20 Amendments of Bettina VOLLATH related to 2017/0360R(NLE)
Amendment 1 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 6 a (new)
Citation 6 a (new)
- having regard to the Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (Istanbul Convention),
Amendment 10 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 20 a (new)
Citation 20 a (new)
- having regard to its resolution of 25 November 2019 on the Union’s accession to the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women 14a, _________________ 14a Texts adopted, P9_TA(2019)0080.
Amendment 11 #
Motion for a resolution
Citation 21 a (new)
Citation 21 a (new)
- having regard to its legislative resolution of 17 April 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Rights and Values programme 16a, _________________ 16a Texts adopted, P8_TA(2019)0407.
Amendment 53 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 6 a (new)
Paragraph 6 a (new)
6a. Reiterates its position as regards the budget envelope for the new Rights and Values Programme within the next Multiannual Financial Framework, and calls to ensure that adequate funding is provided for national and local civil society organizations to grow grassroots support for democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights in the Member States, including Poland;
Amendment 76 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 12
Paragraph 12
12. Is concerned that the new Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Matters of the Supreme Court (hereinafter the ‘Extraordinary Chamber’), which is composed in majority of judges nominated by the new National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ) and risks not to qualify as independent tribunal in the assessment of the CJEU, is to ascertain the validity of general and local elections and to examine electoral disputes; this raises serious concerns as regards the separation of powers and the functioning of Polish democracy, in that it makes judicial review of electoral disputes particularly vulnerable to political influence and is capable of creating legal uncertainty as to the validity of such review22 ; _________________ 22Venice Commission, Opinion of 8-9 December 2017, CDL-AD(2017)031, para. 43; Third Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1520 of 26 July 2017, para. 135.
Amendment 80 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 13
Paragraph 13
13. Is concerned, while recognising the extraordinary circumstances created by the COVID-19 health crisis, about the amendments to the electoral legislation being considered in the Polish parliament shortly before the presidential elections which change the practical organisation of the elections in order to proceed to a vote by postal services, which could impede the elections from taking a fair, secret and equal course, respectful of the right to privacy and Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council23 and which moreover run counter to the case law of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal; stresses, moreover, that it is very difficult to organise a genuine election campaign giving an equal share of attention and equal opportunities to all candidates and programmes and allowing for real public debate in the midst of an epidemic24 ; notes with concern that the elections, originally scheduled to be held on 10 May 2020, were eventually postponed without respecting formal legal requirements; _________________ 23Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1). 24OSCE/ODIHR, Opinion on the draft act on special rules for conducting the general election of the President of the Republic of Poland ordered in 2020 (Senate Paper No. 99), 27 April 2020.
Amendment 88 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 15
Paragraph 15
15. Recalls that the acts concerning the Constitutional Tribunal adopted on 22 December 2015 and 22 July 2016, as well as the package of three acts adopted at the end of 2016, seriously affected the Constitutional Tribunal’s independence and legitimacy and were therefothat the first two acts were declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal on respectively 9 March 2016 and 11 August 2016; recalls that those judgments were not published at the time nor implemented by the Polish authorities; seriously deplores the lack of independent and effective constitutional review in Poland since the entry into force of the aforementioned legislative changes25 ; invites the Commission to consider launching an infringement procedure in relation to the legislation on the Constitutional Tribunal; _________________ 25 Venice Commission Opinion of 14-15 October 2016, para. 128; UN, Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of Poland, 31 October 2016, paras 7-8; Commission Recommendation (EU) 2017/1520.
Amendment 91 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 16
Paragraph 16
16. Recalls that, already in 2017, changes in the method of nomination of candidates to the position of the First President of the Supreme Court deprived the participation of the Supreme Court judges in the selection procedure of any meaningful effect and put the decision in the hands of the President of the Republic; denounces that recent amendments to the act on the Supreme Court even further reduce the participation of the judges in the process of selection of the First President of the Supreme Court by introducing a position of First President ad interim appointed by the President of the Republic and by reducing the quorum in the third round to 32 out of 120 judges only, thereby effectively abandoning the model of power-sharing between the President and the judicial community enshrined in Article 183(3) of the Polish Constitution26 ; notes with concern the irregularities surrounding the nomination of the First President ad interim and his further actions; notes that, on 25 May 2020, the President of the Republic of Poland did not choose the candidate with the largest support among the Supreme Court judges as First President of the Supreme Court; _________________ 26Venice Commission and DGI of the Council of Europe, Urgent Joint Opinion of 16 January 2020, CDL-PI(2020)002, paras 51-55.
Amendment 102 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 19
Paragraph 19
19. Recalls that, in 2017, two new chambers within the Supreme Court were created, namely the Disciplinary Chamber and the Extraordinary Chamber, which were staffed with newly appointed judges selected by the new NCJ and entrusted with special powers – including the power of the Extraordinary Chamber to quash final judgments taken by lower courts or by the Supreme Court itself by way of extraordinary review, and the power of the Disciplinary Chamber to discipline other (Supreme Court) judgejudges of the Supreme Court and of common courts, creating de facto a “Supreme Court within the Supreme Court”;30 _________________ 30OSCE-ODIHR, Opinion of 13 November 2017, p. 7-20; Venice Commission, Opinion of 8-9 December 2017, para. 43; Recommendation (EU) 2018/103, para. 25; GRECO, Addendum to the Fourth Round Evaluation Report on Poland (Rule 34) of 18-22 June 2018, para. 31; Venice Commission and DGI of the Council of Europe, Urgent Joint Opinion of 16 January 2020, para. 8.
Amendment 106 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 21
Paragraph 21
21. Notes that the referring Supreme Court (Labour Chamber) subsequently concluded in its judgment of 5 December 2019 that the Disciplinary Chamber does not fulfil the requirements of an independent and impartial tribunal, and that the Supreme Court (Civil, Criminal and Labour Chambers) adopted a resolution on 23 January 2020 reiterating that the Disciplinary Chamber is not a court due to its lack of independence and therefore its decisions shall be considered null and void; notes with grave concern that the Polish authorities have declared that those decisions are of no legal significance when it comes to the continuing functioning of the Disciplinary Chamber and the NCJ, and that the Constitutional Tribunal has ‘suspended’ the resolution of 23 January 2020, creating a dangerous judiciary duality in Poland and moreover openly defying the primacy of Union law and the status granted to the CJEU by Article 19(1) TEU in that it limits the effectiveness and application of the CJEU’s ruling of 19 November 201932 ; _________________ 32Venice Commission and DGI of the Council of Europe, Urgent Joint Opinion of 16 January 2020, para. 38.
Amendment 112 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 24
Paragraph 24
24. Recalls that the Supreme Court (Labour Chamber), implementing the criteria set out by the CJEU in its judgment of 19 November 2019, found in its judgment of 5 December 2019 and in its decisions of 15 and 23 January 2020 that the decisive role of the new NCJ in the selection of the judges of the newly created Disciplinary Chamber undermines the latter’s independence and impartiality; is concerned about the legal status of the judges appointed or promoted by the NCJ in its current composition and about the impact their participation in adjudicating may have on the validity and legality of proceedings;
Amendment 114 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 25
Paragraph 25
25. Recalls that the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) suspended the new NCJ on 17 September 2018 for reason of no longer fulfilling the requirements of being independent of the executive and legislature and is now considering expelling the new NCJ entirelyhas initiated the expulsion procedure in April 202035 ; _________________ 35 ENCJ, Letter of 21 February 2020 by the ENCJ Executive Board. See as well the letter of 4 May 2020 by the European Association of Judges in support of the ENCJ.
Amendment 116 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 26
Paragraph 26
26. Calls on the Commission to start infringement proceedings against the act of 12 May 2011 on the NCJ as amended in 2017 and to ask the CJEU to suspend the activities of the new NCJ by way of interim measures;
Amendment 126 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 29 a (new)
Paragraph 29 a (new)
29a. Expresses concern regarding the disciplinary proceedings initiated against common court judges in reference to their judicial decisions or public statements in defence of judicial independence;
Amendment 139 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 34
Paragraph 34
34. Is concerned about reports alleging undue delays in court proceedings, difficulties in accessing legal assistance during arrest, and instances of insufficient respect for the confidentiality of communication between counsel and client44 ; calls on the Commission to closely monitor the situation of lawyers in Poland; reminds of the right of all citizens to being advised, defended and represented by an independent lawyer according to Article 48 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; _________________ 44UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of Poland, 23 November 2016, para. 33.
Amendment 150 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36
Paragraph 36
36. Recalls that in its resolution of 14 September 2016, Parliament has expressed its concern about already adopted and newly suggested changes to Polish media law; repeats its call on the Commission to carry out an assessment of the legislation adopted as regards its compatibility with Union Law, in particular, regarding the with Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Union legislation on public media;
Amendment 151 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 36 a (new)
Paragraph 36 a (new)
36a. Recalls that, in its resolution of 16 January 2020, Parliament has called on the Council to address in the hearings under Article 7(1) of the TEU any new developments in the field of freedom of expression, including media freedom; condemns cases of censoring content by the public broadcasters in Poland;
Amendment 227 #
46. Recalls its stance expressed in its resolution of 18 December 2019, when it strongly denounced any discrimination against LGBTI people and the violation of their fundamental rights by public authorities, including hate speech by public authorities and elected officials, in the context of elections, the banning of and inadequate protection against attacks on Pride marches and awareness-raising programmes, as well as the declarations of zones in Poland free from so-called ‘LGBT ideology’, and called on the Commission to strongly condemn such public discrimination;
Amendment 234 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 47
Paragraph 47
47. Notes that the lack of independence of the judiciary in Poland has already started affecting mutual trust between Poland and other Member States, especially in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, given that national courts have refused to or hesitated to release Polish suspects under the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) procedure due to profound doubts about the independence of the Polish judiciary; points out that mutual trust between the Member States can be restored only once respect for the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is ensured;
Amendment 252 #
Motion for a resolution
Paragraph 50
Paragraph 50
50. Calls on the Commission to make full use of the tools available to it, to address a clear risk of a serious breach by Poland of the values on which the Union is founded, in particular expedited infringement procedures and applications for interim measures before the CJEU, as well as budgetary tools; strongly supports the Commission’s approach on inclusion of rule of law conditionality in the future Multiannual Financial Framework; calls on the Commission to continue to keep Parliament regularly informed and closely involved;