[ParlTrack]

Billy KELLEHER, Nils TORVALDS, Nicolae ŞTEFĂNUȚĂ, Stéphanie YON-COURTIN, Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, Olivier CHASTEL, Luis GARICANO, Mauri PEKKARINEN, Gilles BOYER

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 4 a (new)

(4a) The Steering Board should set specific geographical concentration limits for the solvency support window, in line with the indicators and methodology established by the Commission, in order to ensure, respectively, that the majority of the EU guarantee under the Solvency Support Instrument supports eligible companies in Member States and sectors which have been economically most adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and that the majority of that guarantee supports eligible companies in Member States where the possibility of State solvency support is most limited. The indicators and methodology established by the Commission should be consistent with the allocation key applicable to the Recovery and Resilience Facility1a.The limits shall be reviewed on a regular basis and updated to reflect any evolving COVID-19 economic impacts and/or subsequent waves of the virus. _________________ 1aCouncil Regulation []establishing a European Union Recovery Instrument to support the recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic

2020/08/27
Committee: BUDG ECON

Nils TORVALDS, Billy KELLEHER, Nicolae ŞTEFĂNUȚĂ, Olivier CHASTEL, Luis GARICANO, Stéphanie YON-COURTIN, Mauri PEKKARINEN, Gilles BOYER

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 10

(10) The financing and investment operations should be fully aligned with current policy priorities and targets of the Union such as the European Green Deal and the Strategy on shaping Europe’s digital future. Support to cross-border activities should also be targeted.

2020/08/27
Committee: BUDG ECON

Billy KELLEHER, Nils TORVALDS, Nicolae ŞTEFĂNUȚĂ, Stéphanie YON-COURTIN, Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, Olivier CHASTEL, Luis GARICANO, Mauri PEKKARINEN, Gilles BOYER

Proposal for a regulation
Recital 14 a (new)

(14a) Support granted under the solvency support window should include provisions to ensure that efforts to curb tax avoidance, money laundering, fraud and abuse are pursued and that proper functioning of the internal market is maintained. As such, entities benefitting from support, or financial intermediaries or approved eligible vehicles carrying out projects under the solvency support window shall not be established, incorporated, or be controlled by shareholders in jurisdictions listed under the relevant Union policy on non- cooperative jurisdictions, or jurisdictions identified as high-risk third countries that have strategic deficiencies in their national anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing regimes, pursuant to Directive (EU) 2015/849. The EIB should regulatory report to the European Parliament and Council on the continuous measures being taken to detect and prevent fraud.

2020/08/27
Committee: BUDG ECON

Billy KELLEHER, Nils TORVALDS, Nicolae ŞTEFĂNUȚĂ, Stéphanie YON-COURTIN, Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, Olivier CHASTEL, Luis GARICANO, Mauri PEKKARINEN, Gilles BOYER

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

Regulation (EU) 2015/1017
Article 3 – paragraph 1 – point c

(c) the solvency of companies established in a Member State and operating in the Union that have been adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.

2020/08/27
Committee: BUDG ECON

Billy KELLEHER, Nils TORVALDS, Nicolae ŞTEFĂNUȚĂ, Stéphanie YON-COURTIN, Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, Olivier CHASTEL, Luis GARICANO, Mauri PEKKARINEN, Gilles BOYER

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 4

Regulation (EU) 2015/1017
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3 – indent 3

– support to funds, special purpose vehicles, investment platforms or other arrangements under the solvency support window. , especially those facilitating investment in Member States and sectors most adversely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.

2020/08/27
Committee: BUDG ECON

Billy KELLEHER, Nils TORVALDS, Nicolae ŞTEFĂNUȚĂ, Stéphanie YON-COURTIN, Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, Olivier CHASTEL, Luis GARICANO, Mauri PEKKARINEN, Gilles BOYER

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27

Regulation (EU) 2015/1017
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 (new)

Operations under the solvency support window shall be reported on separately, as appropriate and as set out in the guarantee agreement. and shall additionally include:

2020/08/27
Committee: BUDG ECON

Billy KELLEHER, Nils TORVALDS, Nicolae ŞTEFĂNUȚĂ, Stéphanie YON-COURTIN, Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, Olivier CHASTEL, Luis GARICANO, Mauri PEKKARINEN, Gilles BOYER

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 b (new)

Regulation (EU) 2015/1017
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point a (new)

(27b) In the second subparagraph of Article 16(2), the following point is added: ‘(a) a description of the measures taken to detect and prevent fraudulent practices and money-laundering in the investment chain of the EIB investment operations in accordance with Article 21;’

2020/08/27
Committee: BUDG ECON

Billy KELLEHER, Nils TORVALDS, Nicolae ŞTEFĂNUȚĂ, Stéphanie YON-COURTIN, Olivier CHASTEL, Luis GARICANO, Mauri PEKKARINEN, Gilles BOYER

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 c (new)

Regulation (EU) 2015/1017
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point b (new)

(27c) In the second subparagraph of Article 16(2), the following point is added: ‘(b) an assessment of the compliance with and contribution to the European Green Deal and the commitments under the Paris Agreement;’

2020/08/27
Committee: BUDG ECON

Billy KELLEHER, Nils TORVALDS, Nicolae ŞTEFĂNUȚĂ, Stéphanie YON-COURTIN, Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, Olivier CHASTEL, Luis GARICANO, Mauri PEKKARINEN, Gilles BOYER

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 27 d (new)

Regulation (EU) 2015/1017
Article 16 – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 2 – point c (new)

(27d) In the second subparagraph of Article 16(2), the following point is added: ‘(c) an assessment of the contribution to the digital transformation of the Union economy.’

2020/08/27
Committee: BUDG ECON

Billy KELLEHER, Nils TORVALDS, Nicolae ŞTEFĂNUȚĂ, Stéphanie YON-COURTIN, Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, Olivier CHASTEL, Luis GARICANO, Mauri PEKKARINEN, Gilles BOYER

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point 3

Regulation (EU) 2015/1017
Annex II – Section 6 – point d – indent 3

– The funds, special purpose vehicles or investment platforms shall provide financing on commercial terms or on terms consistent with the State aid Temporary Framework12 , while paying due regard to the European nature of the Solvency Support Instrument and to the funds’ and other vehicles’ independent management. Member States involved in the funds, special purpose vehicles or investment platforms shall do so in accordance with the requirements in Annex III of this Regulation. _________________ 12Communication from the Commission: Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak (C(2020)1863), as amended by C(2020) 3156 final.

2020/08/27
Committee: BUDG ECON

Nils TORVALDS, Billy KELLEHER, Nicolae ŞTEFĂNUȚĂ, Luis GARICANO, Stéphanie YON-COURTIN, Mauri PEKKARINEN, Gilles BOYER

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 – point 3

Regulation (EU) 2015/1017
Annex II – Section 6 – point d – intend 5

– Companies targeted by funds, special purpose vehicles or investment platforms shall be encouraged to comply, to the extent possible, with minimum high- level social and environmental safeguards in line with guidance provided by the Steering Board. Such guidance should include adequate provisions for avoiding undue administrative burdens, taking into account the size of companies and including lighter provisions for SMEs. Companies with a certain level of exposure to a pre-defined list of environmentally harmful activities, in particular the sectors covered by the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), shall ~~be encouraged to put in place, in the future,~~put in place green transition plans. Companies shall also be strongly encouraged to advance in their digital transformation. Technical assistance shall be available to assist companies for the purpose of these transitions.

2020/08/27
Committee: BUDG ECON

Billy KELLEHER, Nils TORVALDS, Nicolae ŞTEFĂNUȚĂ, Stéphanie YON-COURTIN, Ondřej KOVAŘÍK, Olivier CHASTEL, Luis GARICANO, Mauri PEKKARINEN, Gilles BOYER

Proposal for a regulation
Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 31 a (new)

Regulation (EU) 2015/1017
Annex III (new)

(31a) The following Annex is added: ‘ANNEX III REQUIREMENTS UNDER WHICH MEMBER STATES MAY PROVIDE SUPPORT UNDER THE SOLVENCY SUPPORT WINDOW (1) General Principles - The State shall receive appropriate remuneration for the investment. The closer the remuneration is to market terms, the lower the potential competition distortion caused by the State intervention. - The COVID-19 recapitalisation should be redeemed when the economy stabilises. The Member State must put a mechanism in place to gradually incentivise redemption. - The remuneration of the solvency support should be increased in order to converge with market prices to provide an incentive to the beneficiary and to the other shareholders to redeem the State recapitalisation measure and to minimise the risk of distortions of competition. - As an alternative to the remuneration methodologies set out below, Member States may notify schemes or individual measures where the remuneration methodology is adapted in accordance with the features and seniority of the capital instrument provided they overall lead to a similar outcome with regard to the incentive effects on the exit of the State and a similar overall impact on the State’s remuneration. (2) Remuneration of equity instruments - A capital injection by the State, or an equivalent intervention, shall be conducted at a price that does not exceed the average share price of the beneficiary over the 15 days preceding the request for the capital injection. If the beneficiary is not a publicly listed company, an estimate of its market value should be established by an independent expert or by other proportionate means. - Any recapitalisation measure shall include a step-up mechanism increasing the remuneration of the State, to incentivise the beneficiary to buy back the State capital injections. This increase in remuneration can take the form of additional shares granted to the State or other mechanisms, and should correspond to a minimum of 10 % increase in the remuneration of the State (for the participation resulting from the State’s COVID-19 equity injection that has not been repaid), for each of the step-up steps: (a) Four years after the solvency support equity injection, if the State has not sold at least 40 percent of its equity participation resulting from the COVID- 19 equity injection, the step-up mechanism will be activated. (b) Six years after the solvency support equity injection, if the State has not sold in full its equity participation resulting from the State’s solvency support equity injection, the step-up mechanism will again be activated. If the beneficiary is not a publicly listed company, Member States may decide to implement each of the two steps one year later, i.e. five years and seven years after granting of the solvency support equity injection, respectively. - The Commission may accept alternative mechanisms, provided they overall lead to a similar outcome with regard to the incentive effects on the exit of the State and a similar overall impact on the State’s remuneration. - The beneficiary should, have at any time, the possibility to buy back the equity stake that the State has acquired. To ensure that the State receives appropriate remuneration for the investment, the buy- back price should be the higher amount of (i) the nominal investment by the State increased by an annual interest remuneration200 basis points higher than presented paragraph 66 of Commission Communication (2020/C 164/03)1a; or (ii) the market price at the moment of the buy-back. - As an alternative, the State may sell at any time its equity stake at market prices to purchasers other than the beneficiary. Such a sale requires, in principle, an open and non-discriminatory consultation of potential purchasers or a sale on the stock exchange. The State may give existing shareholders priority rights to buy at the price resulting from the public consultation. (3) Remuneration of hybrid capital instruments - The overall remuneration of hybrid capital instruments must adequately factor in the following elements: (a) the characteristics of the instrument chosen, including its level of subordination, risk and all modalities of payment; b) built-in incentives for exit (such as step-up and redemption clauses); and (c) an appropriate benchmark interest rate. - The minimum remuneration of hybrid capital instruments until they are converted into equity-like instruments shall be at least equal to the base rate (1 year IBOR or equivalent as published by the Commission1b), plus the premium as set out in paragraph 66 of Commission Communication (2020/C 164/03)1c . - The conversion of hybrid capital instruments into equity shall be conducted at 5percent or more below TERP (Theoretical Ex-Rights Price) at the time of the conversion. - After conversion into equity, a step-up mechanism must be included to increase the remuneration of the State, to incentivise the beneficiaries to buy back the State capital injections. If the equity resulting from the State’s solvency support intervention is still owned by the State two years after the conversion into equity the State shall receive an additional share of ownership of the beneficiary in addition to its remaining participation resulting from the State’s conversion of the solvency support hybrid capital instruments. This additional share of ownership shall be at a minimum 10 percent of the remaining participation resulting from the State’s conversion of the solvency support hybrid capital instruments. The Commission may accept alternative step-up mechanisms provided they have the same incentive effect and a similar overall impact on the State’s remuneration. - Member States may choose a pricing formula that includes additional step-up or pay back clauses. Such features should be designed so that they encourage an early end to the State’s recapitalisation support of the beneficiary. The Commission may also accept alternative pricing methodologies, provided they lead to remunerations that are higher than or similar to those resulting from the above methodology. - Since the nature of hybrid instruments varies significantly, the Commission does not provide guidance for all types of instruments. Hybrid instruments shall in any event follow the principles mentioned above, with remuneration reflecting the risk of the particular instruments. (4) Governance and prevention of undue distortions of competition - In order to prevent undue distortions of competition beneficiaries must not engage in aggressive commercial expansion financed by State aid or beneficiaries taking excessive risks. As a general principle, the smaller the equity stake of the Member State and the higher the remuneration, the less there is a need for safeguards. - If the beneficiary of solvency support above EUR 250 million is an undertaking with significant market power on at least one of the relevant markets in which it operates, Member States must propose additional measures to preserve effective competition in those markets. In proposing such measures, Member States may in particular offer structural or behavioural commitments foreseen in Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation(EC) No 802/2004. - Beneficiaries receiving solvency support are prohibited from advertising it for commercial purposes. - As long as at least 75 % of the solvency support has not been redeemed, beneficiaries other than SMEs shall be prevented from acquiring a more than 10 % stake in competitors or other operators in the same line of business, including upstream and downstream operations. - In exceptional circumstances, and without prejudice to merger control, such beneficiaries may acquire a more than10 % stake in operators upstream or downstream in their area of operation, only if the acquisition is necessary to maintain the beneficiary’s viability. The Commission may authorise the acquisition if it is necessary to maintain the beneficiary’s viability. The acquisition may not be implemented before the Commission has taken a decision on this issue. - State aid shall not be used to cross- subsidise economic activities of integrated undertakings that were in economic difficulties already on 31 December 2019. A clear account separation shall be put in place in integrated companies to ensure that the recapitalisation measure does not benefit those activities. - As long as the solvency support has not been fully redeemed, beneficiaries cannot make dividend payments, nor non- mandatory coupon payments, nor buy back shares, other than in relation to the State. - As long as at least 75 % of the solvency support has not been redeemed, the remuneration of each member of the beneficiaries’ management must not go beyond the fixed part of his/her remuneration on 31 December 2019. For persons becoming members of the management on or after the recapitalisation, the applicable limit is the lowest fixed remuneration of any of the members of the management on 31 December 2019.Under no circumstances, bonuses, other variable or comparable remuneration elements shall be paid. (5) Exit strategy of the State from the participation resulting from the recapitalisation and reporting obligations - Beneficiaries other than SMEs that have received solvency support of more than 25 % of equity at the moment of intervention must demonstrate a credible exit strategy for the participation of the Member State, unless the State’s intervention is reduced below the level of 25 % of equity within 12 months from the date of the granting of the support. - The exit strategy shall lay out: (a) the plan of the beneficiary on the continuation of its activity and the use of the funds invested by the State, including a payment schedule of the remuneration and of the redemption of the State investment(together ‘the repayment schedule’); and (b) the measures that the beneficiary and the State will take to abide by the repayment schedule. - The exit strategy should be prepared and submitted to the Member State within 12 months after support is granted and must to be endorsed by the Member State. - Beneficiaries must report to the Member State on the progress in the implementation of the repayment schedule and the compliance with the conditions in section (4) within 12 months of the schedule’s presentation, and thereafter periodically every 12 months. - The Member State should report to the Commission annually on the implementation of the repayment schedule and compliance with the conditions in section (4). - If six years after the solvency support the State’s intervention has not been reduced below 15 % of beneficiary’s equity, are structuring plan in accordance with the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines must be notified to the Commission for approval. The Commission will assess whether the actions contemplated in the restructuring plan ensure the beneficiary’s viability, also with a view of EU objectives and national obligations linked to the green and digital transformation, and the exit of the State without adversely affecting trade to an extent contrary to the common interest. If the beneficiary is not a publicly listed company, or is an SME, the Member State may decide to notify a restructuring plan only if the State’s intervention has not been reduced below the level of 15 % of equity seven years after the solvency support.’ _________________ 1aCommunication from the Commission on Amendment to the Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak (2020/C 164/03)(OJ C 164, 13.5.2020, p. 3–15) 1bBase rates calculated in accordance with the Communication from the Commission on the revision of the method for setting the reference and discount rates (OJ C 14, 19.1.2008, p. 6), published on the website of DG Competition at https://ec.europa.eu/ competition/state_aid/legislation/referenc e_rates.html 1cCommunication from the Commission on Amendment to the Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak (2020/C 164/03)(OJ C 164, 13.5.2020, p. 3–15)

2020/08/27
Committee: BUDG ECON

12 Amendments of Mauri PEKKARINEN related to 2020/0106(COD)

ParlTrack - 2011-2024