5 Amendments of Sven MIKSER related to 2020/2111(INI)
Amendment 84 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 1 a (new)
Paragraph 1 a (new)
1a. Warns that the crisis has highlighted EU vulnerabilities including in the field of security and defence and in particular in preparedness and responsiveness to CBRN, cyberattacks and disinformation;
Amendment 415 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Underlines the important role of the armed forces during the COVID-19 pandemic and bwelcomes military assistance to civil support operations, notably for the deployment of field hospitals, patient transport, equipment delivery and distribution; Believes that a more in-depth joint operation and coordination of member states’ armed forces within existing frameworks - such as the European Medical Command - or within new frameworks - such as military hospital trains - could lead to greater efficiency and contribute to the EU’s preparedness to fight pandemics; recencourages the setting up of European mechanisms aimed at facilitating the cross-border use of military lognises the need to review the EU’s security and defence strategies to developtical capabilities to face such emergencies, in order to allow for greater coordination, synergy, solidarity and support; supports the EU’s security and defence new initiatives, aiming inter alia at developing the Union’s strategic autonomy, to become better prepared and more resilient to the new and hybrid threats and technologies that have made the nature of warfare less conventional and challenge the traditional role of the military, as well as for a future in which Russia and China and other players, are becoming more assertive; stresses that the future Strategic Compass on security and defence which will present a joint threat assessment should reflect these developments and take account of the broader potential geopolitical implications of COVID-19; believes that, given the new political balance and a potential worsening of the int the budget allocated to EU defence initiatives, notably military mobility, which focus on increasing interoperability would be of great added value in case of future crisis, and the European Defence Fund must meet the EU ambition in the defence area; stresses the need to increase the EU CBRN preparedness ; commands the continuity of the CSDP missions and opernational security environment following COVID-19, the EU defence budgets must not be cus despite the very challenging environment ; suggests to assess the budget, planning and equipment of EU CSDP missions and operations in the light of the COVID-19 lessons learnt;
Amendment 433 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Notes that the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that the emerging Strategic Compass on European Defence needs to take account of the broader geopolitical implications of COVID-19 and to address the full spectrum of threats such as a new pandemic, CBRN, foreign interference, including disinformation or cyber-attacks that are not deterred by borders; urges the EEAS to work on the resilience and sustainability of CSDP missions and operations during crises like the COVID-19 pandemic; insists on the importance of maintaining the continuity of CSDP missions and operations in such context; Calls for a full review of the impact of COVID-19 on the preparedness, readiness, force generation, safety of personnel and continuity of CSDP Operations and Missions, in order to ensure the EU’s operational presence and effectiveness is not affected by the crisis or future similar scenarios;
Amendment 440 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19 a (new)
Paragraph 19 a (new)
19a. Underlines that closer cooperation in preventing and countering cyberattacks is also essential in these particularly vulnerable times; calls for strong coordination with and support from the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) in this respect;
Amendment 452 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 20
Paragraph 20
20. Calls for the expansion and modernisation of EU strategic communication strategies, based on the promotion of facts about the EU responses and scientific evidence, so that EU action is sufficiently visible both within and beyond the EU; urges the European External Action Service (EEAS) to further strengthen its capacities to proactively counter disinformation, including the creation of a dedicated far- East Strat Com Task Force focused on the disinformation emanating from China, and imposing costs on countries that deliberately spread disinformation to divide and harm the EU and its Member States;