45 Amendments of Jessica STEGRUD related to 2020/2122(INI)
Amendment 7 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 43 a (new)
Citation 43 a (new)
— having regard to the European Court of Auditors (ECA) Special Report entitled ‘Resolution planning in the Single Resolution Mechanism’, published on 14 January 2021,
Amendment 9 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 43 b (new)
Citation 43 b (new)
— having regard to Article 140(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 43 c (new)
Citation 43 c (new)
— having regard to the ECB´s Targeted Review of Internal Models, published April 2021,
Amendment 13 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital A
Recital A
A. whereas overall, the banking sector has responded to the COVID-19 pandemic with resilience, mostly founded on the regulatory reforms enacted since the global financial crisis and further supported by extraordinary public poliincreased capital requirements, indicating that equity and solvency arelief measures and capital conservation practices key to tackle financial and economic shocks instead of ever- increasing debt financing;
Amendment 42 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C a (new)
Recital C a (new)
C a. whereas a reinforced Banking Union requires first and foremost accelerated efforts by various Member States to reduce their high levels of non- performing loans and prevent their increase in the future;
Amendment 45 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C b (new)
Recital C b (new)
C b. whereas as long as risks differ greatly between national banking systems, European Deposit Insurance Scheme would pose additional systemic risk for the Banking Union;
Amendment 47 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas climate change, environmental degradation, increased red tape in the context of climate reporting for financial institutions, which could be referred to as "green tape", and the transition to a low-carbon economy bring new risks to banks’ balance sheets;
Amendment 50 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D a (new)
Recital D a (new)
D a. Expresses deep concern about the findings of the ECB´s Targeted Review of Internal Models, published in April 2021, which shows that the biggest euro area banks have repeatedly been too optimistic in their risk-modelling, confirming longstanding suspicions among regulators and analysts that larger banks have often artificially inflated the strength of their balance sheets by underestimating the riskiness of their assets, giving them a short-term advantage over more cautious competitors; is alarmed that the Review resulted in more than 5.800 deficiencies and 253 supervisory corrections of internal models by the ECB, which pushed up the banks’ risk-weighted assets by € 275 billion, a 12 per cent increase in the models examined, which reduced their average common equity tier one ratios by 0.71 percentage points;
Amendment 57 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas prudential and anti-money laundering supervision is necessary; there are still important loopholes in the EU AML framework, such as the explicit exemption of the non- profit sector from anti-money laundering reporting requirements, even though certain NGOs and other non-financial entities (NFEs) operate with larger amounts of money than numerous European banks;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas prudential and anti-money laundering supervision is necessary and equally important;
Amendment 65 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas the withdrawal of the UK from the EU has resulted in the relocation of certain banking services to the EU;
Amendment 74 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I a (new)
Recital I a (new)
I a. whereas the sound public finances are necessary condition for the macro- financial stability of the Banking Union;
Amendment 75 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J
Recital J
J. whereas depositors across the Banking Union should enjoy the sameare exposed to varying levels of credit, market and operational risk, which justifies varying levels of protection;
Amendment 79 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J a (new)
Recital J a (new)
J a. whereas the near zero interest rates greatly reduce the profitability of banks in one of their most important areas of business activity, the provision of credit for long-term investments;
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital J b (new)
Recital J b (new)
J b. whereas the stability of financial institutions in the Banking Union is still a matter of grave concern; whereas the economic downturn will lead to an increase in non-performing loans;
Amendment 81 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. WelcomeRegrets the entry of Bulgaria and Croatia into the Banking Union; especially in the light of both countries' sharp drop in the Corruption Perception Index 2020, where Bulgaria now takes last place, and increasing worries about corruption in Croatia, such as the contested government order forcing banks to retroactively convert loans from Swiss francs to euros and pay out over € 1.1 billion in reimbursement to customers it had lent money to, as well as ongoing corruption charges against the HDZ party (EPP), the Agrokor scandal involving finance minister Maric, or the Sanader case; calls on the EU not to expand the euro area with such corrupt regimes;
Amendment 85 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1 a. Recalls that the Commission assessed in the 2020 Country Specific Recommendations for Croatia that despite several Action Plans, issues of corruption and conflicts of interest remain widespread in Croatia, and that further efforts to strengthen the prevention and sanction of corruption are needed to ensure the transparent and efficient use of public funds; recalls that Article 140(1) TFEU requires the Commission and European Central Bank’s convergence reports to take account of "other factors" relevant to economic integration and convergence, such as corruption; recalls that the Commission criticized Bulgaria in its 2020 Rule of Law report for its disregard for the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary; concludes that Bulgaria and Croatia are not ready for accession to the Banking Union;
Amendment 87 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Recalls thatwhereas the Banking Union has delivered the institutional set-up for greater market integration, through the SSM and the SRM, while a European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) is still lackingwill further disintegrate due to moral hazard and lead to a permanent Transfer Union if mechanisms such as the backstop for the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) and a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) are implemented; regrets that insufficient progress in risk reduction in some member states serves as an argument for mutualisation of deposit insurance schemes, creating incentives for some member states not to reduce risk, or even engage in even more excessive risk-taking; points out that the absence of a proper impact assessment of the EDIS proposal is fundamentally at odds with the principles of sound governance;
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Recalls that the Banking Union has delivered the institutional set-up for greater market integration, through the SSM and the SRM, while a European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) is still lacking;
Amendment 100 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers that banks’ response to the current crisis demonstrates that the regulatory reforms in the past decade, as well as the institutional set-up, have resulted in better-capitalised and less- leveraged banks, proving that equity and not debt is the solution to solve crises and build up resilience against economic and financial shocks;
Amendment 101 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Considers that banks’ response to the current crisis demonstrates that the regulatory reforms in the past decade, as well as the institutional set-up, have resulted in better-capitalised and less- leveraged banks; notes, however, that the high level of non-performing loans remains a serious problem in several Member States;
Amendment 110 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
Amendment 113 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Underlines the vital contribution to addressing the crisis of public guarantee schemes, moratoria on loan repayments for borrowers in financial difficulty, the central banks’ liquidity programmes and the ECB’s targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO) and pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP)Deplores the ECB's role in massively inflating the money supply and expanding its balance sheet up to over 70% of euro area GDP; recalls that banks in the northern euro area hold a disproportionately high amount of deposits with the ECB, and pay disproportionately high penalty interest to the ECB; by contrast, banks in the southern euro area benefit disproportionally from the negative interest rates on TLTRO loans;
Amendment 120 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Underlines the vital contribution to addressing the crisis of public guarantee schemes, moratoria on loan repayments for borrowers in financial difficulty, the central banks’ liquidity programmes and the ECB’s targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTRO) and pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP); warns in this regard over the risk of overshooting the inflation target due to loose monetary policy which could affect the functioning of Banking Union;
Amendment 121 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Deplores that PEPP has had an overwhelming influence on the narrowing of yield spreads and has ensured that southern European government bonds from highly indebted Member States were viewed by investors as less risky5a, which shows that PEPP is disproportionately directed towards highly indebted euro area Member States, and that the ECB is thereby guaranteeing the liquidity of highly indebted euro countries; _________________ 5aLeibniz Centre for European Economic Research, https://www.zew.de/presse/pressearchiv/di e-stabilitaet-der-eurozone-haengt-am- tropf-der-ezb
Amendment 122 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 b (new)
Paragraph 5 b (new)
5 b. Recalls that The Targeted Long- Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs) further zombify the European economy and deteriorate the real income prospects, especially of young Europeans;
Amendment 123 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 c (new)
Paragraph 5 c (new)
5 c. Calls on the ECB to end its stimulus package immediately, including phasing out TLTRO;
Amendment 126 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5 a (new)
Paragraph 5 a (new)
5 a. Is concerned that loose monetary policy contributes to the lower long-term economic growth and creates an incentive to delay the implementation of the necessary structural reforms;
Amendment 127 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 6
6. NotesExpresses concern about the the ‘quick fix’ to the Capital Requirements Regulation31 extending transitional arrangements in order to support banks’ lending capacity32 ; seriously doubts whether supporting further debt- financing is a sustainable way to recapitalize the European economy and to fostering economic growth; _________________ 31Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1). 32 Regulation (EU) 2020/873 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 575/2013 and (EU) 2019/876 as regards certain adjustments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (OJ L 204, 26.6.2020, p. 4).
Amendment 167 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10
Paragraph 10
10. WelcomesExpresses concern about the ECB’s report on the digital euro and the outcome of its public consultation and expects further analysis of the implications for the banking sector, consumer protection and consumer data protection;
Amendment 172 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 10 a (new)
Paragraph 10 a (new)
10 a. Recalls that cash is anonymous and it is impossible for banks or central banks to control the direct expenditure of cash holders, which safeguards their privacy; recalls that CBDC is not anonymous, since central banks will be able to trace consumer behaviour and spending patterns of all citizens; recalls that CBDC would give central banks absolute control over the transactions of citizens, meaning that the ECB will have both the power and the technical capacity to control transactions, including disabling certain transactions; expresses deep concern over giving the ECB such far-reaching powers, which are obviously not within its mandate;
Amendment 189 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
Amendment 197 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13 a (new)
Paragraph 13 a (new)
13 a. Condemns all forms of discrimination and stresses that competence and moral integrity should be the only and mandatory criteria for any job position in EU financial institutions and bodies;
Amendment 220 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 17
Paragraph 17
17. Stresses that ensuring proper and timely management of deteriorated exposures will be key to preventing a build-up of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the short term; advices the Member States to make further efforts to address this issue;
Amendment 260 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 22
Paragraph 22
22. Is concerned that as Member States sell increasing amounts of sovereign bonds, their share in banks’ balance sheets grows, potentially aggravating the doom loop; considers thatpoints out that government bonds are not risk-free assets and should not be treated as such; questions whether the creation of Next Generation EU will provide high-quality European assets;
Amendment 272 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 23
Paragraph 23
23. Notes that the EU-wide stress test launched on 29 January 2021 aims to test capital trajectories of banks in a situation of worsening asset quality; stresses the importance to consider the impact of potentially rising interest rates on banks’ balance sheets;
Amendment 279 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Notes the efforts of the SSM to provide guidance and clarity to banks for self-assessing and appropriately reporting environmental and climate change-related risks; considers the SSM climate risk stress test an important step in evaluating banks’ practices and identifying concrete areas of improvement; warns, however, of danger of green asset bubbles that could be a consequence of oversubsidizing the sustainable investments;
Amendment 300 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 28
Paragraph 28
28. TrustNotes that the introduction of a backstop into the SRF earlier than originally envisaged is positive for the strengthening of the crisis management frameworkincreases risk sharing; advises that risk reduction should precede any form of legacy sharing and risk sharing;
Amendment 311 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 a (new)
Paragraph 29 a (new)
29 a. Endorses ECA’s recommendation that in order to ensure that supervisory action is taken sufficiently early, the SRB and the Commission should approach the legislators and the ECB, in its role as supervisor, and advocate for objective and quantified thresholds for triggering early intervention measures, and reaching the decision that a bank is failing or likely to fail;
Amendment 347 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35
Paragraph 35
35. Notes the importance of depositors across the Banking Union enjoying the same level of protection of their savings; takes note of the Commission proposal to further strengthen citizens’ confidence in the protection of deposits by introducing an EDISregrets that insufficient progress in risk reduction in some Member States serves as an argument for mutualisation of deposit insurance schemes, creating incentives for some Member States not to reduce risk, or even to engage in even more excessive risk-taking; points out that the absence of a proper impact assessment of the EDIS proposal is fundamentally at odds with principles of sound governance;
Amendment 357 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 a (new)
Paragraph 35 a (new)
35 a. Points out that risks still differ greatly between different national banking systems;
Amendment 358 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 b (new)
Paragraph 35 b (new)
35 b. Emphasises the potential high risks of EDIS, particularly those related to moral hazard; opposes therefore the completion of the Banking Union through the creation of a fully mutualised EDIS;
Amendment 360 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 c (new)
Paragraph 35 c (new)
35 c. Stresses that risk reduction would ensure the level of protection that depositors currently enjoy, without raising the systemic risk through establishing fully mutualised EDIS;
Amendment 361 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 35 d (new)
Paragraph 35 d (new)
35 d. Questions whether Article 114 would be an appropriate legal basis for the establishment of EDIS;
Amendment 369 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Notes the Commission’s launch of the review of the CMDI framework, including the op; asks for more efforts to come forward with ambitious solutions to the issue of sovereign exposures and a substantial reductions of a hybrid EDISthe stock of non-performing loans;