27 Amendments of Jaak MADISON related to 2018/0902R(NLE)
Amendment 2 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 1
Paragraph 1
1. Expresses deep concern about the deliberate and systematic efforts of the Hungarian Government to undermine the founding values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU, in particular through the removal of the constitutional checks and balances, by the limitation of the independence of the judiciary, by intentional alteratirection to which the whole European Union is heading due to unfounded and politically motivated attacks against the Member States, which oppose the mainstream visions of the national electoral system and by hampering freedom of expression; highlights that these trends have substantially worseneEU as an ever closer federal supra-national state, and defend the sovereignty and since the triggering of Article 7(1) TEU and have been severely amplified by the COVID-19 crisidependence of the Member States;
Amendment 2 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 1
Citation 1
— having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and in particular Articles 2, 5(3) and 7(1) thereof,
Amendment 5 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)
Citation 6 a (new)
— having regard to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
Amendment 9 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Deplores the fact that theRegards that constitutional balance inchanges that Hungary has continued to be significantly altered by a deliberately broad and instrumental use of cardinal laws and constitutional amendments aiming to entrench the issues which are to beapproved during the last decade are a regsulated by ordinary legislation, with no or lt of a legitimiated public consultation, in use of a govery expedient manner, without any effective involvement of the opposition or civil society; highlights that such a trend is contrary to the rule of law, to constitutional traditions and to principles common to Member States and has been a source of open and consistent criticism by the EU and by the Council of Europe institutions; denounces the excessive use of extraordinary powers with the declaration of the state of danger at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemicning majority received in democratic elections, if and to the extent to which the Hungarian Constitutional Court has upheld them or, at any rate, not questioned them constitutionally;
Amendment 19 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Expresses concern about the steps the Hungarian Government has taken to further limit the independenceRecalls that the fact that the Hungarian Government relies ofn the judiciary, in particular by weakening the powers of the National Judicial Council, which damages mutual trust in the EU, as national judges are judges of first instance of EU law and guarantee equality between EU citizens; highlights, furthermore, that the Hungarian Government increasingly relies on the Hungarian Constitutional Court to avoid compliance with the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), thereby undermining the primacy of EU lawHungarian Constitutional Court without seeking compliance with the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is legitimate use of state sovereignty, which is in compliance with the EU treaties; further recalls that the principle of primacy of EU law has no basis in the EU treaties except for the normative ambiguous Declaration 17 to the Treaty on European Union;
Amendment 19 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B
Recital B
B. whereas any clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State or by the EU institutions of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU does not concern solely the individual Member State or institution where the risk materialises but has an impact on the other Member States and the entire EU, on mutual trust between them and between them and the EU, on the very nature of the Unionlatter and its Member States’ and citizens’ fundamental rights under Union law;
Amendment 20 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital B a (new)
Recital B a (new)
Ba. whereas Article 5(3) of the Treaty on the European Union states that ‘under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States’;
Amendment 21 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital C
Recital C
C. whereas the scope of Article 7 TEU is not confined to the obligations under the Treaties, as in Article 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and whereas the Union can assess the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach of the common values in areas falling under Member States’ competencesclearly sets out the infringement procedure against a Member State where there is a clear risk of the EU values set out in Article 2 TEU being violated;
Amendment 24 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Insists that the Council’s constitutional obligation to organise hearings, enshrined in Article 7(1) TEU, should be implemented in an open, regular and structured manner; insists that in all proceedings related to Article 7 TEU, Parliament and the Commission shoulEU institutions terminate proceedings under Article 7(1) TEU due to the fact that it results in interference in internal affairs of a sovereign and independent state, which is contrary to public international law; recalls that according to the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co- operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted bey treated equally; calls on the Council to systematically provide the Member State concerned with recommendations, and to oversee the implementation thereof on a regular basis, following the hearings under Article 7 TEU; he UN General Assembly on 24 October 1970 (resolution 26/25 (XXV))1a, "[n]o state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state", and that "interference or attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international law"; _________________ 1a https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/3dda1f 104.pdf
Amendment 27 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital D
Recital D
D. whereas for several years the situation in Hungary has not been addressed and many concerns remain, and in the meantime many new issues have arisen, which is having a negative impact on the image of the Union, as well as its effectiveness and credibility in the defence of fundamental rights, human rights and democracy globally, and revealing the need to addrdespite the many visits, hearings, statements and resolutions of the last few years, the assessment of the situation in Hungary, critical as it may be, has not provided good reason to continue this procedure; and whereas the European institutions have, however, often used the debates on respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights as a pretext to put political pressure on a number of Member Statess them through concerted Union actiono change policies that fall within national competences;
Amendment 29 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital E
Recital E
E. whereas following the ad hoc delegation of its Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs to Budapest, Hungary, from 29 September to 1 October 2021, the majority of the members of the delegation, who had prejudices and were political biased on arrival in Hungary, still have serious concerns about democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the country; whereas the delegation, based on nothing other than vague and unsubstantiated ‘concerns’ and ‘worries’ primarily rooted in their own political assessment, that same majority has concluded that the situation has not improved since 2018, but has instead deteriorated;
Amendment 32 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital F
Recital F
F. whereas on 20 July 2021, for example, the Commission indicated in the country chapter on Hungary of the 2021 Rule of Law Report that the transparency and quality of the legislative process remain a source of ‘concern’, althoughdespite the fact that an amendment to the constitution will limit the powers of government as regards the ‘state of danger’ regime after July 2023; whereas ‘concerns’ have been expressed about newly established private trusts receiving significant public funding, managed by board members said to be close to the current government; whereas such accusations do not reflect an objective view of the situation and raise serious concerns about the report’s concept, methodology and sources, as it seems to apply ‘double standards’ when dealing with Hungary in comparison to other Member States;
Amendment 37 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital G
Recital G
G. whereas in its resolution of 17 April 2020 on EU coordinated action to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences4, Parliament deemed totally incompatible with European values the Hungarian Government’s decision to prolong the state of emergency indefinitely, to authorise its; whereas the government nevertheless only used extraordinary powers when required and proportionatelfy to rule by decree without a time limit, and to weaken the emergency oversight of the Hungarian Parliamentprevent, tackle and eradicate the COVID-19 epidemic and to prevent and tackle the adverse effects thereof, and that the Hungarian Parliament dealt with this situation in due manner; whereas in its opinion on the 2020 Convergence Programme of Hungary of 20 July 2020, the Council recommended ensuring that any emergency measures be strictly proportionate, limited in time and in line with European and international standards, that they do not interfere with business activities and the stability of the regulatory environment, and the effective involvement of social partners and stakeholders in the policy-making process; whereas such situations, in whole or in part, have also occurred in many other Member States and should be subject to equally thorough investigations; _________________ 4 OJ C 316, 6.8.2021, p. 2.
Amendment 39 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 7
Paragraph 7
7. InsistsPoints out that legitimacy of the EU’s action on the rule of law needs to be underpinned by a coherent, effective and visible EU annual rule of law monitoring cycle, which should also integrate procedures under Article 7 TEU and under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; calls on the Council and the Commission to respond without delay to Parliament’s requests to negotiate an interinstitutional agreement under Article 295 TFEU framing such a mechanism suffers from actions that create tensions and erode unity between the Member States e.g. from procedures under Article 7 TEU and under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; calls on the Council and the Commission to terminate aforementioned proceedings;
Amendment 45 #
Draft opinion
Paragraph 8
Paragraph 8
8. Takes note of the recent parliamentary elections in Hungary and insists that any Hungarian government elected remains responsible for eliminating the risk of serious breaches of EU values.totally respects their legitimate and democratic outcome;
Amendment 49 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital H
Recital H
H. whereas on 20 July 2021, the Commission indicated in the country chapter on Hungary of the 2021 Rule of Law Report that the Hungarian justice system performs well in terms of the length of proceedings and has a high level of digitalisation, and that the gradual increase in the salaries of judges and prosecutors continues; whereas, as regards judicial independence, the justice system has been subject to new developments adding to existing concerns: the new rules allowing for the appointment of members of the Constitutional Court to the Supreme Court (Kúria) outside the normal procedure have been put into practice and have enabled the election of the new Kúria President, whose position was also endowed with additional powers and who was elected despite an unfavourable opinion from the National Judicial Council (NJC); whereas the recommendation to strengthen judicial independence, made in the context of the European Semester, remains unaddressed, including the need to formally reinforce the powers of the independent NJC to enable it to counterbalance the powers of the President of the National Office for the Judiciary; whereas the Commission's 2021 report thus applies ‘double standards’ and the discrimination against Hungary is clear when its chapter is compared with those on the other Member States; whereas this is the case on the topic of judicial independence, as similar issues exist in other Member States and even in the EU institutions;
Amendment 62 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital I
Recital I
I. whereas on 20 July 2021, the Commission indicated in the country chapter on Hungary of the 2021 Rule of Law Report that the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy is ongoing, butthe Commission's report applies ‘double standards’ as the discrimination against Hungary is clear when its chapter its scope remains limited, and shortcomings persist as regards political pmpared with those on the other Member States, for example with Hungarty financing, lobbying and ‘revolving doors’; whereas risks of clientelism, favouritism and nepotism in high-level public administration, as well as risks arising from the link betweenobtaining one of the top indictment rates on the buasinesses and political actors, remain unaddressed, independent control mechanisms remain insufficient for detecting corruption, and concerns remain regarding the lack of systematic checks and insufficient oversight of asset and interest declarationss of OLAF's recommendations, with a result of 67%, which is almost twice as high as the EU average; whereas new criminal law provisions aim to address foreign bribery and informal payments in healthcare; whereas while the indictment rate for corruption cases is high, and some new high-level corruption cases have been opened since 2020, the track record for the investigation of allegations concerning high-level officials and their immediate circle remains limited;
Amendment 71 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital K
Recital K
Amendment 86 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas on 20 July 2021, the Commission indicated in the country chapter on Hungary of the 2021 Rule of Law Report that media pluralism remains at risk and that concerns persist with regard to the independence and effectiveness of the Media Authority, also in the light of the Media Council’s decisions leading to independent radio station Klubrádió being taken off air; whereas while no media support schemes were established to counter the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on news media outlets, significant amounts of state advertising have continued to permit the government to exert indirect political influence over the media; whereas access to public information was tightened through emergency measures introduced during the pandemic, making timely access to such information harder for independent media outlets; whereas, in the public sphere especially, also remains at risk there and that independent media outlets and journalists continue to face obstruction and intimidation;
Amendment 89 #
Motion for a resolution
Recital L
Recital L
L. whereas on 20 July 2021, the Commission indicated in the country chapter on Hungary of the 2021 Rule of Law Report that media pluralism remains at risk and that concerns persist with regard to the independence and effectiveness of the Media Authority, also in the light of the Media Council’s decisions leading to independent radio station Klubrádió being taken off air; whereas while no media support schemes were established to counter the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on news media outlets, significant amounts of state advertising have continued to permit the government to exert indirect political influence over the media; whereas access to public information was tightened through emergency measures introduced during the pandemic, making timely access to such information harder for independent media outlets; whereas independent media outlets and journalists continue to face obstruction and intimidation;
Amendment 178 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph -1 (new)
Paragraph -1 (new)
-1. Recalls, first and foremost, that Hungary, just like every Member State, has its own national identity and constitutional traditions that are in line with European values and must always be treated with respect, objectivity and consideration for the principle of equality; underlines that the rule of law is a fundamental value for all Member States; expresses concern that the abuse of the concept of the rule of law for political aims destroys mutual trust and sincere cooperation between Member States;
Amendment 183 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 – introductory part
Paragraph 1 – introductory part
1. Reiterates, as a general remark, that the concerns of Parliament relate to the following issues in Hungarywith regard to the rule of law relate in particular to:
Amendment 214 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 2
2. Believes that, taken together, the facts and trends mentioned in Parliament’s resolutions represent a systemic threat to the values of Article 2 TEU and constitute a clear risk of a serCommits, in these areas and within the limits of the powers conferred on it by the Treaties, to apply the same criteria used in its previous breach thereof; expresses regret that the lack of decisive EU action has contributed to turning Hungary into hybrid regime of electoral autocracy, according to the relevant indiceslevant resolutions to all Member States and to the EU institutions with the same stringency;
Amendment 215 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 3
Paragraph 3
3. Strongly regrets the inability of the Council to make meaningful progress in the ongoing Article 7(1) TEU procedure; urges the Council to ensure that hearings take place at a minimum once per Presidency during ongoing Article 7 TEU procedures and also address new developments affecting the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights; calls on the Council to publish comprehensive minutes after each hearing; emphasises that there is no need for unanimity in the Council either to identify a clear risk of a serious breach of Union values under Article 7(1), or to address concrete recommendations to the Member States in question and provide deadlines for the implementation of those recommendations; reiterates its call for the Council to do so, underlining that any further delay to such action would amount to a breach of the rule of law principle by the Council itself; calls on the Council to issue recommendations to Hungary as soon as possible in order to remedy the issues mentioned in its resolution of 12 September 2018 and in the present resolution, asking it to implement all the judgments and recommendations mentioned; insists that Parliament’s role and competences be duly respectedNotes that, according to the Treaties, the Council is the competent institution to conduct Article 7 procedures and, in the spirit of mutual trust, shall defer to its decision at the end of its examination;
Amendment 224 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 4
4. Calls on the Commission to make full use of the tools available to address the clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded, in particular expedited infringement procedures, applications for interim measures before the Court of Justice and actions regarding non- implementation of the Court’s judgments; recalls the importance of the Rule of Law C, pending that decision, to refrain from using the rule of law conditionality regulation or any other tool to exert pressure on Hungary in the handling of specific cases in areas of national competence; notes with regret that this conditionality Rregulation and welcomes the decision to trigger it in the case of Hungary, albeit after a long delay and with a limited scope; callsime would otherwise become another political sanctioning mechanism on top onf the Commission to take immediate action under the regulation as regards other breaches of the rule of law; notes the risk of misuse of funds under the Recovery and Resilience Facility and reiterates its call for the Commission to refrain from approval of the Hungarian planprocedures set out in Article 7, aimed primarily at providing means to circumvent the procedural requirements of unanimity embedded in the latter;
Amendment 228 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 4 a (new)
Paragraph 4 a (new)
4a. Believes that, taken together, the facts and trends show that the European mainstream is pushing for the creation of a supranational Europe that strips Member States of their independence and sovereignty and imposes a single ideology on them; this results in the values enshrined in Article 2 of the TEU being applied arbitrarily and politically motivated sanction mechanisms against Member States that do not agree with that course of action; stresses that this poses a systemic threat to European cooperation; expresses regret that Hungary has suffered ungrounded and politically motivated attacks for no other reason than the fact that it strongly defends sovereignty and the independence of Member States and the initial idea of European cooperation;
Amendment 230 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 5
5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the United Nations.