more robust and structural recovery of the euro area, among which: - The increased distortion of financial markets through impaired risk evaluation, higher leverage and the development of various asset bubbles; - The negative effects on individual savers and pensioners; -The pressure on the profitability and long-term sustainability of financial institutions that provide long-term return guarantees, such as life insurance or pension funds; - The growth of shadow banking; - Lower productivity growth; - Distributional consequences such as exacerbated wealth inequality due to increased financial asset prices in stock, bond and real exchange markets, as financial assets are primarily held by the very wealthy; - The likelihood that some Member States are using ultra-low (negative) interest rates to defer necessary structural reforms and the consolidation of their primary public deficits, particularly at central government level; - The downward pressure on the exchange rate of the euro creating a risk of competitive devaluations which has a major impact on trade conflicts;
Amendment 140 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 b (new)
Paragraph 6 b (new)
6b. Considers that the ECB bond- buying programmes violate at least the intent, if not the letter, of Article 123 TEFU; urges the ECB to refrain from assuming a political role and monetary financing government deficits;
Amendment 141 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 c (new)
Paragraph 6 c (new)
6c. Warns against the risk of excessive valuations on bond markets, which risk to be difficult to handle if interest rates start to rise again, particularly for countries involved in an excessive deficit procedure or with high levels of debt;
Amendment 146 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. NoteRegrets that on 12 September 2019 the ECB announced a broad stimulus package including an open-ended quantitative easing programme that will run at a monthly pace of EUR 20 billion per month, a cut of 10 basis points in the deposit rate, a two-tier system for reserve remuneration, and easier terms for targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO-III); points out that the ECB has few instruments left to fend off adverse macroeconomic shocks; urges the ECB to normalise monetary policy as soon as possible;
Amendment 159 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. NoteWarns that the negative effects on banks’ net interest income have been counterbalanced so far by the benefits from moreand the increase in banks' lending capacity and lower costs for provisions and losses, which rewards risky behaviour and spurs speculation, poses significant systemic threats in the banking sector and the real economy;
Amendment 164 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9
Paragraph 9
Amendment 177 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 9 b (new)
Paragraph 9 b (new)
9b. Recognises the existence of distributional consequences of the ECB policies; believes that wealth inequality has been exacerbated by the inflation of financial asset prices as financial assets are primarily held by the very wealthy;
Amendment 181 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. SupporRegrets the intention of the Governing Council of the ECB to continue reinvesting the principal payments from maturing securities for as long as necessary to maintain favourable liquidity conditions and an ample degree of monetary accommodation;
Amendment 188 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Calls for vigilance against the risk of a resurgence in real estate bubbles and excessive household and private sector indebtedness in some Member States due to the accommodative interest policies of the ECB;
Amendment 190 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10a. Emphasises that the ECB should not target nominal GDP since monetary policy measures cannot systematically improve the drivers of real growth;
Amendment 195 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 c (new)
Paragraph 10 c (new)
10c. Recalls that ECB measures, in line with its mandate, can have favourable effects on financing conditions and investment, but warns that credit driven expansions can lead to a costly misallocation of real resources (“malinvestments”),
Amendment 198 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 e (new)
Paragraph 10 e (new)
Amendment 202 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 11
Paragraph 11
11. Recalls that, as an EU institution, the ECB is bound by the Paris Agreement on climate change and that this should be reflected in its policies, with full respect for its mandate and its independencehas a narrowly defined mandate enshrined in Article 127 TFEU that should be reflected in its policies;
Amendment 212 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Takes good note ofRegrets Christine Lagarde’s declaration of 4 September, in which she welcomed the ECB’s collaboration in the Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) and commitment to contribute to facing the challenges which climate change poses by implementing the NGFS’s recommendations and acting on them substantively wherever possible without, something that would risk undermining the ECB’s price stability mandate and other objectives;
Amendment 227 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Calls on the ECB to continue its preparatory efforts to ensure the stability of EU financial markets for all possible contingencies, especially those relatinged to Brexit;
Amendment 230 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 14
Paragraph 14
Amendment 245 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
Amendment 257 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Calls on the ECBall supervisory authorities to increase its monitoring of the development of crypto- currenciesassets and crypto- currencies, with a special focus on the Facebook-backed crypto-currency Libra, and the increased risks in cyber- security;
Amendment 289 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. WelcomeExpects the increase in accountability under the Presidency of Mario Draghi, and looks forward to eveoming ECB President to deliver on greater accountability, dialogue and openness in line with the incoming Presidentcommitments she made during her hearing before the European Parliament's Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee on 4 September 2019;
Amendment 294 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Recalls that the nominations of Executive Board members should be prepared carefully, with full transparency and together with Parliament in line with the Treaties; calls on the Council to draw up a gender-balanced shortlist for all current and upcoming vacancies and to share it with Parliament, thus allowing it to play a more meaningful advisory role in the appointment process; regrets that to date no satisfactory progress has been made;
Amendment 310 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 d (new)
Paragraph 21 d (new)
21d. Urges the ECB, in order to prevent conflicts of interest, to publish declarations of financial interests for its Governing Council members; urges the ECB to ensure that the Ethics Committee is not chaired by a former President or other past members of the Governing Council of the ECB, nor by anyone liable to conflict of interest; calls the ECB Governing Council to follow the EU Staff Regulations and Code of Conduct and require a two-year professional abstention period for its outgoing members after the conclusion of their mandate;
Amendment 311 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21 e (new)
Paragraph 21 e (new)
21e. Stresses the importance of physical money as the only legal tender, and reminds all euro area countries that euro coins and banknotes and other robust stores of value must not be rejected in transactions;