14 Amendments of Assita KANKO related to 2023/2501(RSP)
Amendment 1 #
Citation 13
— having regard to the Commission proposal of 10 January 2017 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (RegulaDirective 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection on Pf privacy and Ein the electronic Ccommunications) (COM(2017)0010), to the decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations confirmed by Parliament’s plenary on 25 October 2017, and to the Council’s general approach adopted on 10 February 2021 (6087/21) sector,
Amendment 4 #
Recital A
A. whereas in the ‘Schrems I’ judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) invalidated the Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce9, and pointed out that indiscriminateaccess by intelligence authorities to the content of electronic communications violates the essence of the fundamental right to confidentiality of communications provided for in Article 7 of the Charter if such access is indiscriminate and not limited by clear and precise rules governing the scope and application of a measure and imposing minimum safeguards; _________________ 9 OJ L 215, 25.8.2000, p. 7.
Amendment 8 #
Recital E
E. whereas, when examining the level of protection afforded by a third country, the Commission is obliged to assess the content of the rules applicable in that country deriving from its domestic law or its international commitments, as well as the practice designed to ensure compliance with those rules; whereas this is a continuous process taking into account changes to applicable rules and practice;
Amendment 9 #
Recital F
F. whereas the ability to transfer personal data across borders has the potential to be a key driver of innovation, productivity and economic competitiveness; whereas these EU is currently lagging behind other major economies when it comes to innovation and the digital economy; whereas any personal data transfers should be carried out in full respect for the right to the protection of personal data and the right to privacy; whereas one of the fundamental objectives of the EU iaims of the EU is the promotion of its values, which includes the protection of fundamental rights, as enshrined in the Charter;
Amendment 13 #
Recital H
H. whereas mass surveillance, including the bulk collection of data, by state actors is detrimental to the trust of European citizens and businesses in digital services and, by extension, in the digital economy; however, acknowledges that bulk collection of data by state actors can be permissible according to European Court of Justice jurisprudence if sufficiently strong safeguards are in place;
Amendment 16 #
Recital J
J. whereas there is no federal privacy and data protection legislation in the United States (US); whereas the EU and the US have differing definitions of key data protection concepts such as principles of necessity and proportionality; whereas, however, the GDPR requires not identical but essentially equivalent personal data protection for adequacy decisions;
Amendment 24 #
Paragraph 1
1. Recalls that privacy and data protection are legally enforceable fundamental rights enshrined in the Treaties, the Charter and the European Convention of Human Rights, as well as in laws and case-law; emphasises that they must be applied in a manner that does not unnecessarily hamper trade or international relations, but can be balanced only against other fundamental rights and not against commercial or political interests;
Amendment 26 #
Paragraph 2
2. Acknowledges the efforts madesignificant steps taken in the EO to lay down limits on US Signals Intelligence Activities, by referring tointroducing the principles of proportionality and necessity into the US legal framework on signals intelligence, and providing a list of legitimate objectives for such activities; notes that these principles will be binding on all US intelligence agencies and can be invoked by data subjects; points out, however, that these principles are long-standing key elements of the EU data protection regime and that questions remain whether their substantive definitions in the EO are not in line with their definition under EU law and their interpretation by the CJEU; points out, furthermore, that for the purposes of the EU-US Data Privacy Framework, these principles will be interpreted solely in the light of US law and legal traditions; points out that the EO requires that signals intelligence must be conducted in a manner proportionate to the ‘validated intelligence priority’, which appe and that questions remain with regards to be a broadthe interpretation of proportionalitythis concept;
Amendment 39 #
Paragraph 3
3. Regrets the factNotes that the EO does not prohibit the bulk collection of data by signals intelligence, including the content of communications; notes that the list of legitimate national security objectives can be expanded by the US President, who can determine not to make the relevant updates publicCJEU jurisprudence also does not prohibit the bulk collection of data by signals intelligence but that safeguards and conditions apply;
Amendment 48 #
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4 a. Points out that a new redress mechanism has been created allowing EU data subjects to lodge a complaint, free of charge and without having to prove that their personal data was processed as part of surveillance activities;
Amendment 56 #
Paragraph 5
5. Points out that the decisions of the Data Protection Review Court (‘DPRC’) will be binding; notes that the decisions will also be classified and not made public or available to the complainant; points out that the DPRC is part of the executive branch and not the judiciary; points out, however, that the DPRC Judges shall have an independent mandate; points out that a complainant will be represented by a ‘special advocate’ designated by the DPRC, for whom there is no requirement of independence; points out that the redress process provided by the EO is based on secrecy and does not set up an obligation to notify the complainant that their personal data has been processed, thereby undermiweakening their right to access or rectify their data; notes that the proposed redress process does not provide for an avenue for appeal in a federal court and therefore, among other things, does not provide any possibility for the complainant to claim damages; concludes that the DPRC does noquestions remain regarding the functioning of the DPRC and whether it meets the standards of independence and impartiality of Article 47 of the Charter;
Amendment 59 #
Paragraph 6
6. Notes that, while the US has provided for a new mechanism for remedy for issues related to public authorities’ access to data, thequestions remain with regards to the effectiveness of remedies available for commercial matters under the adequacy decision are insufficient; notes that these issues are largely left to the discretion of companies, which can select alternative remedy avenues such as dispute resolution mechanisms or the use of companies’ privacy programmes;
Amendment 71 #
Paragraph 8
8. Points outNotes that, unlike all other third countries that have received an adequacy decision under the GDPR, the US still does not have a federal data protection law; points out that the EO is not clear, precise or foreseeable some questions remain witsh regards to the application, as it can be amended at any time by the US President; is therefore concerned about the absence of a sunset clause which could provide that the decision would automatically expire four years after its nd effectiveness of the EO; underlines that the adequacy decision would be subject to continuous review, taking into account legal and practical developmentrys into force the US;
Amendment 86 #
Paragraph 11
11. Concludes that the EU-US Data Privacy Framework fails to create actual equivalence in the level of protectionquestions remain with regards to the EU-US Data Privacy Framework; calls on the Commission to clarify and if necessary continue negotiations with its US counterparts with the aim of creating a mechanism that wouldin order to ensure such equivalence and which would provide thean adequate level of protection of personal data as required by Union data protection law and the Charter as interpreted by the CJEU; urges the Commission not to adopt the adequacy finding;