14 Amendments of Pedro MARQUES related to 2022/0406(COD)
Amendment 40 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 1
Recital 1
(1) To reinforce the attractiveness of SME growth markets and to reduce inequalities for companies seeking admission to trading in the single market, it is necessary to address obstacles to the access to such markets that stem from regulatory barriers. Companies should be able, subject to strong appropriate safeguards, to choose governance structures that suit best their development stage, including by enabling controlling shareholders of those companies to retain control of the business after accessing SME growth markets, while enjoying the benefits associated to trading on those markets, as long as the rights of minority shareholders continue to be safeguarded.
Amendment 42 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 2
Recital 2
(2) Fear of losing control over a company constitutes one of the maina deterrents for controlling shareholders to access SME growth markets. Admission to trading usually entails dilution of ownership for controlling shareholders, thus reducing their influence over important investment and operating decisions in the company. Maintaining control of the company may in particular be important for start-ups and companies with long-term projects that require significant upfront costs, because they may wish to pursue their vision without becoming too exposed to market fluctuations.
Amendment 47 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 3
Recital 3
(3) Multiple-vote share structures are an effective mechanism to enable controlling shareholders to retain decision- making power in a company, while raising funds from the public. Multiple-vote share structures are a form of a control enhancement mechanism involving at least two distinct classes of shares with a different number of voting rights. Under such structures, at least one of the classes of shares has a lower voting value than another class (or classes) of shares with voting rights. The share carrying the superior amount of votes is a multiple-vote share.
Amendment 63 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 10
Recital 10
(10) Due to a diminished voting power of non-controlling shareholders in the company relative to their investments, multiple-vote share structures may provide controlling shareholders of that company with perpetual control and thereby lead to controlling shareholder entrenchment. That may increase the risk that controlling shareholders extract private benefits from control. To address those risks, the adoption of multiple-vote share structures should be subject to harmonised safeguards to protect minority shareholders.
Amendment 66 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 11
Recital 11
(11) Member States that allow multiple- vote shares provide for safeguards to protect minority shareholders and the interests of the company. However, the existing safeguards vary between Member States due to national specificities and diverging company law systems. Having regard to the objectives of the internal market as set out in particular in Article 50(2), point (g) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, Member States should ensure a coordinated approach in their national laws on multiple-vote share structures with respect to the protection of the interests of minority shareholders and of the company. This includes protection against decisions creating risks for or resulting in adverse human rights, climate change, and environmental consequences. Under that coordinated approach, aAll Member States should ensure that any decision to adopt a multiple-vote share structure, or to modify that structure where there is an impact on voting rights, is taken by a qualified majority at the general shareholders’ meeting. Furthermore, Member States should limit the voting weight of multiple- vote shares by introducing restrictions either on the design of the multiple-vote share structure orand on the exercise of voting rights attached to multiple-vote shares for the adoption of certain decisions. The restriction on the exercise of voting rights may be implemented by requiring that an approval by qualified majority necessitates both a qualified majority of the votes cast at the general meeting of shareholders and of the share capital represented at the general meeting of shareholders.
Amendment 70 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 12
Recital 12
(12) Member States should be given discretionalso be required to introduce additional safeguards, where needed, to ensure adequate protection of minority shareholders’ interests and the interest of the company. Member States should assess the appropriateness of additional safeguards in light of their effectiveness in protecting the interests of minority shareholders and of the company, while, including a transfer-based sunset clause, a time-based sunset clause of five years, an event-based sunset clause, and a safeguard to ensuringe that such safeguards do not defeat the purpose of multiple-vote share structures, i.e. the possibility for a company’s controlling shareholders to influence important decisions, including the appointment of directorthe enhanced voting rights cannot be used to block the adoption of decisions by the general shareholders’ meeting concerning human rights and environmental issues related to the company’s operations.
Amendment 73 #
Proposal for a directive
Recital 13
Recital 13
(13) The disclosure of accurate, comprehensive and timely information about issuers strengthens investor confidence and allows for informed investment decision-making. Such informed investment decision-making enhances both investor protection and market efficiency. Member States should therefore require companies with multiple- vote share structures to publish detailed information on their share structure and corporate governance system at the moment of the admission to trading, as well as periodically in the annual financial report. Such information should mention whether there are any limitations on the holding of securities, including whether any transfer of securities requires the approval either of the company, or of other holders of securities. It should also mention whether there are any restrictions on voting rights, including limitations of the voting rights of holders of a given percentage or number of votes, deadlines for exercising voting rights, or systems whereby the financial rights attached to securities are separated from the holding of securities. Furthermore, those companies should disclose the identity of holders of multiple- vote shares as well as of the natural persons entitled to exercise voting rights on their behalf and of persons exercising special control rights to provide investors, as members of general public, with transparency on ultimate ownership and de facto influence on the company. This would allow investors to make informed decisions and thereby strengthen their confidence in well-functioning capital markets. Such information will need to be updated periodically and after significant changes in the ownership or control of the shares holding multiple voting rights.
Amendment 112 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point b – introductory part
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point b – introductory part
(b) limit the voting weight of multiple- vote shares on the exercise of other shareholders’ rights, in particular during general meetings, by introducing either of the following safeguards:
Amendment 113 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point b – point i
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point b – point i
(i) a maximum weighted voting ratio and a requirement on the maximum percentage of the outstanding share capital that the total amount of multiple- vote shares can representdifferential of one to five;
Amendment 121 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point b – point i a (new)
Article 5 – paragraph 1 – point b – point i a (new)
(i a) a requirement on the maximum percentage of the outstanding share capital that the total amount of multiple- vote shares can represent;
Amendment 140 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – introductory part
2. Member States mayshall also be required to provide for further safeguards to ensure adequate protection of shareholders and of the interests of the company. Those safeguards mayshall include in particular:
Amendment 147 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point a
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point a
(a) a provision to avoid that the enhanced voting rights attached to multiple-vote shares are transferred to third parties or continue to exist upon the death, incapacitation or retirement of the original holder of multiple-vote shares (transfer- based sunset clause);
Amendment 154 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point b
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point b
(b) a provision to avoid that the enhanced voting rights attached to multiple-vote shares continue to exist after a designated period of time (time-based sunset clause)five year period;
Amendment 161 #
Proposal for a directive
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point c
Article 5 – paragraph 2 – point c
(c) a provision to avoid that the enhanced voting rights attached to multiple-vote shares continue to exist upon the occurrence of a specified event (event- based sunset clause);